


THE CASE OF LUDWIG FEUERBACH — PART II

by Lyn Marcus

[The original text is found in the January, 1974, issue of *The Campaigner*. During scanning, only those occasional spelling "errors," which were obviously unintentional, were corrected. A so-called "spelling error" which was potentially intentional was left alone, and no other proof-reading corrections have been made. For reference purposes, page numbers, breaking at the first paragraph appearing on even numbered pages from the original text, are in brackets.]



3. THE CONTRADICTION IN FEUERBACH'S DISCOVERY

The most important conspicuous and direct evidence which **leads toward** identification of his general blunder in epistemology is Feuerbach's failure, or **refusal**, to destroy the self-alienation of the religious man's **Logos** as it is reflected in the form of the Christian Trinity. On this account, having now identified the lurid and indisputable outcome of such merely apparent **tendencies** within earlier chapters, we are equipped to identify such tendencies as the actual blunders they suggested themselves to be. Since it is in those same earlier chapters that Feuerbach sets forth his most important contributions, a retrospective attack on the included blunders provides us the clearest, most direct means for showing the connection between what we have identified as his neurotogenic obsessions and the devastating flaws these introduce to his epistemology.

In the first chapter, "Introduction," he identifies the **essence of religion** as the apotheosis of an essentially human quality which man experiences within himself. This quality he describes as a **feeling** which contemplates only itself (and no other objects) through the mediation of self-consciousness. In religious belief, he outlines, man creates an external object to correspond as the idea of a universal for that inwardly experienced, but universal-to-man human self-conscious knowledge.[86]

In that second chapter, "God As A Being Of The Understanding," he contradicts himself, ignoring his emphasis on the self-conscious, self-subsisting human feeling in the preceding chapter, but otherwise correctly insists on the following principle:

[blockquote]
Disunion exists only between beings who are at variance, but who ought to be one, who can be one, and who consequently in nature, are one. (87)
[end blockquote]

and, shortly thereafter, proceeds to the topic of God:

[blockquote]
This nature is nothing but the intelligence —the reason or the understanding. God as the antithesis of man, as a being not human, i.e., not personally human, is the objective nature of the understanding.(88)
[end blockquote]

That is, the objectification as universal, as God, of human reason itself.

Since he has previously equated God with the "oceanic" feeling, and now with universal reason, it would seem to follow, God being both, that the "oceanic" feeling and universal reason are the same existence. However, he begins to argue that exactly the contrary is the case:

[blockquote]
The pure, perfected divine nature is the self-consciousness of the understanding, the consciousness which understanding has of its own perfection;(89)
[blockquote]

so far, excellent, but he continues after the semi-colon:

[blockquote]
it has no desires, no passions, no wants, and, for that reason, no deficiencies and weaknesses, as the heart does. (emphasis added)(90)
[end blockquote]

to which he immediately adds the following, most clinically revealing qualification:

[blockquote]
Men in whom the intellect predominates, who, with one-sided but all the more characteristic definiteness, embody and personify for us the nature of the understanding, are free from the anguish of the heart, from the passions, the excesses of the man who has strong emotions. (emphasis added)(91)
[end blockquote]

To which he adds this point of emphasis:

[blockquote]
they are not passionately interested in any finite, i.e., particular object; they do not give themselves In pledge;(92)
[end blockquote]

and, then, three most astonishing — but not clinically incomprehensible — words in apposition to this:

[blockquote]
they are free.(93)
[end blockquote]

Then, a short space beyond:

[blockquote]
The understanding is that part of our nature which is neutral, impassible, not to be bribed, not subject to illusions — the pure, passionless light of the intelligence.(94)
[end blockquote]

After developing the argument in this vein for a while, he sums up the burden of the chapter's topic:

[blockquote]
God as God — as a purely unthinkable being, an object of the intellect — is thus nothing else than the reason in its utmost intensification become objective to itself.(95)
[end blockquote]

to which he shortly thereafter adds the stipulation:

[blockquote]
The understanding is thus the original, primitive being.(96)
[end blockquote]

But, what of the feeling cited as the primitive essence of religious belief in the preceding chapter?

The contradiction in this development is then exposed more clearly in the third chapter, "God As A Moral Being, Or Law":

[blockquote]
God as God — the infinite, universal, non-

anthropomorphic being of the understanding, has no more significance for religion than a fundamental general principle has for a special science; it is merely the ultimate point of support — as it were, the mathematical point of religion.(97)
[end blockquote]

and therewith begins to add several most self-illuminating expressions of his neurotic obsession:

The first of these might appear to be innocent enough, if we were not already familiar with the falsification of the "Trinity" and "Logos" in later chapters:

[blockquote]
The consciousness of human limitation or nothingness which is united with the idea of this being, is by no means a religious consciousness; on the contrary, it characterizes sceptics, materialists, and patheists." (emphasis added)(98)
[end blockquote]

The term, "nothingness," is tell-tale here. Feuerbach's inability to comprehend Spinoza's notion of the infinite, and his clumsy effort to see Hegel's Logos as essentially a form of Schelling's infinite, are reflections of his own failure to conceive of infinite continuity as negentropy, as the primitive substance of negentropy, determining the necessary existence of predicated particular objects. Hence, he refuses to comprehend the significance of Hegel's gibe at Schelling's "night in which all cows are black," at the **nothingness of Schelling's infinite**.^[99] The genius of Hegel is that his infinite reason is not bare, not undifferentiated linear extension, but a self-subsisting negentropic space-time, which, therefore, is cognitively comprehensible.

Feuerbach continues:

[blockquote]
The belief in God — at least in the God of religion — is only lost where, as in scepticism, materialism, and pantheism, the belief in man is lost, at least in man as he is presupposed in religion ... The vital elements of religion are those which make man an object to man. To deny man is to deny religion.(100)
[end blockquote]

To avoid unnecessary difficulties for the reader, we should concede that in the foregoing Feuerbach is **subsuming** a valid humanist argument, but in both a muddy fashion and in connection with a principal assertion we shall expose as false. It is true that Christian religion, especially those newer forms of Christian doctrine which appeared during and after the Renaissance, do emphasize a relatively **human** quality man, in opposition to the prevailing **relative** bestialization of individual man in everyday secular practice. In that restricted sense, religion

does fundamentally distinguish man from man from the beasts, and Feuerbach's argument is to that extent approximately well-founded. However, the contextual argument within which he situates this point is a different matter.

He develops his point there:

[blockquote]

It certainly is the interest of religion that its object should be distinct from man; but it is also, nay, yet more, its interest that this object should have human attributes. That he should be a distinct being concerns his existence only; but that he should be human concerns his essence.(101)

[end blockquote]

[14]

In itself, this passage is merely ambiguous; it might be correct or wrong, according to context. The intended error is made clear:

[blockquote]

A God, therefore, who expresses only the nature of the understanding does not satisfy religion, is not the God of religion.(102)

[end blockquote]

The problem which Feuerbach creates in this connection is that **he himself has asserted the separation of reason from the fundamental emotion**, thus inventing for his own purposes a feelingless God of pure understanding, **who is certainly not the passionate Jehovah**, perpetually terrifying the prophets with his rages. It is also he himself who asserted that the universal form of the understanding must appear to man as a kind of nothingness on account of its alleged lack of self-differentiation. On this point, he ignores Hegel, uses this ignoring as a premise, and on that premise constructs a "proof" which he then submits as refutation of Hegel's *Logos*! [103] If, in contrast to Feuerbach's assertions, we acknowledge the unity of self-conscious reason and the fundamental emotion, and the negentropic self-differentiation of a rational continuum, then his God of the understanding corresponds to a being whose nature is in exact agreement with the essence of self-conscious man, and whose form of negentropically self-differentiated universal understanding is cognizable as a universality. Such a God may indeed not be the God of religion, but for quite different reasons than Feuerbach submits here.

In general, Feuerbach's argument, even in the opening chapters, is gradually thus accruing a monstrous burden of contradictory rubbish, which he must — speaking formally — either clear away in subsequent development or fall victim to in the form of gross, lurid errors respecting the


main issues of his inquiry. If he were saying such things as we cite merely as a matter of detailing clinical evidence of religious beliefs, then he would be obliged to continue doing so in pursuit of an accurate account of such beliefs. In that case, presuming he later analyzed those errors of such belief, it would be silly to attack the author himself for the blunders represented to that purpose. In fact, we already know from our preceding sections' criticism of his neurotogenic treatment of the "Trinity" and "Logos" that he not only does not disassociate himself from those contradictions, but rather exploits them as virtual premises in defending his obsession with the image of the Virgin Mary. Moreover, the contradictions to be examined now are directly connected to the systematic errors of his general epistemology, including those blunders Marx identifies in the "Theses On Feuerbach."

We list the following points of fallacy from the chapters reviewed so far:

- (1) The categorical separation of the "heart" and "head," which otherwise pervades his principal writings of that entire period.
- (2) The cognate (or, "hereditary") fallacy, that a man of reason is so distinguished by "disinterest" in earthly matters, by a lack of passion of goals. Although this is at sharpest odds with the thrust of his denunciation of "kosher" scholarship, he is otherwise systematically committed to this fallacy in respect to the internal elaboration of epistemology.
- (3) The absence of a notion of positive evolution (self-subsisting positive) in respect to reason.
- (4) In general, a wholly contradictory view of his representation of "feeling" (first chapter) on the one hand and "reason" as the **essence** of God on the other.

The Clinical View

There is no **psychoanalytical** mystery in such errors. He is primarily a bourgeois neurotic of relatively extraordinary **self-conscious intelligence**, so extraordinary in the form, substance, and importance of his contributions that he must be generally regarded as one of history's outstanding geniuses. Since he is a bourgeois neurotic as well as a genius, his "agony of self-consciousness" is also correspondingly more acute than ordinary.[104] His own statements cited above must be taken as clinically autobiographical in just that sense. He himself implicitly insists that we interpret his work in just this way: "I am nothing but a **natural philosopher in the domain of the mind**"[105] — which is to say that like Hegel's **Phenomenology**, his book must be regarded as the outcome of a critical exploration of his own mind, a study of his own mental processes through a universalizing mode of investigation of the mental behavior of variously the great thinkers and ordinary people of past and present of the



Michelangelo's
Creation of Eve

society in which his own mental processes have been developed and are located.

When he writes of **reason**, he is describing his self-conscious self as **he regards this self** empirically, both (and chiefly) within his own mental experience, and as he uses that reflective insight to gain insight into the inner mental life of others. Yet, as he argues repeatedly in various locations, to define something is to distinguish it from something that it is not. What stands, then, in opposition to his self-conscious self within his own experience of his own inner mental life? What else but his infantile Ego? He says just that as he writes: "I has no desires, no passions, no wants, and for that reason, no deficiencies and weaknesses, as the heart has."(emphasis added)[106] For him, the **reason** is the "head," the **self-conscious self**, counterposed to but enslaved to a common person with the "heart," the infantile Ego.[107] He counterposes the **impotent** nobility of his own reason to the infantile passions of his "mother-image"-dominated Ego.

This is exactly the picture of his own mental life which he demands we recognize as he counterposes the God of reason to a God of religion. By locating the latter in respect to the realm of the "heart" (infantile feeling), he rejects the potency of the God of reason (Jehovah) for the "trinity" of the superstitious witches, in which company all the "unfeeling qualities" of the God of reason are approximated to Feuerbach's own idealized perception of a cruelly cold, unfemininely "rational," earthly father.[108]

How does he reconcile this with the religious feeling he identified in his first chapter? The "oceanic" feeling is as

infantile and universal as the universal form of reason excludes (as humanly incomprehensible) from religion on just these grounds of quality:

[blockquote]
... feeling is the essential organ of religion, the nature of God is nothing else than an expression of the nature of feeling. (emphasis added)(109)
[end blockquote]

"Nothing else"? But, he himself wrote not many pages later: "The understanding is thus the original primitive being," a being free of the "heart's" defect of feeling!!!! But, in the opening chapter he was as wholly unambiguous on this point as "nothing else" implies:

[blockquote]
What, then, makes this feeling religious? A given object? Not at all; for this object is itself a religious one only when it is not an object of the cold understanding or memory, but of feeling.(110)

God is pure, unlimited, free Feeling.(111)
[end blockquote]

He also situated the cognition of this feeling:

[blockquote]
Religion being identical with the distinctive characteristic of man, is then identical with self-consciousness — with the consciousness which man has of his nature. But, religion, expressed generally, is consciousness of the infinite; thus it is and can be nothing else than the

consciousness which man has of his own — not finite and limited, but infinite nature.(112)

Again, “nothing else”! This time — and we have cited from near the outset of the opening chapter — self-consciousness, the identity and form of universal reason, is the quality to which the highest, most primitive truth is attributed. Indeed, all through the opening chapter, or at least the bulk of it, he constantly argues to the effect that the universal feeling and universal reason are the common quality of self-consciousness. Yet, again, that same set of qualities which, in a later chapter, specifies self-conscious reason to be incomprehensible to man, is here repeatedly equated with the unique human power for self-conscious perception of just such qualities!*

{footnote}

* The reader must not be put off by the term, “infinite” in such connections. We shall shortly deal at length with this, and thus wholly demystify that term, which — as we shall demonstrate — has an exact and indispensable scientific meaning, with no connection to the usual infantile usage of the same word in either the pulpit or undergraduate calculus classrooms. We put that clarification to the following section, so that we might not — because of the length and concentrated attention and explication required — lose connection with the immediate point under development.

{end footnote}

Despite the ambiguities, Feuerbach has empirical knowledge of the agreement between self-conscious reason and this special, infinite or “oceanic” feeling, and he properly reports that this feeling is knowable only to self-consciousness. Hence, one might think he ought to be most embarrassed to see himself later asserting that the essence of reason is alien to passion, after he had already reported self-consciousness to be associated with the strongest of passions, or to regard passion as a weakness with respect to reason, when he earlier associated the highest form of self-consciousness with the most intense and virtuous quality of passion!

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Parallels to “Neurotic Resistance”

Such a problem of hysterical self-contradiction is not strange to clinical experience of neurotic resistance. Indeed, Feuerbach’s later obsessive falsification of his own opening statements is exemplary of the exact substance which represents **outright lying** by the patient. “But, a while ago, you said,” the analyst might challenge the subject, to which the subject would reply with a categorical denial. If a tape of the remark were played back then, the patient (unless he or she “came out of it” with such prompting) would in virtually every such case declare that the tape lied, justifying that by the observation that he or she was not responsible to explain how the analyst had rigged his tape machine to effect such falsifications. All the while, the patient’s self-

conscious self would sit impotently within the head, watching the hysterical Ego putting forth such lies, knowing that the mouth was lying. Later, when self-consciousness was enabled to use the individual’s mouth, the patient would almost invariably report such passive knowledge of the Ego’s lying: “It was all lies, but I couldn’t break through to stop myself from lying.”

When the infantile Ego’s affiliation to control by the mother-image is most severely challenged, the subject almost invariably suffers an unusual degree of disassociation, reflected by intense outwardly personality changes and more or less direct control by the “mother-image” in place of the usual “power behind the Ego” arrangement. Usually, the facial and bodily expressions, the tone of voice, etc., are either parodies of the patient’s mother’s attitudes, grimaces, etc., or the patient’s own childhood postures, etc., under circumstances in which he or she was being subjected to an unusually intense sort of will-bending effort by the mother or mother-surrogate. The arguments, words, phrases, coming from the patient’s mouth are frequently “playbacks” from the subject’s experience of the mother’s such idiosyncrasies. In subjects under the most intense internal pressures, or more commonly in those with pronounced schizophrenic tendencies, the direct take-over by the mother’s personality, or strictly speaking, the mother-image’s personality, is total and manifest in the ugliest sort of way.

In such circumstances, the question of “Which of the three of you is speaking?” assumes its eeriest implications: **self-conscious self, mother-image-dominated infantile Ego, or mother-image herself**. Indeed, it is just such ugly experiences which provide the analyst with his next-to-strongest empirical certainty of the “structure” and dynamics of the bourgeois mental life. (The strongest evidence occurs in depth analysis of the sort associated with digging out a potential psychosis.) In such cases, the analyst concentrates on discriminating between his speaking variously to each of these three; no one who has participated in several such sessions would retain any doubts respecting the organization of bourgeois mental life.

The strongest resistance by neurotics is usually associated (indeed, in the overwhelming number of instances) with the threatened onset of the fundamental emotion. At least, this is obviously the case for application of the writer’s methods, which are directed toward early depth analysis. In other cases, the same is necessarily the case, although the weaker expression of the threat may seem to suggest other considerations as primary. At critical junctures in analysis, this involves the most direct opposition of self-conscious self to infantile Ego. (A critical juncture in analysis is a point at which the associative location of a line of recollection leading toward the “unlocking” recollections has been isolated. Since, at that stage of analysis, shame of disclosure itself has ceased to be a

more than moderately significant consideration, the fear which blocks recollection is fear of a quality of feeling which the recollection, in the subject's prescience, will bring forth. Indeed, the block becomes a real block after the analyst and subject have agreed on the essential character of the events, etc., which are "hidden" behind the blocking of recollection, so that the subject already knows that any "shameful" aspects of the recollection are already out in the open. The essential block is a fear of a feeling.) The threat of upsurge of recollection of an early-childhood located sense of "oceanic" "love-death" is a threat to the infantile Ego. Hence, since the Ego is defending itself against that feeling by attempting to hold obsessively to some distracting particular idea or negative recollection, it merely appears that the particular ideas are the substance of the blocking; in fact, they are merely devices collateral to the blocking-activity. The essential issue of resistance at such critical junctures (especially) is the attempt of the Ego to retain possession of the "I" of identity, to retain control of the person, against a threatened take-over by the self-conscious self.

The threat might not seem important to observers, since the Ego ordinarily experiences — in exceptional persons of the sort our experience is chiefly occupied with — a rather frequent takeover of the self by self-consciousness. What is at issue is the ability of the Ego to reassume control from the self-consciousness at the point that any of its special prerogatives are involved: especially various forms of sexual activities, and other ordinary "ego" matters.

Often enough, notably in the case of the Macho's sexual behavior, for one extreme example, self-consciousness is condemned either to helplessly watch a degrading spectacle it despises, or to be put to sleep and later reawaken to realize what sort of hideous charade has occurred during its slumbers.[113] As the extreme case of habitual sexual self-degradation illustrates most clearly, the upsurge of "mother-love" feeling from the witch ordinarily makes the Ego more powerful than the self-conscious "I," so that to counteract this dismal habit, the self-conscious self must acquire deliberate control of its characteristic emotions to an extent sufficient to more than override the infantile sexual impulses turned on by the mother-image. The sought alteration of mental life thus requires that the "trick" portending the onset of the witch's sexual games be recognized ("cathexized") as a sudden burst of a significant upsurge of the fundamental emotion (not necessarily the "oceanic" quality of that emotion) to counteract the witch at the outset. Once the individual has broken through on the "sexual" tricks of the witch, he or she has acquired the rudimentary form of a general means by which to ultimately eliminate the use of the infantile Ego entirely.

Although all three existences, self-consciousness, Ego, and witch, generally share the mental powers and knowledge of the individual they jointly "possess," neither

the Ego nor its immediate master, the witch, are capable of mustering as powerful an emotion or the creative form of intelligence accessible (or, potentially accessible) to the self-conscious self. Once an educated (accultured) self-conscious intelligence has gained wilful access to its fundamental emotion, it has the power to **begin** "regrowing" the entire mental processes to the effect of virtually eliminating the Ego and totally eliminating the witch. That is the real issue confronting the resisting Ego and witch at critical junctures of analysis.

Any person who has experienced analytical work must have been made aware of the increasing cleverness of the witch as the analysis proceeds. The witch gains some experience of the analyst's methods and personal capabilities in dealing with her tricks, and learns from such experience to the effect of inventing a few new tricks of her own. Hence, certain kinds of resistance become stronger as the analysis proceeds; if the analyst becomes better equipped, and has an ally of increased strength in the growing self-consciousness of the subject, the witch, too, is now no raw recruit in this battlefield. Specifically, by the point of analysis at which a critical juncture is reached, the witch is acutely sensible of the nature of the threat to her existence. Once the subject effects a fundamental breakthrough, the alliance of analyst and self-consciousness has gained, the witch knows, the essential conditions for winning the war — if not, therefore, all the ensuing particular battles. The critical juncture, as we have indicated, is defined as the sessions in which subject and analyst have isolated the recollection whose exposure will begin to unlock the basic tangle of the neurosis. Inevitably, since this recollection involves, directly or indirectly, some expression of the fundamental emotion, the witch digs in to fight with every weapon she can muster, including direct, naked takeover of the persona from the Ego.

Feuerbach's Witch Acts

That is, as we have indicated, approximately the case with the astonishing contradictions in Feuerbach's book. So long as Feuerbach has not applied his self-consciousness directly to critical-juncture materials through which he would gain total control over himself, away from the infantile Ego (and its witch), his self-consciousness is permitted to express itself without much interference from the witch. What, then, in this psychological setting of the matter, if he successfully locates the human qualities of the individual corresponding to the liturgical Trinity? This would require, as we have stated, a recognition — as Feuerbach himself almost stated in the opening chapter — that Hegel's Logos need only be modified to acknowledge that it is **both reason and feeling** (fundamental "cathexis"), and that it acts creatively to change the lawful order of the objective world as the mediation of its development as a self-subsisting positive. At this point, the self-conscious "I"

would have to be regarded as self-sufficient, and the Ego and its witch-companion recognized as the evil overcome in the “imitation of Christ” in the passion and resurrection. As this danger to the witch develops, the witch intrudes, at first tentatively, and then more forcefully, then in the form of an obsessive takeover which compels the victim, Feuerbach, to boldly write lies, to deny what his self-conscious self argued, without conceding that any such statements had been made.

It is scarcely accidental that Feuerbach should situate such outrageous lying on the premise of his subjugation to the witch herself, invoking exactly the neurotogenic authority of “mother-love” and the image of the earthly early-nineteenth-century German petit-bourgeois family relations as what he never pretends to be more than an “intuitive” assertion against both Hegel and self-conscious reason itself.

[18]

To summarize this: Self-consciousness in the typical bourgeois individual is characterized by practical impotence, respecting the immediate practicalities of the individual’s life. In all matters affecting the individual person qua bourgeois individual, qua heteronomic individual, of the otherwise self-consciously reasoning individual, the individual is controlled by the Edo-state identity, the infantile, mother-image-dominated self. Relative to the infantile antics of the Ego, the usual bourgeois individual, however otherwise rational, is impotent; his self-consciousness, if not blocked out entirely during such activities, can only watch helplessly with shame at the “deficiencies, the weaknesses, the heart has.”

Thus, the “purity” front passion which Feuerbach assigns to self-conscious reason. His self-conscious is emotionally impotent; it can only reason respecting matters which do not involve the prerogatives of his Ego, the practical “goals,” the subjects of infantile passions, of his Ego, his “heart.” Although he recognizes cathexis for those judgments of the reason which the Ego elects to employ, he sees the “head” and “heart” as opposites, since his “head” (reason) is one identity, self-consciousness, and his “heart” another, his infantile, witch-dominated Ego.

In particular, with respect to those material objects which are realized as subjects of his infantile Ego’s prerogatives, the objects of sexual lust, gluttony, etc., he does not know the actual world in respect to reason, but only in respect to the infantile passion of elated object-possession which is the quality of his “mother-loving” Ego. Hence, he knows material objects only in their “dirty-judaical” form, since that is the only way in which his mother-image permits him to realize such objects. Hence, although his reason demands material objects as moments in a process of realization of higher states of the self-

subsisting positive, the **Logos**, self-conscious reason, his mother-image will not permit him to discover such results; whenever a material object of his personal realization confronts him, she turns off his self-consciousness’s power to act in the world and transfers control to the infantile Ego. Hence, Feuerbach knows actual material objects only as his Ego can know them, in a “dirty-judaical” fashion.

Hence, having discovered the **Logos** as both feeling and reason at the outset, the moment his mother-image assumes control of his pen, he is determined on no objective so passionately, so obsessively, as to bury that same **Logos** from sight — even to the extent of barefaced lying respecting the kernel of his inquiry, the liturgical Trinity.

4. KARL MARX ON FEUERBACH

We shall now consider the essential identity of our own and Karl Marx’s criticisms of Feuerbach, and in that context show exactly where we go beyond Marx in the issues posed.

The special psychoanalytical approach we have employed as the standpoint for our criticism of Feuerbach’s book indicates that he was unable to free himself of the neurotic “map” of the universe which is characteristic of the “mother-image”-dominated infantile Ego of capitalist cultures. Hence, in his criticism of religious belief, he commits two principle obsessive blunders, which represent sufficient evidence of the identity of his neurotic problem. Firstly, he waves aside the fundamental emotion (the **Logos**) in favor of the “more substantial” principle of “mother-love”[114]; this itself is characteristic of the “Ego-state” and the clinical correlatives of sexual impotence.[115] Secondly, he continues this same error as a central flaw in his entire epistemology, in the correlated form of an obsessive preoccupation with fixed objects, “reductionism.”

Apart from these particular, devastating and vicious flaws in his entire epistemology, he escapes from this infantile outlook at certain critical points in his work. Notably in the opening chapter and partially in the second, his self-conscious psychological standpoint is opposed to the Ego-state of, notably, the sixth chapter. Here, as in sections 32-33 and 58-64 of his **Fundamental Principles**, his connection to his own self-conscious self — and to his father-image of Hegel — is predominant. Clinically, this signifies that he has been able to think and write from a self-conscious standpoint on broad issues, but has regressed to the infantile world-outlook as his studies converge on more immediate matters of life.

He himself asserts such a distinction between the qualities of understanding and Ego-situated “mother-love” in connection with his startling characterization of the aspect of God which corresponds to the apotheosized pure understanding.[116] From the standpoint of man on earth,

he asserts, understanding as such is incomprehensible. Man, to Feuerbach, is kept from such quality of understanding by the defeat of his passions, etc. As we have noted in this connection, he thus describes his own self-conscious understanding as impotent (lacking in either passion or objective goal). For Feuerbach, examining his own mental life, the self-conscious understanding is lacking in the impetus (passion) to actuate its reason as the will of a conscious **identity** with self-conscious real-world goals.

It must be interpolated here, so that the implied point is not left hanging, that in his God of pure understanding Feuerbach has essentially returned to the world-outlook of Kant's **Critique of Practical Reason** on this point. We shall shortly identify and develop the significance of that "hereditary" flaw in Feuerbach's argument.

Marx's "Theses" begin with the problem of the fixed object:

{blockquote}

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism — that of Feuerbach included, is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively.(117)

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
That is, that the thing is either axiomatically regarded as a self-evident object, a **thing-in-itself**, or that the discreteness of the **appearance** is taken as **reflecting** the existence of a thing-in-itself. (The latter, essentially the standpoint of the Kantian view of human **understanding**.) Feuerbach continues in the error of ignoring the fact that the object is to be understood as a determined feature of human activity, the concept of the discrete object a **necessary** but **determined** subjective concept derived from human social practice. In short, that the concept of the discrete object does not reflect the axiomatic existence of discrete things-in-themselves behind those subjective appearances.

{blockquote}

Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism.

{end blockquote}

So-called "idealism" (N.B., Hegel) takes the subjective side of human existence as its principal subject of inquiry, i.e., psychology, and therewith concentrates on examining the ordering of those mental processes through which ideas are both determined and determined to the end of providing a coherent overview of the world as it is psychologically experienced. "Idealism" thus deals with the lawful processes by which the mind **creates** object-images, etc. "Idealism" thus treats the **active** side of life in respect to its concentration on defining concepts, by study of the way in which



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concepts are **created** by the mind. To "idealism," the content of an idea is the specific process which **necessarily** creates that idea. Hence, "idealism" enabled man to break through that ingenuous, axiomatic belief in the given discrete object which is the hallmark and essential impotence of materialism.

{blockquote}

— but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such.

{end blockquote}

The defect of "idealism" is this. Although scientific psychology — in the sense of that science exemplified by Hegel's **Phenomenology** — represents reality as reality is reflected entirely within the mental processes, it has the flaw that it does not go outside mental processes to locate the appropriateness of mental laws to the existence of the thinker. Psychology per se fails to examine the quality of mind from the standpoint of the practical determination of the existence of the thinkers through the consequences of wilful action regulated by a certain quality of psychological life as a whole.

{blockquote}

Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really differentiated from thought objects,

{end blockquote}

The positive achievement of Feuerbach is to locate the significance of psychology-in-general in the measure of its appropriateness to a material practice through which the existence of the thinker is determined.

{blockquote}
but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity.
{end blockquote}

In Feuerbach, it is the objects of the “outside world” which are uniquely real, except as he admits (and indeed insists) that corporeal man himself is real in. this way. However, he does not — as Marx properly emphasizes here — acknowledge that man’s wilful action upon those objects is the **essence of objectivity**. From our standpoint, Feuerbach fails to recognize that objectivity is located, not in the concept of the objects, but in the conceptualization of human (wilful) activity as the substance of objectivity, in respect to which the concept of the object itself is merely a **predicate** of that essential objective **subject-matter**.

{blockquote}
Hence, in the Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude,
{end blockquote}

[20]

E.g., Chapter Two: God as the alienated idea of the **incomprehensible-to-man** apotheosis of his own understanding.

{blockquote}
while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical form of appearance.
{end blockquote}

E.g., Chapter Six, in which the Logos is rejected from Feuerbach’s Christian “trinity” in favor of the dirty idolatry of Mariolatry.

{blockquote}
Hence, he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary,’ or ‘practical-critical,’ activity.
{end blockquote}

In that there is already the essence of Marx’s advances over both Hegel and Feuerbach. Here is already stated the essence Of Marx’s notion of “expanded reproduction,” as we otherwise find this same conception of “supra-historical” revolutionary practice and practical-critical activity summed up afresh in the “Freedom”/ “Necessity” thesis from the last section of Volume III of **Capital**.

We can immediately adduce that same thesis as the positive principle for which Marx argues even within the bounds of the first of his “Theses On Feuerbach.”

Classical materialism locates reality as something existing apart from man’s will, and to that effect treats the world of objects qua objects as the only reality. To this

classical-materialist point of view, man himself is real only as he himself is first located as an object detached from his own will, as an ordinary material body. This materialism then attempts to account for the will itself as a mere epiphenomenon of that world of objects in which the human body is located.

Into this religion intrudes with its ontological paradoxes. The essence of rationalist theology is therefore to entirely accept the classical-materialist view of **the sensuous world**, and to account for the human will as either a **deus ex machina**, or as the interplay of contending spiritual powers from outside the physical world. The essence of all theological argument in this connection is to prove the existence of God by exposing the empirical proofs of the absurdity of the claims of **completeness** for classical materialism.

Kant was the first thinker to make a general systematic attack on both classical materialism and theology from the vantage-point of classical materialism.[118] By focusing on the sensuous aspect of the will in human practice, instead of merely occupying himself with the abstract issue of the origins of a purely abstract “free will,” he developed his “fundamental antinomy.” Given the sort of mechanical predetermination implicit in the Euler-Lagrange notion of a total universe of lawful mechanistic relations in a present given state, he identified the predicament created for the notion of completeness in such physical science once we recognize that the human will itself becomes a material cause for succeeding states of **the whole universe** through human **wilful practice**.

In more recent times, emphatically so since the demoralization which has overtaken intellectual life since the end of the First World War, the Kantian antinomy has been brushed aside. This has been permitted chiefly on the basis of the shared imbecility of self-styled philosophers; each being too poor in mental vigor to consider “universals,” they have agreed to make no embarrassing references to the fact that this debilitation is indeed a debilitation. As it might once have been argued, “The world is flat! **Everyone here knows that!**” so modern “philosophers” deny their intellectual pauper’s certifiability under the pathetic protocol, “There are, we all know, no ‘universals.’ ” At the same time, a specious “scientologists’ ” sort of supplementary case has also been offered, pretending that the solution to the Kantian antinomy is obtained in the substitution of “probability” for simple cause-effect relations. Obviously, Kant’s fundamental antinomy applies as rigorously and comprehensively to a “probabilistic” as to a simple causal form of the **celeste mecanique**. Respecting the cited “philosophers,” one is reminded of the undergraduate students who protest that certain topics “are too complicated” to be included in the matters of final examination; as one knows, such students can be most emphatically moralistic — confronting the instructor like a

mass, of justly-indignant rats in such pleadings. The essence of all such posturing is the superstitious conceit that the universe is obliged — in all decency, no less! — to limit its laws to those which ignorant students — and professors — find agreeable to the puny dimensions of their intellects.

What Marx properly demands, and this also represents his fundamental, original contribution to all science, is his seemingly rudimentary proposition: instead of making the world of sensuous **objects** the location of reality, **let us make human sensuous**, objective activity itself the unique subject of scientific inquiry. Instead of locating the reality of human practice in its seeming appropriateness to “self-evident objects,” let us demand that the notion of objects be subordinated to the reality of human practice. The continuum of human practice is for Marx the unique, universal subject of all scientific inquiry.

At first, this seems impossible to accomplish. **How shall we judge human practice?** If we adopt the existence of the entire human species as the objective goal of human practice, the apparent difficulty begins to evaporate. The significance of the object as **predicate** of the **subject**, human social practice in general, is now entirely defined by the momentary significance of that object as the mediation of two successive moments of human practice.

Hence, the neurotic, empiricist absurdity of the little Sraffa book, **The Production of Commodities By Commodities**, in which human practice is degraded to a mere mediation of the self-reproduction of those objects which, as commodities, are distinguished from non-self-reproductive objects only because they are objects of social consumption, i.e., objects distinguished as predicates of human social reproduction!

The last remaining difficulty in the way of making Marx's discovery the entire basis for scientific knowledge is removed once we have located the necessity of negentropic development of human practice itself, as we stated the case in “Beyond Psychoanalysis” and elsewhere.[119] Once we have done two things in this connection, everything else falls into place in a coherent whole.

Firstly, as Marx sums this up in the cited “Freedom”/“Necessity” passage, we have to abstract the general equivalent for an exponential positive value of $S'/(C+V)$ as the general requirement of human practice, the reflection, as an abstraction, of the essence of our **subject, universalizing human social-evolutionary practice**. Hence, Marx's emphasis on “revolutionary.”

Secondly, we must comprehend (conceptualize) the determining effect of the material conditions of life on the productive powers of labor, as Marx also emphasizes in the cited “Freedom”/“Necessity” passage. There are no “basic human consumption wants,” through which to distinguish

“necessities” from “luxuries.” Human wants are determined differently according to what society wants from man, according to the required productive powers of man for maintaining the rate of general productive development in accordance with the emerging new needs of human existence.

In this respect, since the “absolute” amounts “C” and “V” of the expression, $S'/(C+V)$ are rising at least as rapidly as the ratio itself must rise, we are required to make this notion immediately the central principle of, firstly, human ecology, and secondly, ecology in general. The biosphere then becomes characterized by rising values of an invariant analogous to exponential positive values of $S'/(C+V)$, a “world-line.” Coherence demands that the same principle of “world-line” be extended to the inorganic universe generally, on penalty of worshipping an **elan vital**.

The historical significance of S' in ecology generally as well as in human ecology in particular, is that S' is essentially realized as necessary new qualities of the process which become thus new, determinate, necessary particularities. When we equate ecology to a general thermodynamics, focusing thus on the import of this for the “energy relations” content of ecological evolution, the implicit approach to be introduced to theoretical. hypothesizing in mathematical physics follows.

Marx's shortcoming, his only fundamental shortcoming as a **Marxian theoretician**, is his inability to get beyond his own bare conception of the new scientific principle. This shows up, as we have noted, in his most inappropriate approach to mathematics and mathematical physics, and in the failure of his efforts to develop an elaborated model of expanded reproduction from the pedagogical point of reference of models of simple reproduction. In **Capital** itself, the exact nature of this difficulty is made plain by study of the contradiction between his formal amplifications of models of particular capital, in which he never succeeds in locating expanded reproduction, and his clear conception of that same expanded reproduction in other locations. Noting the order in which the various relevant parts of **Capital** were actually drafted[120], it becomes indisputable that this contradiction in Marx's work does not correspond, essentially, to different periods of his life. He possessed a clear general conception of expanded reproduction both before and after he failed in his attempts to reach the standpoint of expanded reproduction from the starting-point of models of simple reproduction.[121]

The essential significance of the present writer's fundamental contributions of Marxian theory is that this recent addition to Marxian theory as a whole corrects the only significant systematical error in the entire work as otherwise given by Marx. Hence, thus now being enabled to put the entirety of Marxian theory together, as could not be done before this, we are situated to defend Marx's own

essential discoveries with an authority and forcefulness of comprehensive elaboration not previously possible. We seem to “read into” the first of the “Theses” the notion of transfinite invariance, etc., as we have summarily identified that above in defending Marx’s notion of **human practice**. Yet, at the same time we thus factually add something to the extent to which Marx elaborated his own case, we have added nothing that was not already essential to defense of Marx’s argument at the time those “Theses” were first composed.

The most difficult notion which we have to communicate is the concept of a continuity necessarily creating definite individual existences. Admittedly, modern topology implies an approach toward such an overview of true processes, but still lacks the most essential concept through which to realize such a potentiality. This problem identifies thus the essential discovery of Hegel: how to conceptualize a true continuum which did not fall into the Schelling-like “night in which all cows are black.” It is no true solution to the problem of conceptualizing true continuity to merely show that a continuous principle ought to be discovered to be immanent in every individual existence; it is necessary to show that self-existence of true continuity must **necessarily create** individual existence.

[22]

We treat that conceptual problem of “true infinity” here for two reasons. Generally — in the general interest respecting various activities actually or imminently in progress, it is necessary to proceed beyond what we have previously published on this core-problem of dialectical method. More immediately, for the tasks of the present paper, the clearer the reader’s notion of the form of the **Logos**-concept in Hegel, the more probable his power to comprehend two decisive features of Feuerbach’s problem. On the one side, to understand the form of the **Logos**-concept is to locate all of Feuerbach’s formal blunders and ignorance in this connection. Otherwise, on the psychoanalytical side, this goes directly to the principal burden of our stated objective. As we show exactly what is involved in the conceptualization of a **Logos** (a “world-line” of true universal, primitive continuity), we show more clearly the exact relationship between Feuerbach’s neurosis and his rejection of this concept. We thereby also expose the neurotic basis for “reductionism” generally.

“Infinite In The Finite”

The term, “infinite in the finite,” arises from the Spinozan ethic, itself interpreted as a realization of the significance of Descartes’ “Perfection” theorem. Once creativity is identified as the essential feature of human existence generally, one side of the problem can be rather directly comprehended. Each creative innovation by an

individual, as it is assimilated for general practice by society, becomes a permanent contribution to **all** future humanity, a stepping-stone to the future. Hence, an individual who develops an outpouring of such creative initiatives as his characteristic expression of social identity represents in his existence an infinitely-significant quality for humanity within his finite self.[122]

This creativity does not simply originate with the individual qua individual, but embodies all of the influences acting upon him, and is hence universal in its origins as well as its outcomes. Furthermore, this creativity is not limited to initiating specific discoveries, but also includes the development of cognitive powers for the realization of the discoveries initiated through others.

The modern discovery of the significance of the “division of labor” permits us to recognize that to the extent that individuals are creative either in the form of discoveries or power to realize discoveries in social practice, every such individual becomes essential for the entire human race. Not merely the future and present humanity, but also the past. It is the continued existence of humanity, an existence which depends upon and is therefore expressed by its development, which realizes the humanity of the past.

Marx’s notion of the interconnection and interdependency of man’s **universal** and **cooperative** labor[123], and the modern concept of the individual cadre of the revolutionary-socialist organization, are expressions of this notion of the “infinite in the finite.”

Through study of the necessary evolution of the **total** bill of consumption as embodying changes prerequisite to the present and future advances in the quality of productive labor, etc., and through corresponding study of necessary changes in the world-wide process-sheet and raw resources requirements to the same effect, we have both a model of the way in which the realization of surplus value and new scientific conceptions combine to determine new kinds of objects, etc. This also epitomizes the principle to be extended, first, to ecology in general, and ultimately to fundamental “physical science” generally. The notion of the necessary elaboration of individual qualities of objects of consumption as the mediation of advances in the value of the exponential tendency for $S/(C+V)$ is the heuristic for a fundamental law of the universe, a universe in which primitive continuity mediates its self-subsisting positive development through the determination of specific qualities of individual existence.

In “Beyond Psychoanalysis,” we referred to Koehler’s chimpanzee experiment in such a connection. We elaborate that notion here.

Koehler “forced” chimpanzees to demonstrate their power to create conceptions by creating a problem and also

supplying the elements which had to be conceptualized to solve that problem. This is more or less what man does for **himself** through the development of his productive powers.

Man is constantly creating both more objects of the existing kind and new qualities of objects through production. This greater abundance and variety of such elements represent immediately items which have but to be conceptualized for new concepts of interconnected usage to lead to advances in productive technology generally. Yet, by merely producing these objects, man is exhausting the relatively-finite resources employed in production. Thus, by solving the old problem, man is constantly creating a new task to be solved.

Hence, man situates himself somewhat as Koehler situated his chimpanzees. Man creates for himself both new problems and the elements which, conceptualized as new Gestalts of social practice, provide the solution to those new problems.

However, the higher his rate of development — i.e., the greater the value of $S'/(C+V)$ — the more rapidly he creates new problems and the more significant the degree of development required — i.e., the greater value of $S'/(C+V)$ which must be realized through new development. It is not difficult to demonstrate, at least in broad terms, that each value for $S'/(C+V)$ corresponds both to a definite division of world-wide labor, necessary division in human social activities, generally, to a definite array of specific individual products as types, and to a specific mode of distribution of those products for human personal and productive consumption. Furthermore, the relationships among these products are also similarly determined, determined in essence by the value of $S'/(C+V)$.

There is a certain practical difficulty in the effort to construct such models from modern capitalist history (in particular). The most notable feature of this difficulty is the lack of correspondence between the actual social-productive relations and their appropriate proportions, etc. However, this is no obstacle to such rough analyses as are sufficient to demonstrate the essential point to be made.

Marx himself elaborated the proof of his labor theory of value and notion of labor power in exactly such general terms, and at the outset of his drafting of **Capital**, no less. This is found in the treatment of the Physiocrats in his **Theories of Surplus Value**.^[124] This is treated at some length in **Dialectical Economics**^[125], and is also being treated more fulsomely in an ongoing research-pedagogy project of physicists and others whose general objective is the establishment of a new set of fundamental principles for ecology.^[126] The current Labor Committee work on the development of food and energy programs to be applied on a world-scale is in substantial part a by-product of that research team's activities.

Briefly, Marx's demonstration was identical with his own and Engels' devastating refutation of the Malthusians.^[127] The Physiocrats properly argued that the only productive activity was that which effected an absolute increase in the wealth of the entire society, i.e., an **absolute profit** to society as a whole. However, they arbitrarily located such productive activity in agriculture generally, and located the essence of this quality in nature rather than in special powers of man himself. In short, they defined peasants, miners, and foresters, as virtually indistinguishable from cattle. The carry-over of semi-feudal relations into capitalist modes of agriculture (production for market) was reflected in the notion that the yield of tilled land was comparable to that of pasture for cattle: putting-out the appropriate number of serfs on this land mediated the realization of its optimal "natural" yield. Once demonstration is made of the effect of industrial development on the increased productivity of agriculture per capita, both of the Physiocrats' essential errors are exposed as fallacies.

Furthermore, in place of the Physiocratic notion of wealth as a mass of specific products, we are obliged to locate the significance of objects consumed by agriculture (especially for manufacturers) in their effects on the increased productivity of agriculture. We must then apply this same standard to agriculture's consumption of its own product, as opposed to the alienation of that product for consumption of manufacturers. In place of "dumb" labor, the essence of production of absolute profit becomes the productive powers of labor. **The independent significance of the object-in-itself evaporates; the object becomes merely a necessary, determined predicate of human revolutionary activity** (development of the self-developing productive forces of society).

Hence, **labor-power**, the implicit expression of the **total** productive forces of society in the individual worker. The labor-power of the individual is the effect on $S'/(C+V)$ for the entire society in the loss or addition of that individual worker. His value is not simply the measure of his effect on total production in a general way; rather, the value of his labor-power cannot be located except by considering his productive existence with respect to definite production at a definite place in the entire division of labor of that society.

The "Infinite in the Finite"

Hence, Marx's Thesis V: "Feuerbach, not satisfied with **abstract thinking** [Hegel] appeals to **sensuous contemplation**; but he does not conceive sensuousness as **practical**, human-sensuous activity." The two terms of "**sensuous contemplation**" must be first examined somewhat separately to locate the force of their being placed together in this way. **Sensuous contemplation** is being



[by Francisco Goya from his work, *Los Desastres de Guerra*, Madrid, 1863, plate 9: "No quieren (They do not want to)."]

From Goya's *Disasters of War*

distinguished from **sensuous practice**.

If Feuerbach had properly corrected Hegel, he would have carried forward the entire form of Hegel's conception of **abstract labor** into its sensuous equivalent, and thus made **sensuous labor**, as a **self-subsisting positive**, the substance of reality. The term, "contemplation," signifies the setting the human sensuous will to act in opposition to the objects of its activity, rather than unifying the will and objects in their primitive actuality as human self-subsisting practice. Hence, to set the objects as existing for man as independent of his will is to degrade man's relationship to those objects to a contemplative one, the viewpoint of a detached "observer of nature" "vulgarly squatting outside the universe."

[24]

The essential flaw in Hegel is not in the **form** of conception of the **Logos**, but, as Hegel himself emphasizes repeatedly, his refusal to permit the creative will of the **Logos** to alter "fixed laws of inorganic nature," his insistence that inorganic nature could not presently have a "history." Hegel's retreat into the "negation of the negation" was the result of his refusal, therefore, to locate advances in thought in the material prerequisites of the existence of the thinker.[128] Thus, he precluded the possibility that man could actually advance his own cognitive powers through wilful advances in the negentropy of nature, precluded the Marxian notion of the successive moments of advancement of cognition as mediated through wilful advances in the

momentary organization of the material-world-for-man. To correct Hegel **in this respect**, it is merely necessary to bring him down to earth **in this way**, and to locate the development of the **Logos** not in the metaphysical communication of two spirits, but in the mediation of its successive states through wilful advances in the material preconditions of thinking existence.

It is also necessary to add something else, the notion of a **sensuous Logos**, at once **passion and understanding**.

Marx On Psychology

Feuerbach's genius, which is manifest so long as his internalized "mother-image" reacts with tolerant boredom to his making self-conscious discoveries, is to replicate the standpoint of Hegel's **Phenomenology**, i.e., to take his starting-point in the self-conscious knowledge of his own mental processes. In this respect Feuerbach has the following principal accomplishments.

(1) His discovery of "cathexis," that the universal human quality of man is both a universal quality of feeling and a universal quality of understanding. Also, that all particular human knowledge exists only in connection with associated feeling.

However, Feuerbach refuses to regard man's unification of his universal feeling with his universal quality of understanding as comprehensible to sensuous

man. His argument for such incomprehensibility is, as we have emphasized, that he defends the infantile, “dirty-judaical” passion for the banalized object as essentially human rather than neurotogenic.

(2) His discovery of the social determination of the primitive existence of each individual’s consciousness. (N.B., Theses 32-33 of the Principles.)

(3) His location of the determination of the existence of the thinking man, the will to act, in the material prerequisites of individual existence. Hence, the appropriate act in the act which produces the material prerequisites of the will to act. To that extent, Feuerbach properly junked the “negation of the negation” for a self-subsisting positive principle.

(4) Emphasizing what was developed only in a different form in Hegel’s work, that individual man’s need to existence made him dependent upon acting in concert with (ultimately) all other men.

(5) Recognizing the clinical fact, although confusing two qualities of emotion in this process, that the emotion of “love” was the unique, fundamental quality of human mental life and behavior, and in that respect the essence of man.

He blundered in attempting to equate the “oceanic” fundamental emotion with “mother-love,” and hence attributing to the fundamental emotion the same banal quality existent in “mother-love.” He made the miserable sentimentality of the “Macho” and “Pappagallo” virtually the essence of the universe.

So, in equating the fundamental emotion to “mother-love,” Feuerbach retreated from his accomplishments to the heteronomic standpoint of the infantile Ego and its witch-master.

Marx writes: “Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the **human** essence.” Feuerbach’s achievement, notably in the first chapter of the **Essence**. “But,” Marx continues, “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations.” What is the **human essence** for Marx but the quality which corresponds to its predicated expression as labor-power; it has the necessary form and content of **human revolutionary practice**, the form of Marx’s **sensuous Logos**, the same **Logos** we have defined above.

[blockquote]

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:

1. To abstract from the historical process

[end blockquote]

“historical process” = substance of revolutionary practice.

[blockquote]

and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract — isolated — human individual.

[end blockquote]

“Heteronomic” man; **sexually impotent man**, for whom his “feeling” is locked within himself, a feeling which can express itself **only impotently**, as mere objects, in respect to other men. It does not mediate itself actually to the feeling-state of the other person **through** “movement” of the object. It does not see objects themselves as merely predicates of a continuum of human revolutionary practice, but situates each individual in a relationship in mere contemplation of the movement of objects between them. Feuerbach’s man is like a chess-player, for whom the essence of chess-play is to conceal his innermost feeling and thoughts from his opponent. (Only in **teaching** chess is there anything essentially human in chess-play; in chess **competition**, the emotion expressed is infantile hatred.) To share one’s innermost feeling and thought through a continuity of shared revolutionary practice is the essence of the human feeling which Feuerbach rejects (especially in his defense of “mother-love”).

[blockquote]

2. The human essence, therefore can with him be comprehended only as ‘genus,’ as an internal, dumb generality which merely naturally united the many individuals.

[end blockquote]

“Dumb” here is synonymous with “linear.” This is emphasized in Feuerbach’s own writings most clearly in his criticisms of Hegel’s **Logos**-concept.[129] Feuerbach refuses to see in Hegel’s **Logos** anything significantly more challenged than in the notion of infinity in Schelling. He makes the same blunder with respect to Spinoza. The idea of a **negentropic** primitive universal principle of continuity is beyond Feuerbach. Accordingly, on this point he himself goes back to Schelling to begin his movement toward self-subsisting sensuous existence.

Marx’s Theses VII and VIII are his elaborations of further Theses along the lines we have already treated those point. In Thesis IX he goes further, to argue the devastating epistemological point, that the viewpoint which Feuerbach exemplifies in rejecting a dialectical sensuous **Logos** inevitably reflects the heteronomic notion of the individual. “The highest point attained by **contemplative** materialism, that is, materialism which does not understand sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals in ‘civil society.’ ”

“Civil society” for Marx signifies bourgeois society in

particular, the society whose ideology characterizes itself in terms of “social contracts” among autonomous individuals: “nationalism,” “local control,” “anarcho-syndicalism,” and chauvinism in all its various forms of anti-human “intolerance” toward those of different languages, ethnic origins, neighborhoods, families, etc. “The standpoint of the old materialism is ‘civil’ society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or socialized humanity.” **Human** here is defined for the individual by location of the sense of personal identity in appropriately modern Spinozan way: the individual who locates his or her identity in self-consciousness of the self-reflexive importance to oneself of contributing to the advancement of the self-development of the entire human species: “socialized humanity.”

Marx is plainly not sensible of the significance of the distinction between self-conscious self and infantile Ego as this bears upon “mother-love.” However, despite that lack of distinctions, the “Theses” reflect a viewpoint which is pervasive in his writings, on which the following can now be said.[130]

Firstly, generally speaking, Marx is consistently attacking Feuerbach’s errors from the standpoint of self-consciousness attacking the infantile Ego. The form of that distinction is readily clear from the formal features of the criticism. However, from the vantage-point of our present psychoanalytical knowledge, it is also apparent that the conceptions he counterposes to Feuerbach’s — beginning with the first of the Theses, are those notions which cannot be conceptualized (in the Hegelian sense of **begreifen**)[131] except by referring within oneself to the fundamental emotion in a definite way. These conceptions can be discovered as **notions of actual existence** and defended systematically as conceptions only when the individual has surpassed the point at which the fundamental emotion overcomes him as the “oceanic” sort of feeling. The experiencing of the emotion has become agreeable rather than merely overwhelming. Hence, on such evidence, we know that Marx’s criticism of Feuerbach is the standpoint of a self-consciously creative intellect who has become habituated to locating his sense of “I” in self-consciousness.

[26]

That established, we know subsumed features of Marx’s internal mental life. We know that he was necessarily aware of the conflict between the self-conscious and Ego-states. He could not have developed notions of the form and content we have identified unless he had successfully combated the very neurotic problem which Feuerbach reflects most luridly in connection with the “trinity.” Consequently, he certainly knew of at least those aspects of the psycho-dynamics we have outlined which can be more readily brought forward to consciousness.

The reader will undoubtedly tend to underestimate the

precise “clinical” significance of the “Theses” on this account. We are lulled into confusing “learning” and “knowledge,” for reasons already identified. The accomplishment of a merely consistent circumscription of an idea, thus distinguishing it from other, similarly-circumscribed ideas is usually confused for knowledge. That degree of competence which suffices for passing undergraduate examinations respecting what one has merely learned usually passes for quality of knowledge. Also, we are familiar enough with the conceit of the student, “If I had lived then, I could have readily come up with such an idea.” Hence, the reader must tend to overlook the egregious effect of conceptions when they were newly presented, a mistake he would not make if he were accustomed to mastering a field by more directly conceptual methods. In such ways, on such grounds, the reader will tend to regard our “reading into Marx” such exact clinical evidence as at least considerably exaggerated.

As to that problem of the reader’s, we are satisfied that we have sufficiently grounded our case. It is merely necessary to emphasize this. The reader must proceed from our identification of the notion of a negentropic primitive continuity, to compare Marx’s arguments against Feuerbach’s blunders with our own from that standpoint. It is only necessary then to recognize that Marx’s conceptions have the same essential epistemological quality in this respect that ours do, and the entire psychoanalytical case respecting Marx’s mind is implicitly uniquely demonstrated.

5. THE SCIENCE OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Both the NCLC (U.S.A.) and European Labour Committees have established unified task-forces for “Psychology, Ideology, Epistemology,” on the premise that these are so immediately interdependent that no one can have formal professional competence in any one without competence in the other two. We more conveniently identify the three as a whole either by “the new psychoanalysis” or by “epistemology” in that sense. Even if we had not already developed a substantial case for the proper unity of psychoanalysis and ideology as inquiries, the connection between them would be extremely plausible at the outset. The still deeper significance of the interconnection of the first two appears clearly as we demonstrate the direct interdependence of the first and third.

Consider so commonplace a superstition as the plausible but groundless assertion that intelligence, special talent, and other notable behavioral traits are genetically inherited. We are already on the track of this pathology when we consider not only the passionate stubbornness with which such a pathetic view is “axiomatically” asserted, but the anger of near-desperation with which such a silly prejudice is often attacked by educated persons who ought not feel intellectually threatened. More direct evidence if found in

the case of individuals who know the overwhelming empirical evidence against “hereditarian” old wives’ tales, but who nonetheless report themselves succumbing temporarily to just such “feelings” during each deeper recurrence of neurotic disorders.

A summary of the ordinary experience of individuals progressing in analytical programs makes the problem clear.

In most analytical programs, it is essential that the individual begin early to settle accounts with the parents, in one fashion or another. If possible, to establish a human, adult relationship to existent parents. In any case, to extirpate neurotic myths, etc., concerning childhood and later relationships to the parents. Usually, the initial breakthroughs in this effort cause a dramatic change in the individual’s internalized perception of the parents as human beings, and often enough the beginning of mutually-beneficial relationship to the existent parents. This initial accomplishment is accompanied temporarily by significant gains in the individual’s enjoyment of conscious life, a frequent attenuation of psychosomatic afflictions, etc.

This initial period of enthusiastic progress is usually followed by a period of partial regression. Such relapses are frequently associated in the subject’s mind with some disappointment respecting the parents. For example, disappointment in the father.

Earlier, the individual had perhaps “felt” that his or her father was an unapproachable wretch of some sort. Then, through analytical sessions, had realized that this was at least partially slanderous and generally unjust. The individual had variously sought to meet with the father, or, if the father were deceased, attempt to reconstruct a more accurate memory of the father with the aid of the mother or other relatives. Or, the individual had merely worked at reconstructing a more appropriate image of the father by working at digging up recollections. At the start, there was significant progress; the individual had recalled incidents of warm feeling for one or both of the parents, etc. Then, the parents had somehow “disappointed” the individual. The exciting initial moments of discovering the real parent had given way to frustration and even anger; in place of the mythical shortcomings of the parent, the individual was now confronted with the real shortcomings.

At that point the individual frequently regresses, “explaining” this renewal of the manifest neurotic behavior by the disappointment.

The parent or parents are **not** therefore the true cause of the individual’s relapse. (As with all clinical problems, in this it is essential to avoid being distracted by the reported form of the problem. Always keep in view what the individual is actually accomplishing by neurotic behavior.) On the surface the individual is contending that since his or

her parents failed to become such-and-such, or, since they refuse to make giant leaps in development at a given week, the individual himself cannot be expected to make much more progress, either. **Typical: “No matter which parent I identify with ... ”** Precisely in this connection, and in this way, we have exposed the neurotogenic root of the epistemological belief in a genetical determination of personality.

What is the individual’s real problem in such an instance? Is it not obvious enough? Is it not absurd that a gifted young adult should exploit the limitations of the parents as an excuse for not realizing his or her own gifts? Is this not analogous to the individual who wilfully drowns in order to carry his identification with his parents (“Who could never learn to swim”) to the limit?

The essential flaw in the individual’s rationalization is that he is locating his identity in an internalized identification with his parents. He is locating his “I” in his infantile Ego. The individual using his parent’s shortcomings to justify clinging to the neurotic pattern — and neurotics are all a stubbornly sly lot when it comes to this! — is not being neurotic **because** the parent fails to provide a better “model;” **the essence of the neurotic mechanism is reflected by the insistence of using the parent as a model.** The parent might be Karl Marx himself, and the son would still be a neurotic; the essential mechanism of neurosis is located in any attachment to any parent in this way. **“Identification” is neurosis.**

What of “transference” in psychoanalysis? Yes, the transference of the patient’s capacity for loving a father to the analyst as a “surrogate father” is a useful, **often indispensable** neurotic device, a necessary **phase** of the program. The object — the proper objective — is to transfer the identification-dependency to the analyst as a means of reaching the point at which all such dependencies cease.

The neurotic individual — to employ the strictest scientific criterion for neurosis — is the individual whose actions are regulated by his estimation of what someone will think of him in consequence of a judgment or action. He selects his judgments for the immediate goal of securing favorable opinion of others for himself.

By contrast, the sane, actually-adult individual locates his self-estimation in the search for those judgments which make him useful to the future of humanity, as these decisions variously represent his actions for society and his self-development of the qualities he needs to act appropriately for society. The sane, adult individual locates his identity in his entire society, not as a body of aggregated individuals’ opinion, but a society as a process of self-development of future humanity.

This is a point on which Feuerbach becomes a tricky source. His notion of “species-consciousness” is to be regarded, from the way in which he develops it, as an approximation of a sane, adult, Spinozan self-conscious identity. Yet, in other locations, he employs the same term, “species-consciousness,” which he has developed in one state of mind (self-consciousness), to express “mother-love,” the ideas he expresses from the opposite state of mind, the infantile Ego-state.

To the sane, adult human being, the alienated opinion of him held by persons around him is useful only as a means for accomplishing an historic objective. Apart from that, his judgment cannot be deflected by either adverse “personal opinion” or the desire for “popularity.”

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The individual whose self-conscious reason is “turned off” by the sight of a large audience, etc., is not only neurotic, but is necessarily acting under a large degree of control by his internalized witch. As long as the individual is neurotically subject to the immediate alienated opinion of himself by others, as an end, he has no means to escape the control of the hard core of ego-ideals associated with the internalized “mother-image.” As long as the “I” is located in the infantile Ego, there is no program, psychoanalytical or other, which could liberate the individual from such control of the “I” by the witch’s ego-ideals.

Such an attachment to the infantile Ego, associated with a “mother-image” developed under capitalist conditions of life (which, obviously includes the Soviet Union in **this special sense** of the term, “capitalist”), is the dynamic of bourgeois ideology. It is in those circumstances in which the individual is being successively subjected to the most aggressive attacks by the witch that he “feels” that the essential features of his personality are “genetically determined.” In the cited example, above, in which one individual is stupidly asserting “inherited personality traits” and the other frantically denying this, the fact is that the first is being totally bestialized and the other is shrieking out protests against the internal threat of a similar takeover by his own witch.

This is exemplary of Marx’s point with respect to the ideology of “civil society”: the individual who rejects or fails to reach self-conscious-“I” identification is therefore plunged back into an infantile Ego-state, in which the heteronomic view of the self-evidently autonomous individual prevails.

This same infantile Ego-state blocks the individual, however otherwise advanced his scientific education, from conceptualizing the notion of a primitive negentropic continuity. Formally speaking, there are two aspects to this blockage. Immediately, in the Ego-state, the individual is, as we have noted, incapable of conceiving objects as

anything but self-evidently discrete objects. In the Ego-state, the possession of the object is an ego-ideal-determined end in itself. The conclusion of the action directed toward the object is the action upon the object itself. The object is the end of the action, and hence **psychopathologically** self-evident. Even if this obsession did not prevent the individual from freeing himself of the pathetic belief in fixed objects, the object-like character of the Ego-identity (as, primarily, an object for the “mother-image”) blocks positive notions of continuity. Firstly, because the Ego-state is depressed and overwhelmed by the only referent (the fundamental emotion) which the mind has for a true continuum. Secondly, for related reasons, since the fundamental emotion can be deliberately applied to a task only from the vantage-point of the self-conscious “I.”

This does not signify that the fundamental emotion is simply entirely locked away in neurotics. Under control of the witch, the Ego is permitted to “access” self-consciousness, whose activities always express at least weak surges of the fundamental emotion, as in the elation of “intuitively” seeing new ideas. The essential thing here is the witch’s ability to withdraw the tenuous “Feeling of ‘I-ness” from self-consciousness almost at will, to react to onsets of fundamental emotion to reduce the Ego itself almost to a pin-point, and in extreme cases, virtually shut down the Ego to take over the individual directly (“disassociation” phenomena).

In the relatively more powerful processes of a **suitable type of group**, the identification of the individual with the group creates a paradox for the infantile Ego-ideal dynamics, at the same time that the limiting of the group’s intra-relations to a scientific perception of joint-action goals effects a constant pressure (at least) toward a shift of the sense of social identity from the Ego to the self-conscious “I.” It has the related advantage over individual analysis of undermining the “selfish” situation of the individual’s concern with “my problems” by emphasizing the self-therapeutic concentration on empathy, on using one’s own self-consciousness to reach and strengthen the self-conscious identification of others. The group collectively provides a strong Ego support for the individual, on one level — creating a paradox for the witch: locating Ego-gratification aiming for self-consciousness.*

[footnote]

* Obviously, the favorable therapeutic” situation within the Labor Committee is not strictly comparable to the less-advantaged subject outside; the Labor Committee members work in the context of a Spinozan social formulation of identity lacking outside that organization. The individual member accepts the notion of determining social identity in terms of developing a scientific overview of the development of the productive forces on a worldwide scale. This does not presently exist outside the Labor Committee. Even within those organizations, of course, that sense of identity has been significantly internalized as a commitment of this sort with

varying degrees of intensity. The man-in-the-street or the poor wretch from such USA groups as the CPUSA or SWP lacks the essential prerequisites for beginning to develop real mental health. The question of shifting the "I" from the Ego to self-consciousness, from the Ego consciousness to the so-called "preconscious" becomes conscious, demands firstly that preliminary scientific education of self-consciousness through which it is able to locate itself as a Spinozan "I" in respect to both a worldwide political working class and the positive, programmatic development of worldwide productive forces. Without the development of that sort of self-consciousness, it is impossible for the adult "I" to "cathexize itself" with the fundamental emotion.
[end footnote]

Access To Self-Consciousness

The ordinary neurotic with some creative or semi-creative achievements can readily recognize a certain aspect of the connection between his Ego-states and his **limited** access to self-consciousness.

To employ an illustration of the most general comprehensibility, we cite the experience of that pedagogical horror the student encounters in ordinary U.S. secondary-school geometry classes. The student can perhaps recall — if he has not blocked out that painful experience entirely — that in standard classroom drill he was instructed to spell out every feature of the theorem-proof canonically. By contrast, in those alternative programs (as in certain European secondary schools) which are, literally, less mind-damaging, the student is expected only to identify the solution-concept.

The latter pedagogy limits the student's output to identification of an appropriate insight into the solution. If the U.S. ex-student reflects on the first, the ugly, typical U.S. secondary-school practice, he should be able to recall that there were two phases to "getting an 'A' " on the geometry paper. Firstly, one had to find the solution-concept. This phase of the work was the only part of the task which involved self-conscious mental effort. The second part, the drill of spelling out every detail of a "canonical Q.E.D." was relatively idiot-savant drudgery.

Borrowing computer terminology, the following is the relationship between the two parts of the job. In the hideous U.S. practice, the student's sense of identity was emphatically located in the idiot-savant drudgery aspect of the task, on which the greatest amount of time and strain was expended. However, at a brief point in the process, the student "accessed" his "pre-conscious processes" for an "insight" which became the solution-concept once that bare insight had been "seen" and then projected into a bare conscious image. The insight aspect of the mental activity was a weak association with self-consciousness; the rest was not such an exercise of the student's real (self-conscious)

intelligence, but rather an essentially propitiatory ritual, of the sort better performed by a "sycophantic" idiot of a computer than a human being.

The actual and implicit potential use of digital computer systems makes the point in what should be a horrifying fashion. In respect to the creative aspects of self-conscious mentation, no digital computer built at any time in the next billion years would seriously threaten to replace man's essential role. However, in respect to the mechanical drudgery associated with the Ego-state, there is little done in that mode today which could not be done better through sufficiently cheap, etc., digital computer control.

Epistemology

The general epistemological characterization of the two, opposed states of mind follows readily from this. The form of the characteristic ideas associated with each respective state can be summarily distinguished as follows. The characteristic emotion ("mother-love" = hate, fear, object-elation) of the infantile Ego-state is **linear**, and corresponds to the ideological representation of the primitive form of the universe as a linear system of "discrete variables" in the form of self-evident elementarities. The characteristic emotion of self-consciousness is the fundamental emotion, which is the referent for a primitive negentropy of the sort we have summarily described above.

The fundamental emotion, considered abstractly as a purely mental activity, has the abstract form of Hegel's **Logos**. An attempt to describe the universe as if it were fully contained within a psychology itself premised on the abstract form of the fundamental emotion, would be essentially a replication of Hegel's **Phenomenology**. The correction of Hegel, which results in Marxian dialectics as we have presented it above, is the actual science of reality essentially freed of ideology.

Four Types of World-Outlook

The following, admittedly schematic heuristics afford the reader a useful introductory overview of the connection between psychological states and epistemological qualities of world-outlook.

For this purpose, we distinguish four typical psychological states: (1) **psychotic**, (2) **infantile**, (3) **enlightened**, (4) **self-conscious**, for which the **infantile** and **enlightened** are most closely-related in their epistemological implications. We distinguish these from one another principally by the "location" of the immediate control of social behavior and, secondarily, by the predicated quality of this control. The following table summarizes the distinctions.

TABLE 1: Basic Psychological Modes		Definition of "Self"	
State	Quality	Subject	Predicates
1. Psychotic	disassociation	"witch"	Ego
2. Infantile	"Sincerity of feeling"	Ego	witch
3. Enlightened	rational-philosophical	Ego	dual: witch/ self-consciousness.
4. Self-conscious	Spinozan	self-consciousness	self-consciousness

Table 2 summarizes the corresponding epistemological distinctions.

Examples of the epistemological viewpoints are given in approximate order of advancement of knowledge by Table 3.

In the **psychotic state**, the control of social behavior is held by the witch, who acts as if in the interest of her possession, the Ego. The "arbitrary" nature of existences and relations to her does not signify that these perceptions are purely fictional. They are a mixture of "pure hallucination" and distorted reactions to actual objects and events.

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The **infantile state** is characterized by the absence of self-consciousness, such that all the "ego-ideals" are essentially supplied by the witch, and such that the impulses of the Ego are acted upon out of naive "sincerity of feeling." In this state, there is no self-consciousness of the way in which one's mental processes determine the emotions and goals associated with the Ego. The form of perception of the outer world (of sensuous practice, actually) is predominantly that of "self-evidently" discrete objects which are related in a mechanistic sense of fixed cause-and-effect connections. However, this is accompanied by a thinly-disguised belief that the permanence of such mechanical cause and effect rules of relationship are to be arbitrarily superseded under special circumstances — i.e., superstition.

TABLE 2:

Epistemological Modes		Being	
State	Quality	Existence	Relations
1. Psychotic	Hallucinatory	arbitrary	arbitrary
2. Infantile	Superstitious	fixed obj.	mechanistic + magical
3. Enlightened	Rational	fixed obj.	mechanistic
4. Self-consc.	Evolutionary	determinate objects	negentropic process

TABLE 3:

Infantile	Enlightened		Self-Conscious	
	Equivocal		Equivocal	
Kierkegaard Stirner Bakunin	Fichte	Kant	Descartes Schelling Feuerbach	Spinoza Hegel Marx

In the enlightened state, the control of the social practice of the person is situated in the Ego, as in the infantile state. However, self-consciousness is “turned on,” as if a predicate of the Ego; the Ego thus reflects on the apparent determination of its own impulses, through a reflexive movement of passive self-consciousness. The terms of the problem to be solved are determined by the infantile ego — hence the discrete elementary-mechanistic world-view, but the world is otherwise seen as constantly controlled by law. The predominance of the Ego means the suppression of the fundamental emotion in the way we have indicated above, and hence the means for conceptualizing a positive evolutionary principle is suppressed. The creative impulse indirectly supplied by the weak employment of the fundamental emotion is regarded as “intuition” (e.g., “pre-consciousness”), and is considered outside the system of rational knowledge. The highest expression of this view in philosophy is Kant.

In the model case of Feuerbach, we encounter an individual who belongs predominantly to the Enlightenment outlook, but who, immediately strongly influenced by Kant, also reflects an extraordinary degree of self-conscious activity. He is unable to sustain direct cognition of the fundamental emotion, and hence cannot employ it as a referent for actual self-subsisting process. Therefore, like Descartes and Schelling before him, he is only able to show the necessity for its existence as a universal principle, but is unable to distinguish its actual “internal” quality. He perceives the universal, primitive qualities in the bad sense, as if linear infinities, as was the case with Schelling. He is blinded to the emotion by encountering it.

In such cases as Feuerbach’s we have the following principal directly epistemological features of psychology. The individual seems to determine his social behavior (including abstract judgments) according to a self-conscious

notion of universal reality. This is only partly true in the final analysis. His “internal map” of the universe is the neurotic Ego’s outlook, in which the mother-image operates as the center of that universe. What he has done in his rational behavior is to identify such rationality with the social success he reports to the internalized mother-image. She appears to reply to his reported such achievements, “That’s my bright boy;” the internalized mother-image places a premium on this form of success. In the more advanced case, such as that of Feuerbach, this rationality converges upon the appearance of self-conscious identity, but only in the sense that the enlightened Ego of such rarer individuals places a premium on the use of self-consciousness. This sort of individual stands in contrast not to the ordinary enlightened case per se. In a case like Feuerbach’s the ego-ideal is an internalized image of a synthetic authority-figure, in Feuerbach’s case, his image of his existent father. Rather than pandering to the immediate opinion of whatever academics he encounters at that moment, he propitiates the favorable opinion of an abstract, internalized authority.

The two features of Feuerbach’s internalized map of the universe which absolutely distinguish him from a self-conscious person are these. Although he locates truth in a universal totality, hence appearing to reject the mother-centered parochialist organization of the universe into degrees of inner and alien regions in that way, he makes “mother-love” the essence of that universe. In his preoccupation with the self-evidence of the existent object and his denial of a negentropic self-subsisting principle as the essence of totality, he preserves the essential ontological features of the mother-centered universe. Finally, in his self-situation of knowledge as the contemplative outlook of the mere “explorer of nature,” he falls into superstitious faith in a fixed order of nature, rejecting the notion of a human existence outside the mother-image-centered view, hence

implicitly denying that the existence of man is located in the negentropic (i.e., revolutionary) principle of human self-reproductive practice.

Within these limitations, his principle achievements are of the epistemological form of the initiatives of a self-consciously creative mind, especially his **linear** approximation of a self-subsisting positive and his discovery of the social determination of the primitive quality of human consciousness in each new individual.

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Contrary to the “kosher” variety of Left scholars, and contrary to Engels’ shallow perception in this matter, Marx did not strictly reject Feuerbach’s notion of “love” and “species-consciousness.” Marx rejected merely Feuerbach’s “dumb” (linear) conception of these qualities. Where Feuerbach attempted to substitute “mother-love” for the “fundamental emotion,” Marx “returns” to Feuerbach’s raw discovery, which he comprehends in its actual form, as the negentropic or revolutionary principle of Freedom/Necessity. Where Feuerbach equated “species-consciousness” to a “dumb” sense of universality commonality with men in general, Marx situated that commonality only toward that portion of humanity which implicitly embodied the revolutionary principle (expanded reproduction) in its sensuous practice, the working class as a whole self-conscious of itself as a sensuously self-acting whole.

Footnotes

86. *Essence of Christianity*, N.B., pp. 12-14.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 33.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Ibid.*
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*
94. *Ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
98. *Ibid.*
99. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25. Contrast p. 34-36; Feuerbach desires to attain what he repeatedly rejects.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25. Cf. pp. 37-43 and *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, §§5-7, 9-11, 13-24. Also “Towards A Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy,” (*Fiery Brook*), pp. 72-84, notably his attack upon the first chapter (“Sense-Certainty”) of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*,

and his careless *partial* equation of Schelling and Hegel on the very point of their most embittered and actually fundamental difference (“a night in which all cows are black”).

104. “The Sexual Impotence of the PSP,” pp. 36-37, in *The Campaigner*, Vol. 7, No. 1, November, 1973.
105. *Essence ...*, pp. xxxix.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
107. *Principles ...*, §§34-36. Cf. §57.
108. *Essence ...*, p. 34: “The father, who *as a judge*, condemns his own son to death because he knows him to be guilty, can do this only as a rational, not as an emotional being.”(emphasis added) It is curious that Feuerbach’s father, P.J. Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach, was a judge,
109. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
113. “Sexual Impotence,” pp. 36-37.
114. *Essence ...*, pp. 70-79.
115. “Sexual Impotence,” pp. 41-42.
116. *Essence ...*, Chap. II.
117. Engels’ edition is used throughout.
118. Cf. L. Marcus, “Introduction” to Rosa Luxemburg, *Anti Kritik*, in *The Campaigner*, Vol. 5, No. 1, January, 1972; also *Dialectical Economics*, Chaps. VII-VIII, *passim*.
119. *Dialectical Economics, passim*; “The United States of Europe: Their Program And Ours,” in *The Campaigner*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Fall, 1972; “Sexual Impotence.”
120. *Cf. Editor’s Introduction, Theories of Surplus Value*, I, Moscow.
121. “In Defense of Rosa Luxemburg,” in *The Campaigner*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring, 1973, pp. 21-25.
122. *Essence ...*, pp. 2.3, 23-25, 34-43. Cf. Note 103 *supra*.
123. “In Defense of Rosa Luxemburg,” pp. 5-16, 21-25.
124. Moscow edition, Vol. I.
125. N.B., Chaps. V-VI.
126. *Cf. New Solidarity*, Vol. IV, *passim*. The published material on food, energy, and related world-wide problems reflects the applied form of on-going fundamental studies.
127. *Cf. Dialectical Economics*, Chaps. V-VI.
128. N.B., *Phenomenology ...*, “Observations On Organic Nature,” N.Y., 1967; N.B., pp. 315-323, 326; “But organic nature has no history.”
129. See Note 103, *supra*.
130. *Cf. “Theses ...*; “Marx overlooks the dichotomy we identify here.
131. I.e., “to seize,” or the largely misplaced usage of “to comprehend.”