


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
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ON THE COVER: Jean-Baptiste Colbert, a humanist architect of French industrial development, guides Louis XIV [in plumed hat] on a tour of the newly formed Academie des Sciences in Paris.

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CONTROVERSY

How the "Enlightenment" Contained French Humanism

"How it is possible that the oligarchical animal farmers and their spokesmen of the Enlightenment were able to defeat the Neoplatonic humanists of eighteenth century France?" This was the question posed and then answered in a Humanist Academy lecture in New York by Jacques Cheminade, a leader of the European Labor Party in Paris, during a trip to America in August. Answering this question is no academic inquiry, Cheminade explained, but a crucial problem today. The entire political spectrum of France — from President Giscard d'Estaing to the Gaullists to the intellectuals of the French Communist Party — identify themselves with one or another of the leading political figures of the eighteenth century. But as the defeat of humanists like

Turgot, France's Finance Minister from 1774 to 1776 shows, if we merely identify ourselves with these humanists, then we too will not have the necessary qualifications to lead and win the humanist struggle of today.

In the eighteenth century the humanists of France were united around a winning strategic conception: to mobilize the industrial potential of the country and the population through education to impose a humanist Grand Design of monarchical republics on Europe. Even as early as 1751 France's humanists understood America to be the strategic pivot for a successful fight against the "rapacious" monetarist power of Britain.

This was the strategy of Louis XV — who was not the profligate degen-



Voltaire, ideologue of the "Enlightenment"

erate he is always painted — and the core of Colbertian royal administrators and army leaders. By the mid-eighteenth century France had recovered from the devastation of the early part of the century and was a "Japan in the works." What frightened the City of London was not France's absolute growth — which until 1770 was behind that of England — but its *rate* of growth.

France became a powerful industrial nation primarily through the efforts of the Minister of Industry and Commerce Daniel Trudaine the elder. In founding the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées in 1747, Trudaine revitalized the Colbertian civil service with a republican institution to train and coordinate a civil service cadre chosen on the basis of merit, not wealth or aristocratic connections, whose identity would be located in the good of the nation as a whole. Under Trudaine's direction, a system of roads was built to connect the entire country to facilitate transport of grain and commodities and improve communications. This went hand in hand with a renewed emphasis on mining and Trudaine's founding of the School of Mines and government sponsorship of industry and industrial invention. In his di-

Sunday Times, Russell Foundation Rally Soviet Bukharinites

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation's campaign to rehabilitate Soviet leader Nikolai Bukharin "may become a rallying cause for the liberal and anti-Stalinist elements within the Soviet Union," London's *Sunday Times* predicted hopefully in a July 23 article titled "Will Stalin make a comeback?" And, the British organ warned, the Bukharin revival "now appears to be" the "only stumbling block" to the rehabilitation of Josef Stalin by the Kremlin next year, on the centenary of his birth.

Bukharin was the deep penetration agent of British Intelligence-Royal Dutch Shell operations to break up the Russian Empire prior to World War I — the so-called "Parvus Plan" — who continued his activities by opposing the industrialization of Soviet Russia from the Bolshevik Revolution until his con-

viction and execution as a spy in 1938, under Stalin.

The current campaign on behalf of Bukharin may be the British monarchy's last chance to preserve the remaining Bukharinite networks in place inside the Soviet Union. Although British-controlled "Bukharinite snakes" have continued their activity in the USSR with some notable success since Bukharin's death, recent demonstrations by the Soviet leadership that they are conscious of and committed to "Grand Design" policies of global economic development has clearly imperiled the Bukharinites' continued usefulness.

Soviet authorities last year rebuffed Bukharin's son Yuri Larin, the nominal head of the "rehabilitate Bukharin" drive, when he attempted to have Bukharin

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Does Education Have a Future?

There is no question in the minds of most Americans that our educational system is dying. Young adults who spent long years preparing to teach in city schools and colleges are leaving after very few years, out of fear for their safety, their financial futures, or their sanity. They are being followed rapidly by students opting for a certificate of "survival skills" or some lifestyle of hedonism. As if to give the benediction, the taxpayers have given in to Proposition 13 fever and thus precipitated school closings by strikes, or the more drawn-out process of attrition.

People have adapted all right. Once-devoted teachers have found jobs in the administration of cost-cutting or in the brainwashing careers being established by the RAND corporation and others. Some of the former students have become employed in the new "growth industries" of casino gambling, horse-racing, and pleasure resorts. The schools have been kept open one way or another, even though the rate of literacy is declining, and the "skills of coping," "ethnic education," and other nonsense are taking over the curriculum.

People are adapting, and therefore the very basis for a future is being destroyed!

The significance of the current horrifying state of education in the United States is, quite simply, that the American population has given up on its historic commitment to progress and prosperity for its posterity, its commitment to the human mind. There is no way in which a generation of drug addicts, bureaucrats, and speculators can discover and realize the scientific breakthroughs needed to bring the world into the twenty-first century. Such a generation is subhuman, and it is the only kind of generation a culture dominated by rock-music, "survival" schools, and a "do-your-own-thing" psychosis can produce.

Mankind has survived previous such crises. America itself, renowned for its compulsory system of quality education up through the end of the nineteenth century, was a product of humanists who were committed to replacing the bestial seventeenth century regimes of England and Holland, in particular, and the "Rousseauvian" back-to-nature fad of the eighteenth century. They understood that unless they established new institutions and cultural centers where Reason would prevail, humanity was doomed. Their commit-

ment, as that of the several-thousand-year-line of humanists before them, was to the central resource of society, the human mind, whose mastery of the laws of nature and mastery over animal passions they knew to be the *sine qua non* of material and spiritual progress. Through creating institutions based on that Neoplatonic concept, they created the basis for a new, higher level of civilization. That is what we must accomplish today.

MORALITY AND SCIENCE

Lyndon LaRouche's *What is a Humanist Academy?*, the lead article in this issue of the *Campaigner*, lays out in unequivocal terms the Neoplatonic method which must inform a revival of education and general culture. LaRouche demonstrates how this method was deliberately obfuscated after the death of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in 1716—by separating so-called spiritual and natural sciences. In America this split—between religion or morality and science—has not always been obvious due to the strong tradition of Neoplatonic religion, in which the individual understands his purpose to be self-perfection through participation in improving the universe and his fellow man. Yet, as the conscious understanding of this tradition has been lost, American education has been increasingly dominated by the Aristotelian bestialists, whose stock-in-trade is to keep the world incoherent and its population under subordination to the "objective" laws of the universe they have concocted.

Thus the companion piece to LaRouche's discussion is appropriately Criton Zoakos' *Aristotle, Political Warfare, and Classical Studies*. Zoakos shows Aristotle to be no philosopher at all. He was a lying fraud of a political operative, whose usefulness has consisted in forcing generation after generation of students to expunge the concept of development and self-perfection from the study of the universe, including themselves.

The utter degradation of today's educational system is the lawful end product of the Aristotelian regimen. For a century, the content of education has been denuded of any study of the great minds who were responsible for the progress of human history, and turned into the memorization of discrete facts connected by laws of formal logic along with the indulgence in an emotional world of myth and magic. The method has not changed,

but it has tightened its grip on those who dare defy it. It has adapted obediently to demonstrate that imperialism, fascism, and now genocide through disastrous economic collapse, are necessary. It is approaching its *reductio ad absurdum*—using “reason” to show that since only beasts can survive in a world of increasingly scarce resources, therefore man must be, or become, a beast.

Take an ugly, but increasingly typical example of Aristotelian logic.

Is money earned from gambling, drug-running and prostitution evil, of a different character than other money? The “scientific economist” trained at Harvard, the Baruch College of Business, and any other “modern” school will argue no: money income = money income, regardless of source (Aristotle’s $A = A$). There is therefore no reason, he says, to regard income produced by gambling or drugs as any different from income earned by producing steel or farm products, or to fail to collect tax or calculate national profit on that sum. Money should not be confused with “value judgments” — your child’s drug habit is contributing to the GNP!

In reality, however, the answer is yes. All money income must be evaluated in terms of its effect on the real economy, i.e., the ability of its labor force to reproduce and advance itself. From this standpoint, income “earned” from gambling and drug-running is not the same as profit from industrial production. It results from a net drain on the real wealth, the productive labor power, the power of mind, of an economy—leaving the workforce less capable than before. As such, it cannot be considered “profitable” even if it reaps taxes—it must be shut off.

The problem in this kind of case is not that *most* Americans would condone gambling or drugs—although that is a foreseeable danger. Most would condemn it for intuitively the right reason: drugs and gambling are degrading to a human being because they undermine his judgment and powers of mind. The problem is that they would not understand their condemnation as an appropriate *scientific* judgment, but as a subjective, and thus dispensable “belief.”

The Neoplatonic standard must be set and spread. This has already begun with the very successful completion of two semesters of the Wiesbaden Academy for Humanist Studies, referenced in the LaRouche article. The Academy has brought hundreds of teenagers and adults into lecture series on Leibniz, Nicholas of Cusa, Ibn Sina, Beethoven, Riemann, and other outstanding contributors to the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition. The acclaim and recognition it has received has put it well on its way to achieving its initial purpose as the seed crystal of an entirely new educational system for Europe as a whole.

This effort has been replicated in a more specialized

way in the United States, where a select group of scholars, specialists in Islamic civilization and classical studies, development scientists and experts in political science established The Foundation for the Development of the Islamic World this September. While the Foundation’s aims are primarily 1) to find solutions to the problems of industrializing the Islamic world, and 2) fostering an appreciation of the contribution of classical Islamic civilization to human progress, its army of notable scholars* gives it considerable prominence and immediate potential for influencing other centers of learning.

Drawing on the physical science profession, the Fusion Energy Foundation—initiated by the U.S. Labor Party in 1974—has served the same function.

These institutions must be supported financially and otherwise, as the initiating core of a humanist-academy movement whose centers of Neoplatonic learning will become the national universities of the future. Just as the Platonic Academy did, they will provide the cadre humanity needs for its survival.

The return of the human mind to its proper value in American society is the only hope for a future for education, for the next generation of youth. It cannot, it must not, be confined to the work of the few. For this reason the fight for humanist education must include a devastating, broad political assault against all use, sale, and advocacy of mind-destroying drugs.



Stopping drugs is the *political* key to reversing the bestialization of our youth, and to apprehending the culprits behind it. Clamp down on users of marijuana, angel dust, and cocaine no matter what their age or class, and you will demonstrate that you are ruthlessly committed to saving the minds of America. Shut down and squeeze the pushers, and you will remove a plague from your communities. If you simultaneously root out the procurers and political protection for these drug rackets, you will clean up the environment not only of drugs, but of the source of terrorism, vote fraud, and every other variant of organized crime today.


The entire network of banks, companies and political organizations which organize, push, and protect these dirty money operations is elaborated in other Campaigner publications, and the cult basis of it will be featured in upcoming Campaigner magazines. These are the heirs of Aristotle the poisoner. Like him, they must be destroyed.

— Nancy Spannaus

National Executive Committee,
U.S. Labor Party

*Fazlur Rahman; Khosron Mostofi; Criton Zoakos; Robert Dreyfuss; Ralph Braibanti, Duke University; Farouk Sankari, University of Wisconsin; Helga Zepp-LaRouche; Clovis Maksoud, Georgetown University; Mohamed Abdul-Rauf, Islamic Center; Mansooruddin Ahmed, Columbia University.







"All education deserving of that name approaches the issues of course-content and pedagogy from the most advanced — Neoplatonic — standpoint."

What Is a Humanist Academy?

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The director of the Wiesbaden Academy for Humanist Studies, Dr. Helmut Boettiger, has reported the schedule for that institution's second semester. Since no more than an isolated minority among the world's contemporary university scholars has as yet competent knowledge of the "internal features" of Neoplatonic humanism, it is most useful that the occasion of the announcement of the new schedule be celebrated by stating basic principles of humanism as simply and clearly as the character of the subject allows.

For reasons which will be clarified in the proper place in this following, summary report, my own emergence as an international public figure correlates with an important contribution to the progress of Neoplatonic humanist thought. This is not so much because my work has been notable in directly and indirectly motivating a revival of humanist academy and related efforts in North America and Western Europe; my scientific work has a special importance within the broader effort by my associates, and by others to revive the humanist movement from the relative obscurity into which a continuing London-centered inquisition had persistingly tended to push it. Hence, my partially autobiographical outline of humanist principles has a special kind of usefulness today.

HUMANISM VIEWED HISTORICALLY

If one includes occasional detours within the notion of a continuous road, there was an unbroken continuity of humanism, from some undetermined point lost in archeological time, through the death of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in 1716. Following Leibniz's death there was a weakening of the creative vigor of the humanist forces in Europe. During and following the developments of 1789-1815, humanist influences on the continent of Western Europe were significantly crushed, through anti-humanist campaigns of forces representing or allied with the British Hanoverian monarchy.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, humanism continued as a besieged intellectual force within the Christian church and in other locations. Its potency ensured that even as a besieged and harassed force, humanism continued to influence the course of history, if chiefly, and increasingly so, through other forces which incorporated aspects of humanist outlook and thought into the shaping of their own world outlook for practice. In general, although humanism influenced various other currents, usually it found few prominent public voices in its own right. It has existed through the dedication of a diminishing number, to today's relative

The Labor Party-initiated Humanist Academies in Europe, the United States, and Latin America are continuing the tradition of humanist education and scholarship established by Plato's Academy and maintained through such institutions as the French Academie des Sciences. Inset, physicist Dr. Steven Bardwell teaching economics in Sweden; above, Campaigner editor-in-chief Nancy Spannaus lecturing in Detroit.

handfuls, who kept the knowledge alive for a future renaissance.

Under London-centered oppression and harassment, humanism suffered not only externally applied injuries and containment of humanists, but some important internal damage to humanist knowledge. A reference to the case of Leibniz identifies the central problem of such internal injury.

From Thales, through Parmenides, Plato and the Neoplatonists, into Descartes and Leibniz, not only did the humanists produce science and most of the fundamental contributions to the advancement of scientific thought, but there was no doubt among them generally that some special, rigorously ascertainable equivalence existed between the mental processes of creative scientific discovery (hypothesis) and the essential lawful ordering of the universe as a whole. If we distinguish between merely knowing that such a connection exists and systematic knowledge of the nature of the connection, we must tend to endorse the often repeated observation that Leibniz was Europe's "last great universal mind." With some exceptions here and there, humanism after Leibniz's death was divided into two currents, respectively distinguished in German scholarship as *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*, by Neoplatonic theologians on the one side and Neoplatonic currents in physical-scientific knowledge on the other side.

Although the nineteenth century Karl Weierstrass and Bernhard Riemann exemplify Neoplatonic theologians who shifted their emphasis to become among the greatest scientists of their time, the fact remains that in the public view, in terms of institutional arrangements, in terms of the accepted forms of argument within institutions, the division between *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft* has persisted as the predominant feature of the humanists' situation since the Treaty of Vienna to almost the present day.

My special contribution to contemporary knowledge in this respect has been that my best-known scientific achievement, a decisive breakthrough in the advancement of economic science, provided the key for a rigorous approach to reunification of the two facets of humanism, *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft* — to reestablish, in modern terms, the universal outlook formerly associated with Leibniz.

The importance of such a unification of these two facets is much more than the fact of reconciliation itself. The tolerated division between the two facets is artificial. *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft* are not to be viewed like two individual soldiers of an army, who fight better in collaboration. The two are facets of the same entity. When these facets are alienated from one another, each estranged facet is mystified in crucial aspects. That part of each which most conspicuously depends upon the other is "explained" without regard to

that other facet on which it significantly depends: reification and mystification. Conversely, once the systematic interconnection of the two facets is understood, the mystification, involuted efforts at edification, becomes clearly unnecessary. Those features of Neoplatonic humanism which tend to be mystified under circumstances of institutional dichotomy are freed from superstition. The matter can be stated more or less directly and unambiguously.

Consequently, the special significance of my own influence in making possible return to a more efficient, superstition-free understanding of humanism.

That said, we turn at this point to defining the terms of our discussion in their appropriate historical setting.

As we have already noted, the formal origins of humanism are buried in archeological history. What is firmly established for present archeological and correlated knowledge is the existence of an institution known as the *tamkaru* in certain city-state cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean. The *tamkaru* are known to exist as most important institutions no later than the middle of the third millennium BC. Hiram of Tyre and the historical King Solomon are *tamkaru*, humanist "philosopher-kings" or "city-builders."

The earlier fight between the humanists and their antihumanist adversaries converged upon a great crisis of Mediterranean civilization, covering a period of time approximately from the fall of Troy through the conquest of Tyre by the antihumanist Babylonians. With the fall of Tyre, the center of humanism shifted to the Ionian city-states and their colonies throughout parts of the Mediterranean. The best-known of the early Ionian prototypes for the *tamkaru*, philosopher-king, is the city-builder Thales of Miletus.

Subsequently — in recorded history since approximately the seventh century BC of Mediterranean and European history — the main line of transmission and development of humanism is traced through the point of influence of Parmenides upon Socrates and Plato. From the point of Plato's establishment of the Academy at Athens, *the name humanism is properly restricted to those currents of thought otherwise termed Platonic or Neoplatonic.*

The term "humanist" is properly interchangeable with "city-builder" to the present day. Humanism as a state policy has always meant the promotion of realized scientific progress, progress mediated through urban-centered technological development.

In this aspect of the matter, state policy, it is elementary factual knowledge that technological progress is viewed as indispensable for maintaining the existence of societies — that is, to avoid the recurring economic-genocidal stagnation and decay which must always flow during the medium to long term under zero-growth or

“environmentalist” policies. It is also acknowledged, even by moderately competent scholars, that technological progress is viewed by humanists not merely as a policy for promoting the prosperity of nations and their citizens. It is essential to lay the emphasis as follows. Humanists view technological progress as an indispensable mediation of the moral development of the individual. Progress is the material *precondition* for fostering generally the uplifting of the individual member of society from the lowest (infantile) moral condition of mind toward the condition of reason.

The cited, recurring tendency for estrangement of *Geisteswissenschaft* from *Naturwissenschaft* illustrates the difficulty most humanists have confronted in their efforts to define rigorously the causal connection between technological progress and spiritual uplifting. Despite the difficulty, the connection exists in fact, and is at least predominately recognized as crucial in the broad sweep of the history of humanism.

The humanist or Platonic current has been one of the two major factions whose conflicts in outlook and policy had shaped the entire history of Mediterranean and European civilizations to the present date. Directly opposing the humanist current is a world outlook and policy most efficiently identified and the *oligarchical* current.

From ancient Babylon — which Christianity properly identifies with the Great Whore Babylon — an element within the landed aristocracy has allied with a financial aristocracy of usurious tax farmers against humanism. This oligarchist alliance has been based on a determination to resist the tempo of technological progress, and to deemphasize urban-centered development, in favor of “feudal-like” emphasis on ruralism and emphasis upon labor-intensive forms of production.

In tracing the roots of European civilization through Hellenic channels, we identify these two factions most efficiently by the opposition between the humanist Homer and the oligarchist, “Malthusian” Hesiod.

Regrettably, this aspect of history is most widely

known in a distorted way, in the more sophisticated apologetics both for anti-Semitism — and for Zionism. From ancient Babylon through the close of the thirteenth century AD in central Europe, Jewish usurers, tax farmers, were a continuous and often dominant element in the antihumanist alliance. This unwholesome cultural and philosophical tradition did persist later within orthodox and other central European factions of Judaism. On this premise, the sophisticated anti-Semites purport to show an unbroken history of nominally Jewish evil from ancient Babylon through the nineteenth-century Rothschilds. This account is occasionally spiced by the additional fact that some of the worst poison-

ings of the Catholic church were accomplished by converted Jews representing such families of usurers.

The hoax of anti-Semitism is conclusively discredited by citing a single name, Philo of Alexandria, the great humanist who fought against the oligarchical faction within Judaism, and whose tradition is inclusively reflected in the Sephardic current proceeding by way of such great humanists as Maimonides and Avencibrol into Benedict Spinoza. This division within Judaism is not merely ancient history, but current history. Those factions within Israel which center their cultural traditions around the heirs of Philo's enemies are the atrocity-stained war-faction. The Sephardic-centered Jewish population of Israel is a part of the social basis for the humanist tradition of Philo, for Ismaili



Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

ecumenical cooperation between Jew and Arab in the Middle East.

The antihumanist, oligarchical point of view has two principal sub-elements. The primary of these two sub-elements is termed the *apollonian* view. The name *apollonian* signifies immediately the cult of Apollo at Delphi. This cult was established by the time of the Persian wars in the Aegean region as the principal institution of usury for the Western division of the Persian Empire. It was also a religious cult. It was also the sophisticated political-intelligence network on which the British Secret Intelligence Service has been modeled

Stoicism defines nations as ships of fools whose only concern is to amuse themselves — a condition ruthlessly satirized by Hieronymus Bosch in his famous "Ship of Fools" painting [ca. 1500].

since SIS's completed reorientation as a Genoa (Black Guelph) controlled institution in 1603.


The *apollonian* outlook is more emphatically the doctrine of the oligarchical faction's ruling social strata. It is, to use modern British analogies, "High Church." It is also a doctrine of jurisprudence, which was formalized early as the Nicomachean Ethics, and embodied in anti-humanist Roman law through the controlling influence which the cult of Apollo exerted over the Roman Republic and emergence of the Roman Empire. It is also the apollonian point of view in art.

The second, complementary sub-element of the oligarchical point of view is termed the *dionysian* outlook. This name is derived from the Phrygian cult of Dionysus. Using modern British analogies, this is the "Low Church," or "dissenter" outlook within the oligarchical outlook. The dionysian cult was replicated by the cult of Apollo at Rome as the cult of Bacchus. The Peripatetics of Ptolemaic Egypt changed the labels to replicate the cult of Dionysus as the Isis-Osiris cult. This latter is notable as the form of the cult of Dionysus which the oligarchical faction used most persistently in its continuing efforts to corrupt the Christian church. During the seventeenth century, British secret intelligence also used the Isis-Osiris cult as the model for an attempted corruption of freemasonry around the "Scottish Rite."

The differentiation between the apollonian and dionysian outlooks is as follows. The apollonian outlook is centered around the principle of zero-growth *as viewed by* the ruling oligarchical strata. It is a desire for an unchanging "feudal-like" order, a zero-growth order. It is exemplified by the outlook of the Norman Domesday Book. The dionysian outlook has been fostered repeatedly over the millennia as a means for assembling the lower classes of society, the plebeians, into a social battering ram, a force of disruption, destruction and rapine, a force aimed against humanist, city-builder policies. The dionysian movement is the "environmentalist," antiurban movement, whose hard core is provided by lesbian cults of female assassins and similar psychopathic expressions.

We shall review, in due course here, how this distinction within the oligarchical faction is lawfully understood from the humanist standpoint.

The modern point of intersection between the apol-



lonian and dionysian forces of the oligarchical, anti-humanist outlook is found in the various continuations of Stoicism. The Stoic cult, itself a creation of the cult of Apollo, expresses both the apollonian and dionysian outlook within its characteristic ambivalences. Hence, it is most useful to compare humanism directly with the modern form of its adversary, Stoicism.

In the context of professed adherence to democratic forms, humanism and its adversary, Stoicism, are efficiently compared in the following terms. Humanism insists that the individual must account for the aggregate, chain-reaction-like consequences of his individual acts of

commission and omission. By acting in a moral way, immorally, or failing to act morally, the individual radiates chains of consequences which have a contributing effect in the shaping of history. The modern Stoic cults angrily reject any such ordering of moral responsibility. They deny their obligation to consider such a connection. That Stoic limits the primary issue of social policy and philosophy to what he misnames the "freedom" of the irrational individual to behave immorally, the "freedom" of the individual to assert his heteronomic prejudices and private greeds irrationally.

In the fascist version of Stoicism, the irrationalist defines an existing or proposed ruling agency both as the Hobbesian dictator and as the expression of that irrational will which must govern society. He proposes the irrational will of a dictatorial force on the same premises Stoicism preaches anarchism. The identity of the fascist and anarchist arguments is not merely abstract. As the clinical case of Mussolini, or of today's anarchist hooligans and terrorists attests, the formation of anarchist dionysian cults under the guidance of Stoic university professors leads lawfully along Hobbesian lines toward the effort to establish a fascist state.

The humanist insists that *freedom is rational, freedom is the moral obligation to create, transmit, and assimilate new scientific knowledge, to do so in response to the necessity associated with the inadequacy of prevailing knowledge and practice.* Freedom is located as a continuing process in the self-development of the creative-potentialities of individuals, and in the fostering of the preconditions for the useful expression of the fruits of such creative potentialities. Freedom is not arbitrary. It is not liberty to violate law arbitrarily in the heteronomic interest of individual prejudice or greedy ambitions; it is the duty and right to act to the moral effect of correcting the law's errors relative to the general interest of mankind, and to secure general progress in the qualitative transformations of law to this same moral purpose.

The irrationalist defines freedom as the liberty of the individual to violate morality in the interest of individual prejudices and greedy ambitions. The irrationalist denounces the mere assertion of a general interest to be an "undemocratic" oppression of individual irrationality. The irrationalist — both anarchist and profascist — denounces Descartes and others as guilty of "the terror of rationalism" on this account. Stoicism is the profession of the liberty to be morally insane.

Stoicism argues for irrationalism in the following broad terms. Stoicism argues, on the one side, that the course of human history is predetermined by means independent of efficient alteration by the individual human will. Astrology is the commonplace, overtly superstitious way in which the most ignorant of people embrace Stoicism. Other Stoics refer to "yin-yang" pulsations of the course of history, as is reflected in the

teachings of Britain's Arnold Toynbee. Whichever the various chimeras Stoics adopt to account for their presumption of fatal predetermination of historical processes in the large, they concur in asserting the irrationalism of the individual will. They prescribe — some directly, some by circumlocution to the same effect — that the irrational acts of the individual have no efficient effect on the course of events in the large.

So, Stoicism makes the case that the irrational acts of the individual are of moral indifference in respect to nations or the world as a whole. Stoicism defines nations as ships of fools. The fools will reach whatever destination the ship brings them to. Ostensibly, the Stoic's ship has no efficient captain, no controllable rudder. Its course and destination are ostensibly beyond control of the crew and passengers. The Stoic so reduces the question of morality and law to the interpersonal relationships (transactions) among the peripatetic fools. Their concern is to amuse themselves, and to reach a social contract among fools to that effect. When one "social contract" becomes boring to the jaded fools, it must be disrupted and another ordering of amusement compacted.

"Who am I?" the Stoic citizen protests. "I am but a little man. I cannot influence the course of events." So, ships of fools have plunged into two world wars in this century, and threatened to wander as foolishly, *as stoically*, into a third. In fact, it is the acts of commission or omission of the little Stoics, the poor little man "minding my own personal and family responsibilities," which plunge us into wars. On the immoral grounds that his judgment, his acts, make no difference in the larger whole, the little Stoic votes for and tolerates those officials and policies which do efficiently lead into wars, and fail to choose those officials and policies by which unnecessary wars could be avoided.

THE PROBLEM OF ELITES

Since nations today are, on balance, professedly ships of fools, the destiny of nations and of mankind generally is left at best to the decisions of the ship's captains. Some of the captains are, or have been, as foolish or worse than the passengers. Even those captains who are virtuous by intent usually lack the means within themselves to select a suitable course. So, the captains — with but few nobler exceptions among such cases — rely entirely upon the advice of navigators, the guiding influence *behind* the visible institutions of power.

The average citizen of today behaves almost as if history began with yesterday morning's newspaper. It is worse, since, in most cases, yesterday morning's most widely read newspaper is a medium for display of wild lying or merely pornographic or other useless nonsense. As we explore the ranks of heads of government, heads

of parties, and other leading strata of leading institutions, in only a few exceptional instances is the situation much improved over the ignorance and pathological short-sightedness of the ordinary citizen.

How, then, are the courses of nations determined? Our attention must focus on the "navigators." *These are the elites*, the guiding forces which know, more or less accurately, what the newspapers never report, what most university professors seldom suspect. These of the elites are either oligarchists or humanists, with the London-centered forces of the oligarchists predominating in numbers and ordinary sorts of influence.

In part, the elites include persons and circles with extraordinary power over governments. In fact, both most parliamentary governments and undemocratic forms of official government are in large degree puppets, unwitting or witting, of the actually ruling agencies, elites, standing above governments. Yet, many who participate in such partially concealed ruling power are not properly members of the *inner* elite. Some of the *inner* elite have no formal participation in power, even though they may be powerfully influential by comparison with their visible physical resources. The *inner* elites, whether oligarchist or humanist, are defined by the *special quality of knowledge at their command*.

The elites are those who know, unlike the fools, how the ship's course is steered, how the decisions are influenced, and what objectives actually govern the judgments of those who prescribe the course of world affairs.

Since the problems of environmentalist irrationalism and international terrorism are properly much before our attention in these days, it is doubly appropriate to use that phenomenon to show how governments and others behave as fools on grave issues.

The popular view of environmentalism and terrorism among presumably better-informed persons is approximately as follows. Modern environmentalism is a revival of the nineteenth-century fads associated with the influence of Reverend Thomas Malthus and the machine-stormers of "General Ludd." Sociologically, the late-1960s revival of Malthusian doctrines appears to be rooted in the existentialist revivals of the postwar years, with such manifestations as Jean-Paul Sartre's (re-Voltaire's) influence and the "beat generation" and the complementary "Mailerism" in the United States. It appears that present-day environmentalist cults' dogmas originate with the 1964 publicity campaign in behalf of a Ford Foundation-funded project, the "Triple Revolution Committees'" doctrine of a "postindustrial society." During late 1969, the "environmentalist" movement as such was launched on a grand scale through concerted efforts by leading financial circles allied to the Secret Intelligence Service circles of the City of London.

In this summation, we have limited the report to those

typical points which are factually accurate as far as they take the matter. The facts are each true, but the image they suggest is false in Spinoza's sense of *inadequate* or *fictitious* knowledge.

No person with basic knowledge of the actual history of European-centered civilization would make the blunder of accepting such a fictitious view of the environmentalist and terrorist movement as adequate. The argument made by the present-day environmentalist cults is *older than Hesiod*. Since Hesiod (and earlier) every environmentalist ferment employing such arguments has been organized on the principles of the Phrygian cult of Dionysus — which is itself an environmentalist cult, like those promoted by the London-based Amnesty International, and by the London-created and London-controlled World Federalists. From that view, the way in which international terrorist cults and Maoist cults are situated within the environmentalist cult-movement is understood as a necessary connection, not a special contingency of the modern circumstances. No cults such as today's European and North American terrorists, today's international terrorists, have appeared in the thousands of years of Mediterranean-centered history except as an integral part of a broader "environmentalist" cult.

No person with a minimal degree of actual competence in history could accept the proposal that today's terrorists are a "sociological phenomenon" of the separate nations they simultaneously afflict. *No dionysian cult has ever been developed in recorded history except at the instigation of and under the controlling influence of the cult of Apollo or a successor cult of that apollonian sect.*

Perhaps the ordinary official or citizen, traveling on his ship of fools, bristles with professed incredulity against the report that the British ruling circles around the monarchy are behind terrorism. Here we are confronted once again by the man or woman whose knowledge of politics reaches not much further than yesterday morning's newspaper.

What is British secret intelligence? Any qualified historian ought to know.

During the sixteenth century the Black Guelph forces then centered in Genoa created a new international intelligence network, which included England's Cecils and Cecil protege Francis Bacon. Genoa, Geneva, Amsterdam, and London were, from 1593-1603 onward, the principal points of a main axis of Black Guelph oligarchical factional organization down to the present date. To either side of this Genoa-Geneva-Amsterdam-London-Edinburgh axis, the oligarchical faction spreads its tentacles into every antitechnology Saustall-Graf family of Europe, and into the pro-usury tax farming families of the world's financial aristocracy.

In the shifting constellations of modern European

history, the center of political organization and power of the aristocratic oligarchical faction moved toward London, being consolidated in that location during the interval 1772-1784, during the period from the 1772-1773 crisis of the Geneva, Amsterdam and London banks to the accession of Lord Shelburne's protege, William Pitt the Younger. Since that point, reinforced by the order of Europe traced from the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, the ruling strata of the Europe-wide oligarchical faction have coordinated their networks with the British monarchy and its Secret Intelligence Service, as the adopted headquarters of their factional resources.

Whoever is astonished at evidence that the British monarchy is in ultimate control of the environmentalist cults and international terrorism thus defines himself as just another passenger on a ship of fools.

The key case from modern history which most directly and usefully illustrates the point is the Jacobin Terror dominating the period 1792-1794. The importance of this illustration is underlined by pointing to the fact that the notions of "right-center-left" gradations in politics, the myths which grip the minds of the credulous at all levels of political life today, are a product of the accident of seating arrangements in the French assembly during the pre-1795 period.

Whoever believes that there exist "principled" differences between "right" and "left" in political life, or principled arguments supporting a "right-center-left" constellation, is our ordinary passenger on a ship of fools. He or she understands absolutely nothing of real politics, of how the world is run in fact. The historical facts concerning the Jacobin Terror ought to suffice to expose mythical delusions.

Danton and Marat were both, in simple matter of fact, agents of the British Secret Intelligence Service. They were trained under Pitt's SIS in London, in part under the supervision of SIS executive Jeremy Bentham. They were deployed from London to Paris to launch the Terror. The political base into which they were deployed was the Rousseauvian Jacobin faction of Necker protege Robespierre. Necker, in turn, was, like the Duke of Orleans, a British agent. Geneva-based, Necker, together with his daughter, Madame de Stael, was a continuity of British agency from his appointment to wreck France's finances and credit through and beyond the events of 1815. His daughter, Madame de Stael, worked as a British agent in both France and Germany, and in collusion with British agent Talleyrand.

The primary targets of the Terror were the allies of Vergennes, Turgot, Benjamin Franklin, and Lafayette. The issue of the Terror was London's determination to prevent U.S. Federalist agent Thomas Paine and the circles around Turgot's political heirs from securing France's adoption of a political order based on the model of the U.S. Constitution.

To accomplish this, Danton and Marat deployed as Jacobin demagogues to "arouse the sansculottes of Paris." The marching orders were issued to the petty demagogues of this rabble through Marat's *L'Ami du Peuple* (*The Friend of the People*). Contrary to the myth, the sansculottes were not the Paris proletariat in the sense of a working-class force. They were the lumpen dregs of the French countryside, herded into Paris through lure of welfare schemes. By concentrating this dionysian battering ram in the capital city, Paris, London aimed at decapitating France.

Were these sansculottes, then, nonetheless, a "sociological phenomenon"? British secret intelligence, in displaying an excess of scholarly zeal, left the scholar no doubt on this point. The uniform of the sansculottes was designated as a *Phrygian cap*, a bit of ancient Greek classicism which no illiterate French lumpen peasant can be blamed for "spontaneously" adopting. SIS consciously developed the sansculottes as a replication of the Phrygian cult of Dionysus.

Although the included victims of the Terror's guillotine were elements of the French landed aristocracy, the central target of the Jacobins was France's humanist intelligentsia. Exemplary is the statement of the Jacobin judge who condemned Lavoisier to the guillotine, "The Revolution has no need for men of science." If they could have lain hands on Lazare Carnot, they would have butchered him as they did Lavoisier.

Also exemplary is the case of Lafayette, the case on which Beethoven based his single opera, *Fidelio*. Lafayette, driven into exile from France by the British monarchy's Jacobins, was imprisoned by German allies, and languished, under British orders, in a miserable Austrian dungeon outside Vienna. It was the heroic effort of Lafayette's wife to rescue him which inspired the heroine Leonora, of Beethoven's opera, an opera in which Pitt, the author of the arrangement, appears as the monster. *Pizarro*. Notably, Madame de Stael and Talleyrand showed their British SIS hands in the Lafayette affair.

Although foolish self-styled "leftists," self-styled Marxists included, note regrettable ignorance and other unfortunate aspects of the Jacobins, these "leftists" have nonetheless sought their own political ancestry from that origin, throughout the nineteenth century into the twentieth, more or less to the present date. The professed "antileftists" heartily endorse such a "leftist" choice of pedigree.

What a farce! The adopted *Uropa* of "leftism" proves to be a tool of the profeudalist European oligarchical faction! If some French aristocrats lost their heads in the process, they were, from London's vantage-point, *French* aristocrats, whose lopped heads were rolled into the service of the Hanoverian cause.

If a second illustrative case is wanted, the pedigree of Bakunin's anarchists suffices. Bakunin, already a police-provocateur during the events of the 1840s, was subsidized by the Rothschilds, on behalf of SIS, during the late 1860s and early 1870s. The direct subsidy from Rothschild to Bakunin was conduited through the covert means of Rothschild purchase of the estates of a British agent, the Russian Alexander Herzen. The other elements of the instant-creation of the anarchist international were created by similar financial arrangements through French, Genevan, Neapolitan, Genoese, Spanish, German and Dutch banks, Rothschild and other. Since the 1870s, the Swiss base for this operation, Geneva and the nearby Jura district, has functioned continuously as the principal safe-house for terrorist forces of Europe. Each of the principal destabilization operations for which anarchist assassins were used — notably including the assassination of Czar Alexander II and U.S. President William McKinley, were accomplished under control of SIS networks in service of one of the British monarchy's political operations.

If today's environmentalist and terrorist deployments are examined on the basis of principles proved by thousands of years of Mediterranean and European combined history, one may not discover immediately each and every lead connecting the British monarchy to each and every individual. The evidence is nonetheless conclusive. The controlling forces turned up prove to be SIS-controlled, in the same general fashion as for the Jacobin and anarchist cases.

Could the forces allied with the British monarchy use environmentalism and international terrorism to manipulate governments and political moods for one week's duration if the truth concerning these SIS-linked cults were acknowledged? In this example we have an excellent illustration of the "ship of fools" principle. The obsessive ignorance and delusions of most leading political circles and the general electorate combined is the indispensable precondition on which the perpetuation of covert oligarchical factional power to manipulate the credulous depends. If credulous governmental figures and the

general electorate ceased to be credulous, if they abandoned the delusion that politics are ordered in principle on "right-center-left" lines, the ability of the oligarchy to turn whole nations into ships of fools would evaporate.

As long as history remains a behind-the-scenes battle between the forces of the two inner elites, the history of nations and the world has the form of one small band or another seizing the helm of a ship of fools. The lower echelons of the crew — the state bureaucracy — and the passengers may or may not note the changes of control and course which occur in this fashion. Whether they observe or not, they play no *initiating* part in the changes



Russia's Czar Peter the Great, shown supervising the building of the Sts. Peter and Paul Fortress in his new capital of St. Petersburg in 1703, developed his transcontinent-wide program for urbanizing Russia at the instigation of Leibniz.

in direction, and tend as readily to tolerate evil as good.

It is the minimal requirement, for the sake of humanity, that the humanist elite prevail in each crisis. When the oligarchical elite prevails, mankind suffers a hideous, new catastrophe, usually during the short to medium term. If the humanist elite prevails, the people may remain fools, and the nation a ship of fools — *but at least the fools survive.*


As long as people in general remain *sheep*, we of the humanist inner elite are obliged to be *shepherds*. If the sheep survive the crisis now before us, then and only then is it possible that they or their descendants might be transformed into true human beings in later times. So, if no better way is open to the shepherds, shepherds must continue to deploy as an inner elite, to seize the helms of ships of fools. That success is of no small importance, yet

success — human survival — achieved in that elitist way is a risky business.

Foolishness must not persist forever; the general population must not remain forever sheep.

It is perhaps pretty rhetoric to speak such fine-sounding words as “freedom” and “democracy.” No known political swindler has been unable to intone such words with what he or she deems expedient sonorousness whenever such utterance appeared to be a matter of short-term factional advantage. Such rhetorical arts pertain to the buying and selling — and sometimes the slaughtering — of foolish electoral sheep. They have nothing to do with reality, but only with rhetoric.

What do such words mean in practice if the people of a nation do not know the reality to which their judgment ought to be addressed? What means the power to cast a ballot if there is an absence of the knowledge which informs one accurately what each choice implies? To speak of “freedom” and “democracy” is a fraud, a hoax —



The U.S. capital was planned as a celebration of the urban-industrial goals of the newly founded American republic. The Founding Fathers were direct successors of the city-building tendency centered around Leibniz. Shown: President George Washington views the construction of the White House.

albeit, oftentimes unintentionally a fraud — unless the electorate — and governments — are lifted out of the fog of prevailing delusions and ignorance to know what are the real choices, what are the actual consequences of such choices. To speak of “freedom” and “democracy” is but to hammer on empty brass pots, unless the citizens are raised in knowledge toward the level of the elites.

The function of academies in the Platonic tradition — obviously, we have nothing in common with

“academies” of chinchilla-breeding or “academies” of Zen-Buddhist toothpick-knitting — is, at a minimum, to develop the inner humanist elite, to transform persons of humanist orientation into adequately informed members of an inner elite. That was the objective of the Academy at Athens, the Academy at Florence which Cosimo de’ Medici founded on the prompting of Platonist Georgios Gemisthos Plethon, the academies founded on the prompting of Leibniz and of Benjamin Franklin.

The second, more ambitious purpose of Platonic academies is to promote the lifting of the general electorate into the ranks of those who know the knowledge of the elite.

NEOPLATONISTS TODAY

The humanist forces of modern industrialized nations, such as the Federal Republic of Germany and my own United States, are broadly divided into two general

classifications. There is a tiny proportion among dedicated humanists who, like my immediate associates and myself, are more or less adequately informed as Neoplatonic scholars and scientists. There is a larger proportion of humanists, proportionately much larger, who are organically committed to humanist policies and outlooks, but who lack the knowledge to match the outlook.

The latter, the “organic” humanists, are those persons committed to progress in science and technology as national and global policies. These include skilled workers, who celebrate a humanist identity in their commitment and achievements in increasing their knowledge

and skill, and in seeing this self-improvement as the source of benefits to humanity. They include industrialists who share in part the impulses of the *tamkaru*, bankers like Juergen Ponto. In the political parties, as the old German Center Party current from which Chancellor Adenauer emerged, or among the German Social Democratic Party *Kanalarbeiter*, there are also such humanists.

Unfortunately, since 1968 — most emphatically —

there has been an accelerating degeneration of the quality of education and public morality throughout most of Europe and the United States. In both aspects of the matter, this decay correlates with the antiscience irrationalism of the "environmentalist" cults and the emergence of the international terrorists and their sympathizers and apologists.

If we compare the standard curricula of public schools and universities of past decades, and look more closely at the content of course-material and training and selection of teachers and professors, we see that — especially since approximately 1968, but notable some years earlier — there has been an accelerating degeneration of the content of education. This degeneration within education correlates with a degeneration in the general cultural levels represented by contents and topics of newspapers, magazines, entertainment, and so forth.

The possibility of establishing new democratic republics, and of defending the viability of those which exist, is being destroyed, at a rapid pace, by depriving the public of competent education and of the benefits of an informative, uplifting cultural experience.

A few illustrations aid in focusing attention on the nature of this decay.

At the close of the 1960s, there was a campaign in the United States for "reforming" public education by means of a doctrine known as "the new mathematics." This doctrine, wherever it was introduced, had a predictably destructive effect on the potentiality of students for scientific and related work. In language instruction and related fields, "linguistics" was emphasized, destroying the ability of victimized students to develop intelligent insight into the uses of language, and undermining their potential for understanding classical and other important literary artistic works. A similar, destructive program was introduced as musical miseducation.

This was associated with an extremist version of the philosophical radicalism associated with William James and John Dewey, whose most hideous, widespread expression was the dogma associated with Ivan Illich — the use of the doctrine of "deschooling" as a guide to proposals for educational reforms.

The *direction* introduced into educational policy by the followers of Illich, Chomsky, and so on, is toward what might be termed an "education" which is "relevant" to members of modern dionysian cults in a "post-industrial society." Educational reform, so-called, as occurring currently in a post-1968 emphasis upon budgetary austerity in education, medicine and so forth, has moved substantially in the directions proposed by the "deschoolers."

The content and environment of education and culture of youth today yields a student of next-to-nonexistent concentration-span, of reduced capacity for forming or assimilating concepts, and most tenuous sense of an identity within the real world as a whole. The emphasis is

upon sensual, infantile-like gratification of the individual per se. Worse than at almost any point in decades of the general experience of adults in their forties or older, the individual youth and young adult or adult is victimized by a vanishing sense of moral purpose in his or her life. The graduate of today's schools and universities is biologically an adolescent or adult, but morally an infant or young child. No significant internal maturation of the moral-intellectual powers of judgment has been accomplished even by standards prevailing during the 1950s or early 1960s.

This moral decay of public schools and universities generally throughout "Western civilization" means that the average youth and young adult of today has less mental and moral capability for assimilating humanist knowledge than during the 1950s and 1960s. This is the chief problem humanist educators of today confront. This is also the problem to which the work of present-day Neoplatonist academy-movements must address themselves. Not only must such academy-movements address themselves to the needs of their own, more-selected groups of participants; they must focus on the need of qualified, dedicated educators and others for assistance in reversing the present, ongoing degeneration of curricula and course-content in public and university education.

The university-sited Neoplatonic educator of today is politically cautious. This caution is understandable. A besieged minority within public and university education, the humanist educator, scholar, and scientist, works within an increasingly aversive *political* environment. Galloping antihumanism is on the ascendancy in the educational policies of governments and most educational institutions. The humanist educator who shows signs of militant opposition to the ongoing degeneration in education marks himself or herself for victimization. His or her budgets will be cut, his or her classes, access to promising students, will be reduced, or he or she might be pushed out of posts by bureaucratic deviousness.

Let there be no evasion of the fact of the matter. There is a vicious inquisition against humanist influences throughout Western civilization (and, also, signs of a similar inquisition being pushed, with aid of Western influences, in the East bloc). This inquisition is being conducted by those who are the loudest in public utterances concerning "freedom" and "democracy," the most boisterous in professing the policy of "pluralism." This inquisition is the circumstance which confronts — and often frightens — honest and qualified men and women in educational institutions and connected aspects of public life.

In the main, qualified humanists still holding out in educational and related institutions have dug into fox-holes, and spend perhaps as much effort in camou-

flaging the foxholes as in practicing their humanist profession. Although numerous of these persons are eminently qualified to undertake the sort of public activity the academy-movement represents, most would not dare initiate so conspicuous an effort in behalf of humanism.

The work of the academy-movement has several specific duties under these circumstances:

1. The academy-movement must do what humanist institutions must always do: assemble existing humanist knowledge, and develop instructional programs around ongoing humanist research.
2. This research-activity must not be "contemplative." The distinction between "contemplative" and "active" life is an anti-Platonic, Aristotelian dogma, a policy rejected by Plato's Academy, and emphatically rejected by Leibniz and Benjamin Franklin in their resurrections of the academy-movement in their own time. Contrary to the perversions of the meaning of the term "academy" in degenerate connotations of the term "academic" today, an academy (in the sense of Plato, Plethon, Leibniz, and Franklin) is a research institution which brings the humanist knowledge of the ages to date into focus concerning the crucial policy issues of contemporary public life.
3. The most immediate reaching objective of an academy-movement is the development of qualified humanist public figures for present-day requirements of various institutions: trade-unions, scientific activities, industrial management, banking, and political parties. It must aid such institutions in developing their own programs for such institutions.
4. Although the academy-movement must be militantly humanist, *it must also be nonpartisan* respecting party affiliations. It must be dedicated to providing competent humanist knowledge to members of all political parties, and other institutions. Humanism has always been and must be catholic in its perspective: it is an ecumenical effort, to strengthen the humanist knowledge of leading forces of presently opposed (as well as presently allied) parties, nations, and so forth. This knowledge then serves as a commonality of knowledge through which conflicts are transformed into ecumenical forms of cooperation around discovered common interests. Humanism is concerned with what is done by the hands of man, but humanism addresses the soul guiding the hands, not the hands as existences-in-themselves.
5. The special function of the academy-movement in today's circumstances is to act as a catalytic agency, a force for fostering those circumstances in which quali-

fied humanist scholars and scientists may emerge from their foxholes.

Given those policies, any academy, such as the Wiesbaden Academy of Humanist Studies, must be itself an ecumenical institution in dedication and practical orientation. Only a dedicated force can bring such an institution into being under present circumstances. This implies a partisan force in the ordinary sense of that term. Nonetheless, the institution must be ecumenical. This means that the control of the institution as an institution is open to all qualified and dedicated Neoplatonic humanists, and that such humanists, of whatever existing political-party or other institutional identification, are the appropriate candidates for research and instructional positions in the work of the academy.

Those branches of the emerging, international academy-movement with which I am more closely associated have one additional responsibility. The special responsibility, distinct from those of academies initiated by other qualified humanist scholars and scientists, is an included emphasis upon the integration of *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*.

The remaining portions of this celebrative report are dedicated to clarifying the leading features of that special dedication.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMICS

Any individuals or circles which have studied carefully the activities of the International Caucus of Labor Committees, the political association initiated and developed by my continuing efforts of the past twelve years, note that the leadership of that institution presently centers around political figures who are also qualified scholars and scientists. In the selective process which governed recruitment to the organization, the content and implications of my own basic, one-semester course in my method and economic-theoretical work, emphasized young persons who were either already professionals, or among the most gifted strata of university graduate and undergraduate students of the late 1960s and very early (pre-1973) 1970s.

At the same time that such members have continued their professional self-development as such, the internal life of the organization has itself been organized around an interconnection between political-intelligence professional work and the kind of intellectual life which ought to characterize a modern university. Inevitably, the emergence of leading strata has emphasized persons selected for combined qualifications in political leadership, political-intelligence professionalism, and an efficient dedication to advanced theoretical work in at least one branch of specialist inquiry.

Many of those members who, as scholars and scientists, have gained professional recognition during recent years would have most probably been more or less

successful in any suitable circumstances. The way in which membership was selectively determined is the point to be emphasized in that connection. However, a further most important qualification must be added: none of them would have been as fruitful as they have been as scholars or scientists, except through the development they accomplished as members of the organization. The difference indicated is qualitative, not merely of degree.

At first inspection, this superior quality of personal achievement is properly associated with the intensity of task-oriented "interdisciplinary" collaboration among scholars and professionals which the organization's work has demanded. The method as well as the intensity of the collaboration is to be noted. *Geisteswissenschaft*, as represented by so-called "liberal arts" professions, has been directly interlinked with *Naturwissenschaft*. The means for accomplishing this has been the method intrinsic to my principal achievements in economic science.

To put my role in the proper perspective, one must acknowledge the correctness of the judgment of many students of the organization's work. During the past two years, most emphatically, politicians, scientists, scholars, industrialists, and so forth have professed themselves astonished by the quality of the organization's accomplishments in theoretical physics, matters of energy-development policies, political science, and other fields. This astonishment has prompted some of them to gather accumulated elements of the organization's publications over a period of years, with emphasis on my own considerable literary output. It is frequently observed, and correctly so, how significantly my own knowledge and intellectual powers have developed during the past dozen years.

Although the specific knowledge I have represented at various points in my adult life, especially from 1966 onwards, has been at that point an important, positive determinant of the organization's successful development to its present quality, that detailed knowledge in itself does not account for *the progress in knowledge*. Granted, prior to 1973, the organization was entirely outside the "corridors of power," and suffered the difficulties which anyone looking in on power from the outside must tend to experience. Hence, excessive value might be attributed to

such influences as the rich experience of the "inside of power" the organization has gained since early 1974, especially since mid-1975.

What must be adduced to account for the qualitative advancement of my own knowledge and intellectual powers during recent years? My own case exemplifies the basic principle of the progress of science generally. The essential feature of scientific knowledge is not the presumably finished body of knowledge possessed at any given point. The essential feature is the creative method, which energizes, and directs those discoveries through which successive revolutions in scientific knowledge are achieved.

My special advantage as a successful, creative personality of some, increasing influence in affairs, is that I have conscious command of those internal, creative processes through which this process is energized. Although I command this knowledge in a far richer way than I did during 1966, or 1973, the distinctive feature of the organization is that all my political and correlated work has been governed by a competent grasp of the essentials of this principle, a scientific knowledge of the principle of creativity which was centrally situated, as empirically grounded knowledge, in my knowledge of the way in which I accomplished my notable fundamental contributions to scientific knowledge of economic processes.

It was this knowledge of the creative process, embedded in the development of the organization in respect of the consciously adopted and governing method, which shaped the development of the organization and its leading professionals of today. It is the combined resources so represented by the richly developed organization of today which enable the organization to effect a distinctive, almost irreplaceable contributing element to the

Jacobin soldiers from the Paris mobs organized by British agents Danton and Marat invade the laboratory of Antoine Lavoisier, shown in an 18th century engraving. The Jacobin judge who sent Lavoisier to the guillotine said, "The Revolution has no need for men of science."



furtherance of Neoplatonic humanism at this historic juncture.

It may be objected that the press of the world does not tout my celebrity, and that universities use my work in classrooms only to a limited degree. Nonetheless, any objection to the hubris of my autobiographical approach to these matters reflects either ordinary ignorance of the work of the organization or, more frequently, the calumnies directed against the organization's work by British-influenced factional forces. I, as a leading element of the organized forces I represent, have achieved some outstanding contributions to knowledge in my adult life, and am, on this point, the most articulate among that relative handful of living persons whose own creative successes are complemented by a conscious grasp of the nature of the creative processes behind such successes — successes by others in various fields as well as my own case.

In particular, in addition to accounting for the guiding methodological principle underlying the development of the organization, at this moment my own case provides the best approach to comprehension of the *direct* connection between *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*.

One further observation should be added here respecting the material included in the following report. Overall, any Neoplatonic scholar will recognize a representation which is consistent with the essentials of Neoplatonic humanism from Thales through Leibniz. What is added to that knowledge here is nothing but a concretization of that (Neoplatonic) knowledge with respect to two facets of the matter. This is, first, the significance of the fundamental discoveries of B. Riemann in physics for solving the connection between

Geisteswissenschaft and *Naturwissenschaft*. It is, secondly, my own refinement of the empirical psychology which has been Platonic knowledge concerning that connection from the beginning. It is the bringing of these elements together in this way, with a focus on the "thermodynamics" of technological progress, which realizes philosophical knowledge as empirical scientific knowledge of that crucial connection.

It is sufficient, as a matter of general background, to report that a chronological reading of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Rousseau, Hume, bits of Kant and other such writings made me a dedicated follower of Leibniz by the age of fourteen. A later, impassioned study of the *Critique of Pure Reason* focused my interest on solving the Kantian formulation of the problem during and following the sixteenth year of my life. This background, combined with an adolescent exposure to, and continuing involvement in management consulting, imbued me with a certain degree of contempt for many things represented as education, including, most notably, my early and valid view of accredited theoretical economics, as the worst sort of incompetence both in method and fact.

The crucial formal problem of economics is that of systematically predicting and accounting for the effects of a consistent application of technological progress in respect to desired improvements in the fundamental ratios of social productivity in the economy taken as a primary whole. This problem of economics is properly recognized as a way of viewing the general business of the effects of human scientific creativity in positive transformations of social practice generally. Hence, since creativity per se is the facet of *Geisteswissenschaft*, and since society's deliberate acts of mastery of nature are the



matter of *Naturwissenschaft*, the posing of that indicated theoretical-economic problem is an efficient approach for gaining empirically grounded access to the most fundamental problems of scientific knowledge as a whole.

Looking backwards toward technological advances of the past, the fact that scientific and technological transformations of the mode of production have been the necessary alternatives to fixed technologies is undeniable. After the fact of their appropriately realized practice, individual scientific discoveries and subsumed inventions are usually accessible to empirical proof of their merits in the same known general way. The problem is that of seeing the same positive connection from the present into the future. The problem is one of *promethean* powers: will the bringing of fire to mankind produce a determinable significant benefit?

Every qualified industrial manager knows that the promethean view is the correct one. However, faced with the opposition from financial officers and the financiers' gaggle of accountant "geniuses," how does the industrial manager defend the necessity of technological progress in particular to persons, such as accountants, who are intrinsically incompetent in industrial management by professional training and orientation?

The same problem is manifest in the hideous incompetence of that branch of the British colonial office known as the World Bank. (British colonial office professionals formed the initial core of the World Bank staff, and determined the policies and internal practices which characterize the policies and practices of the World Bank to this date.) Every qualified observer can attest that World Bank approaches to industrial and agricultural development projects have transformed potentially viable investments into disasters. Yet, few are willing to challenge directly the "cost-benefit analysis" methods by which such World Bank incompetence is intrinsically predetermined.

Those of us experienced in this domain of practice recall with acute pain the frequently near-fatal consequences of "efficiency drives" launched, for example, by the self-esteemed geniuses of the industrial firm's or bank's accounting departments. In respect of national economies, the reports of the German government for 1936-1937, or the reports of the U.S. government for the 1939-1941 military production expansion show the problem involved. Weimar and Nazi Germany had been looted by Versailles reparations and by the austerity programs which Warburg-guided Hjalmar Schacht instituted in 1923-1924, 1928-1933, and as Nazi finance minister. The United States had been looted by austerity conditions of the 1929-1939 period. This savage depletion of tools of production and labor force, the emphasis on "asset stripping" and on labor-intensive forms of production of marginalized plant and labor

force, brought both economies to the point of threatened irreversible collapse in their ability to continue producing. There is a point at which continuation of reduced maintenance of capital goods, lowering of real wages, reductions of social services, increasing the work-tempo, shift toward emphasis on labor-intensive forms of marginal employment, and so forth, passes over from short-term increases in apparent profits, to downward spirals in social productivities in real terms, and then downward spirals in profit rates in accounting terms. Beyond a certain point of inevitability, this downward spiral becomes essentially irreversible. The same principle applies to individual industrial firms.

Accountants, insofar as we can view them in abstraction as merely accountants, are intrinsically incompetent in industrial management, because accounting, as presently defined, denies the efficient existence of that primary element of economy on which capitalist profitability absolutely depends. We are emphasizing *real* profitability, as distinct from *nominal*, or *accounting* profitability. However, a sustained collapse of real profitability precedes and causes an inevitable collapse in accounting, or nominal profitability. Since accounting doctrine does not recognize the existence of the real elements of social productivity or social productivity development in agriculture or industrial firms, the accountant usually assumes that reductions in paid-out costs can be made, gaining short-term increases in nominal profits on paper, by overlooking the collapse of productivities over the medium to long term.

The problem of economy, as Leibniz emphasized, is that of simultaneously increased profits and real wages. This riddle can only be solved through technological progress.

It is notable that Karl Marx's *Capital* contains no competent assessment or systematic analysis of this crucial problem as such. There are several reasons for this blunder within Marx's work. The notable error of Marx — with respect to the matter as we have situated it here — is exhibited most immediately in what Marx's editor, Friedrich Engels, published as the concluding chapter of *Capital* Volume II. This chapter is composed of a collection of fragments which Engels juxtaposed because of their appropriateness to Marx's efforts to resolve a problem he assigned to that general location of the volume in question. These fragments reflect Marx's effort to develop a systematic analysis of "extended reproduction" on the basis of models for "simple reproduction." These models failed for the same axiomatic reason modern accounting practice intrinsically fails. No solution to the problem posed can be accomplished in that way.

Marx's error serves as a most efficient illustration of the nature of the theoretical-economic problem. This is

notably the case because, as the middle and concluding portions of *Capital* Volume III attest most efficiently, he was determined to solve the problem of situating the notion of systematic effects of technological progress within a model for capitalist extended reproduction (expansion through investment of profits in expanded and improved means of production). The fact that he fell prey to the same methodological error that better accountants do, isolates the methodological problem from other complicating considerations in study of Marx's own failure on this account.

The construction of a model of simple reproduction (simply maintaining the existing scale and quality of production) does lend itself apparently to formal, arithmetic solutions of problems of analysis in terms of simultaneous linear equations. If such a model — simple reproduction — is mistakenly adopted as the simplest case for economic reproduction in general, the gross blunder is made of assuming that systems of linear differential equations can solve the problem of analysis of extended reproduction to the extent of admitting inclusion of technological progress as an additional element of such analysis. This blunder Marx committed. Among notable Marxists, only Rosa Luxemburg recognized that this was indeed the crucial formal blunder of Marx's *Capital*. Various others have attempted to correct Marx's obvious failure from the vantage-point of simultaneous linear equations, yielding purported remedies which are infallibly worse than the disease. *The problem does not admit of solution by such methods.*

The problem can be solved only from the vantage-point of Riemann's fundamental conceptions of relativistic physics. It was by reassessing Riemannian physics from the vantage-point of G. Cantor's conception of the transfinite, that I discovered the comprehensive solution to Marx's error during my work of the 1952-1954 period.

It is notable that my programmatic analyses of the current monetary and economic crises have periodically won wide interest among political banking and industrialist circles, as well as trade-union circles, in numerous countries. This has been notable during the post-1974 period, but dates in principle from the aftermath of the 1971 International Monetary Fund crisis. These programmatic analyses have been entertained as credible and applicable among some of the leading financial and related circles, among others.

Yet, apart from purely political pressures radiating from London-centered circles of politics and finance, the chief reason those programs have not been adopted openly by some central financial institutions is that my programmatic analyses project results different from those indicated by "cost-benefit analysis" approaches to computer studies. That is, the best judgment of qualified leading figures frequently recognizes the appropriateness of my analyses, but those persons' subordinates, down in

the accounting and computer-studies department, repeatedly produce a contrary judgment. The problem is that the computers used are all programmed for a totally incompetent doctrine of economic accounting. The same incompetence I successfully correctly solved beginning in the 1952-1954 period, the incompetence intrinsic to what is termed "cost-benefit analysis."

I do not know to what degree the competence of myself and my immediate associates is unique in today's world. In a Japanese writing published at the beginning of the 1970s, which my associates have recently discovered among a collection of related productions by Japanese thinkers, there is an economic-theoretical conception put forth which is identical with my own discoveries in this side of the matter. Furthermore, I know that the Japanese current which produced that achievement is the humanist current which has been chiefly responsible for both the Meiji revolution of 1868 and for the Japanese economic miracles of both the late nineteenth century and the postwar period of Japanese recovery. If those Japanese have not fully reproduced my own achievements in breadth, they are one of the few forces in the world presently capable of having done so.

As a collateral matter, I briefly outline the background history of my achievements in economics, before turning to the internal features illuminated by noting the intersection of my own development with the influence of the Neoplatonist Riemann.

The first successful application of the "models" I derived from my 1952-1954 breakthrough in economic science was accomplished at the close of 1956, in predicting the timing and special character of the 1957-1958 U.S. recession. Through continued work, by early 1958, I had proceeded on the same basis to predetermine the timing and character of an ongoing succession of general monetary crises which must erupt beginning the middle of the 1960s. The further work along these lines focused on both a deeper examination of the special character of the new approach to an ensuing general depression, and the programmatic approaches for preventing transformation of monetary spirals into a new depression of a new, most profound sort.

It was the manifest incompetence of any available political associations in existence to assimilate this economic science, or, consequently, to work for such necessary corrective programs, which impelled me to establish a new political association, an association which developed the rounded internal qualifications the task indicated as necessary.

This issue is not one of the ability of individuals and groups within existing political associations to *use* such conceptions. The issue is the difference between persons qualified to operate an automobile, and those qualified to produce one. Insofar as preexisting institutions were

confronted with the task of considering my work *as the contribution of an individual*, they were incompetent to do so. They could be brought to the point of using such contributions *only when the contributions had first demonstrated their importance through forms of organized social practice*. What was needed was a new *kind of political association*, one qualified to transform conceptions into the form of social practice, which could *then be seen as useful and necessary by other kinds of institutions*.

RIEMANNIAN PHYSICS

The role of Riemann in furthering my own development is properly judged crucial both in my success as an economic scientist, and in the way this economic-science achievement properly affected the methodological approach ingrained in the work of the organization.

The crucial feature of Riemann's genius, the feature of his work which has frightened many commentators, is that he achieved his most fundamental discoveries through a direct application of Neoplatonic principles and method. It is known that he moved from the study of theology to physics, like Karl Weierstrass. What is either overlooked or obsessively denied is that he achieved his successes in physics through the direct application of Neoplatonic *Geisteswissenschaft* to the fundamental problem of *Naturwissenschaft*.

He accomplished, if in a restricted way, what no prominent figure since Leibniz had accomplished before him. He accomplished the conceptualization of the elementary common premises of *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*.

This led Riemann directly to his greatest single achievement, the achievement reflected in his outline of the fundamental problem of hypothesis in physics knowledge. This was not merely the most fundamental of Riemann's contributions to physics knowledge. It is the point of reference from which all of his important work must be studied — otherwise, crucial features of his work must be misinterpreted.

Exemplary of the problem is the misunderstanding of Riemannian relativistic physics by Albert Einstein, Hermann Weyl and others. The Einstein-Weyl program for relativistic physics is usually described as coinciding with a Riemannian physics. Such an opinion represents a grave misunderstanding on the part of Einstein, Weyl and others. The fact that some of the apparatus developed by Cauchy; Riemann et al. was employed by developers of the Einstein program, does not make the Einstein-Weyl program meaningfully Riemannian at all. Rather, Einstein, Weyl, et al. applied the apparatus adopted from Riemann (and others) to describe a universe according to a pre-Riemannian model developed earlier by Riemann's sponsor, Karl Gauss.

This distinction is important, and has important bearing on the connection between *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*. The problem is an elementary one, such that it can be represented without resort to complicated mathematical arguments; it involves only conceptual, not formal difficulties. We shall show the importance of the point and prove it here.

Let us now view Riemann as I came to view him during the 1952-1954 period.

What was clear to me at that point was the issue I have already identified. When we examine economic processes in terms of the creative element, technological progress, and on condition that we treat that element as the *primary ontological reality* of economic processes, we have immediately two results in hand. First, respecting economics as such, we have an *ontological* redefinition of economic processes which points to a feasible solution to the crucial problems; whereas, for axiomatic reasons, all alternative approaches must fail. Second, the instant the general empirical outcome of the human-creative process (scientific and related technological progress) is made primary in this way, the issue of the direct correspondence between the creative-mental processes and lawful ordering of nature is directly and efficiently posed as a problem of economic science.

It is through the manifest results of technological progress, in efficiently increasing our species' power over the lawful ordering of nature, that we demonstrate that *the*



West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt [r] and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing are carrying out the Grand Design policy enunciated by Leibniz today, through their program for a European Monetary System.

ordering of creative hypothesis is a perfectible process, in correspondence with the underlying lawful ordering of the universe. Therefore, economics *so defined* is the crucial experiment on which the empirical authority of all human knowledge depends.

Despite my hostile suspicions respecting the axiomatic structure of formalized mathematics, a conviction strengthened by youthful study of Leibniz, the approach I proposed to take toward thinking about economic fundamentals went against the weight of all conventional opinion. Not only were my insights contrary to the specific economic doctrines known to me, but they required a departure from a formal (mathematical) method as I then knew formal mathematics. These difficulties inhibited me from regarding my views as more than insights, imbued me with a fear that I might be in some way in danger of slipping off into a crankish channel of inquiry.

After struggling with this problem over some years, through many pathways, including biophysics, I was led to the solution through study of Cantor's notion of the transfinite. Cantor's notion made the implications of Riemann's fundamental conceptions comprehensible to me. This discovery enabled me to locate my own work within the framework of Riemann's and correlated precedents. I was freed of doubt concerning my own approach to economics, and strengthened by the specific line of approach to physics which the work of Riemann and Cantor opened up for me.

It is important to emphasize that without a grounding in Leibniz and Kant during the formative years of my adolescent life, I could not have grasped independently the significance of either Cantor or Riemann.

Sigmund Freud, who is a gifted but defective intellect in most aspects of his celebrated work, touched upon the crucial principle of physics in the concluding paragraphs of his *The Future of an Illusion*. Although that essay of Freud's includes grossly inadequate perceptions of religious belief, the concluding defense of a scientific psychology is the culminating achievement of Freud's contribution to human knowledge. The question of the reality of our knowledge of the "external" world is a question of how that world must appear to us because of the organization of our physiological-mental apparatus. If this view is properly situated, it leads directly to the most fundamental discoveries.

The essential feature of the human species, the feature which absolutely distinguishes man empirically from all other known forms of life, is the transformation of human social practice successively over the million or so

years of known paleontological, archeological and historical evidence of hominid existence. Whereas all other forms of life are limited in ranges of their possible behavior, in a manner which suggests a genetically-determined fixity of such ranges of behavioral potentialities, man has deliberately evolved the nature and power of his ranges of behavior. Technological progress is the facet of this process which is, inevitably, most directly accessible to investigation.

It is only as we focus on this aspect of the process, the creative-mental processes associated with realized, successive phases of progress in qualities of scientific knowledge of the universal, lawful ordering of nature, the determination of lawful alterations of nature by social practice, that we have focused upon that aspect of man which must be regarded as essential, as fundamentally human.

To turn Freud's words into a competent policy, we must mean by biological-mental apparatus emphasis upon those processes of thought which pertain to the successful production of scientific hypotheses. As I shall show here if simple, ordinary consciousness is considered primary with respect to human mental behavior, nonsense follows from efforts to apply Freud's formulation. If, however, the creative processes of mind are taken as primary, correct results are within reach. These creative processes of mind belong to the domain of what competent clinical psychologists term the *preconscious* processes.

Ordinary opinion views the conscious knowledge of an educated professional as relatively fundamental, and views the creative element as something added, an exogenous element, to the domain of conscious knowledge.



The collaboration between French President Charles de Gaulle [l] and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the 1950s and early 1960s was based on Leibniz's Grand Design conception.

The correct view treats conscious knowledge as secondary, determined, and the creative-mental processes which produced conscious knowledge as primary — primary in the ontological sense, as well as other senses.

Of this point Riemann was, in principle, directly conscious, and made that view the guiding conception for all his fundamental contributions to physics. *The only enduring truth is the efficiency of a certain method which is employed by the creative mental (preconscious) processes to create those hypotheses leading to the ongoing perfection of scientific knowledge.* Physics, in particular, becomes competent physics only as we define physics as *knowledge of the mental processes by which man demonstrably increases his mastery of the lawful ordering of the universe.*

We look to those empirically-analyzable aspects of mental creative processes (hypothesis-generating processes), in which scientific knowledge is generated. We assess the appropriateness of a particular method of generating hypotheses as such a method is demonstrated to be appropriate, relative to alternate methods, in effecting progress in the empirical domain of technological advancements of man's power of social practice over the universe.

Formally, the generalized Riemannian species of relativistic physics is determined and characterized by a universe which, for each successively given "physical geometry" n , is evolving into a universe of a "higher order physical geometry" $n+1$. Once the meaning of those words is understood, an entire new mastery of every branch of knowledge, including physics, ensues.

We focus on several implications of that, implications most directly bearing on the issue of the connection between *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*. In the course of outlining these selected implications, we aim inclusively at aiding the reader in getting beyond the verbal definition of Riemannian physics to discover the reality these words address.

The first error to be put aside in the reader's mind is the notions that the denotations n , $n+1$, $n+2$, and so forth should be seen as representing counting of new spatial or equivalent geometric dimensions. The inherent flaw of the notions of "physical geometries" derived from Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometries is that this approach incurs the metaphysical burden of aprioristic, scalar notions of extension of space, time, mass, and work. The insertion of such axiomatic assumptions into physics, for example, has repeatedly impelled those among the reckless formalists into inventing fairy-like entities, *Erdeister* whose very existence is nothing but a reification of the absurdities intrinsic to aprioristic physical geometries.

In former times, there were occasionally outbursts of metaphysical pandemics among susceptible persons obsessed with squaring circles and trisecting angles by means of linear constructions. Presently, we witness a

more severe aberration, the persisting discussion of non-existent "quarks," alleged by some to be a most elementary form of composition of subatomic particles. These "quarks" have no empirical existence, nor does any experimental evidence point toward such existences. The whole matter is, in effect, a debate concerning how many angels might be able to dance at one time on the point of a pin — thus asserting some refinement of the age over the cruder times, when the head of the pin was the focus of a grosser sort of interest in this same vein. The "quarks" have not been postulated to exist on the basis of any empirical evidence, direct observation or experimental inference. They have been invented solely to explain away the empirical evidence that the carried-over, dualistic approach to theoretical microphysics does not correlate with the experimental evidence. Wherever misinterpreted quantum theory produces an error, the metaphysicians fill up that lacuna with a member of the wholly imaginary but most fecund "quark" family.

The apparent formal problem of theoretical physics is that of superseding the kinds of metaphysical apriorism and related error which the borrowings of axiomatic Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometry creates in corresponding formal conceptions of physical geometry. Therefore, it ought to be axiomatically clear that insofar as Riemann's work is interpretable as a formalist non-Euclidean physical geometry, it could not be better than an improvement over other formalist sorts of physical geometries. Yet, it is clear that Riemann's fundamental notion of physical hypothesis does not signify any such formalistic physical geometry.

It was Cantor's work which clarified this problem for me. The denotations n , $n+1$, $n+2$, and so forth are not countings of "dimensionalities" of an aprioristic sort. They are denotations of orders of transfinites, *qualities of processes*. They are equivalent, mathematically and physically, to the characteristics of characteristically-dissimilar physical geometries.

The key role of the "world-line" principle in my own theoretical economics shows how and why that Cantorian view of the ordered qualities of a generalized Riemannian transformation is indispensable for solving the key, above-cited problem of economic science.

The significance of the distinction is most readily illustrated in the following way.

Human knowledge of physics today is divided into three qualitatively distinct universalities. (Bear in mind, we are emphasizing human knowledge, not the universe as it might be imagined to appear independently of present human knowledge.) The first of these three universalities is *inorganic physics*. This first quality we denote by n . The second is the universality of *organic physics*. This we denote by $n+1$. The third is the universality of human creative mental processes as manifest universally in human technological progress

since earliest paleontological hominid emergence. This we denote by $n+2$.

The first, n , it is customary today to characterize for knowledge by two, complementary notions. The first facet is the notion of the constant speed of light as an invariant principled measure of action. The complementary expression is derived directly from Leibniz's first postulation of the same physical principal, the expression $E=mc^2$. From the standpoint of a formal, non-Euclidean-based relativistic physical geometry of inorganic physics, the two complementary notions of invariance are reflections of one another — in the general way Leibniz's postulation of work equivalence puts the point. In this universality, it is usually deemed adequate that energy and constant speed of light be projectively equivalent *scalar* characteristics in that indicated sense.

The second universality, organic physics, living processes, is bounded at the lower conceptual extremity by the distinction between nonliving and living physical chemistries. It is characterized by *self-subsisting negentropy*. This characteristic is not a scalar, but represents, when situated with respect to organic evolution of the biosphere, a positive value for a nonlinear increase of biospherical negentropy.

The third universality, creative mental processes, involves the potentiality of creatively directed social practice for willfully changing the state of the universe from an existing to a higher order. It cannot be subsumed as a derived, dependent feature of simple organic physics — not as the latter is presently defined for human knowledge.

Historically, in the sense of physical history, the three universes are connected, first, by the emergence of the biosphere from the inorganic domain, and the subsequent emergence of the creative mental processes of man from the self-evolving biosphere. They are also connected by the fact that $n+1$ is lawfully efficient with respect to n , and that $n+2$ is lawfully efficient with respect to both $n+1$ and n .

Therefore, since the internal characteristics of each of these domains of human knowledge are mutually exclusive, but the domains are nonetheless causally multiply-connected, the distinct characteristics are coherent, and are dominated by a self-developing principle N , which is characteristic of the unfolding universe adduced for the coherence of the subsumed three.

Formally, the argument just summarized is unassailable. The difficulty modally confronting the reader, including theoretical physicists, is that only the case for n and $n+1$ is clear in apparent empirical terms of reference. The case for $n+2$ is probably *only formally* clear, not empirically. We shall remedy such a difficulty under the next general heading. Assured by that promissory note, the reader may proceed in moral contentment on this acknowledged point of difficulty.

It is notable, respecting the connection between n and $n+1$, that we have today a parallel case within experimental plasma physics.

We have in certain conditions of controlled thermonuclear processes the emergence of self-perpetuating "species" of entities such as "solitons." The existence of such entities was projected by de Broglie as early as 1956. These entities form a class, and have crucial features (parameters) in common with "particles" such as electrons, protons, neutrons, and so forth.

These arise in experiments in which the initial conditions, and causal elements of experimentally-controlled change which are introduced, are all ostensibly adequately accounted for by what passes up to this point as classical physics. That is, the initial conditions are all subject to adequate accounting in terms of causality and mathematical determinism as generally defined for physics. However, the experimental condition under which the special "nonlinear" class of phenomena appears is, as my associate Dr. Steven Bardwell emphasizes, causally linked to the initiating set of conditions, but the emergent condition is not determinable from the vantage-point of the initial conditions.

Moreover, as a leading U.S. physicist, Winston Bostick, has emphasized, if these special classes of solitons and related entities are studied in respect to the features they share in common with electrons, the existence of the electron itself ceases to be insolubly paradoxical.

Steering as closely as possible to layman's language, these indicated experimental conditions, when viewed from the vantage-point of notions of a generalized Riemannian universe as we have identified such notions here, as the local region of experimental physical space in which these phenomena occur, are singularities, so defined as a crossover of sorts between n -space and $(n+1)$ -space. It is most powerfully implied that the misnamed subatomic "particles" (and the important features of atoms and molecules as well) are also another subclass of singularities of that general sort.

This latter hypothesis coincides not only with the fact of the interface between organic and inorganic space but with known crucial features of biological processes. Certain types of molecules, which appear adequately explained as acting in one fashion in inorganic space, act in appropriate cases in a different fashion in organic space — but without giving up their efficient connection in inorganic space.

(The reader should bear in mind that the facts reported are based in one respect in the writer's close collaboration with plasma physicists and research biologists, with whom this approach has been intensively explored for purposes of directing research efforts. The authority of the writer is most emphatically premised on his special authority concerning economic and related

processes, a part of the same universe as a whole in which the kinds of process-principles described are dominant. In the immediately preceding illustration of the conception, the writer's methodological approach reflects his collaboration with physicists and biologists. In the general discussion of Riemannian universes and the configuration of inorganic, organic and mental spaces, the writer's authority is independent.)

Resuming the review of the n , $n+1$ and $n+2$ universe of varieties of present human knowledge, the following is to be emphasized. The efficiency of the $n+1$ and $n+2$ domains for actions in the n domain signifies that the interpretation of the n domain in terms of such a characteristic as the constant speed of light (or, $E=mc^2$) is inadequate, and hence — in the usage of Spinoza — *fictional*. In the "center" of the experimental domain of inorganic physics, the use of a scalar characteristic may be *pragmatically* adequate. However, this conventional sort of physics must collapse into incompetence under various circumstances.

The first three kinds of breakdowns of ordinary physics must be in "microphysics" ("infinitesimal"), in the effort to account for the known astronomical universe beyond the period of approximately ten billion years ago or at a corresponding breaking point in the billions-years-span future (the "astronomical infinite"), or in the effort to construct a "unified field" doctrine encompassing the ordering of all of the effects which may be lawfully experienced within the inorganic universe.

When the limits of inorganic physics are considered only in that way, the general result is that one recognizes the existence of an axiomatic fallacy in physics as presently defined. This is essentially the "field-particle" paradox, as that axiomatic fallacy of aprioristic physics troubled Parmenides and others more than two thousand years ago. The existence of the problem can be defined in this way, but there is no visible direction in which to seek an empirically verifiable solution as long as the problem is defined only in those inorganic terms of reference.

When the problem is shifted from the narrow constraints of inorganic physics per se to the connection of inorganic and organic domains, the hint of a solution immediately appears in principle. This fact is also one known over a span of thousands of years. Thus, we have the *hylozoic*-monist outlook whose outline is attributed to the Ionians, and the "noosphere" resurrections of the hylozoic outlook under the impact of Louis Pasteur's work (e.g., Vernadsky).

When hylozoism is carelessly proposed as a remedial approach to the problems of inorganic physics, one has tendencies toward *animistic* inorganic physics. This blunder correlates with an effort to collapse the $n+1$ domain of knowledge directly into the n domain. The reader might rightly suspect from what we have written

already what sort of an error such simplification of the hylozoic notions represents.

Such misguided approaches to *hylozoism* are avoided if the indispensable, "historical" posing of the empirical case is governed by the Riemannian outlook. The first point of reference is the emergence of the organic biosphere from the inorganic domain. This does not yield the basis for the desired solution, but it does provide the point of conceptual reference for progressing in the direction of the solution.

Dead and living processes are different domains. It is not the mere chemistry (in itself) of the constituents of a living organism which marks the dividing line between the living and dead substances. The distinction is the characteristic of living tissue as *tissue which is alive*. There are mediating phases, in which nonliving material is being assimilated into preexisting or emergently living processes, and there is the phase crossing over into tissue-death. Historically, the transition is the emergence of the biosphere from the inorganic domain.

"Life" is not a principle embedded *as a principle of life* in the inorganic physical domain as such. Rather, there is a developmental aspect to the unifying characteristic of the inorganic universe as a whole, a characteristic feature ignored in the notion of a scalar characteristic. It is the causal action of the self-developmental feature of this actual characteristic which itself goes over by evolution into the characteristic of living processes. The two conditions are causally linked but distinct.

Instead of looking directly at the characteristics of n , $n+1$, and $n+2$ separately, consider the characteristic of their coherence, N . N , instead of subsuming a scalar (e.g., constant speed of light) notion of aprioristic extension, is a notion of displacement (extension) such that displacement in the sense of negentropy is associated with negentropic alteration of the characteristic from one epoch of extension to the successor.

Returning from this vantage-point to the distinguished domains, n , $n+1$, and $n+2$, respectively, we have the following deduced observations. First (using the case of n =inorganic physics) we have it that the coherence of the characteristic of the n -domain within the N -domain is empirically apparent locally, only for those cases in which local events are oriented negentropically toward a point of singularity intersecting the $(n+1)$ -domain, and otherwise manifest paradoxically in the infinite, infinitesimal, aspects of the n -domain or in the effort to account for all of the characteristic phenomena of the n -domain as a unified whole.

What we are writing here will seem, at first, egregious, and offensively so, to many persons who regard themselves as professionals in the so-called physical sciences. I fully understand the nature of their confusion, their conceptual inadequacies on this account. They know little or nothing of the actual history of the so-called physical

sciences, but rather a deliberately falsified version of the history of science embedded in an exemplary way in modern university textbook practices. They do not know, for example, that what I am putting forward here is essentially a restatement of the point developed by Leibniz, a restatement premised on the accomplishments of such persons as Riemann, Cantor, and Felix Klein, and also advantaged by current developments in fundamental research in physics and biology.

These professionals find it more comfortable to overlook the events of the 1920s centering around the notorious Solvay conference. They overlook what forces allied with Bertrand Russell (presumably Einstein's acquaintance and "interpreter") did to attempt to break the will of Einstein. They overlook the evil campaign against the great Erwin Schroedinger, the evil campaign Ernst Mach and others earlier led against Max Planck, the campaign to slander and isolate the great de Broglie, and so forth. In continuing to tolerate the inquisitorial crimes committed against Schroedinger and others, these selfesteemed science professionals have cut themselves off from the most fruitful lines of scientific inquiry, and consequently find themselves limited in outlook to a so-called "orthodox" approach which is inherently sterile in all aspects of experimental inquiry bearing on the suppressed directions of inquiry of Schroedinger et al.

Some of the classical precedents for my outline I shall identify shortly.

Such formulations as $E = mc^2$ are not false in the ordinary sense of wrongness. As long as experimental concern is focused on what is regarded as the center of the n domain, such notions of characteristic invariance are to be regarded as proven — with respect to all other inferences so far adduced from study of that portion of the experimental domain *in and for itself*. It is the *in-and-for-itself* which is the error. These conceptions are rather wrong in the sense of inadequate or *fictitious*, as the usage of such terms is to be adduced from Spinoza.

Such fictitious formulations (e.g., constant speed of light, $E = mc^2$) must be judged twofoldly.

First, we must judge them as fictitious. These empirical formulations do not appear to break down until we take into account the *singularities* of the n -domain. These singularities are, at first glance, of the following denominations. The "infinite," the "infinitesimal," and the whole of the n -domain considered as a "unified field."

The "infinitesimal" singularities include the internal features of atoms. Whenever the assumption that these existences are *particles* is associated with the internal features of such phenomena as electrons, electron orbits and so forth, the effort to interpret atoms and subatomic particles as particles leads to paradoxes or outright absurdities. These paradoxes and absurdities can be minimized only by rejecting all ontological conceits concern-

ing "elementary particles," and by treating these discrete existences as *determined* existences — as Bostick's analysis of the problem ably illustrates the point. These are not particles, but rather singularities in relativistic space. They must necessarily represent interface with other orders of physical space in that locality.

A more fruitful approach to the matter of singularities is obtained, by distinguishing in local n -domain space between those phase-space *directions* of causal action which lead to results which are determinable within orthodox forms of physics, and those forms of negentropically-directed causal action which connect ordinary n -domain space with singular phenomena, including living processes.

This approach, this emphasis, forces our inquiry toward discovery of what crucial feature of the characteristic of n -space is left out of account by aprioristic, scalar notions of invariance. This approach focuses our inquiry on the discovery of *transinvariance*, the reflection of the emergence of the $n+1$ invariance in the developmental potentials of the true invariance of n .

The second complementary judgment must account for the empirical validity of $E = mc^2$ within its restricted domain of applicability. So, it becomes clear that $E = mc^2$ is the *degenerate case* for the actually invariant features of the n domain.

Once the physical organization of the universe, and the fundamental (creative) processes of the human mind are viewed from this conceptual vantage point, breakthroughs are implicit on every frontier of specialist inquiry.

The essential aspect of this report is by no means original to me. To our presently available knowledge, notions of such a negentropic (creative) principle were comprehensively defined by two principal Neoplatonic thinkers, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa. Ibn Sina defined this as the notion of *necessary existent*, Nicholas as the proof by sufficient reason of the relatively primary existence of the *non-other*. This same notion was central to the achievements of those leading European thinkers directly or indirectly informed by Nicholas's methodological formulations, such as Kepler, Gilbert, Descartes, Leibniz. If I had not been imbued with Leibniz's *Monadology* at the age of fourteen, I could not have *independently* grasped the fundamental contributions of Riemann and Cantor as I did in solving the fundamental formal problem of economic science. (A rigorous Neoplatonic's study of the classics beginning no later than early adolescence is, as the success of the methods of the Brothers of the Common Life attests, broadly indispensable for developing the higher potentialities of the individual.)

It is notable that Leibniz's correction of Descartes on the notion of momentum was governed by this approach,

and that the criticism, Leibniz's derivation of the notion of momentum (plagiarized by Newton), cannot be understood competently except from that standpoint. The *Monadology* itself ought to be viewed as the principal direct predecessor for Riemann's and Cantor's fundamental achievements for physics.

We know that Ibn Sina, Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz and Riemann explicitly comprehended the higher, determining notion of transinvariance. We know of other Ionian, Platonic and Neoplatonic thinkers who commanded both the outlook and most of the essential premises for effecting a like solution to the problem of hypothesis; unfortunately, the fate of documents being as it has been, we do not presently know which likely discoverers actually did or did not replicate Ibn Sina's and Nicholas of Cusa's achievements in this respect.

Both Ibn Sina and Nicholas of Cusa attacked the problem of physical scientific knowledge by viewing physics knowledge as not something in itself (not inductively, not deductively), but viewed physics knowledge as properly a product of certain mental processes. These mental processes are those creative processes (empirically associated with preconscious processes) through which the mind produces the *predictably fruitful* hypotheses through which physics knowledge (and other scientific knowledge) is successfully advanced for social practice. In adducing that principle of successful generation of hypotheses which is in manifest concurrence with man's increasing power over nature, they rightly recognized the way in which the creative processes of mind reflected the lawful ordering of the universe.

Slanderers and inadequately developed minds misinterpret the outlook of Ibn Sina, Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz, et al. as so-called *idealism*, and foolishly assume that Ibn Sina, et al. mean to attribute to the mind the power of *a priori* knowledge, in the sense of an *a priori* power to elaborate a true physics independently of experiment. In reality, all knowledge is advanced as fruitful hypotheses mediate the increased powers of mind through social practice (experiment, social production of preconditions for human existence). It is the self-development of the creative powers of mind through this mediating (educational) process which is the secondary aspect of knowledge. *The primary aspect of knowledge is located in the principle of self-development associated with successfully mediated advancement of the creative powers of mind.*

The key point is the appropriateness of the creative mental powers to such a mediated process of self-development, through increasing mastery of nature in social practice. It is the fact that this mediating process of *progress in informed social practice* directs the self-development of the creative powers of mind into increasing correspondence, perfection, with the lawful ordering of the universe. Hence, the process of perfections adduced

from the self-development of creative powers is the only aspect of mind (of knowledge) which is in correspondence with the lawful ordering of the universe.

It is at that point of "intersection," and only so, that the fictitious separateness of *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft* vanishes, and adequate scientific knowledge begins.

THE ISSUE OF PLATONIC METHOD

The three domains of knowledge — n , $n+1$, $n+2$ — outlined above have a precise correspondence with the three levels of morality and knowledge as defined by Plato. On condition that one brushes aside the falsified view of Plato's work hereditarily rooted in Aristotle's combined ignorance and distortions, there can be no reasonable doubt of the reason for that correspondence.

It is that correspondence which is, of course, the nexus of the problem of *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*. Now, having started to solve this problem from the vantage point of *Naturwissenschaft*, we set forth the complete solution by reversing the direction of inquiry. Since few modern Neoplatonic scholars have shown an adequate grasp of the point, our special responsibilities, the special significance of our work, thus stand out more clearly defined.

We shall now focus inclusively on the reasons professed Platonists of Cambridge University and professed Neoplatonist scholars of the Warburg Institute have been incompetent to adduce what they presume to be the "hidden knowledge" of such classics as the plays of Aeschylus, the writings of Plato, or such Neoplatonist thinkers as Dante Alighieri.

We proceed now from the point of considering Plato's relationship to physics. Although Plato's Academy at Athens was inclusively a center of physical scientific inquiry, including the development of Euclidean knowledge, the thrust of Plato's work was predominantly on the side of *Geisteswissenschaft*. On this account it is too easy to misevaluate his relationship to physical scientific knowledge.

Using a world outlook and thrust of methodology which this writer continues today, the great Ionian thinkers over the span from Thales through Parmenides were greatly occupied with establishing the appropriate method for developing a universal physics. This effort was successful up to a point; all formal physical knowledge is premised on the heritage of what they did in fact accomplish. If the nature of their actual work (as opposed to Cambridge distortions of it) is examined from the standpoint of modern physical-scientific knowledge, their efforts were well-directed and successful — up to a point.

The case of Euclid shows the way in which they were

blocked from solving what they rightly regarded as the crucial problem. On the one side, *they knew that the reality of the lawful ordering of the universe was of the form of processes, not the interplay of self-evident particles*. Yet, whenever they attempted to reach formal knowledge of processes by methods which otherwise served them well in technological achievements, they found the access to knowledge of processes axiomatically blocked. The overall character of the work of the leading Ionians, Eleatics, and so forth, leading into Plato's Academy, was an effort to discover a way of cracking this axiomatic barrier from one or both of these directions. Thus, the "field-particle paradox," the continuing problem of physical-scientific knowledge to the present date, was rooted in the central preoccupations of scientific thought from its Ionian roots.

Plato, most strongly influenced by Parmenides, adopted the strategic view that the empirical basis for solving the "field-particle paradox" for physical knowledge must wait the consequences of future technological progress.

Contrary to the groundless rumors mouthed by credulous gossips today, Plato was in no way a contemplative idealist. The Platonic Academy was the central political intelligence institution of the Ionian ("city-builder") faction of Mediterranean-centered civilization as a whole, the humanist CIA of the fourth century BC, the intelligence agency behind its protege Alexander the Great. It wrote constitutions for republics, organized coups d'etat against adversary forces, developed the strategic policies responsible for Alexander the Great's victories, and — in alliance with the Egyptian priests of Amon — developed the policy of the *Grand Design* later revived in Europe by such figures as Charlemagne, Otto the Great, Friedrich II Hohenstaufen, France's Louis XI and Henry IV, and by master political-intelligence operative Leibniz.

Respecting the fundamental problems of physical scientific knowledge, the policy of the Academy was to continue progress in scientific and technological development along defined lines of city-builder policies. Plato's Academy did not deprecate scientific and technological work — exactly the contrary. Rather, insofar as fundamental questions of scientific knowledge were concerned, Plato concentrated on the realm associated with political, sociological and psychological phenomena. The practical purpose of this emphasis was to establish the science for securing the hegemony of a system of durable republics. Since the fall of Tyre to the Babylonians, and especially since the Persian conquest of Lydia and Ionia, the winning of the political struggle against the bestialist-oligarchical faction of Philip of Macedon's Persian allies was the issue on which the future of humanity then depended. Unless that battle for humanist republics were won, defeating the bestialist oligarchi-

cal faction, the progress of culture essential to scientific progress could not occur.

The great formal achievement of Plato in scientific knowledge was his elaboration of the nature of the correspondence between the three qualities of human physical knowledge and three qualitative, moral conditions of the human mind. His outlook did not represent a break with the physical-scientific outlook of the Ionians or Parmenides, but rather the more-emphatic situating of precisely that methodological approach within the domain of inquiry into the human mind. Plato did not break from *Naturwissenschaft* in favor of *Geisteswissenschaft*. He maintained the integrity of the two, while examining the whole subject from the standpoint of its included facet, *Geisteswissenschaft*.

This judgment of Plato's work is entirely substantiated by the best sources — that is, the sources, primary and secondary, obtained from the period ranging from the seventh into third centuries BC. This view of such sources is corroborated by Platonic and Neoplatonic sources from the period of the Roman Empire (e.g. Plotinus), and by the greatest scholars of the "Golden Renaissance" period of classical studies. The interesting issue, of which we take summary note here and now, is why any contrary reading of Plato's work should have gained hegemony in the popular gossip of the university lecture hall and textbook?

The prevailing sorts of fraudulent representation of the work of the Athens Academy are hereditarily derived from Aristotle's hoaxes. Aristotle, trained at the antihumanist Athenian school of rhetoric of Isocrates, the rhetorician, was a political-intelligence agent of the cult of Apollo at Delphi, which cult was itself both the usurious banking institution of the Aegean region and was the principal political intelligence arm for the commanding forces of the western division of the Persian Empire. Far from being a continuation of Socrates and Plato, Aristotle entered the Academy as a Persian spy, and was driven from it when his espionage links were uncovered.

Although Aristotle, like both Isocrates and Demosthenes, was an agent of Philip of Macedon, Philip and his son Alexander were not only bitter enemies, but on opposite political sides of the humanist-oligarchist fight. Alexander the Great was a Platonic statesman — murdered by Aristotle's network — while Aristotle, like Philip of Macedon, was an agent of the western division of the Persian Empire, and was a thoroughly anti-humanist oligarchist.

As a consequence of the successful penetration of the episcopal Christian church during repeated periods by the pagan, syncretizing forces of the oligarchists, the reputation of Aristotle as a proto-Christian philosopher has become so entangled with Church history that the Church itself has viewed itself obliged not to attack

Aristotle directly, for fear of unduly disturbing the faith of the ordinary faithful. Rather, Aristotle has been "talmudically" reevaluated by humanist Christian spokesmen, in the fashion Philo of Alexandria attempted to infuse humanism into the Babylonian hoax we view today as the core of the Old Testament. (The claims of Menachem Begin and others to "land title" over *Eretz Yisrael* are not only immoral in every way, but the literary pretext for that claim is a forged document.) Nicholas of Cusa is notable among the Church fathers who explicitly denounces the incompetence and alienness of Aristotle's antihumanism, without bringing forward the issue of Aristotle's actual character.

This pattern of avoidance of the issue of Aristotle's political (and moral) character leads to misunderstandings of a consistent sort. If Aristotle is viewed as an abstract philosopher — abstracted from the reality of his evil morality and practice during the fourth century BC, he is predominantly an apollonian. He emphasizes the point of view of fixed and unchanging lawful ordering in nature and proposed forms of social practice. In this way, it is possible to wrongly adduce from Aristotle an element of philosophical humanism, to regard him as an inadequately developed proponent of natural law — as humanists understand natural law. In this view of Aristotle, he stands apparently in favorable contrast to the naked irrationalism of the heirs of the Phrygian cult of Dionysus.

In consequence of such understandable misunderstandings, Christianity has been associated with professedly Aristotelian humanists, who are themselves the sort of humanists they mistakenly judge Aristotle to have been. The case of fifteenth-century Cardinal Bessarion is illustrative of the principle involved. There was no essential change in character of Cardinal Bessarion in his progress toward a Neoplatonic opposition to Aristotle. To the extent he had attempted to associate his earlier outlook with Aristotle, he had sought to find in Aristotelianism the kind of Christian humanism Bessarion himself represented. The labels which people attach to their essential outlook are most frequently inappropriate labels. We must distinguish rigorously between the names for things and the reality to which names are attached.

Since the emergence of the reorganized, Genoese branch of the Black Guelph faction during the fifteenth century — the revival of the Spanish Inquisition at the hands of the Genoese bankers — and especially since Genoese fostering of and control over both the Jesuits and Calvinists alike (simultaneously) during the late sixteenth century, neo-Aristotelianism has assumed a hideous form fully consistent with the evil character of Aristotle himself. The British Royal Society of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the Edinburgh

British Secret Intelligence Service nest known for such figures as David Hume, Adam Smith, Ashmole, and Walter Scott, and Oxford and Cambridge Universities are the most notable centers of that evil in the history of modern European culture.

During the past two centuries, the center of fraudulent representatives of Plato and the Platonists has been Cambridge University. Francis M. Cornford and Gilbert Murray are exemplary of the most shameless hoaxsters of the present century on this account. During the present century, the frauds imposed by Cambridge have been supplemented by the Neoplatonic studies of the Warburg Institute.

These two seminal currents of hoaxes prominently intersect continuing policy of the British Secret Intelligence Service toward Germany. The reason the British sponsored Hitler during the 1920s and 1930s was given by Winston Churchill before the British Parliament at the close of the last war. In reply to an MP's query, why His Majesty's Government had opposed the planned overthrow of Hitler in 1938 and had opposed the wartime "German General's Plot," Churchill replied with the doctrine articulated by Hugh Trevor-Roper and John Wheeler-Bennett, that Britain had preferred Hitler to the forces attempting to overthrow Hitler. Those forces were elements centered around the old German Center Party and sympathetic currents within the military, "Rapallo"-linked currents which were organically Neoplatonic in tendency, and whose advanced currents were informed by Neoplatonic scholars within the Franco-German currents of the Catholic Church. During the postwar period, British influences have focused most emphatically on the effort to equate Neoplatonism to protofascism, and to destroy Neoplatonist currents within West Germany's Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party's *Kanalarbeiter* forces. The fraudulent campaign against the great conductor Furtwaengler, coordinated by SIS, is exemplary of that effort.

Cornford's purported English translation of Plato's *Republic* typifies the fraudulent character of British Platonic and Neoplatonic "scholarship." Unfortunately, such frauds have widespread hegemony among the teaching institutions of the European continent and North America.

This problem takes a cancerous form in what passes for modern scholarly "scientific method" in the various liberal arts fields. According to that wretched, misconceived regime, the student is obliged to situate his studies and thought in the pseudo-reality of a large population of contemporary "authoritative" secondary sources. In order to secure accreditation for any idea the student wishes to offer, the student is obliged to accept or refute in the most laborious manner each concurring and dissenting opinion of "current scholarship." Since the bulk



Lorenzo the Magnificent, Medici leader of Florence and Patron of the Florentine Academy, with members of the Academy including Pico, Poliziano, Pulci, Ficino, Landino, and Alberti, in a fresco by Vasari. The Academy was initiated by the Byzantine humanist Plethon, as continuator of Plato's Academy.

of liberal-arts secondary sources used by most university programs today, in all liberal arts fields, are chiefly frauds or credulous commentaries on frauds, the process called education turns out in most cases to be a kind of brainwashing, a systematic destruction of the mental powers of the student.

I do not despise investigating such secondary sources, or use of footnotes. I have done far more than most living individuals in digging into such precincts. If to my own efforts, one adds the efforts to the same effect by hundreds of my associates working in intimate collaboration with me, it must be said that our digging into secondary sources, as I have direct advantage of this, is a crucial part of the best coherent concentration of breadth of knowledge existing in the world today. *The issue is not whether to "take into account" such "secondary authorities," but rather how to deal with them.*

The proper approach is to treat footnotes and similar impedimenta of "secondary sources" from an adversary standpoint *as a clinical phenomenon*, not as a matter of primary knowledge or authoritative judgment. One approaches the whole of the "secondary literature" in any domain as a hunter tracks down a beast for the kill. Use the footnotes as the footprints of lies and folly, tracking the beast to its lair. Find the first liar who put such nonsense into circulation — then, all the later liars, who repeat such gossip, are formally discredited by the hereditary principle.

This approach reduces the mass of secondary literature to a small ration of fruitful secondary collaborators. The scholars may then employ such proven sources and proven facts as matters of invaluable assistance in dealing with the primary and other best sources of his or her inquiry.

For example, qualified Greek-speaking scholars among my immediate associates have demonstrated that whole chunks of Cambridge University and Warburg Institute productions hang crucially upon philological frauds. A meaning is imposed upon a term or set of terms in classical Greek, a meaning which is alien to every admissible interpretation and overtone of such terminology among the writers and their audiences of that period. Then, to make the philological fraud appear more plausible to the credulous, various works having the function of encyclopedias, lexicons and so forth in accredited academic practice are caused to incorporate such philological frauds on the authority of the original hoax taken as an authoritative source. In this way, the more successfully the student pursues classical-scholarly credentials at universities, the more irreversibly incompetent he or she becomes in the subject over which he is presumed to acquire specialist authority.

Unless one gets outside the domain of British and British-influenced scholarship, one's efforts to master classical knowledge lead one only further into the swamp

of babbling imbecilities. The object of inquiry is to master the content and implications of primary sources available, together with best sources proximate in value to formerly existing primary sources. One must include study of the relevant authors themselves. It is not adequate scholarship merely to read isolated works. These works must be studied as collections, and collections viewed in respect to the cultural circumstances, and bitter political and related conflicts of the times and places in which they were written.

Ordinarily, if such rules are observed, a scholar or scientist can develop adequate overview of a view which is adversary to his point of view. *For a very special reason*, adversaries of the Platonists and Neoplatonists cannot competently assess a Platonic or Neoplatonic work. That reason is *reason itself*.

The fundamental distinction of Platonic-Neoplatonic views, relative to all other views known, is the fact that Platonic thought explicitly includes three levels of knowledge, for which Plato's "Socratic reason" is the highest. Aristotelian and other anti-Platonic or non-Platonic views admit, at best, only the existence of the lower two of the three levels. Consequently, once an Aristotelian scholar were to competently report any of the essential features of a Platonic or Neoplatonic work, that Aristotelian would axiomatically cease to be an Aristotelian. Once the most essential feature of Platonic thought is conceded to exist empirically, the axiomatic premises of the Aristotelian and other non-Platonic views evaporate.

The insistence that only a Platonist or Neoplatonist can achieve scholarly competence in this matter is precisely analogous to the reasons consistent Christian Scientists are not professional physicians, or the reasons which cause an employer to employ only typists who are also literate as well as having manual keyboard skills. The point we have made ought to be regarded as non-arguable. Alas! Universities continue to play pranks on themselves and their students in employing anti-Platonists to instruct in matters respecting Ionian, Platonic and Neoplatonic thought.

Exemplary of the incapacitating misunderstanding prevailing among the so-called educated is an article published in the *Wiesbadener Kurier* in reaction to the Wiesbaden Academy's inaugural lectures on Leibniz delivered by Professor Uwe Parpart. The reporter complained, almost at the point of hysterical tears throughout the article, that the outlook of the Academy was not "pluralist," but rather took sides on the Leibniz-Newton controversy, and otherwise reflected "dedication to Neoplatonic knowledge. The reporter, herself a product of contemporary university education, reflected a widespread delusion among Western European, North American and other universities, which prizes a per-

petual state of mental and moral confusion as "scholarly objectivity."

We grant the special case in which a scholar formerly dedicated to mastering the Neoplatonic view has slipped into concessions to faddish irrationalist doctrines (e.g., Heidegger, Popper in Germany today). In that sort of case, the apostate or semi-apostate Neoplatonist retains useful knowledge acquired under the influence of his or her earlier dedication. Even in such instances, the apostasy requires a blocking-out of the most essential content of Neoplatonic knowledge, such that the apostate retains only the advantages of being a well-informed tourist-guide to the terrain of Neoplatonist artifacts — which, given the present state of affairs, is not an unuseful attribute.

However, the alternate case is impossible. No one who has not been a Neoplatonist can even as much as competently describe the internal features of Platonist or Neoplatonist thought.

At their relative best — or, rather, least incompetent — what the dominant British and British-influenced schools of Platonic and Neoplatonic studies do generally, whether of the sort of the Cambridge classicists or of the sort of the neo-Kantian Warburg Institute Renaissance specialists, is to admit the fact *that Platonists assert the existence of reason as a third quality of consciousness*, but to deny that such a quality exists outside occult beliefs.

This same falsification of Neoplatonism occurs in epistemological studies of the development of physical science in forms typified by the "intuitionist" doctrine. The source of inspiration for creative insights is identified as more or less a *deus-ex-machina* agency outside the comprehensible features of scientific thought as such.

The significance of this cited hoaxing is that humanist studies — Neoplatonic studies — do not merely assert the existence of reason, as if an object of uncomprehending worship. The essential feature of humanist studies is the examination of those scientifically-reproducible procedures and methods by which reason is exposed as an empirical actuality, distinct from the two lower orders of consciousness, and in which reason is deliberately controlled, consciously, to the effect of making its deliberate employment efficient with respect to verifiable features of human practice. These studies of the processes of reason are the content of all Platonic and Neoplatonic science.

The instant the existence of what is studied, and demonstrated empirically for practice, is relegated by ignorant gossips to the domain of occultism, the gossip loses all capacity for any knowledge of humanism as a whole. A purported scholar who gossips so before the university classroom or in writing is nothing but an ignorant — indeed, worse than ignorant — babbling fool.

REASON AS EMPIRICAL REALITY

The center of the Platonic outlook and method is the Platonic dialogue. Contrary to uneducated opinion on the matter, Platonic dialogue is not a forum for comparing differing opinions, but is a scientifically grounded, rigorous method for effecting qualitative advances in a state of mind from the lowest condition of human consciousness toward the condition of reason. This method is premised in the view of that process of development from the vantage point of reason.

Consequently, to speak of the Platonic dialogue or Platonic method, one must include an identification of the empirical reality of reason itself, reason not as a formalist's construct, but as an empirical actuality.

We recapitulate the starting point of reference being used here, so to situate the presentation of reason as an empirical actuality.

As we have noted above, the method of the Platonic dialogue focuses upon the existence of the three distinct qualities of consciousness, and on the correspondence of each, respectively, to what we have identified as the three distinct qualities of knowledge of physics, n , $n+1$, $n+2$. In the one-sided view sometimes adopted in Neoplatonic theology, this correspondence is either deemphasized or overlooked — until the old debates concerning *consubstantiality* arise to remind such a theologian of what he ought not push to one side. Conversely, when *Naturwissenschaft* is cut away from *Geisteswissenschaft* — as Peter repudiated Christ — for sake of “objectivity” in the eyes of the heathen, the ability to comprehend Riemannian physics is lost to the person who errs in that philistine fashion.

To proceed toward our immediate objective, we must underline a qualification offered earlier concerning the three qualities of human physics knowledge.

Although it was necessary to emphasize the crucial, categorical distinctions as among *inorganic physics*, or-



Galileo illustrated the frontispiece of his "Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems" with this drawing of three figures, representing Ptolemy and Aristotle as the exponents of the Stoic world system, and Copernicus as the exponent of the Platonic world system. Galileo's leading disciples continued the tradition of the Platonic Academy in their "Accademia del Cimento," founded in 1657.

ganic physics and *reason as physical domains*, we also emphasized that each branch of knowledge was *knowledge as a reflection of reality*, and *not reality in-and-of-itself*. Furthermore, we showed in crucial respects how and why that knowledge, as presently defined, was intrinsically inadequate, and that the qualitative distinctions must not be seen as hermetic compartmentalizations, nor coherence be misconstrued as evidence against qualitative distinctions. Their commonality, their *consubstantiality*, lies in the higher order of reality which subsumes each subdomain and the *transinvariance* of their efficient connections. From the standpoint of the higher reality, the standpoint of transinvariance as reflecting reality in-and-for-itself, we gain the overview which enables us to see their causal connectivity among the domains, and also to adequately redefine the invar-

iant characteristics of each domain considered by itself. Only the standpoint of reason (knowledge of the order $n+2$) permits adequate comprehension.

These three levels of knowledge are in correspondence with the Platonic three levels of consciousness and morality in the following general terms.

In terms of approximation, the lowest order of consciousness corresponds to the world outlook of today's "environmentalist." The individual so afflicted sees himself as a strangely-willful object within the n -domain, without possessing coherent knowledge of the n -domain as a lawful domain. He places himself on the same plane he views any form of plant or animal life. His view is centered around concern for the irrational enactment of individual impulses and beliefs in the n -domain viewed as a Hobbesian-like totality. This is otherwise the view of the simple herdsmen or brutish farmer living under conditions in which he or she experiences no perceptible progress in modes of existence over great-grandparents' modes.

The second order of consciousness is characterized by the person who views himself or herself as an object in

the negentropic domain of organic physics ($n+1$). He or she rationally comprehends the n -domain as a domain of law, and is a "rationalist" in the sense typified by the actual Immanuel Kant (as distinct from neo-Kantians). He or she can account logically-empirically for lawful behavior, and believes in progress as lawful, but cannot account for a deliberate, rational process of evolution in lawful knowledge.

The individual whose consciousness is on the third level, views himself or herself as a willful object in the physical domain of reason, and as acting with an outlook comprehending the development of rational knowledge respecting the two inferior domains. The objective of such an individual is the perfection of knowledge and outlook above the domain of reason in itself, to the transinvariance which coherently subsumes all three domains. In Christian theology, this is termed a process of self-perfection whose objective is a state of *atonement*.

All the greatest poetry and music of European culture (in particular) is written from the standpoint of reason. For that reason it affects positively sensitive persons who are not themselves persons of reason. For the same reason the interpretation of such works of art is beyond the formal comprehension of any person who is not himself or herself a conscious participant in the deliberate exercise of reason.

Most educated adult persons of modern culture operate during periods of their lives, periods of most days, on the second level of morality and consciousness. During these periods their judgments are premised upon deductive methods respecting bodies of knowledge which they regard as properly elaborated in a rational way. In that sense, their behavior during these intervals is broadly termed "rational." That usage of "rational" must be distinguished from the usage of *rational* as reflecting the quality of reason. This confusion in the usage of *rational* (*vernunftig*) is associated with general ignorance of reason. The name for the highest condition of mind is misapplied to what is commonly experienced as merely the relatively higher condition of mind.

Those educated persons are not entirely "rational" in even that metaphorical sense. During other moments of their lives, these persons are also relatively childish or even infantile in their mental outlook, manner of judgments, and sense of personal identity. Individual greed, acquired prejudices, parochialist conceits, and other similarities to the outlook of the most backward peasant of stagnating cultures, dominate, a banality of outlook and judgment which centers around sexual behavior and close family and neighborhood relations. This fact is attested in part by the police ledgers, on whose pages it is recorded that incest and crimes of passion among family-like groups are the commonest felonies.

The lowest level of morality and consciousness is associated with the Baconian (Francis Bacon) or *inductive*

method — the *British empiricist method*. The individual so degraded grovels upon the surface of the earth, in implicit bestial conflict with all other individuals over the swine-like possession of those desirable objects he finds in the course of his rooting and sniffing. He is governed by the prejudices, his beliefs, motivated by his individual, competitive sensual appetites, and by those fears which act as the controlling inhibitions embedded in him as "bad conscience" (e.g., Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*). He is the mere "forest animal" sort of "scientist," rightly so despised by Kant and Hegel. This is Baconian man, as defined commonly by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Max Stirner, Bakunin, and John Stuart Mill. This is irrationalist man.

That is the condition which classical literature associates with the ass or the sheep. Theologically, this is the state of sinful degradation of man. This is the state of mind of that immoral degenerate, that Jacobin judge, who passed the guillotine sentence of Lavoisier: "The Revolution has no need for men of science." In its most degraded expression, this is the moral condition of the North American and European Maoist, of the hooligan varieties of "environmentalist," and of international terrorists. This is the world outlook of the Phrygian cult of Dionysus and of Hitler forerunner and SIS operative Houston Chamberlain and the Thule Society.

That lowest level, the asinine level, is superseded as the individual's moral outlook transcends Hobbesian swinishness to take into account the lawful reciprocal causal connections between one's willful actions (or acts of omission) and their chain-reaction consequences in the universe more generally.

This the individual accomplishes by ordering experience into semi-distinct categories of experience and practice. These categories of applied knowledge, such as physics, chemistry, biology, political economy, and so forth, are distinguished from one another *by organization of knowledge and practice*. They are marked off by the distinctions in characteristic forms of social practice more emphatically, relatively appropriate to each.

In turn, these characteristic, categorical divisions of practice have adduceable common features. That commonality we associate with logic, and with the kinds of categorical organization of deductive thought in general represented by the Kantian categories. It is the individual who combines a "rationalist" approach to one or more categories of social practice with the equivalent of a Kantian level of overview of social practice and knowledge in general who typifies the second moral level of consciousness.

Kant is also useful, clinically, because he poses the problem of reaching beyond the upper limits of this second level of morality and consciousness. He fails in this effort, but he has two redeeming qualities. First, he



Benjamin Franklin's experiments with electricity earned him praise as "the Prometheus of the eighteenth century" from such fellow humanists as Immanuel Kant, Christian Herder, and Ludwig van Beethoven. They also prompted the slanderous Frankenstein by Guelph-connected Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley.

recognizes the existence of reason. Second, he rigorously summarizes the reasons the second level of consciousness informs itself of its intrinsic incapability of achieving the higher level of reason itself.

Kant correctly insists that the efficient consequences of practice informed by creative powers of reason cannot be *predicted* in terms comprehensible to the *mere understanding* — understanding being the name for the second of the three levels of consciousness. The upper limit of the second level of knowledge is characteristically defined for Kantian and similar philosophies by the inability of the Kantian to account for the determination of the philosophical and other categories — to get beyond a specific, fixed ordering of present scientific knowledge. G.W.F. Hegel's devastating criticism of Kant on this and related points is very much to the point — although Hegel's own formal remedies must be subjected in large part to similar criticisms.

That stated, we have situated the problem so that we may now turn directly to the burden of this section, the empirical actuality of reason.

Except as observers in the genre of the Warburg Institute degrade pure reason to mystified "intuition," their arguments suppose reason to be a mere intellectual construct — such as "quarks" are in fact. Yet the empirical reality, the accessible perception of such a mental pro-

cess, distinct from other mental processes, is readily available for observation and rigorous investigation.

Creative processes are repeatably accessible to observation only in cases of persons who are, by presently prevailing measures, extraordinarily fecund in their creative productions. The moment of creative thought does occur frequently in nearly every person, but usually under conditions such that it does not lend itself to direct investigation by scientific methods. So, we must introduce the student to creative processes by referring first to a closely related, but more commonplace mental phenomenon.

In the act of remembering a familiar name, there is often enough an element of delay — of frustrating delay. The individual may say of this moment of frustration, "it is on the tip of my tongue." It is the state of thought seeking the misplaced name during that moment of frustration which we isolate to begin direct examination of the empirical actuality of reason.

This moment of thought we have isolated by that description is otherwise known as *preconscious* thought. That term is sometimes burdened with unfortunate implications; we avoid those misleading implications by inculcating the reader against common errors of that sort.

It is termed *preconscious* thought because it lacks, in that isolated expression, direct association with the kinds of *predicated images, such as words, through which preconscious conceptions acquire the forms indispensable*

for attempted ordinary communication to other persons. Only thoughts which have attached names or exact images of other sorts are ordinarily, conventionally termed conscious thought.

If the term *preconscious* is misinterpreted, to imply that preconscious thought is defective in its quality as thought, then all access to the crucial processes of mental life is lost through such follies of misjudgment. *Preconscious thought is the essence of all thought.*

Preconscious thought is a gestalt. This does not signify that it is like a conscious visual-type image, even though conscious images tend lawfully to be more easily accessed by preconscious thought than words.

Does the individual who reports, "the name of that person is on the tip of my tongue," actually have a definite concept of the person to be named? It might seem to be the case that the question is settled by the person's sense of certainty about the appropriateness of the name a moment or so later, when he or she has surpassed frustration to recall the name to speech. It is not quite so simple. Sometimes one recalls the proper name but without a sense of *credibility* for the recollection, even when the name recalled is the correct one. In any case, cutting through those secondary aspects of the matter for the moment, we can state with certainty that the preconscious "image" is a valid, definite idea in most of the instances an honest person reports "the name is on the tip of my tongue." We can also report as a matter of fact, that this quality of the thought as a definite thought is independent of the presence of visualizable images as well as of words.

Thus, we know what we mean, in speaking to one another here, by stating that the preconscious thought associated with such moments of frustrated recollection is a definite, intelligent thought, a consequence of judgment. This quality of the preconscious thought is such that the conscious thought must be regarded as a thought with appropriate predicates attached, that the preconscious thought is the location of the existence of the thought for all cases.

The same experience of preconscious thought in itself occurs in all successful classroom work. The student in the process of solving a problem is engaged in creating an insight *which is original to him*. Whether the insight is gained by deductive or higher methods makes little difference to us at this immediate moment of our writing. There is, again, the frequent experience of frustrating delay between those occasions in which the solution is "honestly" on the "tip of the student's tongue," and in which the communicable predicates of the solution are delivered a moment later. The preconscious thought in this case is also intelligent thought, also appearing at first without communicable predicates attached.

The essential content of all creative mental processes is

the preconscious processes in which the judgment is created. All human thought is *essentially* preconscious. *Hence, the intrinsic imbecility of inductive method or linguistics*, or of any method or procedures which attempt to locate the actuality of judgment in terms of logical or other formal relations among the communicable predicates of conscious thought.

The same principle exhibited in original problem-solving (original to that student) in the classroom is expressed in a qualitatively more advanced form in the case of experimental investigations or protracted scholarship. We select those cases for generalized illustration now in which the person has adopted an hypothetical solution to a problem in advance. However, unlike the classroom case in which the appropriate predicates of the solution have been provided by the instructor beforehand, or are matters of deductive procedure, in this example at hand the person does not have the required predicates. It is not a matter of remembering which combination of pre-given predicates corresponds to the discovered insight. Now, in this example, the person must, so to speak, roam the wide world in search of the kinds of predicates which correspond to the hypothesis. The act of memory as memory has been eliminated from our study of preconscious processes.

We must examine this notion of hypothesis more closely. Communicable forms of hypothesis involve a selection of representable images, which we know as the articulated form of an hypothesis. If hypothesis is ignorantly associated with the notion that merely one such set of predicates is the beginning and end of its existence, we lose sight of everything important.

The preconscious hypothesis, as employed in the example being considered, confronts the thinker's mind with two levels of problems. On the primary level, there is the preconscious thought itself, the actual hypothesis. This hypothesis may best agree with a range of alternative expressions as communicable social practice. The fact that one articulated form of the hypothesis is proven wrong does not necessarily disprove the preconscious hypothesis. It merely disproves the appropriateness of one alternative communicable form of the hypothesis. For example, an hypothesis which is appropriate to cryogenic processes is not essentially discredited if the effort to state it as an hypothesis of room-temperature physics fails experimentally — only the specific, room-temperature articulation of the hypothesis has failed experimentally. The alternatives are yet to be formulated and tested.

It is in fact a commonplace that the constipated professional scientist, the one who has gone creatively stale, suffers from the inability to detach preconscious hypothesis from a one-and-only communicable expression. He or she seems to proceed with the obsessive attachment to the unworkable version of the hypothesis, cannot seem to



The concepts of relativistic physics developed by Bernhard Riemann [r] provided the key to LaRouche's solution in the 1950s of the problem of the relationship between economic processes and technological advances. Today, Riemann's discoveries are being used by physicists to understand "nonlinear" and self-organizing properties of high energy plasmas [shown, the organization of a plasma filament structure photographed by U.S. physicist Winston Bostick] which are "unlawful" from the standpoint of fixed geometries.

return to his preconscious processes to reach out toward a range of alternatives.

The most fruitful sort of experimental scientist or scholar often expends months or even years in intensive work. He or she is governed in this enterprise by a preconscious insight which he or she knows to be sound and important, but without yet knowing what sorts of specific hypotheses ought to be developed to put the discovery into the form of social practice, into the form of a definitive hypothesis.

We admit that in most instances we observe such behavior, the person so engaged is pitifully obsessed, but on the outside, to the casual observer, the patterns of work of the genius and the crank may appear to create similar appearances. We are speaking here only of the properly informed person, not the crank.

Here we are considering the case of the discovery which, as a preconscious discovery, is a genuine insight, a valid insight, which the person knows, by some proper guiding sense of internalized authority, to be valid. Yet, it may be the work of months or years to create the predicates which permit the extension of the preconscious thought into a suitable hypothesis.

This is the most interesting case, of course. Here, it is the distinction between the crankish impulse and the valid preconscious insight which ought to be of the greatest importance to any thinking person. How is it possible

to know that preconscious insights are valid even years before those insights find communicable forms of social practice through which to test their efficiency as practicable knowledge? Are there laws of thought directly applicable to creative preconscious judgment as such? How are such principles to be efficiently applied to preconscious thought before even a communicable hypothesis can be attached to them?

This problem is by no means an insoluble one. It is the focus of Plato's dialogues and of the greatest poetical and musical compositions of Neoplatonists from Dante Alighieri through Beethoven. The function of these modes, all applications of the Platonic dialogue, is to enable one mind to directly communicate with the preconscious processes of another — to make preconscious thought conscious, and communicable. The principle is identical in essentials with Georg Cantor's notion of the communicability of the notion of transfinite. Indeed, it was from the Platonic dialogue that Cantor discovered the solution to the conceptualization of transfinite.

The center of the Platonic dialogue as a method is the "I-thou" principle otherwise imperfectly understood by Ludwig Feuerbach. By seeing my articulated thoughts reflected in the articulated thought of another I create for myself the circumstance in which the other person's mind acts as a mirror to my own.

The simple reflection of a single thought does not

accomplish my purpose, does not produce the desired "mirror." In the effort to change the way in which he thinks about a series of related subjects, I am able to trace in my preconscious processes the inner patterns of judgment which govern his side of our interchange. I read, in effect, the inside of his mental processes. I do not read his mind in the sense of reading words on the page of a book. *I read the kaleidoscopic patterns of his preconscious thought-progress in respect to the subjects under consideration.* It is not his articulated thoughts one-by-one which concern me, but the pattern of the shifts observed.

By following the way in which my articulated thoughts affect this pattern within him, I observe the impact of my thought in the inferred preconscious patterns of his thought. Thus, I make the process of my own thought, my conscious thought's patterns, "visible" to myself through the mirror of his preconscious processes.


What is involved, subordinately, is a "trick" outlined,

for example, by Edgar Allan Poe's C. Auguste Dupin. By mastering the preconscious processes' patterns, one is often able to predict with more or less accuracy, the conscious associations triggered by a preconscious pattern in the mind of another. By introducing certain "crucial tests," one can verify that one's reading is correct without necessarily arousing the individual to awareness that one is reading his or her mind in that way. Then, once the test has been accomplished with satisfactory results, one can astonish the fellow by announcing his thought. He responds: "How did you know I was thinking that?"

By observing the effect of one's articulated thought in following the preconscious patterns behind the shifting articulations of another's responses, one makes one's own conscious thought the subject of one's willful consciousness. Instead of experiencing consciousness as something which "happens to me," one is enabled to locate the determination of conscious thought in one-

self. By operating to correct prejudices which lead to inappropriate judgments, one makes one's conscious thought the subject of willful improvements in its quality. This describes in general, the process of transforming a human donkey into a person of *understanding* (in Kant's sense of *understanding*). Instead of donkey-like blind prejudices and irrational impulses for sensual gratification, one's consciousness is rationally ordered.

If this same process is extended appropriately, the preconscious processes of reason are made willfully conscious in the way the person of mere understanding uses logical processes to govern his professional practice.



The headquarters of Britain's Royal Society. From its 17th century inception until today, the Royal Society has led a witchhunt against humanist science.

This is the purpose of Platonic dialogue as encountered in the writings, for example, of Dante Alighieri or the major musical compositions of Beethoven.

POETRY AS SCIENCE

A preconscious thought of the type standing behind an appropriate form of scientific hypothesis is a *transfinite* (in Georg Cantor's sense) relative to the alternative sets of predicated visualizable images and words with which it might be associated under various circumstances. Among advanced Neoplatonists, familiarity with such preconscious thought is associated with *namings* of such thoughts, such that an entire array of alternate predicates is addressed by speaking the name for the corresponding preconscious (transfinite) made conscious for those persons. The point we now address is the method by which agreement is made among persons to the effect that a definite preconscious thought acquires a name which serves such a purpose. Neoplatonic poetry is the exemplar of the appropriate procedure.

To put the point formally, the way to identify a preconscious conception which has no previously agreed name is to invoke it by referring to its appropriate predicates. So, a definite statement respecting a preconscious thought must have the appearance of ambiguity in respect of the predicates included in the communication. Two or more such preconscious thoughts invoked in this way, and connected to a further preconscious thought which has the implication of a judgment arising from the others, suffices to make a Neoplatonic poem.

The manner in which British and likeminded critics have attempted to "decode" poetical forms of Neoplatonic composition shows how pathetically ignorant, mentally inferior these British are to the Neoplatonists. The British and similar sorts attempt to "decode" the poem (or similar work) to the end of discovering a literal meaning buried somehow as a "coded" "hidden meaning" within the poem considered as a communication. Most of the interpretations offered, except as they are purely slanderous, are pathetic failures on this account. It is the misguided search for *definiteness* respecting the predicates which characterizes the British folly involved.

It is often the case, as in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, that a Neoplatonic work based on principles of the Platonic dialogue suggests to another Neoplatonist a definite message, and may be intended to do so. However, this communication depends upon the hearer's passing through the domain of preconscious images, and then, from that vantage point, viewing the explicit and symbolic predicates as fitting several most appropriate judgments. For example, Hamlet speaks of the murder of Christopher Marlowe at the hands of the Genoese faction associated with the Cecils and Francis Bacon. Hamlet is

also the tragic figure of Queen Elizabeth I. There are additional such insights which leap to one's mind — and accurately so — on condition one is a Neoplatonist and knows the facts most prominently in the minds of the general Neoplatonic audience of that time. Under such preconditions, one must allow *Hamlet* to sink into one's preconscious mind. Consequently all the subsequent implications are not only clear, but the importance of their being communicated in this particular way is also clear.

Schiller's "Ode to Joy," and Beethoven's use of it in his Ninth Symphony are another illustration of the poetic principles on several levels.

The ostensible subject of Schiller's poem is most immediately Benjamin Franklin. Do we know this with certainty? Absolutely! The *Goetterfunken* itself immediately means Franklin to the entirety of the leading humanist faction of Europe during that period. Schiller, like Heine and Beethoven, was politically committed to the humanist faction of Leibniz, and to such specific heirs of Leibniz as Lafayette and Franklin.

Goetterfunken also signifies, and precisely so, the "flash of insight" associated with creative discovery. Thus, the significance of *Goetterfunken* is that it is a preconscious thought, not a literal thought or a symbolic statement in the British understanding of symbolism.

The association of *Goetterfunken* with Franklin was not a symbolic reference to the leading humanist Freemason of Europe and North America. *Goetterfunken* signifies "sparks" — electricity. It is the "spark of genius," the "flash of insight." It is the correlatives of the Prometheus-Eros principle — which foolish Gilbert Murray was at such acerbic pains to deny. It means that the use of "love" in the poem has the "secret meaning" of the Cathar-troubadours, of the "friends of love" — Dante, Petrarca, et al., and not what fools signify by "erotic love" or maudlin romantic effusions over "the simple people." No one meaning can be attributed to such a "symbology." Only the preconscious conception which subsumes, as a transfinite, all the appropriate meanings, can be intended.

The use of the poem by Beethoven in his Ninth Symphony is most significant. Beethoven's best proof of his Neoplatonic outlook and depth of mastery of the method is provided by his double-fugal compositions and related uses of that double-fugal method generally. This aspect of Beethoven is perhaps more sophisticated than even the educated musician might be able to comprehend without considerable further education. Therefore we place the emphasis here on other features of Beethoven's work.

Beethoven established himself as a hard-core, pro-American Neoplatonist with his opera, *Fidelio*. The heroine, Fidelio, is based on the actual role of Lafayette's wife in entering a prison to be with her endungedoned husband, the Florestan of the opera. The villain,

Pizarro, is William Pitt the Younger, the person directly responsible, aided by Talleyrand and Madame de Stael, both Pitt agents, for the imprisonment and exile of Lafayette. It is the arrival of Napoleon, the immediate cause for Lafayette's release, which is celebrated as the climax of rising action in the opera.

The association of the key phrases of Schiller's Ode with Benjamin Franklin has survived into modern public certain knowledge by means of such sources as Forster's eulogy, Kant's reference to Franklin as "the eighteenth century Prometheus," and the vile Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*. Beethoven's conflicts with the opportunist Goethe at their well-known meeting, and Goethe's role in promoting Mendelssohn's and other attacks on Beethoven's music also underline the split between the pro-American Beethoven and the de Stael-connected Goethe-the-opportunist. Beethoven, Schiller, and Heine represent the Lafayette-American-centered current against those who sold out to the British, such as Goethe.

It would be naive and wrong to assume that the Ninth Symphony was dedicated to Franklin in the fashion the banal writers of concert program-notes and record dust-jackets might imagine. Rather, Franklin's image was one of the principal predicates in *the entire range of ambiguities* Beethoven employed to force the audience's mind toward the *transfinite*, the *preconscious image involved*. *The purpose was musical*: the association of the new method of contrapuntal development, the double-fugal form of the Platonic dialogue in music is the subject of the symphony.

This is indicated by the history of the musical material developed for the setting of the Ode. The "Gegenliebe" theme should be understood in its first setting, as a song from the 1790s, as a use of the notion of "love" as used by Dante and Petrarca: the Prometheus-Eros principle as Shelley correctly understood the connection. To the musician, the Opus 80 Fantasy for piano, orchestra and chorus affords and invaluable point of reference — as does a comparison with the Eroica piano variations and symphony. Beethoven's notions of musical ideas are the most fascinating subject for study of music as such.

Much of the most important evidence concerning Beethoven is apparently lost or destroyed. His learning is far broader and more profound than any published accounts acknowledge or explain.

He clearly knew the Ionian-Lydian historical reference-point, knew the Platonic dialogue, and otherwise reflects knowledge in his music which represents classical scholarship of unusual profundity of insight, just as he reflects sophisticated insights into the political processes of his time. On the surface, one might imagine him confused by politics of his time — and biographers and perhaps some distortion of anecdotal materials helped to create that impression. Once one recognizes certain features of his Neoplatonic outlook, which the



This poetic quality of ambiguity is captured by Leonardo in this illustration for the last canto of Dante's Purgatory, of Matilda guiding the poet across to Paradise.

writer and his associates have tracked down during recent years, his political outlook is clear, and sophisticated.

To appreciate this point fully, one must take into account the circumstances under which he lived.

From the beginning, and this is documented from as early as the fourth century BC, the well-tempered system of contrapuntal musical composition was consciously employed by Platonists and Neoplatonists as the musical-principled form of the Platonic dialogue. It opposed the contrary tonal and compositional systems, opposing views and practices which degraded music to the irrationalist doctrine of arbitrary melody and accompaniment. In the modern Neoplatonic currents of the well-tempered contrapuntal system, there is no axiomatic vertical structure in the sense prescribed by the chord-plunking schools of composition. The vertical arrangement is essentially a matter of parallel voices, human voices or instrumental voices acting as surrogates for human voices. A certain vertical configuration of intervals arises from this organization, but not only within

“The essential feature of poetry and music is ambiguity. By disallowing any literal or ordinary symbolic significance, by conjoining predicates ambiguously so that only the preconscious transfinite for such conjoined elements can be intended, the preconscious image is invoked.”

the beat, but also in relation to notes of other voices in preceding and succeeding beats. The vertical configurations so determined are also voices, and have an actual or implicit progression. The dissonances and ambiguities which arise in the statement of parallel voices, or in their development, provide the opportunities and necessity for developing further. Thus, the juxtaposition of voices undergoing interconnected development modifies the statement of each and all voices as in the Platonic dialogue.

The significance of such musical composition lies in the preconscious processes, processes which are ordered by the principle of the love-beauty emotion as that emotion is understood in the Prometheus-Eros equivalence. As this leads to a resolution — as in the special employment of the stretto and modified notions of stretto in Beethoven's late works, the stretto acts as the predicate for the preconscious thought induced by the development. It is that agreement which makes the Beethoven composition lawful, satisfying preconsciously, to the mind.

As Al Farabi emphasizes, as the European Neoplatonic musicians emphasize, and as Bach and Beethoven knew, the purpose of *such* music is to educate the preconscious processes of mind to the effect of increasing the creative potencies of the mind. “Rock” for example has exactly the opposite effect: it impairs the moral and intellectual qualities of judgment.

Poetry, and the special form of poetry which is Neoplatonic music, is not a matter of meter and rhyme. Metrical devices in poetry have an essential significance. Line-end rhyme is not essential to poetry, but prosodic equivalences are, having the same significance as in musical composition. Poe's outline of the construction of the poem “The Raven” is an excellent introduction to this matter for the semi-educated. Plato, of course, outlines the principles of poetry and music in this respect. *Poetry is essentially a science of preconscious communication, to which certain forms of poetic composition are attached as tools of that purpose.*

The essential feature of poetry and music is *ambiguity*. This ambiguity is indispensable to making poetic ideas (preconscious conceptions) definite to the sensitive member of the audience. By disallowing any literal or ordinary symbolic significance, by conjoining predicates ambiguously so that only the preconscious transfinite for such conjoined elements can be intended, the preconscious image is involved.

ART IN THE HUMANIST ACADEMY

The foregoing has the included purpose of reviving the proper significance of the term “humanities” as applied to what are termed “liberal arts” subjects. Once the location of reason in the preconscious creative processes is comprehended as an empirical fact, the kind of education of the creative powers achieved through the Platonic dialogue generally, and through Neoplatonic poetry and music specifically, ceases to be a matter of taste, a matter distinguished from scientific thought. The fictitious separation of *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft* is eliminated.

The associated problem is that the appreciation of Shakespeare's plays, Milton's poetry, of Dante, Cervantes, and so forth, currently provided in universities and authoritative criticism so-called, is generally pretty much rubbish insofar as essential matters of the inquiry are considered. These works are all derivatives of the Platonic dialogue — as the three levels of *Don Quixote* reflect. Appreciations and “scholarship” which explore those productions in a different direction of inquiry, ignoring the Platonic dialogue's principles, do not merely fail to afford the student actual knowledge of the content of such works, but drive the student further away from comprehension — into conceited misunderstandings — than if no instruction had been given at all.

Much of this instruction — such as Gilbert Murray's commentaries — have the character of an hysterical shrieking by the professor, a desperate effort to turn the student away from the point being made by the work in question at each point. A scatterbrained staccato of fallacy-of-composition, in the form of footnotes and what-not, fragments the perception of the work, destroying the affected student's ability to assimilate the essential feature of the composition — the process of development to which the choice of included detail is subordinated.

The ordinary function of a humanist academy must, so-to-speak, include a revival of the power of reading a page: the power to read a Platonic dialogue as a Platonic dialogue.

I was recently exposed — to my horror — to a German television rendering of a certain Goethe drama. My view of Goethe is, to my best present estimation, that of Schiller: Goethe had great talent, but lacked a certain decisive element of character, the element of character indispensable to producing truly great works of art. Despite his defects, Goethe was a master-talent, a craftsman of high order, who mastered the rudiments of the Platonic dialogue, although unable — especially after the middle 1770s — to carry this process through to a satisfactory conclusion. The television performance was a monstrosity. The poor, misguided director and actors were engaged in transforming a subtle symphonic development of conceptions, ideas, into the dramaturgical semblance of a family kitchen squabble.

The case of the predominant cultural doctrine of the German Democratic Republic is also to the point. Those unfortunate persons are so misguided as to place the irrationalist Bertolt Brecht on the same level — or higher — as Friedrich Schiller! What a travesty! As if the banal sentimentalities of a Brecht were anything but a *proletkult*-cabaret parody of art.


The GDR case is relevant also because of the way in which those misguided fellows view Brecht and similar pseudoartists as having superseded "idealism." The

problem with those currents in the GDR is that they do not know the existence of *reason* — they have no understanding of the content of great art, and hence confuse washerwoman ditties of Brecht with the most profound accomplishments of a Schiller or Heine.

In the "East" generally, the problem is that to the extent that Neoplatonic influences are found, these fall on the side of a reductionism-tainted *Naturwissenschaft*. Their problem is that they are atheists in the sense Marx ridiculed atheism in his 1844 Paris Manuscripts. In manic exuberance, in throwing out an anthropomorphic deism, they deny the existence of the *soul* as well. They discover that Nicholas of Cusa's *non-other* and Ibn Sina's *necessary existent* are the empirical reality of the Neoplatonic theologian's God, and they shriek "Idealism!" lest they be suspected of religious influences. The Neoplatonic formulation of the *consubstantiality* of the Trinity, as developed by the school of Plotinus, would throw the poor fellows into an utter panic.

The general work of a humanist academy today must be centered around the advanced researches by those involved in leading the work as a whole. At the same time, the function of an academy must be to provide organic humanists with more modest, step-by-step progress in what might seem ordinary topics of classroom treatment. The distinction of such latter classroom and related activity is that the subject — whether a musical composition, a play, historical subject-matter, basic mathematics and physics, or what-have-you — is illuminated from a Neoplatonic standpoint, and directed toward Neoplatonic objectives respecting the increase of the mental power as well as the specific knowledge of the participants.

All education deserving of that name approaches the issues of course-content and pedagogy (even on the simplest level of subject-matters) from the most advanced — Neoplatonic — standpoint. Once increasing numbers of citizens gain thus a taste of what education in general could become, education generally will bend to the demand for reforms in that direction.



Aristotle, Political Warfare, And Classical Studies

by Criton Zoakos

I. Introduction

The battleground of grand politics is the minds of men and that side wins which imposes its own qualities of intellect on the minds of the adversary. In the kind of politics that counts, no other battleground is worth more fighting for and winning than this.

This is why Aristotle's authority and influence must be destroyed.

Aristotle is the patriarch of a tribe of logicians which begins with himself and, through Saint Anselm, William of Ockham, John Locke, Francis Bacon, and John Stuart Mill, ends with Lord Bertrand Russell, Arnold Joseph Toynbee and, among the living, Mr. Bernard Lewis and Sir Karl Popper among others. These people, working through certain universities and similar academic outlets financed by the British oligarchy and its political intel-

ligence arms, have been using Aristotelianism and neo-Aristotelianism for purposes of political manipulation of large populations.

Destroy the undeserved authority and reputation of Aristotle, the patriarch-figure of the whole pack, and the influence of nominalist-logicians, linguisticians and computer specialists is forever terminated.

The efficient destruction of Aristotle's authority-image will have the effect of putting an end to the hegemony of *Logic* in intellectual life. Logic as a social convention cultivated by the Aristotelians for over two thousand years is, primarily, a powerful obstacle which prevents most people from directly replicating in their minds the concept of Reason, as Reason is defined by Plato, i.e., the power to "hypothesize the higher hypothesis."

Above: Alexander the Great, shown in a detail from the mosaic of Alexander and Darius Codomannus at the battle of Issus, found at Pompeii.

The weapon of Aristotelianism in this form has been used extensively and deliberately for purposes of large-scale "mind control" by a coherent historical faction from the Roman Empire to our day. In the last one thousand years, this faction, composed principally of the "Black Guelph" European nobility, inclusive of the presently ruling European royal houses, has organized itself around the Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem.

The direct predecessor of this international social order was the alliance between the then-fallen nobility of the expired Roman Empire and the warlords of the Nordic tribes. Before that, the order consisted of the multinational banking and tax-farming nobility of the Roman Empire organized around institutions provided by the cult of Apollo — the cult which created and disseminated Aristotelianism.

Thus Aristotle was deployed by the Roman dictator Sulla for the purpose of combatting the Platonist threat to the Roman Empire. Later, during the Patristic era of the Christian Church, Aristotelianism was used by the banking-tax-farming nobility to combat the influence of Neoplatonist Saint Augustine. The third major historical redeployment of Aristotelianism was during the thirteenth century, when Saint Thomas Aquinas, before his repentance, was attempting to stop the influence of Neoplatonist Ibn Sina, at a time when the Catholic Church was a captive of the Black Guelph nobility.

The last deployment of Aristotelianism is the one directed by the British Empire, in the form of British empiricism. As we shall see, Locke, Hume, et al., made virtually no significant addition to Aristotle's initial systemization of the empiricist world outlook. Exposing the fraud of Aristotle *ipso facto* takes care of the problem of having to refute his political heirs.

A professional examination of source materials and ancient records reporting on Aristotle and his times, establishes beyond reasonable doubt the following conclusions about Aristotle which are at odds with all secondary historical writings at this time:

First, Aristotle was primarily a political intelligence agent working on behalf of an oligarchical clique of Macedonian nobles allied with Babylonian-Persian financial interests and court circles.

Second, from the very beginning of his career he was deployed by this oligarchical clique against Plato and the Platonic Academy. He penetrated the Academy and remained there for twenty years for the purpose of disruption, counterorganizing and hostile recruitment.

Third, Aristotle played a key role in a palace conspiracy which organized a coup d'état and assassinated Alexander the Great in 323 BC.

Fourth, in matters of philosophy, he was an incompetent fraud and a throwback in his own time, and he was known as such among his qualified contemporaries.

The contrary information, that he allegedly was Plato's prize pupil, a fatherly figure to Alexander the Great, and an esteemed intellectual, is the result of Stoic and Peripatetic propaganda which began being spread by the Roman dictator Sulla over two centuries after Aristotle's death. (1)

Since all the accounts of the history of antiquity are heavily biased and contaminated fabrications since the time of Clarendon and Gibbon, (2) the reader will need the following principal facts as guidelines for the history of antiquity, beginning with the first millennium before Christ, in order to be able to follow our narrative of the story of Aristotle per se:

First: The Near East-Mediterranean-centered world of antiquity was organized around the principal sovereign power of Mesopotamia. In this sense, there are no Greek, Egyptian, Phoenician, Hebrew national histories. These entities, formally dependent or semi-dependent on the principal sovereign authority of Mesopotamia, can best be studied from the standpoint of the Mesopotamian Empire's "nationalities policy," or "colonial policy."

Second: The Mesopotamian Empire, whether under Assyrian, Babylonian or Persian nominal rule, was dominated by the all-pervasive institutions of the Mesopotamian priesthood-financial caste.

Third: From the beginnings of the millennium onward, there was an irrepressible revolt of the "city-builder" factions of the western-coastal provinces and semi-provinces against the political power of the Mesopotamian priesthood. (3) The Phoenician and Ionian Grand Design of colonization, and the Ionian revolution in science and epistemology in the seventh century, were major strategic outflanking operations aimed at breaking the power of the Mesopotamian system.

Apart from these three invariants during the first millennium BC, the reader should keep in mind the following subthemes that dominate the unfolding of history: The oligarchy of the Mesopotamian priest-financiers continuously struggled to maintain its power by pitting the mindless manipulated masses of peasant populations, against both the central authority of Kings and the industry-and-commerce oriented factions of city-builders. The priesthood, having assumed, according to the social division of labor of the preceding era, the function of doing all the thinking on behalf of the rest of the brutalized population, perfected its means of social control by means of manufactured religious cults, and thus invented democracy, or the technique of managed mob rule. The central authority of Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian kings each in its time succumbed to the priesthood that had developed to perfection the craft of manipulating the popular mind. (4)

Finally, the military tribe of the Achaemenid Persians (whose dynasty was still ruling during Aristotle's time),

were installed to power by the priests of Bel-Marduk, as we have documented elsewhere, (5) for the purpose of harnessing and marshaling all the material-military resources of the Empire for a final assault against the Ionian-Phoenician faction, the archenemy of the Mesopotamian priesthood.

On the other hand, the humanist city-builders of the Ionian-Phoenician faction capitalized on the spread of science, colony-building, and epistemology, the science of perfecting the creative powers of mind, as their principal weapons of political warfare. In the course of this struggle, they produced major innovations in ship-building, navigation, military and civil engineering and the art of warfare. They also established a tradition of philosophical and scientific excellence which produced the character and personality of the people who shaped the factional lineup during the time of our story, the latter half of the fourth century BC. (6)

Thus, the time of Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander the

Great, the time of our narrative here, represents the concluding phase of a continuous, uninterrupted drama which had started around the beginning of the first millennium BC. With the conquests of Alexander the Great, the Mesopotamian priest-financiers were temporarily defeated. With Alexander's assassination, however, the oligarchical principle of government, the "Persian model" as Aristotle called it, was revived and augmented by the Macedonian oligarchs, especially the Ptolemies of Egypt who later transmitted it to their little Frankenstein monster, the disaster that was Rome. (7)

From there, the oligarchical principle of government was directly transmitted to the present British monarchy which, since the ascension to the English throne of the House of Orange, considers itself the upholder of the principle which its Guelph, Pierleoni and Hapsburg predecessors had kept alive through the medieval times.

This brings us up to date for our main subject matter.

II. The Struggle Between Aristotle And Plato

Of all the great and small things that have been written throughout the centuries about the conflict between Plato and Aristotle, the full truth had never before been made public until the recent publications, lectures and seminars on the subject by leaders and members of the U.S. Labor Party.

The full truth of this conflict, which is also the innermost secret of our three-thousand-year-old civilization, is that it was the most celebrated episode in a political war that is still going on today. (8) The two adversaries in this unfinished combat, the rival Neoplatonic and Aristotelian conspiratorial elites, have known this truth all along. The fact has been missed to the broader layers of humanity primarily for two reasons.

First, since the Treaty of Vienna (9), the British-monarchy-centered Aristotelians have increasingly managed to break up the cohesion and continuity of their rival Neoplatonic networks and, second, historically, the Neoplatonic conspiracy itself has been reluctant to come out with the full truth. As a result, that truth narrowly missed being lost forever until we rescued it.

Once more, the only real battleground in real politics is the mind of man. Thus, what ordinary people mistake as ivory-tower and ethereal philosophy, always was, is and will be the heavy artillery of political warfare. Philosophy was born out of political struggles, and was deliberately beaten into shape as a political weapon, and nothing will be understood of the last three thousand years of recorded history, unless all politics is viewed from this vantage point. If history does not make sense to

you, if it *seems* incoherent, it is not because it *is* incoherent, but because the eye of the beholder has not been trained to use the appropriate sophisticated judgment required to discern its coherence, its strict causality.

Plato and Aristotle represent two adversary and irreconcilable views of the human mind, the battleground of politics. So long as the two coexist, humanity will not be rid of its miseries. Unless Plato's side wins out on a substantial worldwide scale, humanity will be drifting between purgatory and limbo, unable to cross over from its quasiprimitive present state to the stage of human history proper. Isolated individuals will still be able to make the leap, but the large mass of humanity will keep living unfulfilled lives.

A lot of nonsense has been written by incompetent commentators and ignorant professors about Plato's own epistemology, doctrine of mind. The most incompetent among them is the so-called "theory of Forms," or "Ideas." Plato never wrote in favor of such a theory. (10) He, and the Platonists and Neoplatonists after him, like the Ionians before him, viewed the human mind as an absolutely unbounded creative power whose unique, characteristic activity is the generation of higher orders of organization of nature. This, however, is the capacity of man's mind which can come into play only through rigorous cultivation. Creativity doesn't grow on trees.

The most accurate accounts of Plato's epistemology in the modern era are contained in the recent writings of Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., especially his "The Secrets Known Only to the Inner Elites" (*The Campaigner*, Vol.

11, No. 3-4), "A Machiavellian Solution for Israel" (*The Campaigner*, Vol. 11, No. 2), and elsewhere. (11) Uwe Parpart is preparing for publication a definitive evaluation of Plato's surviving writings and of the early Academy's little-known political organizing activities with included groundbreaking contributions in this field. (12)

Since, however, this is a report on Aristotle and not Plato, we must limit ourselves to the bare essentials of this subject, not more than what is required for developing the case against Aristotle.

Plato had arrived at the conclusion that there are three broad levels on which the human mind, depending on the degree of its disciplined cultivation, operates. These three levels, corresponding to Dante's *Inferno*, *Purgatory* and *Paradise*, are: the level of sense certainty, the level of Understanding, and that of Reason, or Logos, or Creativity.

A man's mind that has not gone through the rigors of dialectical training of his creative powers, is like the wretch who was born inside a dark cave, was chained, at birth, to the floor of the cave and made to look, all his life, toward the cave's darkest wall. Behind him, and invisible to him, is a ramp and behind the ramp a big fire, the only light inside the cave. On the ramp, marionettes are moving around manipulated by men hidden below. All the chained wretch sees throughout his life is the shades of the marionettes on the wall. He does not know real marionettes, only their shades, and much less does he know men. He does not know real sunlight but only the reflections of the bonfire in the cave. (13)

This is the condition of men living on the level of sense certainty. The task of dialectic is to take them from there and enable them to face the sunlight. Or, as Socrates himself says in the *Republic*:

Then, said I, is not dialectic the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul is sunk in the barbaric slough of Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we call sciences often from habit, though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. "Understanding," I believe was the term we employed. (14)

The "first principle" is Logos, the unbounded creativity-for-itself of the mind. With its attainment, the actual life of humanized man just begins. Before its attainment, in the limbo of "Understanding," man hovers between humanity and bestiality, his only saving grace being his ability to recognize that such a thing as Logos, Reason, must necessarily exist, if not in himself, then in others.

Aristotle occasionally frequents the limbo of "Understanding," but only occasionally at inconsequential moments. His proper abode is the "barbaric slough of Orphic myth," from whence he declares that Reason does not exist, for himself or for anybody else. (15)

Aristotle's view of the human mind, shared by the neo-Aristotelians, the British empiricists and the Logical Positivists, and by the Babylonian priesthood before him, is that mind is a passive receptacle of sense impressions, just like the mind of animals, with the proviso that man's mind has the added trained capacity to organize large batches of sense-impressions into memory storage.

The Aristotelian mind is unable to generate inside itself new gestalt-concepts and, therefore, *does not have* the raw material from which to conceptualize the cathexis of the generative power, Reason, which causes the emergence of new concepts in the mind.

Plato, in 387 BC, during the year of the infamous Persian King's Peace, at the lowest ebb of Ionian fortunes, went ahead and established his Academy for the purpose of creating a political cadre force, an elite which, relying on its mastered and cultivated powers of Reason, was designed to turn around the Persian-Babylonian tide. Twenty years later Aristotle, a young man of seventeen, was deployed by the priests of Apollo at the Temple of Delphi (16) into the Platonic Academy for an eventual career of intelligence gathering, counterorganizing, disruption and hostile recruitment.

Everything that Aristotle wrote during his stay at the Academy leaves no doubt that this indeed was his purpose. The most conclusive evidence against Aristotle, however, is not in his early works, which survive today only in fragmentary form, but his later, so-called "mature" works, which he wrote after he left the Academy and after the death of Plato, and which survive intact. (17)

I arrived at the conclusions presented in this report by using, broadly, the following procedure. First, being generally familiar with the philosophical outlook and theory of knowledge of Plato, I entered into a minute examination of Aristotle's own expositions of the subjects of mind and epistemology; then I went back to a more detailed examination of Plato's own surviving writings to review the differences between the two. At that point, it became crystal clear that the two represented absolutely irreconcilable, diametrically opposed and consciously hostile world outlooks. Once that was established with precision, then the written works of Aristotle became admitted as crucial background evidence useful for the remaining straightforward police-detective type of work required to determine his political associations and their particular significance.

The best procedure, therefore, would be for me to report to the reader the results of the preliminary, episte-



The Delphic oracle: the western headquarters of Mesopotamian intelligence. The babblings of the oracular priestess, the "pythonesse," delivered from her perch on a tripod placed above the sacred "omphalos" [naval], and then "interpreted" by the Delphic priests, were a key element in the sophisticated political-intelligence operation which spawned Aristotle.

mological investigation, and after that conclusion is established, to proceed to introduce the secondary types of evidence which indicate that he in fact was working for allied Macedonian-Babylonian oligarchical interests which plotted the assassination of Alexander the Great.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL EVIDENCE


Going past Aristotle's own abundant hostile remarks against Plato, Anaximander, Heraclitus and the other Ionians in the Corpus Aristotelicum, we focus on the three basic items that he discussed exhaustively, namely *ontology*, the way the world is; *epistemology*, the way the mind works; and, third, that crucial area of intersection between ontology and epistemology in which mind itself views itself as part of the laws of nature — an area which Aristotle denies exists.

The problem with Aristotle's ontology is that, while cloaked in a garb of apparent rationality, it is absurd and self contradictory because, although Aristotle ac-

knowledges that the objects of the universe behave lawfully, he systematically rejects the principle of causality on which lawfulness rests. To take a shortcut in this complicated matter, we shall focus the examination around the concept of the Infinite. The principle of causality stands or falls on this issue.

The concept of the Infinite or, more properly, the "concrete Infinite" was conceptualized by the Ionian Anaximander in order to complete Thales's thesis of the One. Thales's celebrated thesis was that the entire unfolding universe is coherent, susceptible to mastery by the human mind, in the sense that beyond the mere transient objects of sense-certainty the universe is one single being, an indivisible generative principle. (18)

Anaximander, to complete Thales's thesis, reasoned more or less in the following way: The fixed objects of sense-certainty which come into being and pass out of existence are merely the evidentiary raw materials of the natural investigator. Since these all too real objects of sense-certainty are endowed with existence, it follows that that which causes them to exist, their originative



Thales of Miletus, the founder of Ionian humanism.

principle itself, is of a superior order of existence. Apply, now, the same rigor not to the mere arrays of objects of sense certainty but to the evolutionary succession of whole arrays one after the other, to the "innumerable universes" which succeed each other in time. Since the succession of "innumerable universes" is endowed with reality, therefore the generative principle itself of this ordered *succession* is endowed with an existence which is concrete Infinite.

Thus, the whole thesis of the coherence of the universe stands or falls with the concept of the concrete Infinite. *The concrete Infinite itself is the completed principle of causality.* (19)

Aristotle completely repudiates the concept of the Infinite in his book on *Physics*. Thus, by necessity, he throws out of the window all causality. In this he is consistent with himself, since in his various works on logic he equates causality with the middle term in deductive syllogisms.

In his *Physics* he begins the discussion on the Infinite by attributing the concept to his predecessors, quoting here and paraphrasing there: "Some, as the Pythagoreans and Plato, make the infinite a principle in the sense of self-subsisting substance, and not as mere attribute of some other thing..." (20) "Further they identify it with

the Divine, for it is 'deathless and imperishable' as Anaximander says with the majority of the physicists." (21)

Our hero then proceeds to betray his own pathetic ignorance of the origins of the concept:

Belief in the existence of the infinite comes mainly from five considerations:

1. From the nature of time — for it is infinite.
2. From the division of magnitudes — for the mathematicians also use the notion of the infinite.
3. If coming to be and passing away do not give out, it is only because that from which things come to be is infinite.
4. Because the limited always finds its limit in something so that there must be no limit, if everything is always limited by something different from itself.
5. Most of all, a reason which is peculiarly appropriate and presents the difficulty that is felt by everybody — not only numbers but also mathematical magnitudes and what is outside the heaven are supposed to be infinite because they never give out in our thought. (22)

Evidently, none at all of these alleged causes for the origination of the concept that Aristotle enumerates could possibly account for it being thought of as "not a predicate" and as a "principle" and "self-subsisting substance." This enumeration serves us as crucial evidence that Aristotle does not have, inside his own mind, any actual, arrived-at concept of the Infinite. He himself actually declares, further on, at the beginning of Book V of *Physics*: "Now it is impossible that the infinite should be a thing which is itself infinite, separate from sensible objects."

Thus, Aristotle's ontology insists that the highest and ultimate repository of reality is the sensible object. If something does not belong to sensible objects, it is not possible for it to exist. The rest of his ontology is a description of a weird kind of causality which is a mere property of sensible objects. It should not take up our time simply because it represents a very elaborate fabrication. Aristotle's celebrated concepts of causality, i.e., "potentiality," "actuality" and "entelechy," are mere frauds because they are mere predicates of sensible objects. In his view, sensible objects generate causality, not the other way around.

This world outlook would make humanity a mere predicate of individual man; law, a mere predicate of the individual citizen; evolution an accidental property of the biosphere; and energy a predicate of material bodies. Appropriately, this is the moral content of a mind ruled by the laws of sense certainty. For the experienced investigator, the study of Aristotle's attitude toward the concept of the Infinite could be enough of a clue for reconstructing Aristotle's entire mental map.

Aristotle, however, does this for us in his epistemolog-

ical works, six books which together have been known as the *Organum*. These are *Categoriae*, *De Interpretatione*, *Analytica Priora*, *Analytica Posteriora*, *Topica*, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*.

The pathology emblazoned in these six books and in the *Metaphysica* (23) merits a long, quiet, sorrowful look. It represents one of the purest forms of a mental disease that has tormented mankind for ages. Aristotle's writings on the mind are nothing less than the agony of a man's mind which is trapped in the bestial prison of sense certainty, of animal sense certainty, and yet knows itself to be man's mind, not an animal's.

Knowing, thus, itself to be human, Aristotle's mind attempts to describe its humanity by describing the processes of its functioning. The attempt is a catastrophic disaster, and what comes out is a description not of the mind's functioning but of its pathology. A little reflection on the mental map projected on the *Organum*, correlated with biographical information, could give one a complete clinical diagnosis of Aristotle's mental disorder. In broad terms, it is classed as infantile obsessive object fixation.

In more formal terms, which would identify the disorder in its formal-academic predicates, what occurs in the *Organum* is the following:

In all six books Aristotle basically attempts to answer the fundamental question, *What is knowledge*, what are its criteria and how does the mind attain it. It is the same subject that Plato addresses in his celebrated dialogue, the *Theaetetus*. Aristotle, however, instead of answering the question, takes knowledge as axiomatically given and proceeds to describe how mind *processes* already given knowledge, i.e., logic!

Aristotle's crippling flaw is revealed when one scans his writings in search of any piece of evidence or clue that would indicate the existence, in his mind, of any internal point of cathexized reference associated with the experience, common in creative minds, of that turning point in mental life when a new concept is generated, in a burst of illumination, to arm the mind with simultaneous solutions to whole arrays of hitherto seemingly insoluble problems. Aristotle is completely ignorant of the art of creating new concepts and new world outlooks. His mental map is an arid wasteland, filled with the names, as he insists, of the self-evident objects that sense-certainty gives him, all the names and their concepts neatly dissected into ten irreducible Categories, and then classified in phials and shelves neatly by species, genera, classes, orders and phyla. Without exaggeration, this is the entire content of the *Categoriae* and *De Interpretatione*. This mental map is then taken to be the battleground where the fight to discover what knowledge is will take place.

The *Analytica Posteriora* begins with the following assertion:

All instruction given or received by way or argument proceeds from preexisting knowledge. This becomes evident upon a survey of all the species of such instruction. The mathematical sciences and all other speculative disciplines are acquired in this way, and so are the forms of dialectical reasoning, syllogistic and inductive: for each of these latter makes use of old knowledge to impart new, the syllogism assuming an audience that accepts its premises, induction exhibiting the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular. Again, the persuasion exerted by rhetorical arguments is in principle the same, since they use either example, a kind of induction, or enthymeme, a form of syllogism. (24)

The fundamental thesis of Aristotle's doctrine is that there is no possibility of new qualities of knowledge. His allowing the possibility of new knowledge by means of deduction and induction is purely deceptive, as he himself implies as the outset of Book II of *Analytica Posteriora*, where the question is posed, what is it that links "preexisting knowledge" with "new knowledge" or, by means of what questions do we arrive at new knowledge? Aristotle asserts:

The kinds of questions we ask are as many as the kinds of things we know. They are in fact four: (1) whether the connection of an attribute to a thing is a fact, (2) what is the reason of the connection, (3) whether a thing exists, (4) what is the nature of the thing. (25)

This is a formulation more important than funny because, upon inspection, it leads us back to what we discovered when examining Aristotle's inability to conceptualize the Infinite, and that is that Aristotle has absolutely no notion of causality. He is in fact morally dead to the notion of causality. His emphasis, in the just cited paragraph, on the *connection* between "attribute" and "thing," is clinically very significant. He presumably is aware that the questions people ask for the purpose of arriving at new knowledge must somehow aim at discovering new *causalities*. But his questions do not inquire about causality, they inquire about *connection*! Absolutely not accidental, and here is where we catch him by the toe.

Aristotle, as he repeatedly states on numerous occasions, defines *cause* to be the *middle term* of a deductive syllogism.

There is an extensive damning passage in the *Analytica Posteriora*:

We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking whether there is a *middle* or what the *middle* is: for the *middle* here is precisely the *cause* and it is the *cause* that we seek in all our inquiries. Thus, 'Does the moon suffer eclipse?' means 'Is there or is there not a cause producing eclipse of the moon?' and when we have learnt that there is, our next question is: 'What, then is this cause?'; for the cause

through which a thing *is* — not *is this or that*, i.e. has this or that attribute, but without qualification *is* — and the cause through which it is — not *is* without qualification, but *is this or that* as having some essential attribute or some accident — are both alike the *middle*. By that which *is* without qualification I mean the subject, e.g. moon or earth or sun or triangle, by that which a subject *is* (in the partial sense) I mean a property, e.g. eclipse, equality or inequality, interposition or non-interposition. (26)

It is clear that for Aristotle, cause equals the middle term of a syllogism. This holds not only for ordinary causes, but also for the four celebrated Aristotelian cause-categories of the Middle Ages' Scholasticism, the *material cause*, the *formal cause*, the *efficient cause* and the *final cause*. He actually states:

We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause, and there are four causes: (1) the definable form, (2) an antecedent which necessitates a consequent, (3) the efficient cause, (4) the final cause. Hence each of these can be the middle term of a proof, for (a) though the inference from antecedent to necessary consequent does not hold if only one premise is assumed — two is the minimum — still when there are two it holds on condition that they have a single common middle term. So it is from the assumption of this single middle term that the conclusion follows necessarily. (27)

Let us now look at what disastrous results we arrive if we accept the claim that cause = middle term and what this does to the very concept of causality. Take for example the most conclusive type of Aristotelian syllogism, the so-called universal-positive deductive syllogism of the "Barbara mood" whose general form is:

If A is predicated of all B and B of all C, it is necessary for A to be predicated of all C, or:

Major Premise: All B is A

Minor Premise: All C is B

Conclusion: All C is A

"B" here is our middle term and this, in Aristotle's mind, is the cause which accounts for "all C" being "A." In a real life example, you would have something like the following:

Major Premise: All birds fly.

Minor Premise: Hawks are birds.

Conclusion: Hawks fly.

We now come to ask ourselves about the causes of this aeronautical miracle, 'What causes hawks to fly?' Our dodo bird's answer is simple and straightforward: *the middle term*. Or, in other words the fact that they are birds, causes them to fly. Similarly, the fact that cows are cows causes them to produce milk; the fact that roses are roses causes them to have fragrance; the fact that engines are engines causes them to produce work; and generally, all things do what they do *because* we have

classified them as belonging to the species and genera to which they belong. This is the entire depth of Aristotle's doctrine of causality.

The practical implications of this absurdity become even more apparent when we borrow another syllogistic example from Aristotle himself:

'Why did the Athenians become involved in the Persian war?' means 'What cause originated the waging of war against the Athenians?' and the answer is, 'Because they raided Sardis with the Eretrians,' since this originated the war. Let A be war, B unprovoked raiding, C the Athenians. Then B, unprovoked raiding, is true of C, the Athenians, and A is true of B, since men make war on the unjust aggressor. So A, having war waged upon them, is true of B, the initial aggressors, and B is true of C, the Athenians, who were the aggressors. Hence here too the cause—in this case the efficient cause—is the middle term. (28).

One more item remains to be reviewed before we exhaust our evaluation of Aristotle's epistemology, and that is: What is it that determines the truthfulness of the Major Premise of a syllogism? Or, how can the mind arrive at those judgments which constitute the axiomatic background of "preexisting knowledge"?

The modern form of the question, formulated by Immanuel Kant, is: "How are axiomatic a priori synthetic judgments possible?" Incredible as it may at first sound, Aristotle simply answers: "*By definition.*" In Book I, Chapter III of the *Analytica Posteriora*, where he indicates that he is aware of this as the fundamental question of all knowledge, he has the following to say:

Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative (i.e., derived through syllogism): on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate premises [i.e., a priori synthetic judgments] is independent of demonstration. (The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must know the prior premises from which the demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must end in immediate truths, those truths must be indemonstrable.) Such, then, is our doctrine, and in addition we maintain that besides scientific knowledge there is its originative source which enables us to recognize the definitions. (29)

The final inquiry about the nature of this mysterious "originative source which enables us to recognize the definitions" produces the devastating answer: "*animal sense-perception!*"

We have already said that scientific knowledge through demonstration is impossible unless a man knows the primary immediate premises. But there are questions which might be raised in respect of the apprehension of these immediate premises: one might not only ask whether it is of the same kind as the apprehension of the conclusions, but also whether there is or is not scientific knowledge of both; or scientific knowledge of the latter, and of the

former a different kind of knowledge; and, further, whether the developed states of knowledge are not innate but come to be in us, or are innate but are at first unnoticed. Now it is strange if we possess them from birth; for it means that we possess apprehensions more accurate than demonstration [i.e., syllogisms] and fail to notice them. If on the other hand we acquire them and do not previously possess them, how could we apprehend and learn without a basis of preexistent knowledge? For that is impossible, as we used to find in the case of the demonstration. So, it emerges that neither can we possess them from birth, nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of having no such developed state at all. Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort, but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all *animals, for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception*. But though sense-perception is innate in all animals, in some the sense impression comes to persist, in others it does not. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving, or no knowledge of objects of which no impression persists; animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to retain the sense-impression in the soul: and when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those who do not. So our sense perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single experience. From experience again — i.e., from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all — originates the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being. (30)

With this, we end our review of the epistemological portion of the extant evidence against Aristotle. This review has conclusively established the fundamental findings that Aristotle's mental processes are confined by four pivotal, self-imposed limitations:

First: He is incapable of synthesizing in his mind the concept of *concrete Infinite*.

Second: He has no internal cathexized reference point that corresponds to the act of generating qualitatively new conceptual bursts: He is unaware of *creative mentation*.

Third: He has *no conception of causality* that corresponds to the actual universe.

Fourth: He asserts that *no new qualities of knowledge* are possible to occur.

On the basis of these four self-inflicted constraints, Aristotle draws the final, inevitable deduction from his

investigation, that the human mind is in no way different from the mind of animals, except in matter of degree; just as in the case of animals, the intellectual life of man, according to Aristotle, is a passive reception of the external stimuli that a bland, unchanging and well-classified universe of discrete, uncaused objects offers.

Aristotle calls himself an animal. We merely concur.

The remaining issues discussed in the *Organum* are of purely tertiary interest and should in no way distract us. What they are, in fact, are a detailed elaboration of the implications of the above five pivotal points: assuming that there is no creative life in man's mind, the only remaining area for investigation is that of deductive and inductive syllogisms. Deductive and inductive syllogisms are those purely mechanical operations that the mind undergoes when it processes a concept that somebody else has given to it. In short, syllogisms, Aristotle's fatal obsession, are no more than the mind's digestive tract. Once the mental food has been placed on the table and swallowed, the digestive tract goes to work — this is induction and deduction. How that mental food was gathered, prepared and placed at the table (how a priori synthetic judgments are created) is the work of Reason, the proper subject of any true science of mind.

But Aristotle's *Organum* does not touch on this subject at all. Having promised us a book on cooking, Aristotle gives us a manual on how to use a pay toilet. This is Logic, the science of deduction and induction.

ARISTOTLE'S INFILTRATION OF THE ACADEMY

When the eighteen-year-old Aristotle arrived in Plato's Academy in the year 367 BC, the bulk of Plato's life's work had already been done. (31) The Academy, established twenty years earlier, had already produced its first spectacular results and had already transformed, in perceptible ways, the intellectual, political and strategic climate of the world. Plato himself had made the transition beyond the Socratic dialogues and the *Republic* and, about the time of Aristotle's arrival, had been writing his celebrated epistemological dialogues, the *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and the *Philebus*, in which he announces the forging of new "weapons different from those of my previous arguments, though possibly some may be the same."

Plato's Academy was not a grand old school of sciences and learning, not even primarily that. It was a tough training ground bent on producing political leaders and rulers thoroughly immersed in Plato's own philosophical and political ideas. Throughout the Mediterranean world, in Cyprus, in the Propontis, in Macedonia and on the coasts of Asia Minor, the influence of the Academy was shaping political events. The Academy was also maintaining diplomatic relations and

making deals with every kind of government, dynasty and influential personality. (32)

The overt counter-deployment of Plato's enemies within Athens was the notorious School of Rhetoric of the orator and member of the Athenian Assembly Isocrates. It is evident, however, that the Isocrates deployment against Plato was merely the tip of the iceberg, only the visible part of the intelligence-network warfare capabilities arrayed against Plato. The specific assignment of the Isocrates deployment was to function as a counter-Academy for purposes of harassment, counter-recruitment of cadre and also to attempt to limit the Academy's own recruitment efforts. Because of the character of this deployment, massive

amounts of public evidence have survived that give a rich picture of the frequent fights between Academy and the School of Isocrates.

This is a matter of such notoriety that we need not describe it here. Further evidence shows that the containment operations against Plato were organized at three levels, of which the School of Isocrates represented only one. The other two were the "religious" networks of the Temple of Apollo at the Oracle of Delphi (of which more later) and the formal intelligence service of the Persian Court whose typical representative in Athens was Demosthenes, whose records of payment in Persian gold still survive.

Isocrates maintained contacts both with the operation at Delphi and with the Persian Court. It is well documented that his closest associates among the Athenian notables were the Admirals Conon and Iphicrates, both of whom are reported by Plutarch (33) as having been Persian agents who, under the command of the satraps of Phrygia ad Hellespontum, maintained Persian naval supremacy over the eastern

Mediterranean. Isocrates's collaboration with the Temple of Apollo at Delphi became evident when he assisted Delphi in promoting Philip of Macedon into a creditable military protector of the god's Temple during the Sacred War in subsequent years.

Aristotle's entrance into the Academy is a story all by itself. It could have come out of a standard operating manual of any intelligence service.

Immediately following the infamous Congress of Delphi (of which more later) in 368 BC, and while Plato was in Sicily at the time, the Oracle of Delphi ordered the young orphan Aristotle, then under the guardianship of a citizen of Persian-occupied Phrygia ad Hellespontum, to move to Athens.

(34) Once there, Aristotle immediately entered the School of Isocrates, where he stayed for about a year. This was time enough to prepare the young agent and to develop a cover story.

The following year, Plato returned to Athens and worked out a brilliant deal that completely transformed the political fortunes of the Academy. He merged his school with that of the famous mathematician and philosopher Eudoxus of Cyzicus, who transferred his entire school from Asia Minor into the Academy in Athens. Immediately afterward, Aristotle stomped out of

the School of Isocrates, after a fight in which he declared that, having read Plato's *Gorgias*, he was in complete disagreement with Isocrates's method of teaching the art of rhetoric. (35) He immediately joined the Academy.

The episode that followed is also straight out of a classic spy scenario: Aristotle, already within the Academy, begins to agitate in favor of introducing the teaching of rhetoric into the Academy. (36) His argument was more or less as follows: "The art of oratory is not harmful per se. It is just like a neutral weapon—its



Above: Aristotle, being ridden by Phyllis the courtesan. This combined image of the bestial "Prince of the Peripatetics" as an ass and a slave of his senses was popular among Renaissance humanists.

morality is dependent on who is using it. So, why should we Platonists abandon this weapon and let our enemies, the followers of Isocrates, use it among the population against us?" He himself began to give informal classes on rhetoric.

The issue of the art of rhetoric was not unimportant for the Academy. Rather, it touched directly upon Plato's unique method of political organizing. Rhetoric, identified by Gorgias in the dialogue by the same name as "the power to convince by your words the judges in court, the senators in council, the people in the assembly, or in any other gathering of citizen body," hits directly at the fundamental political problem of what a politician in the service of Reason, a "shepherd" in the meaning of the Apostolic Church, must employ as his tools for persuading the ignorant masses, the "flock," to heed his bidding.

In the dialogue *Gorgias*, Plato has Socrates identify rhetoric as the art which produces "belief without knowledge" and rejects it as immoral.

How intense this destabilization operation of Aristotle's was in the beginning, after his entry into the Academy, we don't have information to tell. It was, however, a protracted affair that went on for years. (37) He would propose the introduction of rhetoric in the Academy, and at the same time he would loudly attack Isocrates's particular technique and teaching method of rhetoric. Then members of Isocrates's school would launch counterattacks and keep the commotion and debate going over an unfruitful subject for years. On occasion, Isocrates himself would join in to attack Aristotle personally, and Aristotle would retaliate in kind. His apparent zeal in picking fights with Isocrates served not only to build up his credibility among the naive, but also to waste a lot of people's energies in nonsense.

Instances of these brawls were occasionally reported. Eusebius, in his *Praeparatio Evangelica* reports the following little incident:

Now this Ciphesodorus, when he saw his teacher being criticized by Aristotle, was ignorant of and unfamiliar with Aristotle himself; but since he saw that Plato's views were celebrated, and since he assumed that Aristotle would be philosophizing after the manner of Plato [emphasis added], he attacked Aristotle with criticisms that applied to Plato, and argued against him beginning with the Forms and ending with the rest; about which he himself knew nothing, but merely guessed at the common opinion about them. (38)

In later years, Aristotle wrote a dialogue, the *Gryllus* or *On Rhetoric*, apparently reiterating his views and, once again, attacking Isocrates. Isocrates responded with his *Antidosis*. Aristotle counterresponded with his ludicrous *Protrepticus*. (39) And so on.

The text of *Gryllus* does not survive, only a very brief summary of its argument in the Roman Quintilian and in Diogenes Laertius. (40) The same problem exists for all the early writings of Aristotle during his stay in the Academy. We only have secondhand reports and fragments, which, however, are sufficiently abundant and credible to allow us to establish the judgment that every one of them was a part of some disorienting/de-stabilizing operation or other.

The later myth that Aristotle, during these years, was Plato's prize pupil is nonsense. Why Aristotle was tolerated in the Academy and not kicked out probably has to do with legal subtleties and intelligence "courtesy" arrangements that had to be observed in order to enable the Academy to function in Athens as a legitimate institution. Diogenes Laertius reports that Plato once made the following remark about Aristotle: "Aristotle has kicked me, as foals do their mothers when they are born." (41) Another ancient commentator, (42) obviously an admirer of Aristotle, reported that Plato would refuse to start his lectures if Aristotle were absent and would demand to find where "The Mind" was. As soon as Aristotle would show up, Plato would start remarking "We can begin, The Mind is here." Our reporter was oblivious to the obvious Attic pun with the words "*Ho nous*"=The Mind and "*Onos*"=donkey.

Thus, it turns out that Giordano Bruno was not the first to call Aristotle a donkey. (43) Old man Plato started this tradition too.


Of Aristotle's early writings, during his stay at the Academy, the following is known. Apart from the *Gryllus*, they were eight in number, most titled with names borrowed from Plato's own dialogues—*Statesman*, *Sophist*, *Symposium*, *Menexenus*—or some more original names, such as *On Justice* (imitating Plato's *Republic*), *Eudemus* (imitating *Phaedo*), *On Philosophy* and *Protrepticus*. (44)

What survives of these is brief summary descriptions or passing references in the texts of later writers, or isolated fragments. There is a silly debate raging to this day as to whether these things were "Platonic" in spirit, or "Aristotelian." (45) To anyone with minimal experience of how, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, British intelligence has manipulated political movements, especially the socialist movement, by means of so-called "ideological" controversies, the problem is very easy to solve. The technique employed by Aristotle's controllers against Plato is identical down to the last detail to the techniques used by the controllers of such British agents as Ernest Mandel, Garaudy, or earlier Eduard Bernstein et al. against the influence of Karl Marx.

The technique employed in the lost works of Aristotle is identical to the one described in the case of the controversy over rhetoric above. The facts of the matter are as follows:



Aristotle



Plato

All ancient and modern students and commentators on this matter agree that in all these writings, Aristotle was arguing for and arriving at the same conclusions as Plato in the equivalent dialogues, except that he was using a different method of argumentation for arriving at the same result. (46) Upon inspection of the scanty evidence, there is no reason to dispute this finding.

However, to use a different method than Plato and arrive at the same conclusion is an absurdity. In every one of Plato's dialogues, the method *is* the conclusion. In addition, we have the following testimony from Proclus and Plutarch in which they both concur that Aristotle of that period, in his early, dialogue-form writings, was an admitted opponent of Plato's theory of knowledge.

Proclus quoted by Joannes Philoponus in *De Aeternitate Mundi*:

There is none of Plato's doctrines that that man [Aristotle] rejected more decidedly than the theory of knowledge [the theory of ideas]. Not only does he

call the Ideas sounds in the logical works, but in the *Ethics* he attacks the good-in-itself [i.e., the "highest principle" on which the "hypothesizing of the higher hypothesis" is tested], and in the physical works he denies that coming-to-be can be explained by the ideas. This he says in the work *De Generatione et Corruptione*; and even more so in the *Metaphysics*, for there he is concerned with first principles, and he makes long objections to the ideas both in the beginning and in the middle and in the end of that work. *In the dialogues also he exclaims unmistakably that he cannot sympathize with this doctrine, even if he should be suspected of disagreeing out of contentiousness.*" (47)

This is confirmed by Plutarch:

Aristotle is always harping on the ideas, with regard to which he objects to Plato; and he raises all sorts of difficulty about them in his ethical, in his metaphysical and in his physical notes, and also by means of his *exoteric dialogues*, so that some

thought him contentious rather than philosophical . . . these dogmas, as if he were proposing to undermine Plato's philosophy. (48)

In fact, he was thought to be much more than contentious. Early in the year 347 BC, shortly before Plato's death, he chose to flee Athens rather than face trial on charges of espionage on behalf of King Philip of Macedon. Philip had just conquered the city of Olynthus, an important Athenian ally; the sea lanes through which the Athenian fleet was carrying grain were threatened; the population was hysterical; and many suspected that Aristotle had supplied Philip with information that played a vital role in the fall of Olynthus.

III. The Political Situation in the Time of Aristotle

Aristotle was born into a prominent family, in the Macedonian Court (53) and Macedonia, and, already during his adolescence and youth, he was becoming one of the most critical pawns in the international political struggle of the time. His father Nicomachus was killed during one of the bloody faction fights for the control of the Macedonian throne. He perished along with his personal friend, King Amyntas whom he also served as personal physician. Thus, from birth, Aristotle was cut out for the big political game.

When he was born, in the year 384 BC, Persian power reigned supreme throughout the world and throughout Greece. Athens, completely ruined by the end of the thirty-year-long Peloponnesian War in 404 BC, was now subsisting on official Persian government allowances, and governed by alternating cliques which were serving either the Persian King and his faction, or various Persian satraps of the western provinces who were collaborating with the cult of Apollo and its headquarters at the Oracle of Delphi.

Sparta, the apparent victor of the Peloponnesian War, had succumbed, three years before Aristotle's birth, to Persian authority by signing the infamous King's Peace. (54) The purpose of that treaty was to prevent any of the great old Greek cities, and most particularly Sparta, from forming any alliances that would threaten Persian power. Signed in the year 387 BC, the text of the King's Peace was as follows: "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, shall belong to him. Further, that all the other Greek cities, small and great, shall be autonomous; except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyrus which shall belong to Athens as aforesaid. If any refuse to accept this peace, I shall make war on them, along with those who are of the same purpose, both by land and sea, with both ships

(49) The orator Demosthenes filed a suit against Aristotle. The latter fled Athens and took up an assignment for Philip in Asia Minor. (50)

That a paid Persian agent such as Demosthenes accused Aristotle of espionage is highly interesting in itself. A closer examination of ancient history will explain why two well-identified Persian agents in Athens, one Demosthenes and the other Isocrates, were so desperately irreconcilable in virtually every matter of foreign policy. Most important of all, they were deadly enemies over the crucial matter of Philip of Macedon the personal friend and protector of Aristotle. (51) Demosthenes wanted Philip destroyed, Isocrates wanted him leader and unifier of all Greece. (52)

and money." This text was inscribed on large marble slabs, or stelae, which were permanently displayed in the central market place of every single Greek city, including Athens, Sparta and the town where Aristotle was to be born.

The Persian authorities also had a formidable policing force in Greece, with the assignment of enforcing the King's Peace. This force was the newly created military power of the city of Thebes which built up its power with great amounts of Persian gold, and which had been an ally of the Persian power ever since the Greek-Persian wars had started one and one-half centuries earlier. Thebes, however, was not the one who was formulating policy for the Greek cities. This was being done by the executives of a body called the Delphic Amphictyony, the council of the treaty organization, very much like the modern Atlantic Council within NATO, which at the time was run by the priests of the cult of Apollo at the Oracle of Delphi.

Finally, Aristotle's own native land, Macedonia, at the time of his birth was hardly a civilized state. It was run by a few backward landed aristocrats who refused to submit to the central authority of their king who, at the time, was just one of them, and whose office was elective. The peasant population was barbaric. Youths were not allowed in the company of grown men until they had killed their first human victim. Fighting and hunting were the chief occupations. Bacchic mysteries, Dionysian orgies, sodomy and human sacrifice were rampant.

How, twenty-eight years later Macedonia emerged as the most formidable military power in the world under the stewardship of Aristotle's childhood friend Philip of Macedon, was a miracle that was worked out by the priests of Apollo and their faction in Persian Imperial politics.

THE CULT OF APOLLO

The history of antiquity has been completely misrepresented, and most otherwise honorable historians have fallen victim either to vicious fallacies or wildly banalized and simplified accounts, for the single reason that the secret of the cult of Apollo has not yet been ripped open. No history of the ancient world beginning from the eighth century BC, and including the Roman Empire can be written with any competence, unless it is written from the standpoint of the activities of the cult of Apollo, the most successful strategic intelligence operation of the Babylonian priesthood. (55)

The cult was started by Mesopotamian priests somewhere in northern Syria during the eighth century BC, and was designed to penetrate the relatively more enlightened urban centers of the then formidable Ionian-Phoenician alliance. Later myth and propaganda portray Apollo as the god who, wherever he went, brought with him culture, letters, commerce and civilization. The truth is the exact opposite. Wherever there already was culture, commerce and prosperity, there the cult of Apollo infiltrated.

The great Homer, throughout his *Iliad*, portrays Apollo as a dreadful, treacherous creature, the deadliest of gods whose arrival is like the sudden onrush of darkness and night. (56) He is a god whose deadly appearance only his father Zeus and his mother Leto can endure. In the *Iliad*, the great epic of the Ionian cities, Apollo is portrayed as an enemy god, fighting on the opposite side of the Greeks.

He kept fighting on that side throughout his history. According to the tradition, this oriental god arrived at the Temple of Delphi (i.e., his priests took over that temple) in mainland Greece, at approximately the time that the Babylonian priests of Bel-Marduk (also a sun-god), were helping the Persian Achaemenids to power in Mesopotamia. The legend, widely accepted in antiquity, attributes the following crimes to the activities of the priests of Apollo:

They played a significant role in helping the conqueror Cyrus the Great, founder of the Achaemenid dynasty, crush the kingdom of Lydia, an important strategic ally of both Ionian and Phoenician cities. (57) Later, throughout the Persian invasions into Greece, the god's Temple at Delphi was running both intelligence and destabilization-psychological warfare operations against the Greeks on behalf of the invading force. It attempted repeatedly to induce the Athenians to either surrender or abandon their city. It succeeded in disorganizing military operations as, for example, when it delayed the dispatch of a Spartan military force that was to join the Athenians in the battle of Marathon, and so forth. At the end of the Persian Wars the public outcry was great, but the priests at the temple continued these activities.

The great republican dramatist Aeschylus, a leader of the Areopagus faction in Athens, accused the cult of Apollo of treason and conducted one of the most masterful and effective propaganda campaigns in history against it. (58) Most of his plays, but particularly the profound *Oresteian Trilogy*, a masterpiece of psychoanalysis and political warfare, are a direct polemic against the cult of Apollo.

The priests of Apollo, however, prevailed over the faction of Aeschylus, the Areopagus, and snatched victory from the hands of Ionia by installing the treacherous Pericles in power in Athens during the year 461 BC. The event occurred while the previous Athenian government, controlled by the Areopagus, was vigorously pursuing the war against Persia on all fronts from the Black Sea to Egypt. Once Pericles, head of the democratic party which was financed and controlled by the cult of Apollo, got into office, the war stopped, a peace treaty was signed, Athens was given a tax farming franchise (like any other Persian satrapy) in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean, and Sparta was all of a sudden declared to be the greatest enemy of Athens. The great statesman Pericles, upon inspection, turns out to be a fraud and, moreover, one of the most expensively paid Persian agents in history; unlike all other Persian satraps, he was allowed not to remit to the Great King the proceeds of his tax farming license. Those proceeds, however, were centrally retained, as is well known, at the Treasury of Delos, the second largest shrine of Apollo after Delphi, under the control of the priests of Apollo. The so-called Athenian Empire was thus a hoax and no more than a Persian satrapy under the special management of the cult of Apollo.

There are numerous hints in Plato's Socratic dialogues that would lead one to suspect that the legal lynching of Socrates was an affair cooked up by Delphi. In the international political context of the time, this would make perfect sense.

The power of the cult of Apollo was threefold: money, intelligence, and mind control. The two most important shrines of the cult, Delphi and Delos, were the most important banking centers in the world west of the Euphrates river. Virtually all Greek cities had their state treasuries deposited with the cult's priest-bankers. This was money to be loaned, invested, and sometimes even granted for the needs of both individuals and states—both for business and for the raising of *mercenary armies*, the most formidable form of military service of the period.

The cult also maintained, in the form of Oracle shrines, an extensive network of intelligence gathering listening posts and stations, which, going beyond the notorious Oracle of Delphi, covered the entire littoral of the eastern Mediterranean and extended its sphere of influence westward into Sicily and Rome.

Finally, in terms of population control capabilities,

the cult had deployed two parallel arms, the Orphic-Dionysiac orgies and other rites for the humbler layers of the population, "for women and slaves" as Aristotle once put it, and the Apollonian pseudointellectual rites for the middle class. Between these two social layers, the cult priests could control more souls (and deliver more votes) than any sweet talking orator and charismatic politician anywhere in Greece.

All these weapons were used, and used ruthlessly.

The military power of Macedonia leaped up out of nowhere, to everybody's wild surprise, because of the cult of Apollo, beginning in the year 356, when Aristotle was twenty-eight years old and his friend Philip had been King for three years. The way it happened is as follows:

In 368 BC, on the initiative of the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes of Phrygia ad Hellespontum and his Athenian agents, admirals Iphicrates and Conon, the Congress of Delphi was held among representatives of all Greek cities. In the congress the King's Peace of 387 was reinterpreted to allow for the further strengthening of Thebes and the Delphic Amphictyony. The arrangement worked for twelve years until, in 356 BC, a band of determined and desperate Phocians launched a military assault against the Temple of Delphi, overwhelmed it, expelled the priests, sequestered all the funds, used them to field mercenary armies and organized most of Greece, including Athens and Sparta against the Delphic Amphictyons and Thebes. (59) Thus the little noticed Sacred War started. At its beginning, Macedonia was a primitive hinterland of no consequence.

When this war ended, or rather withered into oblivion ten years later, Macedonia was the mightiest military force in the world. Athens was suing for peace, Thebes had been humbled, Thrace had surrendered and the Persian King, Artaxerxes Ochus, signed a secret peace treaty with Philip. (60) During the same year, 346 BC, Philip triumphantly presided over the Pythian Games at Delphi. He had worked for the honor—he had been the man who for ten years led the fight against the courageous Phocians shouting "Sacrilege!" For seven of these ten years, two important Persian leaders were guests at his court, Artabazus the former satrap of Phrygia and his brother-in-law the Rhodian mercenary general Memnon. (61) Memnon in later years was to become the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces that the Persian Empire was arraying against Philip's son Alexander the Great.

During this brief period of ten years in which Macedonia was catapulted to the position of military supremacy, a number of boorish, backward Macedonian chieftains experienced a dizzying leap from rags to riches. These men, Antipater, Parmenio, Attalus, Amyntas and other personal friends of Aristotle, the formal war council or "General Staff" of the Macedonian army, knew that they owed their careers to the priests at Delphi. (62) Most of them were still

commanding the army when Alexander led it against Persia in 334 BC, under very different circumstances.

THE 'ISOCRATES PLAN'

Unfortunately, we shall probably never obtain the specific pieces of information that will tell us in what way the Platonic Academy influenced events around the Sacred War. The boldness and brilliance of the Phocians' ingenious, near-deadly attack against Delphi will simply leave us guessing in whose head it really originated. Plato comes to mind, but Plato had a strict policy of utter confidentiality in such matters. In one of his letters, he writes: "Consider these facts and take care lest you sometime come to repent of having now unwisely published your views. It is a very great safeguard to learn by heart instead of writing. It is impossible for what is written not to be disclosed. That is the reason why I have never written anything about these things, and why there is not and will not be any written work of Plato's own. What are now called his are the works of a Socrates embellished and modernized." (63)

It should be born in mind however, that certain activities of Plato around the time of the Phocian assault against Delphi are highly suggestive. In 362 BC, there was a general revolt of the western satraps against the Persian King. Upon the outbreak of that revolt, Plato undertook his final trip to Syracuse, and there attempted to win over the tyrant Dionysius to his plans. (64) The protracted negotiations collapsed and Plato returned to Athens to prepare the overthrow of Dionysius. (65) In Macedonia, the king was a certain Perdiccas III, a personal friend of Plato who was receiving direct advice from the Academy. (66) Two members of the Academy assassinated the Thracian King Cotys—a neighbor of Macedonia—an act that could only result in unleashing the dormant powers of the Macedonian kingdom. (67) Subsequently, the Academy organized a large military expeditionary force and dispatched it, under Plato's friend and pupil Dion, to Syracuse, with the objective of overthrowing Dionysius and unifying Sicily. (68)

It was at the same time that the Phocians under Philomelus successfully assaulted Delphi. The surviving records are incomplete, but overwhelmingly suggest coordination between the Academy's international deployments and the Phocian operation. Both the Academy and the Phocians had recruited troops from the same areas in the Peloponnese, where Academy politicians had previously written laws and constitutions. (69) Both Dion and Philomelus were assassinated in the same year, probably by the same opponents of the Academy.

What is indisputable is that at the time of the Sacred War, Plato and the networks of the Academy had deployed themselves as a formidable third international

power, positioned against the two rival factions of the Persian Empire, the central bureaucratic apparatus of the King and the western satrapies under the influence of the priest-financiers of Delphi. The three-way battle was being fought throughout the world, from Syracuse, Macedonia, the Dardanelles, down to Asia Minor, Rhodes, Cyprus, Phoenicia and Egypt. (70)

The King's faction had no program other than maintain the now unsalvageable status quo. The Academy's faction had a program which become apparent through the city-building policies and administrative reforms of Alexander the Great. (71)

The coalition of Delphi, western satraps and Greek puppets did also have a program, best articulated in two surviving documents; one is Aristotle's treatises, the *Politics* and *Ethics*; the second, a speech by Isocrates in the Athenian Assembly, along with a letter by the same to King Philip. Isocrates's formulation is by far the more efficient and we shall call the programmatic perspective of Delphi by his name: "*The Isocrates Plan.*"

In his "Address to Philip," delivered in 346, the year in which Philip presided over the Pythian Games at Delphi, Isocrates first identifies the social problem at hand, which is excess population that keeps feeding social unrest both in Greek-speaking areas, and in the Persian Empire proper:

... those who now, for the lack of the daily necessities of life, are wandering from place to place and committing outrages upon whomsoever they encounter. If we do not stop these men from banding together, by providing sufficient livelihood for them, they will grow before we know it into so great a multitude as to be a terror no less to the Hellenes than to the barbarians. But we pay no heed to them; nay we shut our eyes to the fact that a terrible menace which threatens us all alike is waxing day by day. It is therefore the duty of a man who is high-minded, who is a lover of Hellas, who has a broader vision than the rest of the world, to employ these bands in a war against the barbarians, to strip from that empire all the territory that I defined a moment ago [i.e. everything west of the Sinope-Cilicia line] to deliver these wanderers from the ills by which they are afflicted and which they inflict upon others, to collect them into cities, and with these cities to fix the boundaries of Hellas, making of them buffer states to shield us all. (72)

Further, Isocrates proceeds to identify the issue of greatest concern to the priesthood, the fact that the King's court has completely degenerated and is incapable of running the Empire. Notice that he is presenting the case in a way that suggests to Philip who, among the satraps, are likely to be his allies against the King:

... this King [Artaxerxes III Ochus] is so far from exercising dominion over others that he is not in

control even of the cities which were surrendered to him; and such is the state of affairs that there is no one who is not in doubt what to believe — whether he has given them up because of his cowardice, or whether they have learned to despise and condemn the power of the barbarians.

Consider the state of affairs in his empire. Who could hear facts and not be spurred to war against him? Egypt was, it is true, in revolt even when Cyrus made his expedition [i.e. Xenophon's *Anabasis*]; but her people nevertheless were living in continual fear lest the King might some day lead an army in person and overcome the natural obstacles which, thanks to the Nile, their country presents, and all their military defenses as well. But now this King has delivered them of that dread; for after he had brought together and fitted out the largest force he could possibly raise and marched against them, he retired from Egypt not only defeated, but laughed at and scorned as unfit either to be king or to command an army. Furthermore, Cyprus and Phoenicia and Cilicia, and that region from which the barbarians used to recruit their fleet, belonged at that time to the King, but now they have either revolted from him or are so involved in war and its attendant ills that none of these peoples is of any use to him; *while to you, if you desire to make war upon him, they will be serviceable.* And mark also that Idrieus [i.e., the satrap of Caria] who is the most prosperous of the present rulers of the mainland, must in the nature of things be more hostile to the interests of the King than are those who are making open war against him [he means the satraps of Phrygia, Armenia, et al.] verily he would be of all men the most perverse if he did not desire the dissolution of that empire which outrages his brother, which made war upon himself, and which at all times has never ceased to plot against him in its desire to be master of his person and of all his wealth. It is through fear of these things that he is now constrained to pay court to the King and to send him much tribute every year; *but if you should cross over to the mainland with an army, he would greet you with joy, in the belief that you were come to his relief; and you will also induce many of the other satraps to throw off the King's power if you promise them "freedom" and scatter broadcast over Asia that word which, when sown among the Hellenes, has broken both our empire and that of the Lacedaemonians.* (73)

In terms of practical preparations for the campaign, Philip is advised to do two things: unify the four largest Greek cities, and march. "I affirm that, without neglecting any of your own interests, you ought to make an effort to reconcile Argos and Lacedaemon and Thebes and Athens; for if you can bring these cities together, you will not find it hard to unite the others as well; for all the rest are under the protection of the aforesaid cities, and fly for refuge, when they are alarmed, to one or the other of these powers, and they all draw upon them for succor. So that if you can persuade four cities only to take a sane



Alexander's foreign allies: Among the foreign nations which supported Alexander's Grand Design was Phoenician Sidon. This relief celebrating a victorious battle of Alexander, carved c. 330 BC, adorns the marble sarcophagus of a king of Sidon.

view of things, you will deliver the others also of many evils....." (74) "...the greatest states of Hellas should resolve to put an end to their mutual quarrels and carry the war beyond our borders to Asia, and should determine to wrest from the barbarians which they now think proper to get for themselves at the expense of the Hellenes." (75) "...undertake to conquer the whole empire of the King, or at any rate, to wrest from it a vast extent of territory and sever from it—to use a current phrase— 'Asia from Cilicia to Sinope'." (76)

Was this the plan of Isocrates personally, or that of the priests of the cult of Apollo? Just listen how Isocrates concludes his letter, with a promise and a warning from Apollo himself:

I think that you are not unaware in what manner the gods order the affairs of mortals; for not with their own hands do they deal out blessings and curses

that befall us; rather they inspire in each of us a state of mind that good or ill, as the case may be, is visited upon us through one another. For example, it may be that even now the gods have assigned to me the task of speech while to you they allot the task of action, considering that you will be the best master in that province, while in the field of speech I might prove least irksome to my hearers. Indeed I believe that even your past achievements would never have reached such magnitude had not one of the gods [i.e. Apollo] helped you to succeed; and I believe he did so, not that you might spend your whole life warring upon the barbarians in Europe alone, but that, having been trained and having gained experience and come to know your own powers in these campaigns, you might set your heart upon the course which I have urged upon you. It were therefore shameful, now that fortune nobly leads the way, to lag behind and refuse to follow whither she desires to lead you forward. (77)

Philip and the Macedonian General Staff followed Isocrates' proposal to the letter. Aristotle, having fled Athens, joined Philip's court in 343 BC, and was a very active participant in the preparations, having carried out numerous diplomatic and intelligence assignments. (78) Two of the Macedonian Army's most prominent generals, Antipater, (79) the gray eminence of Macedonia and the power behind the throne, and Parmenio (80) who was later executed by Alexander the Great for treason, both had developed special relationships with Delphi. The first was chosen to preside over the Pythian Games in 342, the second led an army that attacked the city of Amphissa, a local enemy of the Delphic temple, on orders from the Amphictyons in 338 BC.

During the same year, 338, several other important events took place. Philip's armies, at the battle of Chaeroneia, smashed the last remaining opposition of the pro-Artaxerxes faction of Demosthenes in Athens. General Antipater, visiting Athens as an envoy, held a final discussion over the details of the plans with Isocrates, (81) now ninety-eight and soon to die. At the end of the year, a pan-Hellenic Congress was held in Corinth, under the presidency of Philip, which declared Sacred War against Persia for the official purpose of avenging the Greek gods. General Parmenio was

dispatched, in the beginning of the following year, 337, to Asia Minor across the Dardanelles with troops, establishing a bridgehead.

But in the year 338 BC, another important event took place—the Persian King Artaxerxes III Ochus was assassinated by a conspiracy led by his Prime Minister, the eunuch Bagoas, and the Commander in Chief of Persia's western armies, the Rhodian general Mentor, a personal friend of Philip. (82)

In conclusion, a portrayal of the political map of the time would be incomplete if it did not emphasize that Aristotle was playing a central role in all these affairs. Having rejoined the Macedonian court after his flight from the Academy, he spent five years on a diplomatic-intelligence assignment in the city of Atarneus in Asia Minor. (83) He undertook intelligence-research assignments on behalf of the Delphic Temple and along with his nephew Callisthenes won an award for services rendered. (84) He also maintained correspondence with general Mentor, and cultivated a special relationship with general Antipater which shaped the last phase of his life: while Alexander the Great was campaigning in Asia, Antipater was the regent in Greece and Aristotle was his intelligence chief in Athens. (85) The two men headed up the conspiracy that assassinated Alexander, as we shall see at the conclusion of this report.

IV. The Assassination of Philip of Macedon

Apollo's "Isocrates Plan" was never put to effect because Philip of Macedon was assassinated right before crossing over to lead the war in Asia, in 336 BC. He was succeeded by his son Alexander, justly surnamed "the Great," who, after a brief and successful civil war, led a campaign for world conquest under a political program of the Platonic Academy.

Philip's assassination itself remains one of the unsolved riddles of history. The assassin, one Pausanias, was an unfortunate creature who had once been sodomically gang-raped on orders by General Attalus. In revenge, he killed the king on the day of his wedding with Attalus's daughter. It is generally acknowledged, however, that there was an extensive conspiracy behind the assassin. The assassin himself was killed within minutes of his action by two men generally believed to have been among his co-conspirators. They themselves were soon silenced. (86) After that, a chaotic political situation erupted. Alexander, just returned from exile, was challenged by no less than four contenders for the succession. He launched a bloody fight which left the contenders dead and the majority of the General Staff terrified.

Aristotle declared himself in "philosophical" disagreement with Alexander. (87) Many Macedonian nobles, including Attalus, father-in-law of the deceased, fled and joined the Persian forces or stayed and got killed. Alexander, twenty-two years old at the time, relied on a small band of personal associates who had accompanied him to his previous exile, and on the fact that all the other contenders to the throne were dead. As Persian forces, on the Persian King's behalf, were amassing to strike a blow against Macedonia, Antipater, Parmenio and others had to think fast. They worked out a compromise in which Antipater agreed to throw his support behind Alexander's claim to the throne, and then proceed with the campaign against Persia. Antipater and the others in the general staff, including Parmenio, intended to conduct the campaign along the lines of the Isocrates plan. Alexander the Great intended otherwise.

The relationship between the new king and the Macedonian military oligarchy was always very fragile and finely balanced throughout the twelve years of the campaign across Asia. Alexander could be justly acclaimed "great" not so much for his military conquests,

but for the political dexterity that he employed to keep his Macedonian political opponents off balance throughout his life — and until his assassination.

What makes Philip's assassination a significant event is the political program of Alexander, a program against which Aristotle polemicized throughout his life, and on account of which he plotted Alexander's murder.

The program of Alexander the Great had was composed of the following principal ten points:

First: Restoration of the ancient Ionian republican constitutions. (88)

Second: Establishment of a unified Confederation of all Ionian cities and projection of Ionian commercial power as proposed by Thales of Miletus two-and-a-half centuries earlier. (89)

Third: Disbandment of the tax-farming system of Persian satrapies and elimination of the decentralized military power of satraps. (90)

Forth: Establishment of one, central worldwide Treasury to replace the taxing-authority of the earlier tax-farming satrapies and to disburse monies for administrative costs to the former satrapies, now administrative units or "themes." (91)

Fifth: Establishment of one central imperial mint for issuing currency worldwide and elimination of the right of former satrapies and other localities to coin their own currencies. (92)

Sixth: Massive central government support for world trade expansion, including the buildup of infrastructure such as a canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, making the Euphrates navigable and building up Babylon into the largest port in the world for facilitating East-West trade. (93)

Seventh: An extensive program of city-building, which bequeathed to posterity scores of cities bearing the name of the conqueror, Alexandria. (94)

Eighth: A massive educational program for the rapid introduction of Greek science and culture throughout the world; to be accompanied by a program of cultural unification of all the various nationalities. (95)

Ninth: Opening up of the Western Mediterranean for rapid urbanization. (96)

Tenth: Expulsion of the oligarchic faction from Greek cities and enforcement of the republican form of local government. (97)

Across the centuries, men have never ceased marveling at the genius of Alexander, though very very few have even paid attention to or grasped his innermost soul, his driving purpose, which was this program for terminating once and for all the two-thousand-year-old obscenity of the Babylonian system in one powerful blow. Unless this program and this world outlook is understood to have been Alexander's very soul, his brief, noble life would have to be viewed as an incomprehensible, haughty miracle which, of course, it never was.

This program was inspired in him by the Platonic Academy, and it armed him with the resolution and sureness of purpose that people generally mistake for youthful daring and adventurism. This resolution and sureness of purpose was the binding force that terrified his drunken generals into submission, and that also drove them to plot his assassination. General Cassander, the eldest son of Antipater, in later life and after Alexander was long dead, would experience fright and his hair would rise every time he walked past a statue of Alexander. (98) Aristotle lived in fear that he would be executed as soon as Alexander returned home from the campaign in Asia. (99)

The record that reaches us from antiquity is distorted, fragmentary, and mostly written by either biased or poorly informed individuals — in short incomplete and, taken by itself, unreliable. The greatest problem in evaluating completely Alexander's relationship to the Academy is the fact that for six hundred uninterrupted years after Alexander's death, the world was ruled by the deadliest enemies of both Alexander and the Academy, in whose interest it was either to destroy or distort the historical record. (100)

Completeness however is not essential in reaching a firm conclusion on the matter. The shreds of evidence that have survived contain information of decisive character.

It is reported in numerous sources that Alexander maintained correspondence with two leaders of the Academy, the Athenian General Phocion (101) and Xenocrates, (102) now the Scholarch, or head of the Academy. Xenocrates was in fact invited to join Alexander's campaign, (103) repeatedly received very substantial financial backing from Alexander for the needs of the Academy, (104) and was commissioned by Alexander to write a four volume political statement on government entitled *De Monarchia*, which unfortunately does not survive, but which is referred to by Plutarch on numerous occasions, by Cicero, (105) and by Diogenes Laertius. (106)

Another well-known fact is the role the Academy played in restoring the old republican constitutions of the Ionian cities and in carrying out Thales' ancient plan for the establishment of the Ionian confederation.

Immediately after the battle of Granicus, Alexander issued a proclamation in which he promised the abolition of the oligarchical regimes in the Ionian cities and the restoration of the old republican constitutions. The measure was drafted by a member of the Platonic Academy, Delius of Ephesus, who also participated in its implementation. (107) It was the first public affront to the understanding in the "Isocrates Plan," and included such additional measures as freedom of the Ionian cities from any imperial taxation, organization of a unified Ionian Commonwealth, and measures for quick expansion.

sion of manufacturing and trade. It was as a result of these reforms, proposed by the Platonic Academy, that Ionia and its agricultural hinterland became the prized province of the Roman Empire and later, the economic, financial and administrative heart of the Byzantine Empire.

The program for the Ionian cities was not liked by the old generals of the Macedonian army, especially not by General Antipater who had stayed behind as Regent of Macedonia and Hegemon over the other Greek cities. Antipater, with the collaboration of Aristotle, had made a point of promoting the tyrannical form of government in the Greek cities, either by encouraging and strengthening existing oligarchies or by installing new ones.

Thus, even from the very beginning of the campaign, it was generally known among the broad popular layers that there were "two different and rival ways of governing cities, one Alexander's and the other Antipater's." (108)

The old chiefs of the army, however, had to swallow this programmatic measure for a very simple military reason: at the beginning of the campaign, the Macedonians had no navy, and the Persians, having complete dominance over the sea, seriously threatened their supply and communications lines. The Persians' problem, however, was that most of their navy was manned and officered by Ionian sailors and captains. The proclamation of Delius of Ephesus had the result of immediately paralyzing half of the Persian navy.

Plutarch, in passing, notes: "Plato sent Aristonymus to the Arcadians, Phormio to Elis, Menedemus to Pyrrha. Eudoxus and Aristotle wrote laws for Cnidus and Stageira. Alexander asked Xenocrates (head of the Academy) for advice about kingship; *the man who was sent to Alexander by the Asiatic Greeks and did most to incite him to his war on the barbarians, was Delius of Ephesus, an associate of Plato.*" (109)

This little-noticed passage is of exceptional importance because it implies the following. First, Delius of Ephesus had been sent to Alexander "by the Asiatic Greeks" (i.e. the Ionians) before the spring of 334 BC, before Alexander started his campaign, else why should he have to "incite him to his war on the barbarians." Second, if Delius went to Alexander before 334, the question is *how long before?* Namely, before the assassination of Philip or after? There survive two tiny passages in ancient sources and that is all we have by way of hard evidence. One is Suidas's entries under Euphreaus and Leon and the other in Philostratus' *Lives of Philosophers*. They report "Delius of Ephesus who under *Philip and Alexander* was the active promoter of the expedition against the Persians." (110)

This means that Delius had been sent "by the Asiatic Greeks" while Philip was still alive. That means before

the summer of 336 BC, the time of Philip's assassination. That also means that we do not have to assume that Delius was trying to either contact, or "incite to his war on the barbarians" King Philip himself. There are two reasons. *First* Philip needed no "inciting" as the "Sacred War" had already been declared in 338 BC and as he had already deployed advanced troops into Asia Minor under Parmenio. *Second*, "under Philip" simply means "during the kingship of Philip" and need not imply any cooperation between King Philip and the Platonist Delius.

That would leave us with the assumption that Delius was "inciting" Alexander while Philip was organizing his own expedition under the Isocrates Plan. When would this be occurring? We know that while Philip and his generals were preparing their expedition, Alexander, as Crown Prince, was attempting to pursue a foreign policy hostile to Philip's and independently of Philip. In the notorious Pixodaros Affair, (111) his efforts were discovered, and they led to open fights between Philip and Alexander and resulted in the exile of *Alexander and his personal supporters*. The Pixodaros Affairs took place in the late part of winter 337/336, and Plutarch (112) places the exile some time after that incident. Alexander returned from exile in early 336, probably in the spring, and in July of that year, Philip was assassinated.

It must have been during this period that Delius of Ephesus was advising Alexander, and, as a result of his advice, one of two possible alternatives must have occurred. Either Alexander and his personal entourage were won over to the programmatic perspective and that made Alexander an absolutely unacceptable choice to the oligarchic Macedonian army chiefs and caused them to launch a campaign against Alexander's succession rights; or an Alexander already hostile to the chiefs found in Delius's program the appropriate rallying issue to launch his bid against the oligarchy. Either way, the result was the same. And the issue had to be resolved before the great Hellenic crusade started eastward. The issue was the succession to the throne and it was crucial. As King Philip was setting on a very uncertain military enterprise, in which there was no certainty that he would remain alive, everyone knew, including Philip and all the chiefs, that, in the labile politics of Macedonia, leaving the issue of succession unresolved was politically suicidal. The generals indicated that they considered Alexander a bastard, with no rights to succession, (113) and Philip agreed to marry the niece of General Attalus, a lady of proven fecundity who would provide a new, legitimate, crown prince who would have the advantage of being an infant, i.e., allowing the continuation of government through such devices as regency, guardianship, etc. in which all generals would share the power.

Philip's wedding had been staged-managed to be the

great pageant with which the military campaign would commence. Preparations had been made for the groom to join with his troops and sail off as soon as the wedding ceremony had formally resolved the issue of succession. Tens of thousands of Greek guests from all cities were invited at the court of Aigai to send off the troops and witness the wedding. For months, the propaganda machine of the Temple at Delphi built up a tense atmosphere of religious enthusiasm around the country: Hellas was about to avenge itself upon the Persian King. Philip sent messengers to the Delphic Oracle to obtain an appropriate prophecy for the undertaking and the god's priestess sent back: "*The bull has been garlanded, the end is come, the sacrificer is at hand.*"

King Philip was assassinated as he was entering the temple for the wedding ceremony. Alexander immediately launched a ruthless fight that won him the

throne. Many Macedonian nobles were either killed or fled to the Persian court. Aristotle reversed views and, whereas he had for years been supporting and preparing for Philip's war on Persia, now declared himself against Alexander's war. (114) Most of the chiefs who remained determined to use Alexander as a puppet king to carry out the Isocrates plan. Alexander determined to use his generals to carry out his own plan.

We shall probably never know the details of the particular role that Delius of Ephesus, the "associate of Plato" played in this drama. From the political-economic program that he carried out in Ionia a few months later, we know him to have been a man of great insight and political depth. From the way he forced the Macedonian army chiefs to swallow that program, we know him to have been a man with an extraordinary sense of political timing and self-confident resolution.

V. The Assassination of Alexander

As is the case, to date, with all great events in history, the Greek expedition against Persia that was launched in the spring of 334 BC meant different things to the different layers of the masses of participants. For the Macedonian soldiers of the rank-and-file, it meant that they would do what they always did, follow their king to yet another war of conquest and booty; to the soldiers of the contingents from the Greek cities, it meant a sacred war to avenge the wrongs done to them by the Persians in 490-480 BC. To most in the officer corps it meant a welcome opportunity for wealth and career. At the level of the General Staff, there was a split. Some, intimates of Alexander, shared in the king's Grand Design; others were driven by personal loyalty to him; most of the old-line oligarchs were planning conquest and plunder in which they would secure their own satrapies.

At the top, the Regent Antipater, his confidant Aristotle, and Chief of Staff Parmenio were dedicated to implement the Isocrates Plan, a balance-of-power scheme for stabilization of oligarchic rule both east and west of the Euphrates. Antipater and Aristotle, upon the start of the campaign, retired in Athens where they would control the Greek cities and the supplies in men and material for the advancing army. Parmenio, in Asia with Alexander, would coordinate to keep the king under control, as second-in-command.

Alexander himself, throughout the twelve-year campaign would cooperate with and confide in a very limited, select circle of trusted personal friends who shared in the Grand Design. (115) Most prominent among these men was the Chiliarch Hephaestion who was also made Alexander's Prime Minister. The Army

never learned of the full scope of Alexander's far-reaching objectives until after his death in the summer of 323, when General Perdiccas, having obtained a number of secret memoranda, the *Hypomnemata*, read them publicly to a hostile audience in order to have them officially repudiated. (116)

There are two characteristic political features of the twelve-year-long campaign of Alexander. First, at each turning point of the war, Alexander would make a new programmatic statement which, invariably, resulted in generating additional political advantage for the marching army — and also in revealing certain new features of his Grand Design hitherto not made public. Second, each time the programmatic content of the war was thus clarified by Alexander, assassination plots would be hatched against him, all of which failed except the last. In every one of all the assassination conspiracies reported, the conspirators involved were either close family relatives or trusted friends of Aristotle and Antipater.

First was the conspiracy of one Alexander of Lyncestis, brother-in-law of Antipater, who, as Arrian reports, was caught arranging with the Persian King, Darius Codomannus, for the assassination of Alexander. (117) A Macedonian noble, Amyntas, who had fled to the Persian court after Philip's assassination, was aiding in the conspiracy.

The second attempt was discovered while being hatched by General Philotas, the son of Parmenio, and Parmenio himself in the year 330 BC. after the final defeat of and death of King Darius. Philotas and Parmenio were duly tried and executed by the army. (118)



British mythology: the Peripatetic propaganda hoax that Aristotle was Alexander the Great's tutor is idealized in this fanciful 19th century British Romantic engraving.

The third attempt was made by the nephew of Aristotle, Callisthenes of Olynthus, in the year 327, when Alexander and his army were returning from India. Callisthenes, according to all accounts, had organized a conspiracy among some of his homosexual liaisons in the corps of Royal Pages. It was through this group of Royal Pages that the fourth and last assassination plot was organized four years later. (119)

Until the time of the Callisthenes conspiracy, Alexander had handled his problem with the generals in a cautious way to be described below. After the Callisthenes conspiracy, he determined to crush all opposition and raise and train a non-Macedonian army

if necessary. He knew that the time had come to settle his final accounts with Antipater and Aristotle.

His first programmatic confrontation with the oligarchic chiefs was, as we saw, after his first victory over the Persians at the battle of Granicus, when he successfully pushed the program of Delius of Ephesus. His second confrontation was after his second great victory at the battle of Issus, just past the Cilician Gates. The Macedonian victory at Issus would have secured the success of the Isocrates Plan which provided for a division of spheres of influence with the Persian King retaining the area east of the Sinope-Cilicia line, and the Macedonians everything west of the line. Alexander scrapped the Iso-

ocrates plan right then and there. This is how Arrian describes the event:

While Alexander was at Marathus, envoys from Darius came with a request for the release of his mother, wife and children. They also brought a letter from him, of which the substance is as follows:

"Philip and Artaxerxes were on terms of friendship and alliance; but upon the accession of Artaxerxes's son Arses, Philip was guilty of unprovoked aggression against him. Now since Darius's reign began, Alexander has sent no representatives to his court to confirm the former friendship and alliance between the two kingdoms; on the contrary, he has crossed into Asia with his armed forces and done much damage to the Persians. For this reason Darius took the field in defense of his country and of his ancestral throne. The issue of the battle was as some god willed; and now Darius the King asks Alexander the King to restore from captivity his wife, his mother and his children, and is willing to make friends with him and be his ally. For this cause he urges Alexander to send to him, in company with Meniscus and Arsimas who have brought this request, representatives of his own in order that proper guarantees may be exchanged."

Alexander, having written his reply, ordered Thersippus to accompany Darius's envoys on their return, giving him strict instructions to deliver the letter to Darius but to discuss no question whatever which might arise from it. This was the letter:

"... First I defeated in battle your generals and satraps; now I have defeated yourself and the army you led. By God's help I am master of your country, and I have made myself responsible for the survivors of your army who fled to me for refuge; far from being detained by force they are serving of their own free will under my command.

"Come to me therefore, as you would come to the lord of the continent of Asia. Should you fear to suffer any indignity at my hands, then send some of your friends and I will give them the proper guarantees. Come, then, and ask me for your mother, your wife, and your children and anything else you please; for you shall have them, and whatever besides you can persuade me to give you.

"And in the future let any communications you wish to make with me be addressed to the King of all Asia. Do not write to me as an equal. Everything you possess is now mine; so if you should want anything, let me know in the proper terms, or I shall take steps to deal with you as a criminal. If, on the other hand, you wish to dispute your throne, stand and fight for it and do not run away. Wherever you may hide yourself, be sure I shall seek you out." (120)

The Isocrates Plan was thus scrapped. Plutarch in his account reports some more details, including the fact that Parmenio, the Chief of Staff, tried to convince Alexander to take the deal and end the campaign right then and there:

Darius wrote him [Alexander] a letter, and sent friends to intercede with him, requesting him to accept as a ransom of his captives the sum of a thousand talents, and offering him in exchange for his amity and alliance all the countries on this side the river Euphrates, together with one of his daughters in marriage. These propositions Alexander communicated to his friends and when Parmenio told him that, for his part, if he were Alexander, he should readily embrace them, "So would I," said Alexander, "if I were Parmenio." (121)

According to Plutarch, Parmenio had also tried to undercut Alexander's decision by trying to "set him up" in a sexual liaison with a Persian lady captured at Issus, the beautiful Barsine, who was the widow of the former Persian Commander in Chief Memnon, a Rhodian mercenary, and daughter of the satrap Artabazus, both collaborators of Parmenio and Philip since 353 BC at the hatching of the "Isocrates Plan." Here is Plutarch's account:

She [Barsine] had been instructed in the Grecian learning, was of gentle temper, and by her father, Artabazus, royally descended, with good qualities, added to the solicitations and encouragement of Parmenio, as Aristobulus tells us, made Alexander the more willing to attach himself to so agreeable and illustrious a woman. (122)

This notwithstanding, Parmenio's efforts failed.

Alexander's next political confrontation with the generals was after the battle at Guagamela, where Darius was defeated and fled from his throne for good. After the battle, Alexander formally proclaimed himself King of Asia, declared the purpose of the "Sacred War" of all Greece against Persia completed, and allowed those Greek troops who wanted to demobilize to do so. Moreover, he defined his objectives of further conquest eastward and declared, implicitly, his juridical independence from the *Congress of Corinth*, the Delphic priests' treaty organization over which Antipater, back in Greece, was still presiding. Moreover, he officially declared that he wanted the tyrannical form of city-government ("Antipater's way") formally abolished in all of Greece. At the same time he introduced the practice of appointing non-Greeks to administrative posts.

Plutarch reports:

This battle being thus over, seemed to put an end to the Persian Empire; and Alexander, who was now proclaimed King of Asia, returned thanks to the gods in magnificent sacrifices, and rewarded his friends and followers with great sums of money, and places, and governments of provinces. Eager to gain honor with the Greeks, he wrote to them that he would have all tyrannies abolished, that they might live free according to their own laws... (123)

This was in October of 331 BC. Toward the end of the

next year, another assassination plot was uncovered, in which most of Parmenio's family was involved. Parmenio, his son Philotas, and others were tried and executed. Alexander continued his administrative reforms and pressed his campaign eastward. Later, on his return from India, the nephew of Aristotle, Callisthenes, was caught organizing another assassination attempt in 327. He was tried and executed, and this opened the final drama of our narrative.

After this plot, Alexander declared open war on both Aristotle and Antipater, and it was evident that the final reckoning was soon to come. Plutarch reports of a warning that Alexander sent to Antipater and Aristotle:

But yet afterwards, in a letter to Antipater, he accuses Callisthenes. "The young conspirators were stoned to death by the Macedonians," he wrote, "but for the sophist [meaning Callisthenes], I will take care to punish him with them too who sent him to me, and who harbour those in their cities who conspire against my life," an unequivocal declaration against Aristotle, in whose house Callisthenes, for his relationship's sake, being his niece Hero's son, had been educated. (124)

Alexander was an old toughy and knew exactly what was coming. He was resolved to meet the menace head-on. From the evidence scattered in ancient sources, we know that his gameplan was to move fast and replace the old army with a new force made up of personally trusted officers and Greek-trained Persian recruits, while at the same time dislodging Antipater from his power base in Greece by mobilizing the republican factions that Antipater had exiled. On the other hand, Antipater's network, as Alexander anticipated, mobilized to create a noose around the King, by means of minirevolts, army mutinies, administrative destabilizations, and attrition of his trusted personal guard. While in India, Alexander faced his first army mutiny and was obliged to call off his last campaign. On the way back, sporadic mutinies broke out and the army refused to fight. The main issues of discontent were first, Alexander's eagerness to reconcile with the Persians and employ them in the kingdom's service, and, second, typical "soldier's gripes" about the length of the campaign, etc. (125)

In the midst of this tension with the army, in the summer of 324, Alexander made a bold move which opened the final act of the drama. At Susa, on his way back to Babylon, he and eighty of his top officers married women of the Persian nobility. At the same time he enrolled 30,000 newly trained Persian youths in his army, and reorganized his personally trusted cavalry under reliable officers and incorporated in it Persian riders. Finally, he demobilized 10,000 of the more troublesome Macedonian veterans and, under the command of General Craterus, sent them off back home.

But he sent them back with instructions. Craterus was to replace Antipater as Regent, and instruct Antipater to report to Alexander in Babylon; second, Craterus was to see to it that all the exiles from the Greek cities were returned home and republican forms of government restored; third, the cult of Apollo's representatives at the treaty organization of the Congress of Corinth, was to recognize him as god. (126)

It was a neat and ruthless package. The part about deification, contrary to recent gossip among modern historians, was an accepted political form of the time which Alexander was using to officially declare that he was no longer legally bound to the treaty obligations that the Macedonian throne, under Philip, had assumed toward the cult of Apollo. (127) At the time, the deification issue was understood in these terms.

Simultaneously, Alexander had his Proclamation on the Return of the Exiles read publicly at the Olympic Games of September 324 BC, where 20,000 assembled exiles heard it and received it with enthusiastic acclamation. (128)

But from that point on, Antipater's countermeasures begin to show their effect. In the late autumn of 324, Alexander's most trusted associate and childhood friend, the Chiliarch and Prime Minister Hephaestion was found dead at the age of thirty-five. (129) Craterus and the 10,000 veterans were stranded on the shores of Cilicia, and never reached Greece to replace Antipater. The news of the King's death in the summer of 323 found them still squatting in Cilicia. Antipater himself refused to go to Babylon, and instead sent his son Cassander, who organized on the spot the assassination of Alexander. Once the king was dead, General Perdiccas obtained possession of Alexander's secret plans, the *Hypomnemata*, and read them to the assembled army and had them voted down. The generals declared the end of war and divided up offices in the empire. Perdiccas was declared regent to the unborn child of Alexander, Antipater retained Greece and Macedonia, and other offices were distributed accordingly.

Craterus, the general who disobeyed Alexander's orders and did not move to dislodge Antipater, now married one of Antipater's daughters. Perdiccas was in the process of negotiating marriage with another of Antipater's available daughters. The next year, Perdiccas decided instead to marry Alexander's sister, and the wars of succession were on.

Now, the circumstances of the assassination itself and Aristotle's role in it. The circumstantial political evidence is overwhelmingly in support of the thesis that Alexander was indeed assassinated. Subsequent events also fit the assumption. Most importantly, the "hard evidence" is also available and reported in the ancient accounts. And yet all historians reject the thesis. This is what is called a cheap hoax, as we shall prove.

Arrian's account of Alexander's death is as follows:

According to some accounts, when he wished to leave his friends at their drinking and retire to his bedroom, he happened to meet Medius, who at the time was the companion most closely in his confidence, and Medius asked him to come and continue drinking at his own table, adding that the party would be a merry one.

The Royal Diaries confirm the fact that he drank with Medius after his first carouse. Then, the Diaries continue, he left the table, bathed, and went to sleep, after which he supped with Medius and again set to drinking, continuing till late at night. Then, once more he took a bath, ate little, and went straight to sleep with the fever already on him. (130)

Arrian then continues a long, tedious description of the account of the Royal Diaries until the point that they describe the king's expiration. Then he continues:

I am aware that much else has been written about Alexander's death: for instance, that Antipater sent him some medicine which had been tampered with and that he took it with fatal results. Aristotle is supposed to have made the drug, because he was already afraid of Alexander on account of Callisthenes' death, and Antipater's son Cassander is said to have brought it. Some accounts declare that he brought it in a mule's hoof [i.e. the poison was highly corrosive], and that it was given Alexander by Cassander's younger brother Iollas, who was his cup bearer and had been hurt by him in some way shortly before his death; others state that Medius who was Iollas' lover had a hand in it, and support the view by the fact that it was Medius who invited Alexander to the drinking party — he felt a sharp pain after draining the cup, and left the party in consequence of it. (131)

Plutarch reports on the rumors about the poisoning in the following way:

At the time, nobody had any suspicion of his being poisoned, but upon some information given six years later, they say Olympias [Alexander's mother] put many to death, and scattered the ashes of Iollas, then dead, as if he had given him the poison. But those who affirm that Aristotle counselled Antipater to do it, and at that by his means the poison was brought, adduced one Hagnothemis as their authority, who, they say, heard King Antigonos speak of it, and tell us that the poison was water, deadly cold as ice, distilled from a rock in the district of Nonacris, which they gathered like a thin dew, and kept it in an ass's hoof; for it was so cold and penetrating that no other vessel would hold it. (132)

Both Plutarch and Arrian in their texts subsequently deny the truthfulness of the reports about poisoning. They both rely on one single source, the authority of the Royal Diaries. Now the Royal Diaries are a fraud. First,

they are a very strange document in ancient doxography. They have not survived in any form to our times; they are not referred to as historical source materials in any other sort of history written in ancient times except in these two locations in Arrian and Plutarch. All the Royal Diaries report are a sanitized version of Alexander's death. It is generally accepted that the Royal Diaries were written after the fact, for the purpose of discouraging reports that the King was assassinated. (133)

Moreover, Arrian, in a wonderful tongue-in-cheek way, while pretending to subscribe to the official version of Alexander's death (for whatever reasons of political expediency prevailing in Arrian's own time), gives us the clue that we need to discard the version of Alexander's death presented by the Royal Diaries. He says, as he quotes from them:

The Diaries say that Peitho, Attalus, Demophon and Peucestas, together with Cleomenes, Menidas, and Seleucus, spent the night in the temple of Serapis and asked the God if it would be better for Alexander to be carried into the temple himself, in order to pray there and perhaps recover; but the God forbade it, and declared it would be better for him if he stayed where he was. The God's command was made public, and soon afterwards Alexander died — this, after all, being the "better" thing. (134)

Plutarch also:

The same day Peitho and Seleucus were dispatched to the temple of Serapis to inquire if they should bring Alexander thither, and were answered by the god that they should not remove him. On the twenty-eighth, in the evening, he died. This account is most of it word for word as it is written in the Diaries. (135)

And now the clincher: Both Plutarch and Arrian, writing fifty years apart from each other in the second century AD, *knew very well that there existed no god Serapis when Alexander died. The cult of Serapis was inaugurated twelve years after Alexander's death, by General Ptolemy of Egypt.* Therefore, the only reason for Arrian and Plutarch to attribute the report about the temple of Serapis to the Royal Diaries would be that they intended to warn the reader that the whole story about Alexander dying a normal death was an official fabrication.

There are some additional important features to the Serapis clue. The Serapis cult was manufactured, down to the last detail of its rites, by the Peripatetic School of Aristotle on commission by Ptolemy when he proclaimed himself King of Egypt. In Arrian's and Plutarch's accounts, it was the god of Aristotle and Ptolemy who, coldbloodedly, announced to the public that death was the "better thing" for Alexander.

Finally, all we can conclude from the available

evidence, is the following: Immediately after the King's death, the generals' junta kept matters quiet. When, in the following year, 322 BC, their deals fell through and Perdiccas refused to marry Antipater's daughter, the story about the assassination broke out with a vengeance. Perdiccas, allied with Alexander's mother Olympias and sister Cleopatra, encouraged rumors that would implicate Antipater, Cassander, and Aristotle. Later, when Antigonus joined forces with Perdiccas, he pushed rumors implicating Ptolemy of Egypt and Antipater's clan. Ptolemy responded by employing the Peripatetic School to write, under his byline, a history of the period, which used the fabrication of the *ex post facto* Royal Diaries to cover up the story. Antipater went about assassinating and torturing whoever in Greece would dare suggest that Alexander had been poisoned. And all Arrian and Plutarch, living under a Roman regime which had become an Empire as a result of Ptolemaic support, could safely do to discredit the Royal Diaries was to graft onto them the Serapis clue.

And what about Aristotle? Well, it seems we shall never know for sure. There exist, in the annals of history, two versions of the great Macedonian conqueror's death. One is that Antipater and Aristotle did it. The other is the version of the Royal Diaries. The version of the Royal Diaries is discredited. In the last 2301 years, no third hypothesis has been advanced.

Furthermore, there shall never be an official court verdict against Aristotle. When the news of Alexander's death arrived in Athens, there was chaos. All of Greece was in revolt and Antipater's very life was in danger. So, the School of Isocrates — the old man being already dead — drew up a list of complaints and sued Aristotle. A disciple of the School, Ciphesodorus (c.f. supra p. 53)

drew up the list of complaints. Timon, another disciple, accused Aristotle of dissipation and foolishness. Aristotle's accusers were Eurymedon, the High Priest of the goddess Demeter, Democrates, the nephew of Demosthenes, and Demophilus, son of the historian Ephorus, representing the School of Isocrates. Four years later, Demophilus was the prosecutor in that trial that condemned to death General Phocion, a leading member of the Platonic Academy and friend of Alexander the Great.

The charges against Aristotle were sacrilege, homosexuality and lust. He was accused of having blasphemously worshipped Hermias of Atarneus ("They held that Hermias had been his lover," Diogenes Laertius says). He was also accused of having established a religious cult of his first wife, the niece of Hermias of Atarneus. According to Diogenes Laertius, when Aristotle first possessed this lady he was so overwhelmed by lustful pleasure that he was driven to sacrifice to her in a ritual fashion that offended the goddess Demeter.

In retrospect, the Hermias affair of years back, in 341, was an intelligence assignment that Aristotle had botched up. In the midst of general disaster falling upon the world, the foolish politicians at the School of Isocrates seem to have wanted a scapegoat in the person of their queer friend Aristotle. Aristotle unfortunately, the minute he heard that Antipater had just lost a battle and that Demosthenes, the old nemesis had just returned to Athens, skipped town and never showed up for his trial. The next year he died, without a final verdict having been reached. He left a last will and testament whose text survives to this day and whose legal executor was the oligarch Lord Antipater.

VI. Summary and Conclusion

This report has established the following firm conclusions which, in the long run, will transform the way history is taught in schools:

First: Aristotle, throughout his life was an enemy of Plato.

Second: He was an enemy of Alexander the Great; this enmity was deadly.

Third: The cult of Apollo was a major political force in antiquity and represented, in Greek politics, Persian Imperial interests. It controlled Philip.

Fourth: The Platonic Academy played a crucial role in shaping Alexander the Great's program and campaign, and thus, subsequent history to this day.

So, what is the big deal? All the facts are to be found

in publicly available ancient sources. But the whole affair becomes very important because it draws an indictment of modern historiography. This is not the place to belabor the point, it should simply be made.

The field of ancient history, archeology and classical studies in the last two centuries has been completely dominated by the gamemasters of British intelligence. (136) There were, it is true, some brilliant independent researches by German and French historians (and recently some Americans), but all these have not amounted to anything. Classical studies to this very day means Oxford, Cambridge, Durham, Harvard and some places in New Zealand and South Africa. This is the main body of historiographical activity on the planet at

this time, and it is hegemonic. What is interesting is the way it is organized.

The top authority levels of this profession, worldwide, are Intelligence chiefs, either overt or covert, of the Royal Institute of Strategic Studies and the British Secret Intelligence Service: Hobbes, Clarendon, Gibbon, Bacon, Jowett, *Toynbee*, et al. Beneath them, their academic colleagues, are people who know their job is not historical truth but political management of the minds of nations through manufactured history writing. Beneath this knowledgeable layer is the great swarm of academic rats, Department heads, Distinguished Professors, Doctors of History and so forth, who furiously propitiate, footnote after footnote and acknowledgement after acknowledgement, those immediately above them. It is these who do not know that history writing is a political intelligence operation. When those among them who show they have learned to propitiate are ready to get into the political game, they

are promoted. The others stay back in the rat race of academic propitiation.

The root of academic propitiation is the Aristotelian disease, Logic. Logic is not what it is cracked up to be, it is merely the rules of propitiation: What is the prevailing academic opinion in the field (what will my peers consider "axiomatic synthetic judgement") that the propitiating academic will use as his "Major Premise" in his syllogistic outlook and research? When people in our universities learn to synthesize "a priori judgments," they will begin their way back to recovery.

But we can offer them a short cut to the cure: destroy the authority of "Aristotelian Logic", its claim to rule over intellectual life, and the patient is half cured. His clinging to the authority of Logic is the specific block which prevents therapy. Cut off the transference-cathexis of the patient to the "father image" of Aristotle, and results are assured: Balliol College will never be the same again.

1. It is well known that a substantial body of Aristotle's writings were not published until circa 80 BC by the eleventh scholar of the Peripatetic School, Andronicus, on orders from the Roman dictator Sulla. At that time, Sulla, upon the conclusion of his Eastern campaign, brought back to Rome a mass of writings of dubious authenticity which, according to some propaganda claims of the time, had been found in the basement of a villa in Atarneus, Asia Minor, and were believed to be Aristotle's. These and the various archives and notes of the Peripatetic School were edited by Andronicus and have become today the accepted Corpus Aristotelicum, accredited, to this day, on the authority of the Roman tyrant.
2. British monarchical historiographic practice, beginning with Hobbes's translation of Thucydides in his Parisian exile away from the Cromwellian forces, has been oriented toward the practical policy objective of imitating the Roman Empire as a method of government. This tradition was augmented with the artificial elevation to prominence and authority of the pathetic Gibbon and the homosexual rape of Carlyle by John Stuart Mill. It culminates with Arnold Joseph Toynbee. See also note 136 below.
3. Henry Moss, *The Secular Origins of Ionian Philosophy and Science*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Pennsylvania State University.
4. See Paul Arnest, "From Babylon to Jerusalem: The Genesis of the Old Testament," *The Campaigner*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 1977.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 56, 57.
6. The unbroken string of successive powerful personalities from Thales (640-548 BC) through Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Cratylus, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Melissus, Democritus, and Socrates, to Plato and the Academy, happens to be, in fact, a political, constitutional and economic movement which much later in history, due to the shoddy practices of the French "Enlightenment," was mistaken as a mere "philosophical" tradition.
7. Unpublished studies on Rome by Uwe Parpart.
8. For a fuller identification of the nature of this 3,000-year-old secret, see Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "The Secrets Known Only to the Inner Elites," *The Campaigner*, Vol 11, No. 3-4, May-June 1978.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.
10. To this very day, Oxford University's *Classical Quarterly* devotes prime space to Mr. Cornford's pathetic, boring and "thick" efforts to reinterpret Plato's *Theaetetus* in a way that might salvage his, and Oxford's, "theory of ideas." What the ancients meant by "Plato's theory of Ideas" was the theory of knowledge based on "hypothesizing the higher hypothesis up to the first principle itself," not Cornford's nominalist "theory of Ideas."
11. See Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "The Clinical Significance of Poe's critics," *New Solidarity*, Vol. 9 No. 24 (May 23, 1978) and Vol. 9 No. 25 (May 25, 1978); "Draft U.S. Military Strategic Policy: The Cornerstones of U.S. World Leadership," *New Solidarity*, Vol. 9 No. 30 (June 13, 1978); "Poetry Must Supersede Mathematics in Physics," *New Solidarity*, Vol. 9 No. 33 (June 23, 1978); "Poe's Conception of Poetry," *The Campaigner*, Vol 11, No. 6 (August 1978); "The Long Waves in Scientific Progress," *New Solidarity*, Vol. 9 No. 57 (Sept. 19, 1978) and Vol. 9 No. 58 (Sept. 22, 1978).
12. Some of this material was presented by Uwe Parpart in a series of lectures from the U.S. Labor Party's Humanist Academy in March and April of 1978.
13. Plato, *Republic*, VII, 514.
14. *Ibid.*, VII, 533d.
15. Aristotle's explicit confession on this matter is made the conclusion of *Posterior Analytics*, II, 19.
16. The story of Aristotle moving to Athens on orders from Delphi is mentioned in the following ancient *vitae Aristotelis*: *Vita Marciana* 5; *Vita Vulgata* 4;

- Vita Latina* 5; *Vita Syriaca* 4; Ibn an-Nadin *Kitab al-Fihrist* 4; Ibn abi Usaibia *Uyun al-Anba fi Tabaqat al-Atibba* 3; all cited in the article "Aristotle and Athens: Some Comments..." by A.H. Chroust, published in *Laval Theologique et Philosophique*, Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1966.
17. With the reservation, of course, about the authenticity of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, expressed in note 1 above.
 18. Cf. Criton Zoakos, "Aristotle and the Craft of Intelligence," Part I, *New Solidarity*, Vol. 8, No. 99 (Feb. 24, 1978).
 19. For more developed discussions of the "concrete infinite" see Uwe Parpart, "The Concept of the Transfinite," *The Campaigner*, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb. 1976), and L. Marcus (Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.) *Dialectical Economics* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1975); also most of LaRouche's writings, including those cited above and his *The Case of Walter Lippmann* (New York: University Editions, 1977).
 20. Aristotle, *Physics*, III, 4, 203a, 5.
 21. *Ibid.*, III, 4, 203b, 12.
 22. *Ibid.*, III, 4, 203b, 15-25.
 23. The clue that the *Metaphysics* is a fraud is to be found in the observed disparity of Book Lambda from all other books of the work. In it, Aristotle attempts to fake a creditable discussion of the Platonic concept of "Prime Mover." His attempt collapses with the outpouring of incoherent rubbish in chapter eight of Book Lambda.
 24. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, I, 1, 71a.
 25. *Ibid.*, II, 1, 89b, 21.
 26. *Ibid.*, II, 2, 90a, 5-15.
 27. *Ibid.*, II, 11 94a, 20-28.
 28. *Ibid.*, II, 11, 94a, 35, to 94b, 8.
 29. *Ibid.*, I, 3, 72b, 19-25.
 30. *Ibid.*, II, 19, 99b, 20, to 100a, 10.
 31. For a highly competent more general discussion of the information contained in ancient sources on the subject of Aristotle's entry into the Academy, see A.H. Chroust, *Aristotle* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973). Chroust's evaluation suffers from the fact that he is unaware of the international factional positional of the cult of Apollo at the time.
 32. For a quick survey of the Academy's political activities see Plato, *Epistles*; Plutarch, *Dion, Phocion, Alexander, Adversus Colotem*, etc.; Diogenes Laertes, *Lives of the Philosophers*; Aelian, *Varia Historia*; Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*; etc. Unfortunately, no one to date has competently pulled together the amazing wealth of bits of information about the Academy's political activities. Eduard Zeller, in the late nineteenth century, made a creditable effort, but Zeller was completely innocent of professional political judgment. Uwe Parpart is preparing a forthcoming work on the subject.
 33. Plutarch's *Artaxerxes* must be read for the breathtaking factional picture of the Persian Court that he portrays, and also because he mentions many prominent Athenian collaborators of Isocrates who were agents of the Persian King. Though other secondary sources always emphasize Isocrates's pronounced anti-King, philo-Macedonian policy, they invariably cover up the fact that Isocrates was definitely allied, personally and through his faction in Athens, with Persian oligarchical, satrap-linked interests. In short, after the assassination of Socrates, Athenian politics was dominated by two Persian factions: the "anti-Macedonians" of Demosthenes, working for the Persian King, and the "pro-Macedonians" of Isocrates (in which Aristotle belongs) who were working for the oligarchical Persian satraps and the financiers of Apollo, against the Persian King.
 34. See notes 16 and 31 above.
 35. The fights between Plato's Academy and Isocrates's School are too well known to require documentation. It should be recalled that Isocrates personally had deployed one of his most important collaborators, the historian Theopompus, to the court of Philip of Macedon, on the sole assignment of slandering Plato to King Philip.
 36. Diogenes Laertius (V, 1) reports this, but for a more general discussion, see Chroust, *op. cit.*
 37. The *Gryllus* was named after the son of the historian Xenophon who died at the battle of Mantinea fighting against the Persian-puppets of Thebes. From circumstantial evidence, it seems that Aristotle attacks those who had done honors and heaped posthumous praise on Gryllus, hence the name of the dialogue. Since the battle of Mantinea took place in 362, it is evident that Aristotle continued his debates over rhetoric a full five years after he entered the Academy.
 38. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, XIV, 6.
 39. See A.H. Chroust, *op. cit.*, Vol. II.
 40. Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, II, 17, 14; Diogenes Laertius, II, 55.
 41. Diogenes Laertius, V, 2.
 42. Mentioned in the later Syrian and Arab biographies of Aristotle.
 43. See Giordano Bruno, "The Cabala of the Winged Horse, With the Cyllenian Ass," English translation by Nora Hamerman, *The Campaigner*, Vol. 11, No. 2, March 1978.
 44. These titles, among others, are reported in Diogenes Laertius (V, 1) and elsewhere.
 45. Werner Jaeger, the pompous, unimaginative and thoughtless "authority" on Aristotle of the 1920s and 1930s, developed a long-winded, tedious argument about the evolution of Aristotle from Platonist to "Aristotelian." Jaeger, in his *Aristotle, Fundamentals of His Development*, published by Oxford University Press, corners himself into arguing that the early, lost works of Aristotle are "Platonist." This, as Jaeger unconsciously admits, is an impossibility in view of the barrenness and paucity of mind of the later, published works of Aristotle. Unfortunately, the insightful and often penetrating A.H. Chroust falls into Jaeger's trap in his own unfruitful discussions of Aristotle's lost works.
 46. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, uses doxographic techniques to demonstrate that in the dialogue *Eudemus*, Aristotle used his own method, distinctly and consciously hostile to that of Plato. This view is generally accepted. It is valid despite the employment of doxographic techniques.
 47. Quoted in Joannes Philoponus, *De Aeternitate Mundi*, II, 2.

48. Plutarch, *Adversus Colotem*, 14, 1115b.
49. A.H. Chroust, "Aristotle and Athens: Some Comments. . . ." in *Laval Theologique et Philosophique*, Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1966.
50. The Hermias Affair, generally reported in all original sources, ought to be studied further. It must have been a first rate intelligence botch-job, and Aristotle was the case officer in charge. Hermias of Atárneus, a local ruler in Asia Minor under Persian suzerainty, was Aristotle's host when the latter was sent there by Philip of Macedon. During Aristotle's stay Hermias was arrested by General Memnon on the Persian King's orders, interrogated, and executed on charges of treason. As a result of the affair, the Persian King broke diplomatic relations with Philip. Demosthenes, in Athens, was exuberant and claimed that now, "the Great King is going to find out about the scheming." Toward the end of his life, Aristotle's associates from the School of Isocrates sued him for having botched this affair.
51. Aristotle's family was one of the most prominent in Macedonia for four hundred years. His father, Nicomachus, was the personal physician of King Philip's father, and Philip and Aristotle were associates since childhood. Sources: Diogenes Laertius, V, 1; *Vita Marciana*, 1-2; *Vita Vulgata*, 1-2; *Vita Latina*, 1-2; *Vita Syriaca*, 1; *Vita Hesychii*.
52. Isocrates allied with Philip only after the Sacred War had made Philip the predominant military power. Before that, he advocated that Athens play the role ultimately played by Macedonia.
53. See note 52 above.
54. The facts on Greek history can be corroborated in standard texts, e.g., J.B. Bury, *History of Greece*, or the *Cambridge Ancient History*.
55. George Gregory, *Aristotle and the Cult of Dionysus*, unpublished study, Wiesbaden, 1977.
56. Homer, *Iliad*, I, 47.
57. This and other incidents are reported in Herodotus, *Histories*.
58. George Gregory, *op. cit.*
59. The events and details of the Sacred War are reported in standard history books.
60. On Philip's alliance with Artaxerxes III Ochus, cf. Arrian, *Alexander's Anabasis*, II, 14; for interesting commentary, see Arnold Toynbee, "If Ochus and Philip had lived on" (*Some Problems of Greek History*, Part IV).
61. Artabazus and Memnon later returned to the Persian court at a time when Memnon's brother Mentor and the grand vizier Bagoas were the dominant powers there and were in the process of squeezing the Persian King out of effective power. Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius reports, maintained correspondence with Mentor.
62. The friendship of Aristotle and Antipater is well known. Diogenes Laertius reports that Aristotle named Antipater executor of his will, and also that Aristotle maintained voluminous correspondence with Antipater. There are nine books of such correspondence listed among the writings of Aristotle — by far the largest entry among the various items of his correspondence.
63. Plato, *Second Epistle*, to Dionysius of Syracuse.
64. Plato's *Epistles* give a general sense of his efforts with Dionysius of Syracuse. For a historical accounting of the events, see J.B. Bury, *History of Greece*.
65. Plato was planning to overthrow Dionysius and have him replaced with Dion, his close friend and long-time political collaborator. Plato, in his *Fourth Epistle* to Dion says: "Since then all men are watching you, prepare to make Lycurgus [the lawgiver of Sparta] and Cyrus [the founder of the Persian Empire] appear but primitive, or anyone else who has ever become famous for superior character and statesmanship, especially since many, in fact all who are on the spot, say that it is quite likely that, when Dionysius has been put out of the way, our cause will be ruined by the rivalry between you and Heraclides and Theodotes and others of note. . . ."
66. Plato, *Epistle Five*, to Perdiccas.
67. Reported by Eduard Zeller in his *Plato and the Older Academy*, 1888; the names of the assassins, Pytho and Heraclides of Aenos, are mentioned by Philostratus and in Suidas.
68. Plato's Academy provided the officer corps of this successful military expedition and much of the recruiting was done in those part of the Peloponnese where the historian Xenophon, an old friend of Socrates, had lived in exile. Plutarch reports the story fully in his biography of Dion.
69. Both the Phocians and the Academy seem to have recruited military personnel from the same geographical areas, namely, the parts of the Peloponnese in which the historian Xenophon and his collaborator King Agesilaus of Sparta, friends of Socrates, had been active during the previous generation.
70. The Academy's cadre was predominantly international rather than Athenian. According to Zeller's compilation, most of the known cadre were from Asia Minor, i.e. Ionia and the coastal cities of the Propontis and the Black Sea. Diogenes Laertius (VIII, 8, 86) has a fascinating story of the Platonist Eudoxus who, on personal recommendation from King Agesilaus, was introduced to the Egyptian King Nectanebo and the Egyptian priests, with whom he worked for a number of years. Eudoxus then established political contact with Mausolus of Caria and then settled in Athens. It is highly likely that the Academy was in close collaboration with both the priests of Amon in Egypt and with the Carian royal house. This would explain a lot of Alexander's spectacular career, because it would explain two of the major, still unresolved riddles of his life, the Pixodaros Affair (see note 111 below) and his special relation with the Temple of Amon.
71. See page 61 in text.
72. Isocrates, *Address to Philip*, 121.
73. *Ibid.*, 100-104.
74. *Ibid.*, 30-31.
75. *Ibid.*, 9.
76. *Ibid.*, 120.
77. *Ibid.*, 150-152.
78. A.H. Chroust, *Aristotle*, Vol. I.
79. H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich aus prosopographischer Grundlagen*, Munich, 1926, Vol. 2, entry no. 94.
80. *Ibid.*
81. Reported in J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian*

- Imperialism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976).
82. A whole series of assassinations and palace coups was launched with the murder of Ochus; Diodorus Siculus (XVII, 5.3-6.3) gives an amusing report of the situation.
 83. See note 50 above.
 84. See A.H. Chroust, *Aristotle*, Vol. I.
 85. Plutarch, Arrian, Curtius Rufus, Quintilian, Dio Chrysostom, Pliny, Aelian, Athenaeus and many other ancient sources describe the close relation between Antipater and Aristotle; see also note 62 above.
 86. J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, ch. VIII, presents the facts of the assassination adequately, but his interpretation is way off.
 87. A.H. Chroust, *Aristotle*, Vol. I, extensively discusses the well-known differences between Alexander and Aristotle on the conduct of the war.
 88. W.W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, Vol. II.
 89. *Ibid.*
 90. Measure implemented after the battle of Granicus and throughout Alexander's life.
 91. Measure introduced in the time between the battle of Issus and the battle at Gaugamela, and fully carried out after the death of Darius Codomannus.
 92. Fully enforced after the battle at Gaugamela.
 93. Policy launched as Alexander establishes contact with the Phoenician authorities of the city of Sidon around the time of the siege of Persian-controlled Tyre. Later measures included the cutting of a canal from the Red Sea to the Nile, and ordering Nearchus to promote sea exploration. Items four, five and six of the above program are variously reported in Diodorus Siculus, XVII; Curtius, 6; Justin 12; Plutarch, *Alexander*; Arrian, III. They are supposed to have taken full effect after Gaugamela.
 94. Alexander's intensive city-building started taking off after his famous secret meeting with the temple of Amon in the oasis of Siwah, a probable outpost of Egyptian collaboration with the Platonic Academy.
 95. Enforced upon Alexander's return from the Indian campaign.
 96. Developed in Alexander's secret policy memoranda, the *Hypomnemata*, which are described thusly in Diodorus Siculus (XVIII, 4): "The following were the largest and most remarkable items of the memoranda. It was proposed to build a thousand ships, larger than triremes, in Phoenicia, Syria, Cilicia, and Cyprus for the campaign against the Carthaginians and the others who live along the coast of Libya and Iberia and the adjoining coastal region as far as Sicily; to make a road along the coast of Libya as far as the Pillars of Hercules and, as needed by so great an expedition, to construct ports and shipyards at suitable places; to erect six mostly costly temples, each at the expense of fifteen hundred talents; and finally to establish cities and to transplant populations from Asia to Europe and in the opposite direction, from Europe to Asia . . . when these memoranda were read, the Macedonians . . . saw that the projects were extravagant and impracticable and decided to carry out none of those that have been mentioned." But Alexander was already dead.
 97. See the famous "Exiles Decree" which cost him his life, note 128 below.
 98. Reported in Plutarch, *Alexander*.
 99. Reported in Plutarch, *Alexander*, and elsewhere.
 100. The foreign policy of Ptolemaic Egypt, a state organized on Aristotelian principles of total war against the legacy of both Alexander and the Academy, gave rise, through the gradual manipulation of both Carthage and Rome, to the final emergence of the Roman Empire, which had thus been groomed from its infancy for axiomatic hostility against the Platonic outlook.
 101. Plutarch, *Phocion*.
 102. Diogenes Laertius, IV, 14.
 103. *Ibid.*
 104. *Ibid.*
 105. Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, XII, 40, 2.
 106. Diogenes, Laertius, IV, 14.
 107. Discussed in Eduard Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy*.
 108. Discussed in W.W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, Vol. II.
 109. Plutarch, *Adversus Colotem*, 32, 1126C.
 110. Mentioned in Suidas's entries on Euphraeus, Leon; in Philostratus, *Lives of Philosophers*; discussed in Eduard Zeller's *Plato and the Older Academy*.
 111. The notorious Pixodarus Affair, which occurred in the spring of 336 BC, was the cause of Alexander and his faction's exile from Macedonia. Pixodarus, ruler of Caria and successor of the famous Mausolus, made overtures to king Philip for an alliance that would strengthen Caria's independence from Persia. Alexander — already fighting for his right to succession — along with his factional allies took the initiative of offering separate terms of alliance to Pixodarus in an effort that was kept secret from his father Philip. When the secret negotiations were discovered by Philip, all of Alexander's friends were sent into exile and the negotiations fell through.
 112. Plutarch, *Alexander*.
 113. Plutarch, in his *Alexander*, reports that General Attalus, at the wedding of his niece Cleopatra to king Philip, remarked that he "desired the Macedonians would implore the gods to give them a legitimate successor to the kingdom by his niece. This so irritated Alexander, that throwing a cup at his head 'You villain,' said he, 'what, am I then a bastard?' Then Philip, taking Attalus' part, rose up and would have run his son through." Other sources report this incident also.
 114. For a discussion of Aristotle's opposition to Alexander's campaign see A.H. Chroust, *Aristotle*, Vol. I.
 115. It is evident from all extant sources that virtually every time Alexander announced a new set of policies, there was widespread opposition in the majority of the general staff. On the other hand, we know that his inner circle of friends and advisors was mostly civilians in various capacities and that the most predominant military element was from the ranks of the top commanders of his personally led cavalry.
 116. Diodorus Siculus (XVIII, 2) describes how in fact General Perdicas, after the death of Alexander, conducted a widespread purge in the officer corps, especially in the cavalry but also in the infantry, which only months earlier had been reorganized by Alexander. The reading and repudiation of the

- Hypomnemata* was a crucial part of the coup d'état.
117. Arrian, I, 25.
 118. Plutarch, *Alexander*; Arrian, III, 26-27.
 119. Arrian, IV, 13-15; Plutarch, *Alexander*.
 120. Arrian, II, 14. Diodorus Siculus in XVII, 39, 7 reports that Alexander in fact suppressed Darius's letter and substituted another "in accordance with his interests" which he put before the army commanders in order to secure their rejection of a negotiated peace. However, all sources report that Darius repeated his offer two more times, one after the fall of Tyre and again before the battle at Gaugamela, this time offering 10,000 talents and guarantees that Alexander would control the eastern Mediterranean ports.
 121. Plutarch, *Alexander*.
 122. *Ibid.*
 123. *Ibid.*
 124. *Ibid.*
 125. For army mutinies and frictions between Alexander and the army, see Arrian, Books IV to VII.
 126. Both Arrian and Diodorus Siculus give an adequate account of Craterus's instructions; Diodorus Siculus, however, reports in Book XVIII that Craterus was still stalling in Cilicia when the news of the king's death arrived.
 127. The political implications of the issue of Alexander's "deification" are adequately discussed in W.W. Tarn's *Alexander the Great*.
 128. Diodorus Siculus reports (XVIII, 8.3-6): "Therefore, the Olympic Games being at hand, he sent Nicanor of Stageira to Greece, giving him a decree about the restoration, which he ordered him to have proclaimed by the victorious herald to the crowds at the festival. Nicanor carried out his instructions, and the herald received and read the following message: 'King Alexander to the exiles from the Greek cities. We have not been the cause of your exile, but, save for those of you who are under a curse, we shall be the cause of your return to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about this to the end that if any cities are not willing to restore you, he may constrain them.' When the herald had announced this, the crowd showed its approval with loud applause; for those at the festival welcomed the favor of the king with cries of joy, and repaid his good deed with praises. All the exiles had come together to the festival, being more than twenty thousand in number."
 129. Hephaestion's death is another one of history's unsolved riddles. It is significant that in Arrian's biography of Alexander the Great, there is one occasion in which one whole page is missing, obviously torn out of the original manuscript by a very discriminating hand. The gap is in Book VII, 12 to 13. Where the text discusses Antipater's hostilities to Alexander, it breaks off abruptly and then resumes in mid-sentence with a summary report of Hephaestion's death.
 130. Arrian, VII, 25.
 131. Arrian, VII, 27.
 132. Plutarch, *Alexander*.
 133. The German historian Berve in his *Alexanderreich aus prosopographischer Grundlagen*, characterizes the Royal Diaries in the following way: "Den einwandfreien Krankenbericht der Ephemeriden, der eine Vergiftung als Todesursache ausschliesst" — i.e. a "cover story."
 134. Arrian, VII, 26.
 135. Plutarch, *Alexander*; but Diodorus Siculus is much more unabashed in XVII, 118: "They say that Antipater, who had been left by Alexander as viceroy in Europe, was at variance with the king's mother Olympias. At first he did not take her seriously because Alexander did not heed her complaints against him, but later, as their enmity kept growing and the king showed an anxiety to gratify his mother . . . Antipater gave many indications of disaffection. This was bad enough, but the murder of Parmenio and Philotas struck terror into Antipater as into all of Alexander's friends, so by the hand of his own son, who was the king's cup bearer, he administered the poison to the king. After Alexander's death, Antipater held supreme authority in Europe and then his son Cassander took over the kingdom, so that many historians did not dare write about the poisoning. Cassander, however, is plainly disclosed by his own actions as a bitter enemy of Alexander's policies."
 136. A study on British historiographical practices is being prepared by Labor Party researchers and historians under the supervision of Christopher R. White for publication at a later date. In the meantime, Arnold Joseph Toynbee, the dean of British historiography, will serve as an example: Toynbee, a participant at the Versailles Treaty, was the British Intelligence case officer who, in the early 1920s "solved" the "Eastern Question" that the Ottoman Empire was posing in the Balkans and the Middle East. Subsequently he was appointed chief researcher of the British Intelligence community at the Royal Institute. During World War II he headed up the combined intelligence services committee which prepared the daily intelligence summaries for the War Cabinet. Every day during the war, Winston Churchill received his intelligence briefings personally from Toynbee. See also Christopher R. White, *The Noble Family*.



RUSKIN

by Quentin Bell
George Braziller
1978. 164 pp.
\$9.95



The British System of Art Criticism

John Ruskin, who in 1870 became the first Slade Professor of Fine Arts at Oxford University, was the best-known Victorian critic of art; the man who set up the National Gallery in London; the source of almost every modern trend in architectural theory and practice; and, as a "political economist," a major ideological fountainhead of the British Labour Party and its international offshoots. With Ruskin began the academic profession of historian of the visual arts in English-speaking countries, and to him, with little variant, may be traced the essential outlook of most current practitioners of art history — this writer's former profession.

The essence of Ruskin's outlook was that art was a form of social control. He squirmed before the most highly developed art of the Italian Renaissance, and systematically misread great works of the earlier Renaissance and "medieval" period, for which he professed intense admiration, as propaganda for what today would be called a synthetic belief-structure. Little wonder that in 1906, when the future parents of Italian Communist Party leader Giorgio Amendola were undergoing brainwashing in Rome under the tutelage of British intelligence's Annie Besant and her Theosophy cult, their first collaborative project was to translate one of Ruskin's writings into Italian.

"Beauty," for Ruskin, was the anti-thesis of industrial progress, which he identified with the British free enterprise system, ranting against Ricardo and Mill. It was not Britain's international looting and its base in feudal oligarchic interests which he hated; on the contrary, Ruskin loathed the heavy manufactures and particularly the iron industry which were, in fact, largely the result of social surplus created by "dirigist" economic systems in France and elsewhere, and pilfered by Great Britain.

In Ruskin, Great Britain's cultural program for its subject populations is thrown into sharpest relief. Here was a man whose classes on "fine arts" at Oxford inspired Cecil Rhodes and other founding members of the British imperial Round Table with the "master race" doctrines applied in southern Africa and subsequently instilled in British puppet Adolf Hitler.

Quentin Bell cites Ruskin telling Oxford undergraduates: "We are still undegenerate in race, a race mingled of the best northern blood.... We have been taught a religion of pure mercy, which we must either betray, or learn to defend by fulfilling." England will teach "these her colonists that their chief virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and that their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea."

While avowing "horror" at such statements Quentin Bell ultimately dismisses them as a great man's "foibles," along with Ruskin's infatuations with little girls (he felt such distaste for adult women he was unable to consummate his marriage), and the fact that for the last ten years of Ruskin's life, Ruskin was utterly mad. Indeed, Ruskin's "style" is held up in this book as a model for would-be creative writers. His political economy, self-described by Ruskin in successive passages of one of his works as "old school Communist" and "old school Tory," is to be considered a phenomenon of his unresolved "duality of mind." What Bell is actually describing, however, is how, long before Britain installed in the 1930s Germany one version of a Volk re-discovering its communal, hierarchic "roots," Ruskin had pulled together the blueprint for fascism.

Who is this that describes this hellish synthesis as a quaint personal wobbling? Quentin Bell, in addition to spending eight years as Professor of History and

Theory of Art at Sussex University, British intelligence's leading latterday center for creating belief structures, filled Ruskin's shoes as Slade Professor at Oxford. Furthermore, he is the scion of Vanessa and Clive Bell of the Bloomsbury circle, the avowedly irrationalist, homosexual-lesbian grouping in England which included Hjalmar Schacht's coach John Maynard Keynes and the Moseley Fascist, later turned "Communist," John Strachey.

Although Bell does not share *in toto* Ruskin's particular distribution of artistic tastes—canons which have changed in accordance with art market conditions over the past century—what he and most art historians today do share with Ruskin is the candid conviction that man is an *animal*. Ruskin attributes the sensuous beauty of Renaissance Venetian painting to the "animality" of such artists as Titian and Giorgione. Furthermore, in his earliest political-economic essay, *Unto this Last*, Ruskin proposed to replace private enterprise with national-controlled land and transport under the direction of gentlemen "of pure race; well bred, in the sense that a horse or dog is well bred. . ."

Ruskin's fanatical commitment to realize man's animality evolved into a project for a "Guild of St. George," a plan to create a new rural society first in England and then throughout the world. In Bell's description:

A new peasantry, strictly disciplined and sternly educated would be established on the land under a resident gentry. Machinery would be abolished, prices fixed, newspapers suppressed, literature regulated. There would be schools, museums, libraries and home industries.

Ruskin was unable to fulfill this scheme. He was, however, immediately successful in his academic sponsorship of the Pre-Raphaelites—a counterpart of the present drug assault. The environmentalist and associated terrorist movements of our time, sponsored by the British oligarchy, pursue the same goals. And they pursue them with the moral connivance of most of professional "critics" of the arts—Ruskin's children.

ART VERSUS SCIENCE?

Ruskin considered his main enemy the "pestilent art of the Renaissance." The 15th and 16th century Renaissance, with its largest outpourings centered in Italy and other urbanized areas of Europe, created the highest expression in the visual arts of man as a being defined by *creative mentation*. Great Renaissance painting, sculpture and architecture as exemplified by the work of Brunelleschi and Leonardo da Vinci enable each individual to celebrate man's free will to determine *not* to be an animal, in response to the necessity of social progress. Ruskin was incapable of understanding that real beauty is associated with *love* in the sense of "loving a problem" in scientific discovery: as Lyndon LaRouche pinpointed in a recent *Campaigner* study on poetry, "to deliberately effect the creative solution to that problem."

Da Vinci—the epitome of the Renaissance "decadence" Ruskin attacked, generally by way of attacking Raphael—understood this *explicitly*, and made the experiencing of discovery of a communicated preconscious conception the *explicit* subject of his writing and drawing. In less developed but nonetheless deliberate way, this notion of beauty also informed such great early Renaissance artists as Mantegna, Piero della Francesca, and even a century earlier Giotto, whom Ruskin inversely portrayed as a "precapitalist" hero.

The identity of great art and great science thus becomes central to our judgment of Ruskin. Quentin Bell adduces Ruskin's early liking for rocks to persuade the credulous that he was a "scientist" at heart; to test this, one need only compare the drawings of even Leonardo's *school* with Ruskin's "nature sketches." Ruskin's hand is guided by "pure feeling"; he totally refuses to try to penetrate the superficial appearance of an object, where the Leonardo school drawing searches out the observed object's process of development.

Bell spends a sizeable part of his short book luridly delving into Ruskin's "sexual incompetence," then exculpating Ruskin on the incredible ground that the



RUSKIN

critic was "not organically impotent (we know that from childhood he had been addicted to auto-erotic practices)." There is a compelling link between Ruskin's repugnance for the adult woman who became his wife, his failure as an artist and scientist, his phobia towards technological advance and the feverish racialism which is no foible but the ruling feature of his writings on art and architecture. Short

of the ability to really see a person of the opposite sex as a human being—and to know that person's mind as a continuous process of creative discovery—there can be neither art, nor love, nor beauty.

This is the fact to which Quentin Bell and his legion of fellow aesthetes in the hermaphroditic world of art history and art criticism have not had the courage or the capacity to own up.

—Nora Hamerman

A TIME FOR TRUTH
by William E. Simon
Preface by
Milton Friedman
Forward by
F. A. von Hayek
Readers Digest Press
1978.



Saving Bill Simon From His Friends

Some of Bill Simon's associates think it is doubtful that he has read the highly publicized book *A Time for Truth*, published under his signature. Since we are, indeed, in *a time for truth*, let it be stated from the outset what every political insider knows: former Treasury Secretary Simon didn't write it. *Reader's Digest's* hatchetperson Edith Efron not only wrote the book, and not only wrote the acknowledgements to herself in the frontispiece, but bullied Bill Simon out of any suggestions he came up with for how the book might have been written. Should Mr. Simon question any of the above statements, *The Campaigner* will provide documentary substantiation. He is a good man in bad company, and there is no reason to allow a charade in these pages.

In recent weeks, *A Time for Truth* has popped up on the best-seller lists as the leading new conservative statement of principles, a phenomenon generally linked to the "Proposition 13" hysteria. Naive people would assume that the book's proposals, which boil down to a fundraising pitch for "libertarian" outlets like the Heritage Foundation, account for its presence on the lists. The opposite is in fact the case. Simon signed his name to a prepackaged tract for a canned "conservative market," promoted through the "conservative" political network that includes the Heritage Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, and so forth. Stepping out of the Treasury into the blinding light of day, Bill Simon became a media hero of the right wing.

That the Heritage Foundation happens to be the American correspondent of the British Tory Party's Center for Policy Studies, and the brand of conservatism it peddles is specifically Tory, did not concern him. Somebody has fed him an utter pack of lies. He claims that John Locke and Adam Smith were the inspiration for the American Revolution, whereas the American Revolution was fought—and the Founding Fathers said so—against the policies of Adam Smith, the perspective of enforced backwardness. The Founding Fathers repudiated Smith's and Locke's "libertarianism," by founding a *republic* based on the principle of perfection, and creating a National Bank to generate a national development program.

Simon, or the unspeakable Ms. Efron, cites Winston Churchill as "the greatest politician of this century"—the man whom FDR and Secretary of War Henry Stimson denounced for wishing to maintain that developing world in colonial backwardness, the violent foe of America's vision of world industrial development. Simon now sits on the board of the Heritage Foundation next to Winston Churchill III, the great admirer of China's peasant backwardness.

There can be no single national purpose, Ms. Efron writes. "There are only individual citizens with individual wills and individual purposes. There is only one social system that reflects this sovereignty of the individual: the free-market, or capitalist, system, which

A TIME FOR TRUTH



Simon and Richardson, 1976.

means the sovereignty of the individual vote in the marketplace and the sovereignty of the individual vote in the political realm." Although he did not write this, there are indications that Simon believes in this hedonist credo. The pleasure of having a Booz, Allen Hamilton limousine distracts his attention from where he is being driven.

More than that, Simon, during his 1974-77 tenure as Treasury Secretary, helped shoot down at least one opportunity to end America's national drift, at the Rambouillet economic summit in the fall of 1975. At that point the Japanese put a new world development bank on the summit agenda, and the West Germans pressed for a return to a fixed-rates monetary system. Simon was a factional enemy of those in the Ford Administration who wanted to meet the Europeans and Japanese half-way back then—something the United States has little choice about now. As the 1978 Bremen agreement for a new monetary system takes shape, Simon will doubtless understand he was wrong to insist upon "free market" principles, e.g. the commitment to floating exchange rates and the "benign neglect" policy for the dollar. Otherwise, it would be unfair to single out Bill Simon for culpability amidst the general shambles of Ford Administration economic policy. Efron does sound his trumpet a bit loudly, however, as a lone defender of fiscal conservatism in the

Administration. What about the February 1975 tax rebate?

The honest truth of the matter is that the leading economics people in the Nixon and Ford Administrations had good intentions, and no idea of what they were doing, and will own up to this in private conversation. There are passages in *A Time for Truth* in which a sane Bill Simon appears amidst the ghostwriting, e.g. his passionate attack against the mess in Federal energy regulation and the rats' maze he faced while Federal Energy Coordinator.

But the conclusions the anarchistic Ms. Efron draws are reprehensible, to the point of being anti-business—once it is understood that most businessmen are not really "free marketeers," but want to influence government "intervention into the economy" in the direction of economic growth. Most shocking is the underhanded endorsement of the past years' Watergate-style attacks on corporations: "(Businessmen) do indeed seek to protect their enterprises, but with little understanding of the philosophy that justifies their actions. Consequently, they do so secretly, financing politicians, and, of lobbying, financing politicians, and, not infrequently, bribing them." Not a word does Efron write of the covert operations directed at business from the Fabian camp!


Bill Simon knows, and is worth, better than this.

—David Goldman

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CONTROVERSY (cont'd)

How the "Enlightenment"

Continued from Page 3

rectives to his regional representatives (*intendants*) Trudaine stressed — like Turgot after him — that the *intendants'* major concern must be the raising of labor power through education and the raising of real wages.

A colleague of Trudaine, the Minister of Agriculture Bertin, introduced chemistry into agriculture and worked against resistance of the landed aristocracy to industrialize agriculture. Under the auspices of the networks created by Trudaine more economic and scientific journals proliferated throughout France than today.

Trudaine's work to revive the French economy was matched by the reforms in the military established by the network of humanists that trained Lazare Carnot and the generals of the French revolutionary army. The strategic conception of the army was put forward in a letter written to Louis XV in 1751 by the Marquis de Noailles, Lafayette's wife's uncle and a descendant of the collaborators of Mazarin and Richelieu. "Britain," wrote Noailles, "is the source of all the conspiracies against France. England is not interested in the continent of Europe except to foment wars as diversions for invading France's colonies. The British System is based on using natural wealth as the basis of building up political hegemony. It is only by maintaining America in its grip that it can succeed."

Immediately after France's defeat in the Seven Years War, military leaders reorganized the army and replaced the cabinet warfare tactics which had led to its defeat with the *Grand Tactique*. This strategic conception broke up the "squares" of wooden soldiers and based the army

on a core cadre of trained professionals with light artillery created as deployable free energy. The army itself — as realized by the *leve en masse* of Carnot — was merely the core of a national militia. France's military leaders solved the field-particle problem of the soldier's relationship to the unit of deployable forces through the creation of a national militia and the self-conception of the individual soldier — organized through education with an understanding of fighting for progress — a peace-winning strategy based on economic development. It is this conception that gave birth to the revolutionary army in which France's peasantry was mobilized into the best army of Europe, and to the Ecole Polytechnique, which was created in 1794.

The British, however, were not passively watching the growing strength of their neighbor across the Channel. Aside from attempting to embroil France in wars on the continent and fomenting rebellions through the regional Parlements (the latter-day equivalent of the feudalist Fronde with a base in slave-trading rather than serfdom), the Anglo-Dutch financiers contained France with two operations: the holding of the French national debt by particularly Genevan financiers and the rising hegemony of the British Royal Society's liberal Enlightenment. The Swiss banker Jacques Necker milked the French economy from his bank in the front part of his house and undermined the French intelligentsia from his salon in the rear, where Madame Necker and her daughter, Madame de Stael, reigned over a coterie of agents.

By holding the national debt, the Swiss and their Anglo-Dutch allies siphoned off the revenue of the French government that was needed

as credit for industrialization. By the 1780s, the Genevan bankers had drowned France with what Turgot called "Necker's monkey money" for which the French population ultimately had to pay back up to 600 percent of the principle.

The Enlightenment rendered French humanists incapable of breaking this looting operation. Beginning with the trips to Britain of Voltaire and Montesquieu for their training under the Royal Society in the 1720s, the Enlightenment was an operation to destroy the Cartesian-Leibnizian scientific tradition in France. Its feeding ground was the salon, where French intellectuals found themselves surrounded by the insipid culture of the Paris aristocracy. The banality of Rameau, the pornography of Fragonard, and the rule of the leading "grandes dames" of the salons was the predominant cultural atmosphere of France.

Anyone who actually reads Montesquieu, Voltaire, or Rousseau, Cheminade noted, cannot help but be struck by their stupidity. Montesquieu, the Enlightenment's aristocratic spokesman, held that man's culture and political system were determined by the climate; Voltaire countered Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* with the declaration: "I don't think all the time, but I always am"; as for Rousseau, he was known even then to be a madman.

Nonetheless, the Enlightenment was never denounced for what it was: a calculated assault on the creative process of the human mind which makes progress possible. With the cynical smile of the mad grandmother, Voltaire contended that man is a miserable creature who must submit to the perverse fate rewarded him by a universe he cannot understand. While Voltaire was pro-

CONTROVERSY (cont'd)

claimed in Paris as a literary genius, the humanists created no true poetry to replace him.

This is the failure that lies behind Turgot's attitude toward the intervention of France into the War for American Independence. Although Turgot, the foremost French leader of the time, wanted American independence and looked to America as the hope of the future, he became involved with British embassy attempts to stop French intervention. To him, French intervention into the war for America — which he connected with emotion — would run up expenses that would destroy his program for national financial reform. This program — which called for gaining freedom from Geneva by contracting no new debts — Turgot associated with necessary reason. Turgot chose the side of "reason" and rationalized his stance by asserting that since American independence was good it would inevitably occur. Turgot thus walked into a fatal trap in which Necker of all persons was able to depose him by hurling the slander that he was anti-American.

To solve this paradox Turgot would have had to create an entirely new political universe by creating a new credit system in a direct challenge to the Swiss, Anglo-Dutch oligarchy's right to loot France. It was the cultural and moral decay that the Enlightenment engendered in France that undermined Turgot's ability to solve the problem. While Turgot understood the importance of writing poetry, he wrote bad poetry, founded in isolation without the faith that an audience existed to hear it.

That is the problem, Cheminade concluded, that the organizing work of the European Labor Party is solving today.

— Linda Frommer

Rally Soviet Bukharinites

Continued from Page 3

reinstated to membership in the Soviet Communist Party, and since have maintained their refusal to consider rehabilitation by declining to hear an appeal of the guilty verdicts under which Bukharin was executed.

As the *Sunday Times* noted in encouraging its readers to back the world-wide campaign on his behalf, Bukharin was the leading opponent of Stalin's policies of rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture during the late 1920s. While his allegiances zig-zagged many times between "left" and "right," he remained consistently hostile to any Rapallo style policies of cooperation with industrial capitalist forces in the West. When he did look for friends outside Russia, he looked to England.

"Capitalist industrialization," he announced, "is the parasitism of the city toward the countryside, the

parasitism of a metropolis towards its colonies, the hypertrophic, bloated development of industry, serving the ruling classes...."

He looked eagerly to the peasant masses of the East, particularly China, as the force of the "world countryside" which would rise up and "guarantee our final victory" over the imperialist "world city." That, in his view, would be "socialism."

And, the *Sunday Times* glowed, Bukharin also "fought for 'socialism with a human face' long before expression was invented."

Bukharin's economic and social policies were thus identical to the program for world genocide put forward today by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the Brandt Commission, "conservative economist" Milton Friedman, all linked to the same British-Royal Dutch Shell-Vienna and nexus that ran Bukharin.

—Susan Welsh

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COMING... IN THE CAMPAIGNER

The Witchcraft of "Christians Who Are Not Christians"

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Analysis of key institutions through which political intelligence networks of the oligarchical faction have operated in the modern period — e.g., Freemason, Jesuit, Order of Malta, Zionist — shows them to be factionalized between persons committed to the oligarchical cause and contrary humanist networks operating nominally through these institutions, but acting to reverse and win away key personnel from the feudalists. Such is the history of Franklin's Paris center of European Freemasonry, Mozart's Freemasonry, etc., versus the Ashmole Scottish Rite British SIS deployment; Lafayette's networks within the White aristocracy as a counterdeployment within the Order of Malta circles, etc. The key hallmark to distinguish the oligarchical faction within institutions is their adherence to cult of Isis forms of belief and practice, cult beliefs traceable to the Dionysus cults of antiquity. The psychological content of Isis cult belief is key to susceptibilities for manipulation and indoctrination by the oligarchs, and reveals the potential for otherwise inexplicable present-day political alliances: for example, how the general susceptibility to "chicken-soup" and kibbutz mother-domination neurosis among Jewish males permits the existence of the Isis cult within Judaism upon which Zionism is based. Zionism in turn allies with the Nazi Falange, which is itself based upon adherents of the same cult-belief within the Christian Maronite community of Lebanon.

The power of the Isis doctrine resides in the psychological content of the mother-witch image — the form in which the

infant's object-propitiation and object-gratification relationship to the mother is carried over into the adult as a lingering belief in magic, irrational forces of nature, and the fixation on sensual gratification as the aim of adult activity. Beginning with the feudal aristocracy of Greece, the oligarchical faction organized mass cults committed to irrationality around the image of Dionysus's mother (later, the Isis figure) as a political battering ram against the city-building faction. Through initiation in pornographic, sexually perverse practices, use of psychedelic drugs, etc., adolescent youth were recruited into the cult, just as today's environmentalist-terrorist bands are recruited. Cult beliefs are grouped around immersion in infantile fantasies and the hatred of science and progress.

Apostolic Christianity rejected the identical Isis cult perversion in Old Testament Judaism which had been authored by priests acting as agents of the Babylonian empire. It offered a New Dispensation against the evil that had insinuated itself into Judaism, in which the central features of Christianity — Christ's passion and crucifixion, Christ's relation to his mother — acted as an image for man's new-found relation to the mother that transcends infantile propitiation and object-elation, that is, as an image for the conquest of infantile emotions by an adolescent maturing into the manhood of human reason. Hence, the precision of New Testament characterization of the Isis cult as the Whore of Babylon, the prostitute-mother who is nothing but an object of sensual gratification for the infant.

Why Charles Beard Lied: Britain's War on the Constitution

by Kathleen Murphy

Charles Austin Beard, who attacked the U.S. Founding Fathers as self-serving profiteers in his *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* and thereby earned himself recognition as the titular founder of twentieth century "liberal" approaches to both history and political science, stands exposed as a top agent of British Fabian and Round Table circles, an avowed Aristotelian, and, in his own words, a Kiplingesque racist whose unpublished works include a demand that the "life" of the world's "blacks and yellows... must be repressed."

Trained at Oxford and once promised a position in Ramsay MacDonald's first Labour Cabinet, Beard was a conscious exponent of Cecil Rhodes's strategy for establishment of an "Anglo-Saxon Empire" which would reincorporate the United States into the British Imperial System which Beard viewed as "the world-creating process." The American-born Beard's re-deployment from Oxford to New York's Columbia University in 1902 was part of a drive by Britain to subvert the U.S. Constitution, which Beard's close associate MacDonald described to a British Fabian gathering as "the great bar to progress in the U.S."

Beard's *Economic Interpretation*, when it appeared in 1913, was part of the British ideological subversion of the Constitution. Long criticized for the historical distortions in the book, Beard had no pretensions to accuracy, believing that

history as it actually was is not known and cannot be known." Instead, he viewed the production of "theories of history" as "inspiration and justification" for "modern revolutions."

An Economic Interpretation was explicit and unabashed propaganda for the Aristotelian theory that, as Beard put it, "the safest and most enduring form of democracy is... that based upon agriculture." Applying Aristotle's theory that a state dedicated to the general welfare of its citizens is impossible, Beard invented and distorted "facts" to prove that the Founding Fathers represented a "capitalistic special interest" which aimed at furthering its own advantages at the expense of "agrarian interests."

Like Aristotle, Beard was a dedicated opponent of technology and commerce-based societies, and a proponent of "agrarian-based democracy" in the U.S. In his subsequent career he was an admirer of Mussolini, a participant in schemes to insinuate the "British Civil Service" system into U.S. government, and an "intellectual father" of Franklin Roosevelt's fascist "New Deal" (later attacking Roosevelt as FDR progressively scrapped the New Deal's antitechnology goals). He ended his life issuing senile diatribes against the Soviet Union, convinced that "we have no justification whatever for regarding our universe as a unified process under law and hence reducible to an exact science, either physical or political."