

the Campaigner

double issue

PUBLISHED BY THE NATIONAL CAUCUS OF LABOR COMMITTEES

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER \$1

**Beyond
Psychoanalysis**
by L. Marcus

**Brezhnev's
Finland Station**

Photographs on page 5 of Social-Democrats Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr are compliments of the German Information Center. Photograph on same page of Social-Democrat Olof Palme is compliments of the Swedish Information Service.

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English-language journal of the National Caucus of Labor Committees. Current policies of the organization are stated in editorials; views expressed in signed articles are not necessarily those of either the organization or editorial board.

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Subscription Rates: 1 year (11 issues) — USA \$8.00; Europe (airmail) \$14.00. Back issues, at single copy price published for each issue (as available). **Correspondence:** all correspondence to **The Campaigner**, Box 295, Cathedral Station, New York, N.Y. 10025 USA.

this ISSUE

This special double issue of THE CAMPAIGNER brings into sharp focus the tasks confronting the working-class movement as the conjunctural crisis deepens decisively. Indeed, in just one short year **The World Has Changed**, as our editorial outlines . . . The historic Brandt/Brezhnev deal, coincident with the relocation of world capitalist leadership from Washington to Bonn, defines the immediate parameters within which the battle for socialism will take place. In **Brezhnev's Finland Station**, N. Syvriotis presents the evolution of this strategy, underwritten in Moscow, to institute, under the aegis of the Social Democracy, the fascist labor policies now required by the capitalists. With **The Socialist Reconstruction of Europe** John Lawrence presents a concrete perspective for European reconstruction elaborating the methodology of socialist planning . . . Anna Kiehl, in **Fascism as the Destruction of Creativity**, proceeds from an analysis of the hell of the bourgeois ego to locate the kernel of fascist ideology in the annihilation of human creativity, as that process was reflected in the development of fascism in Germany . . . Finally, in the groundbreaking piece **Beyond Psychoanalysis**, Lyn Marcus introduces the theoretical prolegomena to a terrible new weapon in the socialist arsenal, a weapon forged in the self-conscious grasp of the actual process of creative mentation, a weapon now within reach of the political working class as a whole.

The next issue of The Campaigner will appear for November distribution. After that, there will be regular monthly issues, except for the combined July-August numbers. This new schedule coincides with increased frequency of publication by the journals of our fraternal organizations in Europe and Latin America. The German-language Internationales Bulletin will appear monthly; the Italian, French and Spanish journals will be published bi-monthly; the Greek-language Espanastasi will appear quarterly. Many of the articles prepared for initial publication in one of these journals will be translated for concurrent or later appearance in one or several of the other issues.

For example, the November issue of The Campaigner will include three articles prepared for the Nov.-Dec., 1973 Spanish-language journal. These include a major piece on the background to the torture-regime in Brazil and a depth-study of the tragedy of the Latin American Popular Front, highlighting the case of Chile. Also from the Spanish journal, a major piece, "The Sexual Impotence of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party" — exposing the connection between the cult of Machismo and the Left political impotence pervading Latin American politics. Appearing in the Nov.-Dec. Spanish journal, but not immediately scheduled in The Campaigner, is a clinical study of the most important novel to appear from Latin America during the past quarter-century, Gabriel Garcia Marquez's Cien Anos de Soledad.

Our November issue will also feature initial publication of the current draft program of the Executive Committee of the International Caucus of Labour Committees.

- ** DRAFT PROGRAM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CAUCUS OF LABOUR COMMITTEES
- ** THE CASE OF BRAZIL
- ** THE COLLAPSE OF THE POPULAR FRONT IN LATIN AMERICA
- ** THE SEXUAL IMPOTENCE OF THE PUERTO RICAN SOCIALIST PARTY

next ISSUE

editorial

The World Has Changed

Think back a year ago. Then, it was the eve of the U.S. elections. Nixon was tolerated as the obvious lesser evil exactly because he seemed successful. "Nixon is, after all, Nixon...I agree," the general view went, "but, he does seem able to hold things together..."

Then, beginning with the U.S. fiasco at the January Paris International Monetary Fund meetings, the U.S.A. began to fall apart. The dollar collapsed repeatedly. Inflation ran amok. The last vestige of the old trade-union system collapsed. The Democratic Party had already collapsed. Now, Nixon's Administration became totally unravelled.

By mid-summer, Nixon remained in office only because there existed no parliamentary faction capable of pulling together a majority to replace a presidency even as totally, as abysmally discredited as Richard "Gamaliel Clark" Nixon. Senator Sam "Mother-image" Ervin presided over the autopsy, but no one of influence dared step forward to concede that the dead flesh on the autopsy table was actually a cadaver.

By late August, Secretary of State Rogers retired — no doubt, to have his stomach pumped out. The last surviving creature of the Nixon cabal, Henry "Metternich" Kissinger, stepped forward into Rogers' place, begging Europe to pull itself together and do something about a world-situation Washington could no longer ever pretend to control.

In the last twelve months the whole world has changed — drastically.

The world capital of the dollar empire is being packed up and moved — to West Germany's Bonn, much as decaying Rome packed itself off to Constantinople. And, precisely who is it that now looms as the new world leader for the empire of the Rockefellers and their kind? — The Social Democratic Chancellor, Willy

Brandt! With what credentials? Nothing less than the active support of Soviet party boss Brezhnev!

Indeed, the world has changed!

Why Brandt?

Is it possible that the Social Democrats, in alliance with the Soviet leadership, have victoriously assumed leadership of the capitalist world? **Then, where have Nelson and David and John Rockefeller gone? Why are Nelson and David smiling!?**

Brandt and Brezhnev are not about to be given independent joint mastery of the dollar empire — they have a third partner, the U.S. CIA and its European and Latin American appendages. Brandt and Brezhnev are mere errand boys for the real bosses, the men — like the Rockefellers — who exert direct, independent control of the CIA.

We explain.

As the Campaigner and New Solidarity have detailed repeatedly before this time, the present world economic situation demands a virtually fascist economic and anti-labor policy as the only possible immediate step for holding the collapsing capitalist paper structure of debt and equity titles together. To this end, the Rockefellers et al., have adopted the essential features of the 1933-36 policy of Nazi economics minister Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht. It happens that they have no mass-based fascist movements in the advanced sector — yet. They are consequently compelled to attempt to impose fascist economic and anti-labor policies through non-fascist political formations.

They cannot implement such policies through traditional bourgeois parliamentary political machines.

A bourgeois parliamentary machine maintains itself as a majority electoral force through the doling out of material concessions to the various pluralist elements which make up such a majority. In the present period of deepening world depression, not even basic food, let alone token concessions, is readily available for such continued practices. In any case, the traditional parliamentary machines of Western Europe and North America are already a shambles.

In Italy, a stable parliamentary government is seldom much more than a rumor. In France, Pompidou clings desperately to the mere shreds of a disassembled Gaullist coalition. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Prime Minister Heath's government wobbles like Humpty-Dumpty determined to enact his fall, supported principally by the ineptitude of the widely-despised Labour Party leadership. In North America, Canada's government resembles a gathering of drunks leaning against one another for support; if any of the gaggle moves suddenly, the whole assembly topples to the ground. In the U.S.A., the Republican and Democratic parties are corpses performing autopsies on one another, each adhering to a gentlemen's agreement against delivering a verdict.

Lacking strong bourgeois parliamentary parties, and lacking a sufficiently developed, mass-based fascist movement, to where do Messers Rockefeller et al. turn?

If one lacks the political force to smash a trade-union movement, there is only one effective way to smash it otherwise: **induce it to smash itself**. Weighing this thought, Messers Rockefeller et al. instruct their errand boys, "Tell Herr Brandt and Mr. Brezhnev to step in."

In Western Europe, the political arm of the organized labor movement is the social-democracy. In Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, the official Social-Democracy exists in its own traditional name, with left-support from relatively small Communist parties and, occasionally, small "Trotskyist" groupings. In Italy and France, the official Social-Democracy is relatively an impotent joke: in those countries, the role of the social-democracy is performed by the mass-based Communist parties. Hence one cannot induce the trade-unions to smash themselves throughout Europe without an alliance around such an objective by both the official Social-Democracy and the Communist parties.

In English-speaking North America, the political organization of the trade-union leadership has been principally the "populist" wing of traditional bourgeois capitalist parties, notably the U.S. Democratic Party. Those parties are now a shambles. Yet, bearing in mind Brandt's long-standing close reactionary personal alliance with the late Walter Reuther, the traditionally more "liberal" trade-union leaders, such as Reuther's

heir, Woodcock, are **an organic social-democracy** — and are not-accidentally beginning to play a kind of independent political role in exact step with the worldwide Schachtian union-busting program of the Brandt-Brezhnev cabal.

The adducible reasoning of the German Social Democrats is more instructive.

The thrust of Chancellor Brandt's **Ostpolitik** has been apparently twofold.


Locally, Brandt offers his German religious electoral base the chiliastic prospect of the ultimate unification of the "two Germanies," while offering the heathen U.S.-dominated cartels the more earthly prospect of immediately large, urgently desired "concessions" in the Comecon sector as a whole. On a broader scale, Brandt — together with Austria's Kreisky and Sweden's Olof Palme, has been persistently putting together an international Social Democratic-Communist alliance around a Schachtian-model counterinsurgency program developed chiefly by Palme, the so-called "Swedish Way."

The two political tactics converge.

Through negotiations with Italian Communist Party boss, Berlinguer, Brandt opened up the negotiations with Brezhnev, in return for the gesture of legalizing the German Communist Party (DKP). As a result, Berlinguer, with Moscow's support, forced France's Communist Party — among others — into line with a Brandt-Berlinguer alliance for all Europe. Germany, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Italy, France, and probably Britain, are now essentially brought into line — awaiting only the retirement of the outlived Heath and Pompidou governments to make Brandt's and Berlinguer's joint leadership of all modern Europe total and effective.

In both Germanies, the Social-Democracy pathetically dreams of restoring the old, pre-Hitler (1918-1933) Weimar Republic through **eventual** unification. The present world dollar crisis is the one apparent principal danger to that dream. The German Social-Democracy remembers that in a similar fix, in 1931-33, the capitalists dumped the Weimar Republic and chose Hitler because the old Republic "failed" to put the Schachtian program into effect. Brandt et al. are determined not to make such a "mistake." They have taken over the Nazi economic policy-objectives whole hog, as a matter of accepting the "new realities" of world capitalist crisis, and are grimly, hysterically determined to make a new fascist holocaust "unnecessary" to the capitalists — by showing the Rockefellers that Social Democrats can carry out Nazi-type economic and anti-labor policies so well that the fascists will not be necessary.

Mr. Brezhnev's complicity in this affair is a bit more complicated.



1. Brandt

2. Kreisky

3. Palme

4. Bahr

5. Berlinguer

6. Marchais

CABALISTS OF THE NEW SLAVE-LABOR POPULAR FRONT: Former Luebeck quasi-Trotskyist, Willy Brandt (1), expedited new coalition of capitalist and Soviet blocs against working class interest through negotiations conducted by Brandt's emissary, Bahr (4), and Italy's Berlinguer (5). Anti-labor strategy, sometimes known as the "swedish Way," was developed by Swedish Social-Democratic brains-truster, Olof Palme (3), and promoted with collaboration of Austria's Kreisky (2). Initially reluctant French Communist Party leader, Georges Marchais (6), was brought into line through pressures from Kremlin and Berlinguer (5).

On one level, he undoubtedly shares Herr Brandt's world-view; Brezhnev proposes to save "the socialist camp" from the threat of fascist holocaust in the West by placating Messers Rockefeller et al. At the same time, Brezhnev's political base in the Soviet Union itself is a cabal of the most right-wing forces, the managerial stratum of the bureaucracy. Ironically, the most counter-revolutionary, more pro-restorationist social tendency within the Soviet bureaucracy has recently established total control of the Soviet state, and is embarked on exactly those Libermaniacal restorationist policies formerly advocated by the Soviet-tank-crushed Czechoslovakian Dubcek regime!

Soviet complicity in Brandt's crimes is thus partly tactical opportunism and also partially a reflection of the degenerate character of the Soviet internal regime itself.

Hence, the "New Popular Front" of Social Democrats, Communists, CIA, and selected "left-wing" capitalist financial interests.

Although the instability of the economic and social situation precludes certainty in this matter, the current world situation is thrusting West Germany's Brandt toward the potential position of world-leader for U.S. imperialism, and consequently the imminent influx of baggage from Washington to Bonn.

In The U.S.A.

In the U.S.A. itself, the process has a somewhat different character than in Western Europe. Here, the CIA, operating more visibly through corporate-directed "retired" CIA and other counterinsurgency "dirty

tricks" specialists, is systematically taking over increasing numbers of local governments while applying Vietnam and other "field-tested" counterinsurgency programs directly to the organization of mass-based forces for fascist and proto-fascist "radical" projects.

One by one, beginning with the UAW's Woodcock and the USW's Abel, we have watched leading trade-union officials moving openly into alliance with CIA agencies and corporate officials in outright union-busting and job-busting programs identical in principle and objectives with the Schachtian schemes being pushed by the Brandt-Berlinguer coalition in Europe. And, not accidentally, the corpse-like remnant of the U.S. Communist Party is openly and dutifully supporting many of the CIA agents and their activities.

This ugly picture has already been heavily documented by New Solidarity and other Labor Committee publications.

The more closely one traces out the details of the proposals and actual programs afoot in both North America and Western Europe, the clearer the worldwide collaboration among the CIA, the Social Democrats, and the Communist parties becomes.

In Latin America

This collaboration is nowhere more vicious nor further advanced than in Africa and in Latin America.

When a group of CIA-trained military officers took over Peru and began to implement, down to the fine print, the current U.S. "Development Decade"

schemes for Latin American countries, the local Peruvian Communist Party — and radio Havana — gave this gang of CIA agents energetic support and Left credibility. In Brazil, which has become a model of Schachtian policies now being advanced throughout Western Europe and North America by the triple alliance of CIA, social-democracy and CPs, the entire country is already turning into a vast Auschwitz. In Chile, the Communist Party is assisting Allende's Popular Front farce in preparing a general right-wing coup and bloodbath. In Argentina, Franco's fascist admirer Juan Peron stepped in to resume the authority of government at just the crucial point that the U.S. economic policies for that country could not be safely carried further without trade-union and Left support. Needless to say, fascist Peron received general trade-union and Left support notably from the Argentine Communist Party — even after Peron's butchering numbers of his credulous leftist supporters! All Latin America is on the brink of becoming one vast and bloody demonstration of the three-way alliance among CIA, Social-Democracy and Communist Parties.


The Left

At the same time that the Social Democratic and Communist parties openly move into alliance with the CIA as the agents of fascist-model economic and anti-labor policies, the residue of the Left — excepting the Labor Committees — is on the verge of being dissolved.

In the U.S.A., the Communist Party is virtually dead in all its traditional areas of Left and trade-union activity. In the recent New York petition-campaign for its mayoral candidate, the local CP apparently could not find enough Party members to witness its nominating petitions without resorting to the baldly illegal ruse of having these signed by CP members who had voted in the Democratic primary! It is merely the corpse of the once-Left-hegemonic CPUSA which pathetically stumbles out to play its role as FBI and CIA informers. (Who knows, the CP is so demoralized that perhaps only the KGB and infiltrated FBI agents are still inside holding office and paying dues!?)

Otherwise, on the U.S. Left, the Socialist Workers Party is dead except as a participant in various CIA-directed schemes and projects. The formerly-Maoist Progressive Labor Party is a tiny fragment, its disorientation symptomized by its support of the outright fascist and CIA stooge, "Aunt Jemima" Baraka! The small "International Socialist" organization recently split down the middle — over the choice of road to self-extinction. The other "Maoist" and "Trotskyist" groupings are either also inside the CIA movements or are simple inconsequential little sectlets howling in their determination to maintain perpetual obscurity.

In Western Europe, the various Maoist and



Leonard Woodcock



Irving Bluestone

U.S. SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY: In the U.S.A., the role of social-democracy is exemplified by Democratic heirs of demised Brandt crony, Walter Reuther, Leonard Woodcock and Irving Bluestone.

Trotskyist groups are either falling apart rapidly, or are being swept up into the fringes of the Social Democratic-CIA operations.

In short, noting that the Social-Democracy and CPs have openly gone over to the class enemy's camp, there is a worldwide vacuum developing in the Left, apart from the now-rapidly-growing numbers and influence of the still-tiny Labor Committee tendency.

Admittedly, in Western Europe, the recent consolidation of Labor Committee groups from several countries into a European Labour Committees represents only a small force on that continent, but two phenomena are notable. Firstly, the small Labour Committee branches in Britain, France, and Italy have already produced widespread and violent fear-reactions to its very existence from the larger, well-established groups of the Left. The ELC is already so significant, in Moscow's eyes, that a special detachment of the KGB has been assigned to attempt espionage, wrecking, and assassination activities against its members. Otherwise, outside the Social-Democracy and Communist parties, the ELC is the only Left force on the continent effectively organized to deploy its admittedly limited physical resources on a continental scale of tactical operations. In that latter respect, the ELC is already more powerful than any other forces of the European Left but Brandt's and Berlinguer's supporters.

Admittedly, in Latin America, the Latin American Labor Committees still exists only in an embryonic form. In fact, the Latin American section of the International Caucus of Labour Committees is presently mainly concerned with pulling together a collaborative relationship among viable existing individuals and groupings throughout the continent, rather than occupied — so far — in actually building its own organization.

It is only in the U.S.A. that the National Caucus of Labor Committees has so far emerged as the unquestioned Left-hegemonic force — and consequently, the principal target of the CIA, FBI and allied agencies. Yet, even in the U.S.A., we appear to be so very small, and hence so very vulnerable.

If, as it thus appears, the small Labor Committee tendency is the only Left vanguard-force standing between the working-class forces and fascist schemes, is it reasonable to hold out any hope for humanity for the rest of the century?

Our Tactics

On several past occasions, NCLC National Chairman L. Marcus has described the organization's tactical perspectives for success as like that of a man walking a tight-rope across a sea of boiling lead: there is a scientific method for getting to safety, but, one misstep, and, then... That has now become the situation of the Labor Committee tendency throughout the world.

In this situation, another analogy — from former periods' elementary tank tactics — applies. It might have occurred, in poorly organized armies, that a certain tank battalion had begun its movement across an open field toward its assigned objective. In this case, a subaltern gained the battalion commander's attention: "Perhaps if we do not go too far, we will not enrage the enemy excessively." In this badly-organized army, the battalion commander halted the unit in mid-field — thus, not unduly provoking the enemy. Then, the incoming shells found their sitting targets!

When one is committed to such combat, go like Hell and don't stop until the objective is secured.

In our situation, our class enemy has overwhelming amounts of the physical force he might wish to have to



McGovern



Nixon

crush us. How, then, do we survive — considering the fact that we have directly assaulted the most powerful agency in the U.S.A., the CIA, and have even dealt that agency a number of painful setbacks? The key term is "factitious advantage."

The way we survive is to deploy our limited forces in such a fashion that the enemy's resort to sufficient force to crush us will cost him more than he gains. In our case, if the CIA and its allies muster sufficient of their forces to crush us — e.g., by assassinations, massive frame-up arrests, etc. — that action itself would strengthen the credibility of our work and organization; in fact, the more drastic the action our enemies take, the greater the resulting advantage to the general credibility and influence of our work. To come out into the open with a display of sufficient force to crush us would expose the CIA operations in precisely the fashion the CIA is determined not to be exposed.

Yet, each week, especially as we more effectively sabotage the CIA operations in the U.S.A., the CIA's potential and motivation for crushing us increases. The deteriorating political and social situation gives the CIA and its allies greater freedom for venturing into the open against us. We survive only to the extent that we increase our factitious advantage at least as rapidly as the CIA forces increase their motivation and capability for deploying their forces against us.

If we stop, if we hold up, as for fear of "unduly provoking" the CIA, we will be absolutely crushed. However, if we "go like Hell" along the line of attack we have chosen, we can, under those conditions and only those conditions, ensure that our countervailing advantage keeps pace with the increased actual capability of our deadly enemy.

In this situation, our tactical political policy is "Attack, attack, and then more attack." Organize like Hell,

THE REAL "WATERGATE" CRISIS: Senator McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign reflected and aggravated the collapse of the Democratic Party as a coherent, national force capable of offering political leadership to capitalist system during this period of crisis. Nixon's successive floundering and bunglings during the Winter of 1973 on handling of deepening monetary crisis and galloping U.S. inflation effected an evaporation of confidence in his administration, reviving interest in the facts of the 1972 "Watergate" affair. Vacuum of credible leadership in both Democratic and Republican parties creates favorable conditions for moving capital of international capitalism from Rome (Washington) to Constantinople (Bonn).

challenge our opponents remorselessly; it is merely necessary also to be occasionally diabolical and to avoid being provoked into foolish forms of counterattack.

In that respect, the principal danger to the Labor Committee would be a failure of nerve for the next attack on the part of the leadership. If the leadership should falter, the membership would falter. If a particular layer of leadership were crushed — without faltering — the membership would automatically replicate leadership. As Isaiah warns with appropriate prophecy: If the trumpet should sound an uncertain note, who then would heed the call to battle?

However, the question also arises: is it possible that a small vanguard organization can actually organize enough workers in time to assure the seizure of world power within the several years during which this possibility will exist? It is not a trivial or otherwise idle question; the proper answer is no ordinary answer.

A Terrible New Weapon

During the summer months, representatives of the International Caucus of Labour Committees spent a month closeted with the newly-formed Executive Committee of the European Labour Committees. The principal purpose of this meeting "somewhere in Europe" was the drafting of a set of tactical programmatic theses for the ICLC as a whole.

This document will be published in the following now-monthly issue of the Campaigner, and also in the various journals of the ELC and LALC. Apart from its analytical summation of the implications of the Brandt-Brezhnev alliance, the most notable, historic feature of this programmatic statement is the exposition of the conception of **the organizing process**. Behind that exposition lies the Executive Committee's comprehension of the most terrible political weapon ever possessed by any Left political group.

Heretofore, the use of "psychological warfare" has been limited to capitalist agencies and the forces of the Soviet KGB. For the first time, we, a Left group in the capitalist sector, have undertaken counterattack against capitalist and Soviet psychological warfare tactics, basing this counterattack on a far more advanced and hence more effective technology than any of our opponents.

A preliminary exposition of the general basis for this new political technology is given in the major article included in this issue, L. Marcus's "Beyond Psychoanalysis." In subsequent numbers, we will publish other major articles representing the same specialty, beginning with our November issue's "The Sexual Impotence of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party," and followed by an analysis in depth of "The Cult of the Passion,

Crucifixion, and Second Coming of Leon Trotsky." These two forthcoming articles will elaborate some of the more detailed features of the methods portended in "Beyond Psychoanalysis," while dealing directly with the principal psychological disorders which must be immediately rooted out of the Left as a precondition for effective mass-organizing work.

As we progress in clearing away from the Left those specific neurotic disorders which make most socialists effectively dysfunctional as organizers and political thinkers, the thrust of our application of these methods will assume a new, twofold emphasis. We shall employ the obvious methods derived from this work to accomplish psychological terror against bourgeois and other opponent forces, to undermine the psychological "forces" which are the functional integument binding an organization's members into an effective whole. We shall, more positively, use the same techniques to remove the principal obstacles preventing rapid mass-organization of workers and youth for socialist transformation.

As the Marcus article in this issue indicates, there is nothing alien or skew to actual Marxian method in these techniques. Quite the contrary: they are rooted in the development of modern philosophy from Descartes through Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, and represent essentially nothing but the elaboration of a Marxian psychological science. It is to be emphasized that the very title of Marx's and Engels' 1845 work, **The German Ideology**, portends — at least in respect to Marx's own contributions to that volume — nothing but the sort of elaboration we have adopted and for the very principled purpose of application we have chosen. To organize the working class into an effective mass revolutionary force, it is first essential to free that class from its characteristic capitalist ideology.

This report becomes the relevant and sufficient answer to the question posed above when it is recognized that all the so-called "objective" arguments needed to prod workers into immediately establishing socialism are already well established facts. The fact that masses of workers have not already established socialism is primarily a **subjective** question.

Bourgeois ideology, rooted in the bourgeois family relations in which the mind is formed, separates the world into an inner world, the world of the family, and an outer world. It is the worker's resulting pathological delusion, that family life can somehow continue **magically** despite lawful processes in the outer world, which reduces the worker to political impotence, which impels him to cling hysterically to propitiatory "old familiar ways" of (personal) survival when all the objective evidence of reality — the real, outside world — prescribes that the only result of "old, familiar ways" is the guarantee of personal doom.

Brezhnev's Finland Station

by Nikos Syvriotis



1. The International Setting

Any knowledgeable student of international affairs knows that in spite of the last sixteen months of feverish, Metternichian diplomatic superactivism, all semblance of coherence and continuity in international relations has been destroyed. In every major national sector, all ruling institutions that have guided mankind's destinies for a quarter century are now pathetically bereft of any sense of direction and purpose. In their midst, a multitude of competing factions has emerged, each with its own proposals, with its own outlook and cherished myopia.

In the United States itself, the once solid and exuberant faction of liberal financiers of the Northeast that had formulated and carried out the post-World War II U.S. foreign policy has, by now, been stripped of its commanding power and, split into a number of contending schools, finds itself reduced to an impotent, bickering country club. In the meantime, initiative of foreign policy formulations has passed, for the time being, to the bungling hands of mid and far-western interest groups — picturesquely typified by the assorted coteries of Roy Ashes and John Connallys that have been pestering Nixon's administration for the last five or so years.

There is, of course, the special case of Henry A. Kissinger's high-powered group — a mere flake off of the erstwhile Eastern-liberal lobby of foreign policy — which, whenever it frees its hands from its factional entanglements with the State Department occasionally stumbles into what may be construed as policies that approximate the best capitalist interests in the present conditions of breakdown crisis. Yet, on the whole, Kis-

singer's formulations and initiatives are riddled with incompetence, outright stupidity and gross neglect — the popular columnists' adulation for the playboy-diplomat notwithstanding.

The only diplomatic successes that the U.S. leaders have scored, i.e., the rapprochement with the workers' states, they have scored in spite of themselves. What seem to be Kissinger's ingenious innovations in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relations are nothing but Washington's grudging admission of the fact that the far-reaching conceptualizations that have guided the diplomacy of West Germany's Willy Brandt since at least 1969 are, after all, the only ones appropriate for capitalist survival in this period: Bonn and not Washington has been supplying the political leadership that the international capitalists need if they are to weather this storm.

It would be wrong to assume that West Germany and its brand of foreign policy are capable of rescuing capitalism just by themselves. The three main citadels of imperialist strength, Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. are currently riddled with a multitude of crumbling and discredited governmental institutions out of which a bewildering mass of contending political factions is emerging — each trying to prove itself, none as yet having emerged as a credible option. Out of this chaos, there is an iron necessity that is pushing forward: The iron necessity of what is the only possible course of action that international capitalism will have to adopt if it is to survive at all — the establishment of a new, closely knit order of relations between Western Europe, Japan and the United States that will enable this industrial core of world capitalism to undertake a coordinated global strategy for its survival.

This is where the Kissinger-Nixon diplomacy has failed by refusing to subordinate the parochial U.S.

interests to the overall interests of the incipient Europe-Japan-U.S. bloc. It is the failure that has nearly cost Nixon his job.

The repeated snubbing of Japan in crucial matters of trade, monetary policy and diplomacy, the crude handling of the Europeans by the Connallys, Volckers and Eberles, have been drawing international capitalism further and further away from the possibility of ultimate survival under the developing circumstances. Undoubtedly there exist in the U.S. in the highest echelons of capitalist command, factions whose composite programs and strategies call for the subordination of the parochial U.S. interests to those of the industrial bloc as a whole; that call for an immediate end to the type of politics to which their class had been accustomed in the era of the Dollar Empire. Undoubtedly, there are similar factions in the top financial and political circles of both Western Europe and Japan.

Yet, also undoubtedly, nowhere have these factions solidified the political power necessary to carry out this only strategy for capitalist survival. Nowhere have the leading strategists of imperialism succeeded in overcoming the bulky inertia of their own class in rallying the political layers of their class under the banners of their emergency program — nowhere except in West Germany.

2. Problems of Transition to World Fascism

The imminent threat of trade wars, monetary chaos, swift halt of world trade and major disruptions in capitalist industrial production is growing by the hour — to the point that a writer on the subject cannot be sure whether the Crash will have already occurred while his article is still in the proofreader's galleys.

Like the last Great Crash, this present one marks the end of an entire historical period; capitalism can no longer survive without altering certain salient characteristics. It has exhausted the base of primitive accumulation that sustained the post-war credit system, as well as the political institutions that depended on it. The only possible next form in which capitalism will stabilize its existence must, of necessity, be characterized by the following three general conditions:

- i. Massive reduction of living standards in the entire industrialized sector, with the concomitant reduction of populations, including freezing of wages to below-subsistence levels, eliminating whole sectors of public services such as education, health, etc. — a condition that can only be brought to completion by fascist regimes.
- ii. A comprehensive program of joint U.S.-Japanese-European exploitation of the entire underdeveloped sector based more on the Brazil-Auschwitz model than the classical methods of primitive accumulation that have prevailed in the post-war period.

- iii. General availability of the workers' states' wealth-producing capacity for support of the new imperialist credit-system-to-emerge; extension of the system of imperialist loans, penetration of capitalist capital and management into the Soviet and Chinese bloc; utilization of the available bureaucracies for collection of debt service payments.

These sweeping transformations of the character of contemporary capitalism imply — but, more significantly, **require** — that the advanced capitalist sector act with coordination, coherence and unity of purpose. To say that at present this coherence and unity is lacking would be an understatement. For each of the major industrial national sectors of imperialism, political life is characterized, on the domestic side by grave political crises and breakdowns such as in the U.S.A., Japan, Italy (and in a different way in France and Great Britain), and on the international side by a clash between this new, emerging consciousness of the need for a world fascist order and the old, resisting habits that had been cultivated in the previous period of the Dollar Empire.

While today the international bourgeoisie is paralyzed, crisis-ridden and "unable to rule in the old way," the key to the world's — and capitalism's — future is held by the world working class. In such major disruptions of organized social life it is not what the bankrupt rulers do but what the immense masses of the ruled do, that decides the outcome. Will the working class rise to the challenge to rule the world? This is the central question to which every political consideration, domestic or foreign, is subordinated.

The working class does not enter the arena as a political virgin. Its response to the crisis depends not only on the crisis itself, but also on the organizations, institutions, movements that the working class has built in the past, institutions that have shaped its consciousness and to which it has offered its allegiance. What these institutions do and **what happens to them** to a large degree determines how the working class generally reacts. So, thus, it is in the hands of the Social Democracy and the Communist Parties that the destiny of the capitalists has come to rest.

The Social Democratic and Soviet bureaucracies today are engaged in an unprecedented worldwide effort to destroy the proletariat's potential for resistance to the looming fascist threat. Each comes out of a different historical period. The Soviet bureaucracy emerged and matured when Social Democracy was destroyed — during the 1914-1915 breakdown of capitalism. Now, with the onslaught of the present breakdown, the Soviet bureaucracy — the most advanced type of institution built so far by the international working class — is following the path of the old pre-war Social Democracy: It is destroying itself as a **working class** bureaucracy.

And there is a grim warning to this: What is today known as Social Democracy was rebuilt by the secret services of imperialism — mainly based, in the first post-war years on CIA millions.

It is in this general context that Willy Brandt's overall political strategy holds the key to capitalist survival. Brandt's domestic and foreign policy is the only available body of tested capitalist practice that outlines how specifically the mass organizations of the working class must be used for the transition to fascism. The central conception is summarized in one word: **Mitbestimmung** or co-determination. The Soviet leadership has dubbed the same thing "Peaceful Coexistence," appending, perhaps, ... "in one factory."

When the German Communist Party was given license to organize itself in West Germany in 1968, it was in pursuit of this joint plan. When emissaries of Moscow and of the rightwing Italian Communist Party traveled up and down Western Europe, arguing, organizing, threatening and arm-twisting, ever since the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, they did so in pursuit of this policy.

It has been on the basis of this plan that West German Social Democracy, under Willy Brandt's leadership, has organized its hegemony in practically all of Europe: not only Bruno Kreisky's Austria, Olof Palme's Sweden, Kaleve Sorsa's Finland, but Denmark, Holland, and Belgium as well are ruled in essence by Bonn, through the mediating links of these countries' Social Democratic parties. This Brandt "bloc," extending to Italy and Switzerland as well, exercises a powerful cohesive influence not only in the drive for the unification of Europe for the coordinated implementation of continent-wide austerity and slave-labor policies, but also in the quest for a stabilized world imperialist order where a new "Atlantic community" that will include Japan will be the collective arbiter of world affairs.

Brandt's particular genius is that he has consistently pursued a policy of facilitating the treacherous proclivities of the Soviet bureaucracy at every turn. His own policy for capitalist survival, therefore, is merely a consequence and a corollary of the devastating developments that were in the making in the USSR for quite some time, but that were consolidated following the 1969-70 period. It is out of these developments, to be discussed later on, that the foreign policy of the Brezhnev faction flows, a policy based on a massive, well-planned counter-revolutionary intervention in the international working class movement.

This is then the general situation in the hegemonic institutions that influence working class behavior in this period of crisis. Both the Social Democratic and the Communist leaderships of trade unions, political par-

ties and other mass organizations are deliberately committed to the CIA-inspired and CIA-controlled co-determination, "local control" offensive against the working class.

3. Co-determination, the Fascist Subversion of the Working Class

Every West European Communist Party has been passing and propagandizing major resolutions in favor of co-determination, local factory control and other worker participation schemes. Moscow's foreign language publications that enjoy worldwide circulation have been tireless in pushing this new line. The Italian Communist Party, in addition to its routine strike-breaking duties, has been actually carrying out pacification programs in areas where it controls provincial administrations, by means of local control. The Belgian Communist Party has introduced in Parliament major pieces of local-control, co-determination-type legislation.

Soviet, West and East German, Austrian and other Communist Party "theoreticians" have been producing volumes of "co-determination," "industrial democracy" propaganda. In West Germany the government and employers have pushed through massive speedup of the work tempo in every industry, while the Communist Party was running behind the Social Democratic leaders of labor supporting the various **Mitbestimmung** hoaxes by means of which workers were duped into accepting speedup.

Over the last year and a half, every time that the I.G. Metall, West Germany's 2.5 million-strong metallurgical workers union, took a beating either through wage freezes or through speedup or through inflation or attrition of the work force, Herr Eugen Loderer, the union's chief did his best to quell the rebellious mood of the ranks: in every instance he blackmailed wildcat strikers, he suppressed opposition, he appealed to workers' sense of loyalty to "their" Social Democratic government — and when nothing else seemed to work, he invariably broke his own union's strikes by channeling them into ineffectual, isolated work-stoppages in distant regions (the so-called "guerilla" strike actions known to U.A.W. workers as "Operation Apache").

Every one of Herr Loderer's undertakings ended in resounding success. In his entire two-year reign, I.G. Metall, the world's largest trade union and the pacesetter for European labor has been led from one defeat to the next. And after every defeat, the union's leadership indulged in ever more militant diatribes for the cause of **Mitbestimmung**, trying to sell a militant image by "demanding" from employers and government more worker-participation, more local control at the factory level. The story was repeated with every union, after every advance of the government's austerity poli-

cies. Labor leaders who were engineering defeats, were trying to convince workers that **Mitbestimmung** is where militancy is at.

The Communist Party was there, at every turn, to verify that yes, **Mitbestimmung** is where militancy is at. **International Affairs**, Moscow's most auspicious English-language publication which circulates in every country of the world, devoted article after article not merely to the abstract virtues of co-determination but specifically to the admirable way in which the I.G. Metall leadership was pursuing it.

Wherever any degree of co-determination has been implemented anywhere in those European countries ruled by Social Democratic parties, the result has invariably been that factory workers themselves have imposed and maintained a harsh regime of speedup and competition; they have accepted wage freezes and other forms of financial sacrifices in order to save the firm's "profitability" and, in many cases, workers' committees have taken on the task of deciding which workers should be fired as a result of speedup and other "labor saving" measures.

Everything that co-determination stands for is against the traditional interests of even the trade union movement: speedup, job insecurity, austerity measures — and more important — elimination of national trade unions' control over conditions in local plants. And yet it is supported and carried out by union bureaucracies, and Communist and Social Democratic party leaderships together.

Among the circles of today's demoralized and disoriented Left, both inside and outside the Communist parties, the implicit lie is cultivated that the ideas of co-determination and local control are naturally popular and appealing in the working class. Nothing is further from the truth. These ideas have spread in the working class as a result of a deliberate, diabolical conspiracy spearheaded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which has been working on the idea through the Tavistock Institute in Great Britain, the Institute of Social Research in the U.S.A. and other similar "think tank" outfits in existence since the end of the First World War. The fact that the Soviet leadership knowingly provides massive — and indispensable — assistance to this major CIA operation is a measure of Moscow's present commitment to pro-capitalist policies: to the degree of collaborating with imperialism's major espionage and counterinsurgency agency.

As for the lesser advocates of local control like Ernest Mandel or Andre Gorz, one must admit that these dimwits are not aware, as usual, that their programs derive from the CIA plot. They have merely catered to the general public opinion that the counterinsurgency operators have generated among selected working class

populations. It is not accidental that this portion of the left got overheated on the issue of local control in the late fifties-early sixties, i.e., at precisely the time when the CIA-Tavistock crowd had its first large scale application of its ideas in Norway and Sweden with the collaboration of Einar Thorsrud and the Norwegian Institute for Research in Industrial Environments. From then on, the idea started catching like wildfire.

Even in earlier periods of working class history, the idea of local control was introduced into the working class by capitalist specialists at times of social unrest. It is a tried weapon for destroying the workers' instinctive motion toward classwide unity in such periods. Marx in his polemic against Proudhon cites such instances in the class struggles in Britain. In the nineteenth century in Italy, when the CIA was not around, the Vatican became the champion of local control with some added features (especially appealing to M. Mandel) such as "individual dignity," "quality of life," "resurgence of spiritual values."

Why the ruling class resorts to this weapon? Helmut Schmidt, presently West Germany's minister of Finance, who built his political career by being NATO's agent in the ranks of Social Democracy for over a decade, wrote in his 1969 book **Strategy of Equilibrium**: "Participation...is the most important demand of man in industrial mass society. If it were not to be realizable, the flood of discontent would at first be stowed up behind the dams — later, however, it might spill over the dams or destroy them and carry everything away with it. Thus, mass democracy has to create outlets and channels for the flood."

The French bourgeoisie, since 1968, has become acutely aware of the need for "channels for the flood."



The Brandt-Brezhnev deal guarantees the active support of the "Communist" parties throughout the world in implementing the fascist labor policies required to keep capitalism afloat. The DKP is a militant advocate of Brandt's co-participation (**Mitbestimmung**) scheme.

Ever since the May 1968 mass strike, both the Gaullist regime and the Employers Association have been investing millions of francs in huge propaganda campaigns throughout the country trying to sell co-determination and "spiritual values" to the working class. Through their agents in the labor movement, French capitalists succeeded quite early in the game in mobilizing the meagre forces of Mitterand's Socialist Party for the co-determination campaign. Ever since 1968, the socialist-controlled trade union confederation, the CFDT, did its best to confine the militancy of the French working class to isolated local struggles, to weaken such struggles with "autogestion" demands and, in many cases, to lead them to defeat by substituting "local control" gains for real economic concessions.

In fact, the Socialist Party's excessive zeal in the pursuit of "autogestion" was the main stumbling block that was at one point responsible for the delay in the collaboration between the French Communist Party and the Socialist Party. Sufficient public evidence suggests that although the French CP leadership, for its own reasons, refused to tolerate the Socialists' "autogestion," Moscow's persistence and pressure convinced them to ignore this "minor difference" and proceed with the "Programme Commun" electoral campaign of last spring which resulted in a massive revival of the then moribund Socialist Party.

(An indispensable footnote to this story: As soon as Moscow, honoring its previous deal with Willy Brandt, secured the revival of the French Socialist Party by having forced the French CP into electoral collaboration, it took advantage of the newly strengthened SP's influence to force the French Communists to accept "autogestion," which they had been resisting for their own reasons. Georges Marchais was told, immediately after the electoral campaign, to go to Bologna and hold talks with Italian CP chief Enrico Berlinguer, himself fresh from Moscow. Upon his visit, Marchais announced two major shifts in French CP policy. One, acceptance of the co-determination line; two, abandonment of the party's former anti-Common Market posture. Brezhnev was selling out to Brandt.)

With the French CP's capitulation to co-determination this spring, Moscow has completed its campaign of lining up every European Communist Party behind the CIA-Social Democratic program of labor containment. In this way, it is following the evolution of pre-war Social Democracy. It will be recalled that long before the CIA co-determination plot existed, a similar crude strategy was developed by the German Social Democratic Party and its trade union leaders in the 1920's and 30's, to deliver the working class to Hitler.

4. Repetition of History

Official SPD pronouncements of that period reveal an unmistakable trend: when fascist pressure was low,

SPD-trade union propaganda for local control and co-determination was correspondingly low-keyed; as fascist pressure was mounting, the disarming of the working class through co-determination was intensified, resulting ironically in massive defections from trade unions, in increasing emasculation of the labor movement and, in turn, in further escalation of fascist pressures.

This type of self-feeding process is stripped of its mystery if one keeps in mind the limited and specific character of working class bureaucracies generally. As social formations they arise generally during the ebb of revolutionary waves and, riding on the advances and gains of the preceding upsurge, they assume the role of mediator between sectors of the working class and capitalist society — when the self-activity of the working class has already ceased. From that point on, the life of such bureaucracies, as best exemplified not only by trade unions but — even more lucidly — by the evolution of the Soviet State, assumes its own internal logic of evolution.

Its continued existence is predicated on the preservation of the status quo that has emerged out of the previous mass strike upsurge to which it owes its existence. For the working class to resume its historical self-activity means that the mediating role of bureaucracies becomes superfluous. Therefore, the continuous twin task of such working class bureaucracies is the preservation of their class base on the one hand and the suppression of the self-activity of that class on the other.

The police terror of the Stalin era is not the only example of how working class bureaucracies have attempted to squash the revolutionary self-activity of the class and thereby retain their historical mediating role. The Stalinist experience itself, among others, shows that violence is not necessarily the only or main means of repression. Working class bureaucracies attempt to obviate the necessity for revolutionary self-activity by claiming that their role of mediation is quite adequate for the solution of emerging crucial problems.

Since, in capitalist states, the existence of labor bureaucracies depends on the preservation of the capitalist status quo, the SPD-trade union bureaucracy of the 1920's and early 30's in Germany was compelled to adopt a policy of proving to both the bourgeois regime and their working class constituencies that they could still be useful under conditions of grave crisis.

They had to do this by embracing a radical ideology and program. Only a radical appeal could have a chance of being heard among workers in those days. But it had to be a radical appeal that cohered with the interests of the surrounding bourgeois society. Thus the trade union-SPD bureaucracy became the agent, in the working class, of the radical Nazi programs of corporatism and local control — the radicalism of the bourgeoisie. If

only because today the Soviet leaders are following the exact same path by endorsing the CIA participation plot, the Social Democracy's behavior in the 1920's and 30's merits a cursory review:

A major plank of the SPD's 1925 Heidelberg Program, drafted by Hilferding, was "the development of a system of economic councils (wirtschaftliches Rattersystem) for the purpose of exercising the right of co-determination of the working class in the organization of the economy..."

When the going started getting rough in 1928, the 13th Trade Union Congress in Hamburg started elaborating the ideas of **Betriebsgemeinschaft** (factory community), **Arbeitsgemeinschaft** (labor-community) and **Volksgemeinschaft** (people's community) — conceptions that were pivotal in the Nazi idea of running society. In the meantime, Social Democratic "theoreticians" were putting forward the view that co-determination is necessary for the pursuit of the capitalists' best interests, or as they put it:

Only at a point when the tendency of development consciously puts workers' organizations on the same footing with employers' organizations in the economy, will it be possible to fully bring out and utilize for the production process those personal energies existing in the millions of working people...

...then as today, the way to speedup went through co-determination.

In the year 1930, the mass propaganda publications of the Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB), the Social Democratic labor federation, were full of "quality of life" rhetoric quite similar to that peddled today by the French Employers' Association, the Patronat: "We should stop telling the worker that he cannot enjoy his job. Rather we should find out what kind of joy he can have on his job and what must be done to maximize it. This is what our time is crying for. A planned 'work joy' (Arbeitsfreude) policy is what we need. Possibly this would be the most important aspect of working class cultural policy."

While the SPD was peddling its Lordstown-style "Ode to Joy," in one stroke the rightwing government of Bruening robbed the unions' unemployment insurance funds and cut wages by 20%. The SPD supported the measure in the interest of "parliamentary democracy." Within months, the party and trade union leaders could hardly find any member with whom to hold meetings. They had virtually busted their own unions.

The epilogue: In the midst of 1932, as the Nazi party was preparing to take over, the ADGB recommended official cancellation of all types of union meetings and conferences. It joined the government in carrying out slave-labor policies. It entered in secret negotiations with Gregor Strasser of the Nazi Party and with General Schleicher, the kingmaker of the Army's General Staff.

Finally, in April 1933, the ADGB came out in support of Adolf Hitler and endorsed his "Brown Mayday." On May 2, the ADGB was completely destroyed by the Nazi party. Fascism had finally destroyed the working class movement.

Like today, it all started with softening up the working class with co-determination and local control propaganda. Unlike today, it was opposed by official Communist Parties of the period. Unlike today, it was not the key of an international alliance between Communists and Social Democrats. Unlike today, it did not enjoy the weighty support of the vast bureaucracies of states ruled in the name of the working class.

Were it not for the emergence of the Labor Committee movement, there would have been absolutely no opposition today to the international co-determination-local control campaign.

5. The Old Comintern and the Socialist International

In the years 1972 and 1973 certain far-reaching changes took place in the relations between the European parties of the Socialist International and the Communist parties that once constituted the old Comintern. They have moved closer and closer toward fraternization.

To understand these changes, one must first appreciate what has happened in the relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI, the largest in the capitalist world) between 1968, the year of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and mid-March 1973, when Italian CP chief Enrico Berlinguer visited Moscow — in what subsequently proved to be a very important mission. The 1968 move of Soviet troops on Czechoslovakia left the more rightwing western Communist parties such as the Italian and the British with a deeply felt taste of bitterness — the intervention was spoiling their domestic rightwing image.

As a result, when in the following year Moscow convened the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, "communist unity" was a sad affair. While the Meeting's deliberations were a solemn rightwing show, putting forward the international Popular Front line that was to be implemented in subsequent years, some of the most important western Communist parties, led by the 1.7 million-strong PCI, either excused themselves from endorsing the Meeting's major resolutions, or limited themselves to initialing certain agreeable sections. Moscow had to rely on parties such as the CP of Lesotho, of Luxemburg, etc., in order to create a Potemkin facade of unanimity.

The objections of the dissidents around the PCI were that the "line" wasn't rightwing enough, i.e., it wasn't allowing for enough "national peculiarities" for each



In 1930, the German Communist Party (KPD) and the official Communist movement made a weak-kneed but sincere effort to stand up to a mass-based fascist movement. Frantically, they condemned the Social-Democracy and the trade unions for organizing for fascist economic policies in the factories. In 1933, the KPD passively submitted to defeat. Today, the Apparatchniki heading the official CPs want to hasten their own destruction. They are the leftwing standard-bearers of the ideology of a future fascist movement.

party — a demand that Moscow could not have entertained back in 1969 when its grip over Eastern Europe was still shaky. The Italians were hitting on the most sensitive problem that the Soviet leadership was facing: How to decentralize both the economy and the bureaucracy's own political institutions without loosening the grip that the bureaucracy as a whole has over society?

Since the International Meeting, the first crisis related to this dilemma broke out during December 1969-January 1970, resulting in a significant curbing of Aleksei Kosygin's power base and influence in Soviet Politburo and marking the beginning of the Soviet leadership's orientation toward Dubcek's ideas of economic reform and of relations with the West. It was the beginning of the thaw in the relations between the CPSU and the PCI. It took place soon after the West German Social Democratic Party, under Willy Brandt's leadership, had ascended to power. What Brandt had started as foreign minister in the previous "Grand Coalition" government of the rightwing Christian Democrats could now become the far-flung and ambitious Ostpolitik.

Undoubtedly, the PCI today is the cornerstone of Soviet policy in Western Europe. On March 10, 1973, *L'Unita*, the Party's daily, published a statement of the Italian Politburo on the international economic crisis. It was followed five days later by a joint PCI-CPSU communique that reaffirmed the Italian position — while PCI's Berlinguer was still in Moscow on the invitation of the Soviet Central Committee. The main thesis was: The solution to the crisis is to be found in a system of economic collaboration between East and West.

The Italian CP, for its part, could promise that it would do its utmost to provide stability in the institutions of the Common Market, to expand collaboration among "all sections of the labor movement" (Communist, Socialist, Catholic) and to guarantee that the principle of "peaceful coexistence" would be carried out to even the factory level. After years of strikebreak-

ing, the PCI decided that the capitalist ploy of co-determination is nothing but the "Leninist principle" of peaceful coexistence applied domestically.

For years, the PCI headquarters in Rome's Via delle Botteghe Oscure had been the center of communications between the German Social Democracy and Moscow. The role of the Italian leaders in this liaison was one of applying Social Democratic pressure on Moscow rather than Soviet pressure on Willy Brandt. In fact, political circles in Western Europe are well aware of Willy Brandt's political embarrassment over the rather excessive adulation of Italian communist leaders for him and his foreign and domestic policies. Yet, as soon as Moscow was ready, since early 1970, for the consummation of the Brandt-Brezhnev Deal, the PCI's intermediary role assumed another dimension: It conveyed Moscow's line to the rest of the West European Communist parties.

While Moscow's international publications opened a heavy barrage in favor of co-determination, "industrial democracy" and the like, while contacts, conferences and exchanges between the CPSU and other Communist parties from the West started multiplying at an unprecedented rate, Signor Enrico Berlinguer, the liberal Sardinian landlord-turned-communist started his rounds in Western Europe. His close consultations with F. Mitterand of the French Socialist Party and with French CP leaders were instrumental in consummating the standing alliance between the PCF and Mitterand's autogestion-Socialists.

This particular undertaking was instrumental in winning the French Communists over to co-determination and local control despite their earlier objections. The indefatigable Italian leaders continued their contacts with the Swedish, the Belgian, the Dutch and other parties, both Communist and Social Democratic.

The Communist press of Europe has been saturated, over the past year, with laudatory comments for the PCI's successful French operations: the alliance between the Socialist and Communist Parties. Within 1972 and early 1973, every West European Communist party has come out in favor of alliance with the Social Democracy, thus supplying an indispensable left cover to the CIA's international co-determination plot — the line of domestic peaceful coexistence.

On the eve of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn this year, Moscow decided that the French CP hadn't capitulated enough. True the Austrian, Danish, Belgian, Finnish, British and, of course, Swedish CPs were all in line. But they didn't count for much. The Communist movement in Europe is the Italian and French Communist Parties by virtue of their sheer size. And the French CP was still suffering from its old centrist, Stalinist hangover. Its position on the Common Market with its anti-market vote in last year's referendum was pure sabotage of detente; its position on co-determination was from hostile to grudging. Leonid Brezhnev's ability to deliver on his promises would have been questioned in Bonn if he couldn't take care of this thorn on his side.

While the last vestiges of old-style Stalinist resistance were being dismantled in the Kremlin itself (symbolized by Gennady Voronov's and Pyotr Shelest's purge from the Politburo), heavy pressure was being applied on the French. Almost simultaneously with the Politburo purges in Moscow, Georges Marchais, French CP chief, warned of the changing winds, delivered a major policy speech in Toulouse, signifying a complete capitulation to co-determination and an open collaboration with the Common Market forces. The French Communist Party, despite the extensive purges of 1968-69 connected with the Garaudy faction, was finally wearing its mask of bourgeois-democratic respectability.

With Leonid Brezhnev's footsteps still fresh in Bonn, the final convincing signals to Willy Brandt were sent from Bologna, Italy. Berlinguer had invited Georges Marchais to address a mass rally in that city. The talk, later rubber-stamped by a joint communique, emphasized the need for common initiatives of "Communist, Socialist Parties and Catholic forces." It exalted the Communist-Socialist Popular Front in France. It reiterated the "European Course" of the Italian Communist Party as endorsed by Moscow: strengthen the "democratic institutions" of the Common Market and solve the capitalist crisis through "peaceful coexistence" and the establishment of a "system of economic collaboration between East and West." During the same day, in Paris, the Communist-controlled CGT, the trade union federation, had entered into "meaningful discussions" with the Patronat, "around a program for the Improvement of Conditions in the Work Place." The Communist delegates to that conference stated publicly that the results were "very positive and meaningful."

This whole staged show of good will toward Willy Brandt was very carefully planned. For one thing, the choice of Bologna for the public affirmation of the Communists' "European Course" was not accidental. Bologna, the capital of the Emilia-Romagna region has been ruled in recent years by a Communist local administration on the basis of the most advanced capitalist programmatic conceptions — community control, co-determination and even Zero Growth — the operating philosophy of the Common Market's Commission since 1971. The message wasn't lost in Bonn. By all accounts, Brezhnev's visit and its aftermath were a resounding success.

The success was so resounding indeed that Kurt Bachmann, chief of the West German Communist Party, declared in a public meeting on May 26: "I thank you for your support — but please support Federal Chancellor Brandt instead." (quoted in *Berliner Stimme*, May 26, 1973)

6. The Predicament of the USSR

The European Social Democracy, now governing almost every capitalist country in the continent, came to power at the aftermath of the 1968 worldwide mass strike wave, essentially by proposing a CIA blueprint for counterinsurgency as its program. Only one reason, essentially, explains the success of Social Democracy: it received abundant support from the Communist ranks, providing it with a left justification for the co-determination, local control ideology. This support was given with premeditation, calculation and a definite expectation of return: acceptance into the capitalist markets.

On this basis, the leaders of the Second International made their peace with the Brezhnev faction during their Summer of 1972 International Congress in Vienna, where they confirmed an earlier recommendation of their Amsterdam International Bureau that "Socialist parties can have contacts and relations with Communist parties if they so wished." There was no dissent, although a tendency (usually represented by Bruno Kreisky and Pietro Nenni — and indirectly echoed by the *New York Times*) continued to enjoy a cultivated notoriety as theoreticians of a certain banal "theory" of weakening the Soviet bureaucracy by playing the "moderate" elements against the "conservative," by accommodating to the "moderates" while intensifying the "ideological contest," etc.

What this faction (which the Kremlin anonymously labels "Right Wing Leaders") ignores is that not even the most "moderate," i.e., the most class-collaborationist elements of the Soviet leadership can possibly function without a strict "ideological" control over the larger layers of their population and the CP memberships abroad. Destroy the bureaucratic credibility of the rightwing in the Kremlin and you unleash an unpredictable flood of developments in the international

working class movement that will set every bragging Social Democrat in Europe running for dear life — a danger well appreciated by Willy Brandt.

Otherwise, despite appearances, the Brezhnev regime is the furthest thing from “neo-Stalinism” imaginable, that is, from the Stalinism or neo-Stalinism as a distinct phase of the Soviet administrative bureaucracy’s evolution.

In fact, what went down in history as “Stalinism” incorporates three successive stages of evolution of the bureaucracy. First, the Thermidor stage, mainly consisting of the political triumph over the Bolshevik Party, lasting up to 1929 and the Sixteenth Party Conference. Second, the stage of actual buildup and self-creation of a centralized and coherent nationwide administrative apparatus lasting up to about the 1939 Party Congress, and characterized by the merciless preponderance of the “centralizing” tendency of the bureaucracy over its centrifugal, pluralistic trends. This was the period of the Great Purges, the period of Stalinism par excellence where the bureaucracy, through Stalin, tempered itself into a social force competent to run Soviet society with a very considerable degree of success.

The seeds of the present Brezhnev tendency were planted in the third stage of the bureaucracy’s evolution, in the “coming of age,” so to speak which is marked by a considerable stabilization of the regime, as a result of which the regional and “special interest” pluralistic tendencies begin to assert themselves. The turning point was the 1952 Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU, the last of Stalin’s lifetime, during which the future events of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev transition were already discernible; the composition of the Nineteenth Congress Central Committee as well as the Praesidium reflected a remarkable increase of the influence of regional governmental officials representing various branches of industry, trade and parochial administration at the expense of central government and party officialdom (which was still to remain on top of things for a considerable time.)

During the current year, at the culminating point of the developments set off by Khrushchev’s sacking in 1964, the Soviet bureaucracy has entered the path of self-destruction as a **working class** bureaucracy. History, with its characteristic vengeance, has compelled the present inheritors of the Thermidor to conceive and speak of their own self-destruction in terms of the old “Socialism in one country” debate.

When, back in April 1972, Soviet Ambassador at the United Nation’s Evgenii Chossudovske announced on the behalf of the Politburo that “Socialism in one country is no longer a possibility,” he hardly suspected that he was also implying that the further existence of

the Soviet bureaucracy as it has been hitherto known is also no longer a possibility. The statement, itself a major departure from Soviet orthodoxy, was made in an article with a dramatic history all of its own.

Under the title “Genoa Revisited,” the article was printed in **Foreign Affairs**, the traditional bulletin of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, during the time that a powerful revolutionary offensive in South Vietnam had liberated the northern portion of the country and had dismantled about seventy-five percent of Saigon’s armed forces. Chossudovski’s article, framed in blunt and explicit language, promised Nixon virtual strangulation of the Vietnamese revolution. Within days of this reassurance, Nixon had decided to mine the Haiphong harbor and bomb the North back to the Stone Age. A little later he was received warmly in Moscow while the CPSU’s old time hard-liners were being purged.

Chossudovski, thoroughly a Brezhnev man, is typical of the breed of Soviet leaders who have discovered that their further survival, contingent on overcoming the grave bottlenecks of the Soviet economy, contingent on their ability to keep an ever more discontent population under control — depends now on a wide-ranging integration of the Soviet economy into the world market. Since Khrushchev’s removal, the country is pestered by an aggravating problem: increasing need for expansion of overall social productivity through massive introduction of advanced technologies — of a scale available only in the world market.

This in fact is the predicament of the underlying success of the Soviet economy. It is a success that has now reached its outer limits. It can no longer be sustained without major breakthroughs both in the organization and the technology of the economy. Take for example the notorious agricultural problem of the USSR. In recent years, the harvest failures have not been caused by bad weather, natural calamities, etc., but exclusively by the inability of the industrial sector to support agricultural operations. Up to sixty per cent of all available tractors of all types are in the repair barns at any given time as a result of general spare-parts shortage. Large portions of the harvest have been left to rot because the transportation system of the country — with few roads and abysmally low production of automobiles or rolling stock — could not bear the burden. Fertilizers and related support from the chemical industry has also been reported inadequate.

The industrial apparatus of the country, built at breathtaking tempo, has been so successful that it can no longer handle the new range of problems that success inevitably brings. These requirements create a much higher potential for division of labor — a division of labor that requires a supporting population much larger than the Soviet Union’s or indeed the Soviet bloc’s.

In a related way, if the Soviet economy fails to obtain the absolutely crucial new technologies that it needs and in the scale that it needs them, it will be faced, among other things, with the spectre of a sustained deterioration of its labor force. Since the early sixties, the country has been faced with serious labor shortages, as marginal agricultural populations and a large proportion of housewives had already been absorbed into the labor force. Without massive imported technologies, the diversion of crucial portions of the labor force to new advanced fields of the economy becomes practically impossible.

In this sense, Chossudovski and his chiefs in Staraya Ploshchad are correct: "Socialism" in one country is no longer a possibility. A semi-primitive country has been brought into the twentieth century as a result of a socialist revolution. But that's as far as a semi-primitive country goes. From a certain point onward, it has to join the world or perish. This point was not reached just now with the crumbling of the Ninth Five Year Plan. It had been reached much earlier but it had not found its mature political expressions until after 1964.

It is of course well-known that Khrushchev was ousted for his "harebrained scheming," in the contemptuous characterization of the peasant leader by the sophisticated technocrats and administrators. The fact however remains that, as it will be recalled, Khrushchev was removed when he was pushing for a panicky abandonment of the process of decentralization of the economy that he had introduced. His various dabblings at "reorganization" had been creating havoc, as he was trying to respond to the perplexing requirements of vastly complicated planning with political techniques inherited from two decades ago.

Khrushchev was merely responding to the pressures for decentralization in the way any politician of the bureaucracy would respond — he was not part of that pressure. The leaders who later saw power slip into their fingers, those who were part of the pressure, had a more definite idea for a systematic transition toward a stable decentralized structure — they wanted to avoid bumps and "harebrained scheming."

Long before 1964 the leading managerial and administrative layers had been responding to the impasse of the economy. Growing numbers of technocratic cadre were maturing into the idea of collaboration with the international capitalists and of "economic reforms" and decentralization. The idea of central planning has for a long time been under relentless attack. As the Italian CP's daily *L'Unita* has proudly pointed out, they were engaged in "demystifying" the idea of central planning.

7. The Brezhnev Faction

It has been a continuously rising wave. Leonid Brezhnev and his coterie have been riding on its crest,

pulling it together, organizing it. Brezhnev's drive for power against his rivals in the "collective leadership" has been exclusively built on recruits and cultivations in this milieu. Young industrial managers, such as in the notorious case of Katushev from the Gorki *oblast*, were overnight hurled to stardom and Central Committee Secretaryship, hardly ever bothering to evolve through regular promotion schedules. While the Brezhnev machine was being built in these years (or while Brezhnev was being built by the machine) the power fiefdoms of his rivals were crumbling. First came the eclipse of Kosygin who narrowly escaped expulsion in January 1970.

Subsequently, Nikolai Podgorny's power base in the Ukraine was dismantled piece by piece until, in a final blow, Shelest, his close longtime collaborator was expelled from the Politburo. Then, the third major rival, chief "ideologist" Suslov saw his supports disappear in a series of sackings in the various cultural and propaganda agencies. These three now remain in the Politburo as mute decorative figureheads, a symbolic gesture to the past — and a prudent political precaution as the restless population is scrutinizing every ripple at the top. The last gesture of mercy that these ex-leaders received was at the 24th Party Congress when Kosygin was allowed to read the economic report authored by the Brezhnev group — and this because Kosygin opposed it.

Of the present sixteen members of the Politburo that emerged in April of this year, ten are straight "Brezhnev" men. Men like Kulakov, Kunayev, Mazurov and Poyanski rose to preeminence at the top of the rightwing technocratic wave. Some of them got there through the concerted efforts of the maturing machine, others through chance and individual excellence. But in the end, their fate is controlled by the rising wave.

Not even Yuri Andropov, the KGB chief in the Politburo, is excluded from the rule. Naive opinion would have it that his presence on the Politburo means renewed preponderance of the Secret Service in the affairs of the Republic. The opposite in fact is the truth. Andropov, the liberal technocrat whom Khrushchev once sent to "break" the Stalinist hards in Eastern Europe, after the 20th Congress, owes his rise to and is controlled by the technocratic-managerial faction. Even as he was earmarked for position in the Politburo, Brezhnev appointed an obscure upstart as the KGB's second-in-command. The rivalry between the two men enables the Brezhnev machine to keep the Secret Service at arm's length.

But the really significant feature of the new setup in the leading bodies is not this and similar pieces of Byzantine politics. Nor is this the way in which the various branches, sections and parochial interests of the bureaucracy achieve a workable harmony. An en-

tirely new principle underlies the relations among fragments: **pluralism!** It may not have been made glaringly obvious yet, but the old centralism, the old predominance of "party" men over "government" men is now a thing of the past. Brezhnev may dabble for a while in certain sorts of "personality cult" clowning, but the principle of centralism no longer dominates relations inside the bureaucracy. Having been replaced by pluralistic "checks-and-balances" of sorts, "centralism," i.e., the arbitrariness of authority is reserved for the population at large. This "centralism," which has nothing to do with centralism but which is the bureaucrat's euphemism for coercion, no longer operates inside the administration.

The Brezhnev faction retains its hegemony over all other political factions of the bureaucracy because it represents an inexorable tendency, a program for the crisis, while its opponents have no program and no clear, conscious orientation toward the problems of the growing crisis. At each decisive moment — best exemplified by last winter's regional breakup of the country's economic administration — the centrifugal forces grow. Simultaneously, the overtures to the West, in the light of plans involving tens of billions of dollars, grow in weight. With over 75 percent of the USSR's present

foreign exchange earnings going for the payment of interest and debt service, one can imagine the powerful effect of the upcoming multi-billion dollar deals that are the core of Brezhnev's program.

Given the international situation, and the deliberate assistance that the Brezhnev faction is offering to the emerging fascist threat, his is the first serious and imminent threat of capitalist restoration that the Soviet bureaucracy has produced. His opponent factions in the bureaucracy could gain control only in conditions where domestic developments would threaten the existence of the bureaucracy as a whole. At any rate, widespread working class discontent would not favor the present ruling group — and it would strengthen the hand of the (presently chaotic) opposition.

Given the general options that the bureaucracy has, a future massive working class upsurge would not produce strong or stable governments. The result will be increasing political instability. Depending on one's success in solidifying the revolutionary process in the West, the moment will strike again for the rebirth of revolutionary Marxism on Soviet soil, and Brezhnev's restorationist clique will have been an ugly episode. Otherwise....

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The Socialist Reconstruction of Europe

by John Lawrence

I. The Collapse of Europe

Europe is dying. In the heartland of Europe, in East and West Germany, Austria and Luxemburg, more people are dying than are being born. Zero Growth has arrived. In 1972, for the first time in the capitalist era, for the first time in nearly two hundred years, the population of Central Europe has begun to decline. And the rot is spreading outwards. Since the post-war "miracle" sputtered to an end in 1963, birthrates in every West European country have declined by from 20 to 40%. If current rates of decline in birthrates and fertility rates continue, and there is every reason to believe that they will accelerate as the Depression deepens, within five years the population decline will have spread to Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Switzerland. The population of all of Northern and Central Europe, of the most industrialized region of Europe — a population of more than 200 million — will have begun to die off, as that of Central Europe is already doing. And by that time, the population of the United States will be declining as well. (See Graph I)


Not even during the last Depression, and only for brief periods and in more limited regions during the Nazi conquests, has capitalism so starkly demonstrated its inability to maintain the mere existence of human life. (See Table 1 and Graph II) To find a crisis of human existence of comparable severity, of actual declines in population over wide areas of Europe, one must go back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Then, decayed feudalism was strangling the productive forces; famine and pestilence was decimating the population,

and the only way out lay in the extension of the unfinished bourgeois revolution already begun in England to the whole of Europe, as occurred during the period 1789-1848. Today, capitalism is in its turn choking off the productive forces it produced, threatening again to cast Europe into the depopulation and desolation of the fall of Rome. And today the only way out lies in the extension of the unfinished socialist revolution to the entire world.

In absolute terms, of course, today's standard of living is higher than that of the grim days of the 1930's and 40's. There are no starving children visible in the streets of Bonn or London. Yet relative to the needs of a labor force which could be productive at anywhere near present levels of technology, the accelerating collapse of production has created an even wider gap between those needs and what exists. The population is dying off because capitalists cannot afford to feed, clothe and house it such that it could be productive. The "prosperous" inhabitants of Europe cannot afford to have children.

European nutrition is deteriorating. Per capita supplies of meat have been declining steadily for more than three years; in England, this decline amounts to more than 20% since 1966.(1) Even before this decline, Europeans received inadequate supplies of vital animal proteins. French workers received only four-fifths (83%) of the per capita meat supplies of US workers, German workers only two-thirds (71%), English workers two-thirds (71%), and Italian workers less than

(1) **FAO Agriculture Yearbook**. Note on sources generally: Agricultural data are all from this source unless otherwise noted. Education statistics are from the **UNESCO Statistical Yearbook**. Trade statistics are from the **UN World Trade Annual**. Labor and employment statistics are from the **ILO Yearbook**, except statistics on skill levels and wage levels, which are from **EEC Social Statistics**. All other data, unless noted, are from the **UN Statistical Yearbook** and its monthly supplement, and from the **UN Demographic Yearbook**.



GRAPH I. Rates of natural increase of population (birth rate minus death rate) for Northern and Central European countries and the US.

one-half (43%).(2)

The same collapse is visible in housing. Over the past decade, housing construction stagnated in France, and declined by 20% to 25% in Germany, Italy and England. The result: stagnation or actual decline in the total amount of housing available, new families being forced into ever more crowded and ever more ancient dwellings. The average English worker has about nine-tenths the floor space of an American, the average French or German only about two-thirds, the average Italian only one-half. Two-thirds of the housing of France and Germany, and three-quarters of the hous-

ing of England and Italy is more than 20 years old. One-third of British housing is more than fifty years old, and one-third of French housing is more than 100 years old.(3)

The quality of housing is no better than its quantity. While in the US, only 12% of all housing units have no bath, and only 10% no toilet, in the UK, the percentages are 21% and 7%; in Germany, 36% and 17%; in France 51% and 44%. In Italy, 71% of all housing units have no bath, 38% no interior running water at all, and 29% have neither interior nor exterior plumbing. The implications of these conditions for the health of

(2) US per capita consumption is 310 gram/day. East European countries are even worse off than the Western ones: Polish meat consumption is 44% that of the US, East German 55%. Other measures of quality of nutrition, such as meat and fish consumption or total animal protein consumption change the European-US comparisons by very little, for both Eastern and Western Europe. Comparing animal protein consumption (including milk and cheese), for example, would raise the figures given by only about 5% in each case.

(3) French and British **Handbooks of Statistics**.


Europeans is evident.(4)

Behind the decline in the production of the means of existence lies a rot in the productive apparatus of Europe generally. Steel production has stagnated, declining slowly since 1969. The coal mines of Europe stand idle. Among the major producers of West Europe, coal production has dropped in the last decade by 50% in Belgium, 44% in France, 30% in Germany, 40% in the UK and 40% in West Europe as a whole. Opposite the idle plants and mines stand the ever growing millions of unemployed.

These declines in standards of living and production are not merely a phenomenon of the past decade. That period is both prelude to the much more catastrophic collapse of the immediate period ahead, and the most recent stage in the process of capitalist depletion of Europe which extends back over the past 60 years.

The period of the Depression and more acutely that of World War II brought sharp declines in consumption and accompanying collapse in reproduction, especially among the urban working class. Net reproductive rates were forced far below 1.0 in all European countries.(5) (See Graph III) This, however, was merely the prelude to the depletion suffered in the late forties and early

GRAPH II. Rates of natural increase of population in the advanced capitalist sector, 1790-1973. Solid line, US alone; dashed line, Northern and Central Europe (UK, Germany, France, Low Countries, Scandinavia); dotted line, combined population of US and Northern and Central Europe.



(4) Eastern Europe is even worse off. Housing density (persons per room) in East Germany is about the same as in Italy, in Poland nearly 50% higher. Seventy-eight percent of all East German housing, and 86% of all Polish housing, has no bath; 67% and 73% respectively, has no toilet.

(5) Net reproduction rate (NRR) is number of female children each woman can be expected to have if age-specific birth and death rates remain the same. The condition for long-term stability of the population is that the NRR be 1.0, as against the net population growth rate, which is the "instantaneous" growth rate. Population may still rise with a NRR less than 1, if the existing population is sufficiently young.

Table 1. Natural rates of population increase (births minus deaths) for selected West European countries and selected years (percent per annum).

	1930-34	1935-39	1940-44	Current
Austria	0.16	0.08	0.47	-0.01
Germany*	0.53	0.75	0.52	-0.05
France	0.13	-0.06	-0.15	0.63
Italy	1.26	0.93	0.63	0.67
Britain	0.37	0.33	0.27	0.36
Total of 4 major nations	0.56	0.52	0.34	0.34

* Current Germany figure is for East and West Germany combined.

fifties, especially after the collapse of the pop front governments of the immediate post-war period. The "post-war economic miracle" ushered in by the "democratic triumph of the victorious resistance" was, in fact, a period of ferocious looting of the European population.

As N. Syvriotis points out, US imperialism selected Europe for the role of supplier of capital goods to the Third World, which in turn was to supply raw materials, textiles, etc., to the US mainly.(See "The Self-Cannibalization of Capital in Europe," by N. Syvriotis in *The Campaigner*, Vol. 5, No. 3.) The cycle involved export of US machine tools and general industrial machinery to Europe, where they were used to produce much larger quantities of cheap capital goods for the Third World. For example, in 1963, net exports of machine tools from the US to Germany amounted to 3500 tons, and net exports of textile machinery from Germany to India was 3900 tons, as compared with only 2000 tons from the US. Net exports of burlap from India to the US were 186 million, or about 40% of total US consumption.

While the US provided the fixed capital needed to expand European, and especially German industry, it supplied nothing for the expansion of labor power, for the maintenance of the population. Fertility remained extremely depressed during the mid-fifties, averaging about 1.0 NRR in the urban areas, as against nearly 1.75 in the US at the same time. (See Graph IV) Qualitatively, the situation was even grimmer. Education was starved, the net output being barely enough to replace attrition of skilled labor. During the fifties, while median US educational levels rose from 9¼ years to 10½, UK levels remained at about 9½, Italian levels stagnated at an abysmal three years, and the French educational level actually regressed from slightly above to slightly below five years.

Nowhere is the process of depletion, of primitive accumulation, more evident than in that "workers paradise," Social Democratic Sweden. Forty years of Social Democratic rule have rewarded today's Swedish workers and peasants with a diet slightly **inferior** (in **absolute** terms!) to that enjoyed by their parents and grandparents in the Depression thirties. Relative to other countries, the drop in nutrition is much greater. Meat consumption has dropped from 76% of contemporary US standards in 1934-38 to 46% in 1970, from the level of France and Germany to that of Italy and Poland. Over-all animal protein consumption (boosted by traditionally high Swedish consumption of milk and cheeses) has gone from above depression US standards to three-quarters of present US consumption.(6)

New labor to man the capital-goods-producing industries came, at first, from absorbing the existing unemployed skilled labor. In the late fifties more than a million unemployed workers were absorbed in Germany, more than a million and a half in Italy. This was, however, insufficient, and by the late fifties, first Germany, then Italy and France began to suffer from an exhaustion of skilled labor reserves. The capitalists then turned to the unskilled agricultural population, absorbing them as migrants to Northern Italy and **Gastarbeiter** in Germany and France. These workers compensated for their low productivity on the capitalists' books by the even lower wages paid them. In the first half of the sixties, two million Italian agricultural workers and peasants were forced off the farms and into the factories; in France, it was more than a million. Meanwhile, between 1951 and 1971, land under cultivation declined by 1.4 million hectares in Italy.

This process of depletion had a catastrophic effect on industrial skill levels. In Italy, while 44% of middle-aged workers are skilled, only about 32% of those between 21 and 30, who entered industry in the sixties, are skilled. At the same time the decimation of the agricultural population eliminated it as a reserve for the reproduction of future workers. The convergence of British and French reproductive rates in the fifties is due to the depletion, both numerically and in terms of living standards, of the higher-fertility French peasantry. The more rapid consumption of human beings in urban industries is most dramatically illustrated in the case of Greece, where the shift of population to the cities between 1950 and 1965 is accompanied by a 15% increase in death rates among the older age groups.

Despite efforts of the capitalists to compensate for the shortage of skilled labor, by about 1963 this shortage, mediated through the mass struggles of the workers, forced significant concessions and increases in the standard of living. (The very small age groups, born in the forties and fifties, which were then entering the

work force aggravated the tight labor market.) The result was a rapid, if limited increase in housing and food production and an accompanying brief increase in fertility. Housing construction in the four major West European states increased from 1.2 million units in 1955 to 2.0 in 1964. Per capita meat supplies increased over the same period by about 35%. During the sixties, major educational reforms, aimed at somewhat overcoming the tightness of skilled labor were instituted. Between 1961 and 1968, the percentage of German students still in school after 11 years rose from 14% to 70%; in Italy, from 16% to 30%; and in the UK from 37% to 67%.

At the same time, the temporary increase in the cost of labor eliminated the profitability of further investment in European industry, and thus destroyed the basis for the post-war "boom." From 1964 on, no significant increases in industrial employment occurred. New investment and accompanying employment were shuttled into waste production, bureaucracy and, in the UK (to a lesser extent in France) armaments. Commercial employment increased by more than half a million in Germany and by a million and a half in France. Unemployment, of course, also increased, especially near the end of the most recent period.

In Great Britain, this increase in idleness meant merely an intensification of the unemployment and decay experienced since World War II. Because of the relatively higher cost of labor in Britain, and, more importantly, because of the need to preserve the British credit structure at artificially inflated prices, no large-scale industrial expansion occurred in Britain during the fifties and sixties. Manufacturing employment, which had declined by more than a third of a million between 1957 and 1963, declined in the ensuing decade by a further 1.6 million.

Under these conditions of declining industrial base, the accumulation against Europe was stepped up in intensity. On the one hand, accumulation against constant capital was begun, with the balance of exports swinging towards the US rather than Europe. Instead of merely supplying the needs of the Third World, Europe was now forced as well to supply part of the needs of the US, at the expense of replacement needs in Europe. Net exports of machine tools from the US to Europe shifted from 19,000 tons in 1963 to 21,000 tons in 1969. The "export boom," so hailed by bourgeois and so-called socialist economists meant the sacking of European industry.

The depletion of the work force was also stepped up, driving the cost of labor abruptly downwards. During the recession of the mid-sixties, the productivity of Italian and German labor increased by more than 40%

(6) Meat consumption rose slightly in Sweden between 1934-38 and 1970, by about 7%. However, milk consumption declined by 13%, leading to a reduction in over-all animal protein consumption (as well as a reduction in caloric value). The 1970 figures reflect the shortlived rise in living standards at the end of the sixties. Diet during most of the post-war era was even worse.

to 50%, more than half of that in pure speedup. At the same time, available skilled labor was shifted increasingly from Department II to Department I, from consumer to producer goods. In this period, employment in the capital goods sectors increased by nearly 20%, while consumer goods employment declined.

The Results. As a result of this process of accumulation, Europe is at present faced on the one hand with enormous and growing idleness of capital and labor, and on the other with enormous and growing shortages of skilled labor, and to a lesser extent, depletion of capital. These shortages exist to such an extent that in at least two national subsectors, Italy and Germany, the skilled labor does not exist to run even existing plant at full capacity, without resorting to speedup.

Specifically, there are in Italy about 1.1 million individuals who are either skilled or who have sufficient education to be rapidly trained to current skill levels, and who are not at present employed in manufacturing industry. Of these, about 200,000 are in socially unnecessary occupations, and 900,000 are unemployed. Considering that 3.3 million skilled workers are currently needed to run Italian industry at 75% of capacity, and at an intensification of labor of at least 30% to 35%, a deficit of 1.3 to 1.5 million skilled workers exists to just reach full capacity.(7)(See Appendix)

In Germany, the net total skilled work force outside of manufacturing is between 2.5 and 3.0 million, of which perhaps 1 million, mostly women, are unemployed, and about 2 million are working in socially unnecessary jobs. By comparison, nearly 3.5 million workers would be needed to utilize existing plant at full capacity.

In France, the situation is somewhat better. Owing to a generally less intensive exploitation, the potential for

expanded employment of existing labor power remains. Here we have a skilled "surplus" of about 2 to 2.5 million, of which only about 1.5 million would be needed to achieve full capacity levels.

The situation in the UK is the opposite of that for Germany, for here a large and highly skilled and educated work force languishes next to a decrepit productive plant. Here skilled unemployment or misemployment is about 6 to 7 million, of which about 3 million would be needed for full capacity of existing plants. A very sizable net surplus of three to four million skilled workers, or potentially skilled, educated individuals exists here.

Thus, at one pole, represented by Britain, skilled workers without the tools to produce; at the other, Italy and Germany, workers without the skills or standard of living essential for them to become productive.

II. The Reconstruction of Europe

These conditions are not inevitable or unchangeable. It is only the need to maintain the value of capitalist property titles that precludes any possible reversal in the decay of Europe. Once a socialist revolution has swept away these paper titles, reconstruction can begin. On what basis will the working class organize the economy to achieve that reconstruction?

The first task to be faced by socialist reconstruction must be the overcoming of the tremendous shortage of skilled labor, the first prerequisite to further development. This means, of course, mobilizing the presently idle resources — both idle plant and the millions of unemployed, to produce the products needed by a skilled, productive labor force. But as soon as we consider this task, it is clear that any such reconstruction would

(7) The method used for calculating these skilled-labor reserves was greatly complicated by the lack of accurate and recent statistics for educational attainments of Europeans.

To start with, I took 11 years schooling to be the minimum necessary to acquire or be capable of rapidly acquiring a skill. This conservative estimate was based on the following grounds: (i) US skilled workers need from 12 to 13 years education at present technical levels, but European industry is at a somewhat lower technological level. (ii) Apprentices need 8—9 years when apprenticed, and must acquire considerably more training to become skilled (which most never do). (iii) The educational reforms of the sixties were generally aimed at increasing the number of workers with 10—11 years education.

The number of skilled workers in manufacturing was obtained from EEC statistics, which give 1966 figures for Italy, France, and Germany. Using UN statistics, these were corrected for under-reporting on the EEC samples. This gives total skilled employment, and the attrition (from the age structure) contribution for apprentice programs. In the case of the UK, the ratio of skilled workers was estimated to be 60%; an error here will not be significant.

Nearly all available trained labor was absorbed into manufacturing and other productive work in France, Germany, and Italy, up until about 1963. Taking the total school leavers (1963-73), subtracting college educated (they become professionals, and are tiny in number anyway), and then comparing this with net absorption of skilled labor into production, yields a gross surplus. Some of this labor surplus, however, was absorbed into socially necessary work.

For a crude estimate of socially necessary employment, I compared employment ratios in services and commerce for these Western industrial nations with those for Czechoslovakia, a highly industrialized state, which presumably, has relatively little gross wastage of labor.

This method yields total available educated labor not currently employed in production, construction, etc. To obtain the number needed for full capacity, we simply divide existing skilled labor in industry by capacity utilization and multiply by the estimated speedup.

For the case of the UK, the same method is applied starting with 1953, since there has been no net absorption of labor into industry since that date.


Admittedly, this method is extremely crude — under socialism we will just take a census (the US regime publishes just such statistics). But given the manner in which these estimates were derived, the conclusion that in Britain alone do substantial reserves of skilled labor exist, and that these reserves must number at least three or four million, is quite defensible.

Details of the calculation are summarized in the Appendix.

be impossible except from the standpoint of the worldwide coordinated development of the productive resources of the entire planet. No single country or region, not even Europe as a whole has the capacity to overcome the devastation of capitalist decay and to begin again the development of the productive forces. The essence of program is simply those policies needed to utilize the worldwide division of labor and resources to renew the process of expanded reproduction of the world economy as a whole. Every decision the workers

provide a wholly inadequate base for achieving sufficient agricultural production. The program, for example, of the Italian Communist Party for a single-country solution to the crisis of the Italian peasantry is seen in this light to be wholly false and fantastic.

Northern Europe, where agricultural technology is the highest, would be unable to achieve self-sufficiency owing to a shortage of available land. To produce the



GRAPH III. Net Reproductive rates (NRR) of major West European countries, 1939-1973.

make, down to the last detail in the individual plant must be taken from that worldwide standpoint.

A. Agriculture

The need for economic planning on at least a Europe-wide scale to begin to overcome the shortage of labor power is most clear in the realm of food production. The conceptual powers needed for skilled workers implies a sufficient supply of animal protein, mainly obtained through meat. To obtain the approximately adequate consumption levels of US workers, meat consumption must be increased by 20% in France, 40% in Germany, 50% in England, and 130% in Italy — about 65% for the whole of Europe. This in turn implies a massive increase in the amount of feed raised. The only way this can be actually accomplished is through an integrated European plan for the mechanization and collectivization of agriculture. Any sub-region of Europe, let alone any single nation would

necessary one ton per year per capita of feed and other grains needed, Northern Europe would have to increase grain production by 50%.(8) since per hectare yields cannot be rapidly increased by anywhere near this amount (they are already the highest in the world, and farming is carried out on an extremely intensive basis); the amount of land under grains would also have to be increased by about 50%. Since 30.5 million hectares are under grains at present, this means a total necessary area of 46 million hectares, which is equal to the entire arable land available, leaving no room for other crops, cattle raising, etc.

On its own, Southern Europe would be even worse off. A 100% increase in grain production is needed here. If southern agriculture is left at its present abysmal technical level, this would mean an increase of 100% in land under cultivation and a 100% increase in agricultural labor. In other words an increase in agrarian population of 38 million, at the expense of the cities,

(8) Based on US consumption levels.

and an increase in land cultivated to 44 million hectares, as compared with a total arable area of 42 million hectares.

But to raise the technical level of agriculture is just as hopeless if we take Southern Europe by itself. If land and labor resources are not to be exhausted, yields must be raised by the 70% needed to achieve the highest technical levels available at present only in the UK. But to achieve such levels would require an increase of 200% in fertilizer production and a doubling of the number of tractors.(9) If this is to be accomplished in five years, a 400% increase in tractor production is required. Yet, considering the immense shortage of skilled labor in the South, where would the 150,000 new skilled workers to produce the tractors, and the more hundreds of thousands to produce the new tractor factories come from, when insufficient skilled labor supplies exist to even cover present capacity?

The situation is much the same in Eastern Europe. To increase meat production by the necessary 40%, East European peasants would have to convert large areas presently devoted to potatoes to corn and soybean production. The problem here is again labor. Potato raising takes far less labor than raising feed and animals, yet already one-third of Eastern European labor is devoted to agriculture. Again, the only way out lies in increasing the productivity of agricultural labor through mechanization. And here again, hundreds of thousands of new skilled workers, at present unavailable, will be needed to increase tractor production by a factor of 5, increase machine tool production for the tractor factories, and so on.

While utopian on the level of countries or regions, the revolutionizing of European agriculture is wholly possible on a continental scale — in fact it will serve as the objective basis for the alliance of the workers and peasants. Only by using the advanced industrial base of Northern Europe to mechanize and collectivize Southern and Eastern European agriculture can adequate nutrition be obtained for all Europeans. Through mechanization, the productivity of both the land and of agricultural labor must be radically increased and some of the land now fallow must be returned to production.

Compared with that of the UK, Southern and Eastern agriculture is woefully inefficient. Productivity of agricultural labor in the UK is 40% greater than that of

Germany, twice that of France or Poland, seven times that of Italy and 14 times that of Greece.(10) Similarly, per hectare yield in the UK is about twice that of Spain or Greece and about 50% higher than that of Italy or Yugoslavia.

The cause of this unproductivity lies in the parcelization of the land and the lack of mechanization and modern farming techniques. Continental European farms, especially those in Eastern and Southern Europe, are pitifully small, wastefully using the meager resources available. The average farm size in the UK is 45 hectares, in France 19, Germany 12, Spain 15, Italy 7, Yugoslavia 4, and Greece 3. Even more crucial is the dearth of tractors and fertilizer. In England, there are 9 tractors for every 10 farms, 8 for 10 in Germany, 6 for 10 in France, while in Italy there is only 1 tractor for every 7 farms, in Poland 1 for 16, in Greece 1 for 20, in Yugoslavia 1 for 40. English farmers use twice the fertilizer per hectare as do Polish or Italian peasants, four times that of Yugoslavs.

The entire European agricultural base must be raised to the level of present British agriculture. The tiny plots must be collectivized, offering to peasants the incentive of one tractor for every collective and adequate supplies of fertilizer purchased on easy terms. Our minimum goal will be a farm size of 50 hectares within ten years. Based on British per-hectare levels of fertilizer and tractor use, fertilizer production must be increased by 60%, the number of tractors from 5.5 million to 8 million, tractor production doubles to 1.25 million per year. Once these requirements are met, the necessary feed production to increase meat production by 65% will be achieved by switching wheat and potato production in Southern and Eastern Europe to soybeans and corn, and by increasing land under cultivation by about 10%, or 8 million hectares, most of this new land coming from Italy and Spain. These feed supplies will be delivered to meat-producing centers in Northern Europe, to supply meat to the entire continent.(11)

Nearly all of the needed expanded tractor and fertilizer production would come from the UK, where the relative surpluses of skilled labor exist. The increase of some 600,000 tractors a year would mean the absorption of about 100,000 British workers into industry while the approximately \$500 million (1963) in plant and equipment needed for this expanded production will be obtained from existing German industrial machinery and machine tool factories.(12)

(9) Based on UK levels of 1 tractor per 50 hectares and 0.47 tons of fertilizer per hectare. Tractor production is based on the need to replace tractors every ten years, as well as expansion of tractor supply. Skilled labor needs based on present Italian productivity of 2 tractors per skilled man year, 170,000 workers for 350,000 tractors per year.

(10) Productivity is estimated by dividing total staple production by agrarian population.

(11) Total land area required is calculated by dividing total necessary grain production by British yields; fertilizer and tractor needs are then found by multiplying this by British per hectare figures of tractor use and fertilizer consumption.

(12) Number of workers is based on current British tractor production and employment. Capital estimates here and elsewhere based on total present British capital of \$50 billion at 1963 replacement costs which employs a British work force of about 10 million.

As a result of the revolutionizing of European agriculture, within seven to ten years the agricultural population will be reduced from 88 million to 33 million. In Italy alone, more than 3 million working age individuals will be freed for work in industry and construction.

B. Education

While increased meat production will begin to provide Europeans with the standard of living needed to achieve modern skills, this potential will not be realized without a mammoth expansion of education, emphatically including adult education. Even to achieve increased food production, European peasants must be trained in the techniques needed to run a scientific, efficient farm. Without this education, no amount of tractors and fertilizer will have any effect.

In general, the supply of individuals with an absolute minimum of eleven years of education will be the determinate of the over-all supply of skilled labor to industry. In France, Germany, Italy and the Continent generally, this policy immediately means the abolition of the apprenticeship racket and substitution of adult workers at full pay, while the youth return to school with all necessary financial backing until they have completed at least 11 years. Similarly, to deal with crucial immediate labor shortages, the adults who have nine and ten years of school and can more or less rapidly be trained to the required levels must also return to school. This pool numbers about three and a half million in France, and two and a half million in Germany and Italy.

At the same time these minimum provisions are being taken, steps must be rapidly carried out to extend the minimum required education upwards to the 14 years that will be required as European industry adapts to the more advanced technical level represented by the US aerospace industry. This process will most immediately get under way in the UK, where higher educational levels already exist.

This expansion of education obviously implies an expansion of present overcrowded school facilities. School population will almost immediately increase by 3 or 4 million in each of the four major West European countries, and about proportionately in the rest of Europe. The task of educating nearly the entire adult population of Europe over a period of 10 to 12 years will mean as many as 80 million additional students in Europe at the

peak of this process. Assuming 20 students per class, nearly one and a half million new schoolrooms will be needed almost immediately, and 4 million within a few years.

Many of these classrooms could come from converting parasitic office space. Perhaps as many as 300,000 could be converted in this manner in France, about 250,000 in Germany and about 100,000 in Italy. In addition, the labor and machinery now going into office building construction would provide in excess of 100,000 new rooms in France and Germany, and about 50,000 in Italy.⁽¹³⁾ Since each of these countries will require at least 400,000 new classrooms in a few years, much of the existing "slack" in construction capacity Europe-wide will be taken up in this task, at least at first.

While the construction demands of a school expansion program would stretch existing construction facilities, the teaching demands would also approach or exceed existing supplies of college educated individuals. To maintain a student-teacher ratio of no more than 1:10, more than half a million new teachers will be needed in each of the four major West European countries immediately, and another half a million in a few years. With only a million college graduates in Italy, and about a million and a half in the other three states, present widespread unemployment among this layer will instantly be converted into a shortage, and major expansion of college education will become an immediate priority.


C. Housing

While the productive demands created by the need to educate the European population can themselves be "filled locally," when we turn to the largest single task of reconstruction, that of creating decent housing, we see that even Europe as a whole is an inadequate base. Without decent housing, the education of a new layer of workers is impossible: Hans can't learn to read with his little sister sitting on top of his books. Within ten years of taking power, the working class must expand the housing supply to obtain at least present US density levels and to replace all housing built before 1960, which by then will be in excess of 25 years old. This means the production of 1.3 million units of housing a year in France, 1.6 million in Germany, 1.5 million in the UK and in Italy: about 12 to 14 million in Europe as a whole.⁽¹⁴⁾

(13) Estimated on the basis of converting 25% of total commercial floor space built after 1960 to schoolrooms, at 100 square meters per schoolroom. Much of the remaining floor space that is convertible will have to be used for temporary housing. Capacity is based on full conversion of all present commercial construction effort to school construction.

(14) Based on replacement of all pre-1960 housing with new, larger units, and allowing for 1.5% population rate of growth for 1978-88.

	Total housing units (millions)	Built pre-1960	Built post-1960
France	17	11	6
Germany	21	14	7
Italy	16	12	4
UK	17	12.5	4.5



GRAPH IV. Net Reproductive Rates (NRR) for the US and UK.

This task will demand huge amounts of labor: 1.6 million new jobs in Germany, of which 1.0 million will be skilled; 1.0 million in France, of which 0.6 million will be skilled; in Italy, 2.0 and 1.0 million respectively; and in the UK, 1.8 and 1.1 million. The priority assigned to this task will inevitably mean that some existing manufacturing capacity, the oldest, will inevitably stand idle for lack of labor during the first few years of socialism.(15)

An even graver shortage will be in construction equipment. Construction capacity will have to be increased by 60-70%. Throughout Europe, capital equipment for more than 10 million construction workers must be produced, even assuming full productive utilization of existing equipment. This is about 25 times total European production for one year. A work force of about 1.5 million, available in the UK, would be suf-

ficient to produce this vast quantity of equipment in about three years. But this work force itself would require about 8 billion dollars in machine tools and industrial machinery.

This task alone would quite overburden the entire European capital goods industry. Considering the need to rebuild and maintain the existing industrial equipment, plundered over the past decade, and that 30% of German industry and 50% of British industry is more than 10 years old, it is unlikely that the total existing surplus available for expansion of plant and equipment exceeds 1.5 billion dollars per year (1963 prices). To rely on this resource alone would make the task of reconstruction impossible. The only solution here lies in the absorption of enormous quantities of capital goods, especially machine tools and industrial machinery from a socialist United States.(13)

(15) Labor demands are based on current productivity in residential construction and respective ratios of skilled labor. In Italy, construction is presently carried out with lavish amounts of unskilled and highly unproductive labor, which will, however, be rapidly replaced by machines. Taking into account these additional labor demands, we have for net deficits of skilled labor: Germany, 1.6 million; Italy, 2.4 million; France, none; UK, net surplus 2-3.5 million.

(16) Estimate of size of work force for construction equipment manufacture is based on current British production. Estimate of European potential for capital goods production of this sort is based on total net exports of machine tools and other general industrial equipment, taking into account that about one-third of the necessary investment would be plant construction, two-thirds new equipment.

III. European Reconstruction From the Standpoint of the World Economy

The capital goods needs cited above are, of course, not the only ones required for the reconstruction outlined above. For example, the vast increase in construction and manufacture of construction equipment will produce large demands for new steel capacity. An increase of 8 million housing units a year will by itself necessitate a 30% increase in steel production, utilizing all existing capacity. The further demands of new construction machinery will mean a capacity expansion of a further 10%. (17) This requires additional capital goods, about 60% that required by the construction equipment industry.

Only the United States has the capacity to supply these capital goods needs. The US, thanks to a much higher standard of living, has immediately available nearly 40 million educated workers to be employed at skilled jobs in industry. At the same time, the US has, in the aerospace-defense sector, the potential for producing very rapidly the capital goods needed to utilize this labor power to produce more capital goods.

In terms of the prices we have been using (about 50% below US prices), current capacity for machine tool and other industrial equipment is only about \$10 billion a year, enough only for US replacement needs. However, capacity convertible from defense and aerospace is at least equal to this amount. (18) This will give us an immediate potential for the creation of at least one million new jobs a year in new capacity, excluding those which will result from bringing the machinery industries generally up to full capacity. The greatest portion of this new capacity will be in expansion of the machine tool and general industrial equipment industries themselves, leading to a more than 100% a year increase in these sectors for at least the first few years. At this rate, the capital goods needs of Europe could be filled easily in the US within a couple of years of the seizure of power in North America. (19)

But it is not only on US capital goods that Europe will be dependent. The reconstruction will also radically

increase the consumption of raw materials, both in the US and Europe, an increase that will necessitate an enormous expansion of skilled labor supplies in the Third World. Take copper, for example. The demand in the US and Europe will almost immediately increase world copper consumption by 50%. If this expanded production were to come from the developed sector alone (mainly the US), these copper reserves would be exhausted in four or five years. The development of copper mining in the Soviet Union and Poland would be an immediate necessity. But even with these reserves fully exploited, the continued necessary expansion of the world economy (to supply capital goods to Russia, for one thing) would exhaust even these expanded reserves in about eight years.

The only even temporary solution would be in the increase of production in Chile, Zambia and Zaire. This is not a matter of just shipping out mining equipment. In all these countries, the miners are the best educated and skilled layers of the working class: Production is limited by the shortage of skilled labor. To avoid copper shortages, this labor supply must be increased by 7-800,000 workers in a period of less than eight years. This in turn implies hundreds of thousands of new jobs in the advanced countries, especially in Europe, to produce the construction equipment, modular housing, agricultural equipment, etc., essential to the production of skilled labor in the Third World. When these demands are projected upwards from the 25-odd million population of the copper producing regions to the whole of the Third World, it becomes clear that full employment of the populations of the advanced countries will be essential. Europe must again become a supplier of capital goods to the Third World, but on the basis of the development of labor power, not on its depletion. (19)

Even with full utilization of existing resources, rich ore bodies will be rapidly exhausted, copper within 15 years at most. The development of fusion power methods of separating metals from ordinary rock must be achieved by that time on a scale suitable to supplying the needs of the entire economy. Nearly 60 times present world power output, the output of some 600 large scale fusion generators, will be needed. While the exact

(17) From US figures; one housing unit consumes about 8 tons of steel. According to *World Trade Annual*, which gives figures for construction equipment in dollars and tons, \$1500 worth of equipment consumes one ton of (mainly) steel. First demand is about 60 million tons, second about 12 million. Total European steel production is 200 million tons per year. Assuming about 40 million tons idle capacity, we need a 15% immediate increase in capacity, another \$5 billion in steel equipment, and some 2 million more workers.

(18) This includes only capacity in the machine-tool and general-industrial-machinery sectors, which are available for a variety of capital goods needs, excluding the rather smaller special-industrial-equipment industries, such as steel plant, textile equipment, etc.

(19) Each productive worker in these capital-goods industries can create the capital to employ 1.5-2 more workers in one year, assuming sufficient supplies of steel, construction labor, etc. After conversion of the aerospace-defense sector, we will have a gross potential from this expanded capital-goods sector of 2 million jobs per year, of which one million will actually be replacement. Nearly all of these jobs will be pumped back into the capital-goods sector, increasing employment there 1-2 million. The same thing will occur over the next two years, bringing employment in the machine-tool and general-industrial-machinery industries to about 10 million. By this point, other industrial capacity will have to be expanded, but the necessary basis for filling the machine tool, etc., needs for Europe, the US and the rest of the advanced sector will have been created.

(20) Reserve figures from *World Mineral Survey*. Copper consumption estimates are based on proportions of copper absorbed by construction and machinery manufacture, and are probably quite conservative.

requirements of such an endeavor cannot be estimated today, millions, and eventually tens of millions of workers will be needed for the construction and expansion of a fusion power system of primary processing, a task absolutely essential for continued supplies of raw materials. These demands on highly skilled and technical labor supplies will in turn necessitate the shift of machine tool and electronic manufacture from the US to Europe and Russia, and the shift of other machinery and consumer goods production to the Third World, again implying further upgrading of educational and other living standards in these regions.(21)

IV. The Process of Reconstruction as a Whole. Implied Policies. (Summary)

The actual process of socialist planning must proceed in the opposite direction from the pedagogical presentation above. That is, we must begin from the worldwide tasks, and proceed from them to the sector-by-sector immediate policies. From this standpoint we can see that not only is worldwide development a prerequisite to increasing European workers standard of living and productivity, but that these productive European workers are in turn essential to worldwide development.

Our goal is the freeing of mankind from labor, freeing human beings for creative, scientific endeavor, on the basis of the total automation of the economy. In order to lay the basis for creating such an economy, we must first create a productive world population. Within about 25 years, we must bring the entire world population to the education and other living standards of the most highly skilled present-day US workers. This can be achieved only on the basis of a fusion power economy and on the full productive employment of all available labor.

We must create, worldwide, more than one billion additional jobs in manufacturing and construction.(22) We must build more than 2 billion new units of housing. In order to bring adequate nutrition to the world's population, we must produce 50 million tractors, and increase, through fusion generators, electric output 1000-fold, to supply necessary irrigation from sea water.

These tasks imply others. First, the production of construction equipment; building up within 10-12 years a construction equipment industry employing more

than 20 million workers. Second, the creation of an entirely new industry of modular housing, an absolute necessity if wholly disproportionate amounts of labor are not to be absorbed into residential construction at current low productivity.(23) More than 50 million workers will eventually be absorbed in this industry, incorporating household appliances as well. Thirdly, within 12-15 years, sufficient fusion power generation capacity must be created to entirely replace current mining and primary processing industries. Finally, the machine tool and general industrial equipment industries must be expanded within 15 years by at least 50 million workers to supply the machinery needed by the expansion of industry generally.

We will match these tasks with existing and developing sources of skilled labor power. North America will provide the initial supplies of machine tools and industrial machinery, based on the absorption of 10 million workers into this industry in three years, a task made possible by the conversion of defense industries, and the absorption of skilled labor from a pool of 40 million unemployed and misemployed. This sector will also build up the necessary high technology fusion and materials processing equipment. Within 10-12 years, 60-70 million new workers will be productively employed, drawing in 35 million currently unemployed or women not in the work force, 20 million misemployed in the bureaucracy, and 15 million coming into the working age population, as well as absorbing more than 10 million into socially necessary occupations, especially teaching.

Construction equipment, agricultural equipment, and modular housing will have to be supplied at first by Europe, and somewhat later by Russia as well. Eighty million new jobs must be created in Europe, concentrated first in these priority areas, although not excluding other capital goods, such as transport equipment. Within about 12 years, these millions must be drawn out of agriculture (20 million), unemployment, and from newly matured workers. The largest single source will be the integration of 40 million women into the economy.

A skilled work force must be created in Europe. This means:

(a) A policy of universal education, aimed first of all at overcoming immediate, crushing labor shortages by

(21) Assuming 3000 joule/gram of rock ionized and the known concentration of copper in earth's crust, 6×10^{13} watts are required, compared with present production of 10^{12} watts.

(22) If per capita production is to be increased to at least four times present US levels, this means a 50-fold increase in world industrial production, at a minimum. If productivity is increased ten-fold, the present approximate gap between the petrochemical industry and industry generally, we would still need a five-fold increase in productive employment, or 750 million skilled workers. Considering at least 150 million for agriculture, 200 million in construction, and the reduction of the working day, it becomes evident that the entire world adult population must be capable of skilled employment in either productive or socially necessary work.

(23) At current US levels of construction productivity, 200 million housing units a year would involve 400 million workers, or about one-quarter of the entire productive work force worldwide.

educating some 10 million workers to at least an 11th grade level within two or three years. Secondly, a policy that will educate the entire population of Europe to a 14-year level within 12 years. Building 4-5 million new schoolrooms and training 10 million new teachers.

(b) Construction of 12 million new housing units per year.

(c) Mechanization and collectivization of European agriculture, raising the minimum farm size to 50 hectares and producing three million additional tractors. Increasing fertilizer production by 60%.

(d) Preventing future labor shortages by gearing all projections to population growth rates of 1.3-1.5% annually, or about double current fertility rates.(24)

Within Europe, sectoral division of labor resources dictates that, in the first years, the overwhelming bulk of capital development will be concentrated in the British subsector, whose own capital needs will be supplied mainly by the US, and secondarily out of existing capacity in Germany. At least two to three million British workers, above the some 6 million needed for existing capacity, will be absorbed in the capital goods industry in the first two years of reconstruction. Britain will in turn supply the initial construction and agricultural machinery needed by the rest of Europe. In these first years, available labor supplies on the Continent will be concentrated in construction, while Eastern and Southern agricultural areas will become suppliers of feed grains to Northern, and later Eastern European meat producing regions. As reconstruction proceeds, Europe as a whole will become suppliers of construction and agricultural equipment to the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. An expanding circle of skilled labor will spread outward from the US, to the UK, France, Germany and Italy, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and

so on.

Additional supplies of labor will be freed not only from agriculture, but from anachronistic and unproductive industries as well, such as the medieval Italian shoe industry.

The implied wages policy will be that, immediately, no wages will be paid below that of the most skilled workers during the period of the highest real wages in the sixties. Such a wage policy coheres with a policy of the distribution of labor diametrically opposed to existing capitalist recycling: less-skilled labor will be consistently replaced in manufacturing with more skilled, while the less trained workers will be trained either in full-time school or part-time while engaged in construction, agriculture or remaining necessarily less skilled occupations. Unskilled **gastarbeiter**, mainly working away from their families, will be able to return home, accompanied by the capital goods needed to rebuild their native regions and with the subsistence needed to become productive. They will be replaced by more skilled formerly unemployed Northern workers. Apprentices will also in general return to school, with all needed financial support while their jobs at much higher pay will be taken over by more productive adults.(25)

The general pace of the reconstruction outlined here is not arbitrary. A too slow pace would result in major constant capital shortages, especially in threatened exhaustion of mineral reserves. A too rapid pace would further exhaust rather than expand existing labor power. While the pace proposed here is based on considerations of pace of technical development, present capital and labor reserves, training times, and so on, actual rates and therefore exact allocations of labor, will be the subject of a policy process extending throughout the world working class.

(24) Based on growth rates during the late-nineteenth-century development of the European work force, and on short "boom" periods like the mid-fifties in the US.

(25) Even the replacement of unskilled youth with unskilled adults or unskilled Yugoslavs with unskilled Germans will add to social productivity.

Appendix: Calculation of skilled labor shortages and needs in Western Europe. For Germany, France and Italy figures are totals for 1963-73; for the UK, 1953-73, unless otherwise noted. (All figures in millions.)

	Germany	France	Italy	UK
Total school dropouts above 11 years schooling minus professionals	4.0	2.4	1.7	7.5
PLUS contribution to skilled labor supply of apprenticeship programs	1.0	1.0	0.3	1.5
GIVES total new skilled labor available	5.0	3.4	2.0	9.0
MINUS attrition of skilled workers in productive sector	1.3	1.1	0.3	2.0
MINUS net increase in skilled work force in productive sector	0	0.2	0.2	-2.0
MINUS attrition of skilled workers in non-productive sector	0.8	0.4	0.2	1.5
MINUS net increase of skilled workers in non-productive sector	1.8	0.7	0.4	1.8
PLUS estimated new socially unnecessary jobs created	1.8	1.1	0.2	1.8
Equals total gross skilled surplus in 1973	2.9	2.0	1.1	7.5
Total skilled employed in 1973	6.4	4.0	3.3	8.4
DIVIDED by capital utilization ratio	0.8	0.8	0.75	0.8
TIMES speedup	1.3	1.1	1.35	1.1
EQUALS total skilled employed at full capacity and no speedup	9.9	5.5	5.8	11.4
MINUS total present skilled employed EQUALS needed new skilled workers for full capacity	3.5	1.5	2.5	3.0
SUBTRACTED FROM gross surplus of skilled labor EQUALS net surplus of skilled labor	-0.6	0.5	-1.4	4.5

Fascism as the Destruction of Creativity

by Anna Kiehl

The hell of the bourgeois ego is that it cannot feel or experience the world and so it cannot feel a sense of self.

Beginning with the needs of the world-historical process, the individual, sensuously anesthetized in bourgeois society because himself only a fragment of a process, can recover the capacity to feel by becoming a determinate factor in creating new laws of the universe. In that process, the necessity of feeling the process of change as agony is made bearable only because there is a way out of that agony. To begin from the standpoint of program means that the individual can afford to feel the difficulty of moving toward the implementation of that program. The bourgeois self does not feel death. He merely decays.

New laws of the universe cannot be created outside the individual. In the process of determining social reproduction on a world scale, and in fighting for that right to do so, the individual is forced to fight with himself, i.e. his relations to others. That fight, sensuously celebrated, demands the concretization provided by art and love.

Today the necessity of making a revolution in the advanced sector within five years demands that two illusions of self be destroyed: that the individual feels his identity apart from humanity; that he can find himself by drowning himself in the masses. The

world-historical process must be made the conscious possession of every aspect of the individual's sensuous existence. Artistically this idea has already been planted by Beethoven. It is up to us to bring it to social fruition. In Beethoven the labor of an entire process is the consciously determining force behind any one moment, it is the relentless force which wrenches every turn in the music away from becoming an isolated sensual moment and tames it to fuel the act of universal labor. The most diverse states of mind are reconciled in Beethoven, the way socialism reconciles the most diverse parts of the working class. There is no human feeling, no matter how wild, how whimsical, how potentially heteronomic which is not transformed into a particular imbued with the self-conscious struggle of the process as a whole. Beethoven's music is the individual's struggle to overcome his separate existence through his sensuous identification with the universal labor process.

The hell of the bourgeois ego is that it cannot develop and so it is unsuited to identify itself as a determinant of a universal process of expanding labor. It is produced by a society which is dying and consequently the bourgeois ego itself is fascinated with death: either actively or passively; either as the self-destructive assertion of the atomized individual or as the selfless individual who merges into the backdrop of a dying capitalist world. In the first case the individual believes that he has "found himself" in a chaos and motion

which he deludes himself into thinking is real motion so that he can convince himself that he is not really dead, static and unfeeling. The case of the second individual is one in which he runs away from experiencing the possibility of his irreplaceable existence for mankind, his sensuous concreteness with all its weaknesses which must be turned into compassionate insights into the weaknesses of others. Historically, in the socialist movement, the first kind of individual has appeared as the ultra-left, the SWP which organized by widening the fissure already existing between the fragments of the working class and incited their autonomous motion. The faceless individual has had a place in the socialist movement, too. The Comintern bureaucrat who joylessly submerges himself in activity out of a sterile sense of duty to the masses whom he hates, who does not feel himself grow as a result of that activity. The spiritual emptiness of such politics has been dutifully recorded on innumerable canvasses of socialist realism.

In the fascist movement, the split in the bourgeois ego, always slumbering in periods of relative stability, has found itself in its most frenzied form. The case can be seen most clinically in the underlying dynamic of the organizing method of the Nazi party between the years 1926 and 1934, years of vacillation between anti-capitalist chaos and capitalist "law and order" within the party itself, a dynamic which could be used as an organizing tool because it followed the grain of bourgeois society's conception of its own activity: individual freedom vs. "law and order." The dynamic was one of vacillation between two ways of destroying species-existence, and Hitler exploited the craving in people for extinction by playing one faction off against the other.

1.

The two factions crystallized around Goebbels and Rosenberg. The former drew upon the illusion of freedom which people in bourgeois society have as directionless motion, autonomous self-assertion, and was consequently regarded as the "revolutionary" wing of the Nazi party. Rosenberg's faction, the "Volkish" wing, drew upon the deeply rooted craving for coherence amidst the chaos of the Weimar Republic — the drastic inflation and rising unemployment. Together they complemented each other the way two sides of a schizophrenic personality are held together by the inadequacy of both.

It had been Gregor Strasser's radicalism which attracted the young Goebbels in the 1920's. Both wanted to build the Nazi party on the spontaneous motion of the proletariat, as Goebbels' diary of this period indicates. "In the final analysis," he wrote in 1925, "it would be better for us to end our existence under Bolshevism than to endure slavery under capitalism." In 1926 he told himself in his diary, "I think it is terrible that we [the Nazis] and the Communists are bashing in each others' heads...Where

can we get together sometime with the leading Communists?" At this time he published an open letter to a Communist leader assuring him that Nazism and Communism were really the same thing. "You and I," it stated, "are fighting one another, but we are not really enemies."

With increasing uneasiness Hitler watched the Strasser brothers and Goebbels building up the anti-capitalist wing of the party in the north. The showdown came at the end of 1925 and the beginning of 1926. It was forced by Gregor Strasser and Goebbels over the issue of the expropriation of the extensive estates and fortunes of the deposed royalty by the Republic. This proposal had been made initially by the Social Democrats and the Communists, and Strasser and Goebbels proposed that the Nazi party support them. Hitler was alarmed. Not only had some of these former rulers made financial contributions to the Nazi party, but several large industrialists had shown interest in financially backing the Nazis precisely because they promised to be effective in destroying the Communists, Socialists and trade unions. If Strasser and Goebbels were not stopped immediately the sources of income of the party would dry up.

Before Hitler had time to act, however, Strasser called a meeting of the northern district party leaders in Hannover whose purpose was not merely to put the northern branch behind the expropriation drive, but more grandiosely to launch a new economic program which would do away with the twenty-five point program which had been established in 1920 and was now regarded by these leaders as insufficiently anti-capitalist. Instead the Strassers and Goebbels proposed the nationalization of big industries and estates and substituted a chamber of corporations modeled on Italian fascist lines for the **Reichstag**. Hitler declined to attend the meeting, which ended up as a brawl with Goebbels screaming with workerist fervor, "I demand that the petit-bourgeois Adolf Hitler be expelled from the Nazi Party!" Hitler bided his time and then suddenly, in February 1926, called a meeting in southern Germany, choosing a weekday when it was difficult for the northern leaders to get away from their jobs so that only Gregor Strasser and Goebbels were able to attend. Publicly Strasser and Goebbels capitulated to Hitler and abandoned their program. But a day after the Bamberg meeting Goebbels confided in his diary: "Hitler talks for two hours. I feel as though someone had beaten me. What sort of Hitler is this? A reactionary? The question of the private property of the nobility must not even be touched upon. Terrible!" And to show where his loyalties were, Goebbels accompanied Strasser to the station and tried to console him. A week later he recorded in his diary: "Long conference with Strasser. Result: we must not begrudge the Munich crowd their Pyrrhic victory. We must begin again our fight for socialism."

But it was easy for Hitler to manipulate Goebbels. He merely invited him to speak at a large rally on the same podium as himself, playing on Goebbels' vanity. How easily subdued the dionysian spirit is! In April, 1926 Goebbels recorded: "Hitler phones...His kindness in spite of Bamberg makes us feel ashamed...I enter the hall. Roaring welcome...And then I speak for two and a half hours...People roar and shout. At the end Hitler embraces me. I feel happy...Hitler is always at my side." A few days later Goebbels succumbed completely. Diary entry, April 13: "Hitler spoke for three hours. Brilliantly. He can make you doubt your own views...Russia wants to devour us...I love him...He has thought everything through. His ideal: a just collectivism and individualism. As to soil — everything belongs to the people. Production to be creative and individualistic. I am now at ease about him...I bow to the greater man, to the political genius."

By August Goebbels had publicly broken with Strasser and his followers in an article where he accused them of being "revolutionaries in speech but not in deed...Don't talk so much about ideals and don't fool yourselves into believing that you are the inventors and protectors of these ideals. We are not doing penance by standing solidly behind the Fuehrer. We bow to him with the manly, unbroken pride of the ancient Norsemen who stand upright before their Germanic feudal lord. We feel that he is greater than all of us, greater than you and I. He is the instrument of the Divine Will that shapes history with fresh, creative passion."

As we can see by the outcome of Goebbels' adventure with socialism, deeply embedded in the heart of petit-bourgeois radicalism is the craving to submit to authority, to have the flirtation with freedom terminated by an external force which will relieve the individual of his responsibility to use that freedom to create his species. Hitler knew that Goebbels was not a serious revolutionary but only a **poseur**. Given the opportunity to strike a revolutionary pose, Goebbels would be inwardly relieved and only too anxious to grovel and obey. To make absolutely sure that Goebbels retained the lesson, Hitler rubbed in his face the madness of his flirtation with socialism. Late in October, 1926, Hitler put Goebbels to work in "red" Berlin, where the majority of voters were Socialists and Communists. "Clean up 'red' Berlin," Hitler said to Goebbels, "and show that you have no independent existence of your own." From that point on Goebbels was Hitler's man.

But he became Hitler's man not by outwardly repudiating his radicalism. Hitler's plan was much more diabolical. From the point that Goebbels had been inwardly broken and caved in to Hitler, it became safe to use him as a puppet which would provide a left cover for Hitler's steady advance toward the preservation of capitalism. He could be a dummy which would trap all

the anti-capitalist ferment and channel it into the Nazi party instead of the Communist. Furthermore, the illusion that there was a left wing of the Nazi party could be very useful to Hitler himself as a bargaining leverage with the large industrialists who might otherwise cramp his personal rise to power. The gun which Hitler held to the temple of Thyssen, Krupp and other Ruhr industrialists was an organization called the NSBO (National Socialist Factory Cell Organization — nominally a **strike**-support organization!).

The NSBO grew out of tentative beginnings in 1928 with the formation of National Socialist factory cells primarily among white collar workers and highly specialized skilled workers in the machine tool and electric industries. At that point it was confined to "red" Berlin with the approval and propagandistic support of Berlin Gauleiter Goebbels. By the end of 1928 there existed at least fifty National Socialist factory cells, no longer just confined to Berlin, so that by 1929 the Nuremberg convention of the Nazi party decided to form a nationwide organization of cross-union caucuses of National Socialist trade unionists. With the founding of the NSBO the party adopted a resolution that any party members who participated in strikebreaking activities would automatically be expelled from the party. Though not uniformed, the NSBO was conceived by Muchow, a protege of Goebbels, as a paramilitary cadre organization, the SA of the factories, working in close cooperation with the local SA groups. Significant numbers of demoralized communist workers flocked to the NSBO as successful joint strike-support actions by the NSBO and the SA were held in Hanover, Bremen, and Berlin with the SA essentially functioning as a paramilitary organization of the unemployed. These actions were propagandistically supported by a weekly paper, the **Workers' Cause**. Communists left the KPD when the NSBO and SA clearly dominated organized strike activity, when the two organizations became famous for their resolve, determination and fighting strength in sharp contrast to the impotence of the KPD and SPD. By the time Hitler took power in 1933 there were 400,000 members in the NSBO.

Was this leading toward socialism? Many undoubtedly thought it was, but dangerously close as the NSBO was in form to socialist strike-support institutions, it was allowed to develop only to be used in the end as a tool to crush labor. To understand how this occurred we must first look at the other side of the party during those years to see the countervailing forces being built up to balance the left wing.

2.

Alfred Rosenberg represented the forces of "law and order" in German terms: the medieval spirit of the Volk community as a force which would unify Germany, the

“spiritual” force which Rosenberg presented as towering by comparison to any unity on the basis of class. It was a myth whose seeds were found in the German Romantic movement, the nostalgia for the German feudal tradition, which ripened in the rapidly deteriorating social conditions of the Weimar Republic. The idea of the Volk had a fatal fascination for key sectors of the working class. Veterans, returning home to the chaos, formed organizations which declared themselves politically neutral but dedicated to recapture the spirit of medieval stability. The largest and most famous veterans’ organization, the Stahlhelm, was founded immediately in 1919 on the principle that “The Stahlhelm fights for the German Volk and therefore for the renewal of the Germanic race; it fights to strengthen German self-consciousness so that foreign racial influences will be eliminated from the nation.”

Another largely independent Volkish group was Germany’s largest white-collar union (DHV) which, in addition to being anti-Semitic, exhibited Volkish characteristics in the following way. While the union fought for better working conditions and wages, especially in labor disputes with Jewish employers, it found its real identity not in the usual trade-union demands but in the cultural life of the nation.

The Nazis exploited this craving for folk community among workers and steered it in the direction of solutions advantageous to the capitalists. They encouraged the notion that the work situation had never superseded the guild ethos of social harmony and pride in craftsmanship, the way participation schemes have recently emerged in Western Europe and the U.S. One might recall the appearance of the Townsend Plan last October, which advocated that corporation executives regularly work on the assembly lines “to get first-hand knowledge of working conditions.” Townsend also advocated a scheme whereby workers and their employers would jointly and locally participate in planning how their factories would be run — without the assistance of trade unions.

The Volk community spirit was the form that workers’ participation in management took in the early days of the Hitler regime. Small details helped to impress medieval fantasies upon the working class: miners’ lodges bore the medieval appellation of Colliers’ Corporations, and factory foremen were addressed by the antiquated guild term **Meister**. Hitler, the first head of German state to do so, used to walk among the lathes in order to be present with the shipyard workers during launchings. When some workers died in an accident on a construction site in the Berlin underground, Hitler provided for a state funeral at which the contractors and engineers were arraigned in mock trial proceedings.

The real meaning of Volk was the levelling out of all class distinctions. Proof of real folk community was provided by miners donating a half shift per month for

the benefit of unemployed colleagues, by secondary school girls being forced to adopt deprived children and support them, all of which gave an impression of magnificent national altruism. Even anti-Nazis proved gullible: one resistance leader who was subsequently executed lavished praise on the Nazis for having “taught Germany the lesson that people have to help one another.”

3.

What kind of art could have emerged in an historical situation in which the struggle was no longer between the Communists and the Fascists, but between two wings of the fascist movement? With no historical basis for the active self-creativity of the working class what art could have been produced except a mirror of the hell of the bourgeois ego: the rivalry between art glorifying the atomization of the individual and glorifying the wave of the masses which would annihilate the individual? The rivalry was predictably tied up in an art dispute within the Nazi party led by Goebbels and Rosenberg.

The inspiration for an art which would convey the chaos of the individual cut loose from the boundaries of species-existence was wafted up to Germany from the Futurist movement in Italy, led by Mussolini’s poetic aide, Marinetti. “Airborne power” was the way Marinetti described the Futurist movement. It was motion at the expense of the requirements of sensuous human development, in contempt of nature. It was the vitalization of existence in the rhythm of machines, motors, geometric forms which found their fulfillment in the movement of storm troops and Fascist legions. Marinetti claimed that it was a dynamism which would end the static view of history; but it was a dynamism which accelerated the movement of humanity toward death.

In an essay written as early as 1920 called “Beyond Communism” Marinetti had said, “We are not only more revolutionary than you, Socialist officials, but we are beyond your revolution. To your immense system of levelled and intercommunicating stomachs...we oppose our marvelous anarchic paradise of absolute freedom, art, talent, progress, heroism, fantasy, enthusiasms, gaiety, variety, novelty, speed...One must stimulate spiritual hunger and satiate it with a great, joyous, astonishing art. Art is revolution, improvisation, impetus, enthusiasm...drowning in the Absolute, struggle against every hindrance. Everyone must be given the will to think, create, waken, renovate and to destroy in themselves the will to submit, conserve, copy.”

As Marinetti was writing about the need for universal creativity, that year the fascists began to methodically smash the trade unions by beating, banishing or killing their leaders and destroying their property.

The northern counterpart of the Futurists were the culture heroes of the large National Socialist Students

Association: the German Expressionist painters. Who were these artists and what did they have to say about human creativity?

There was the most famous one, Emil Nolde, into whose painting one walked as into a cold darkened room. As one became accustomed to the darkness, putrescent colors began to erupt the way colors break out around the sewage floating towards a drainage system in the gutter. But they never dispel the heavy shadows, Nolde's morbid fascination with the shadowy realm between sanity and insanity, with a borderline existence on the outer limits of human consciousness. And who was the man behind the paintings? A crusty recluse living in a lonely fisherman's cottage up in the northernmost province of Schleswig-Holstein, who would occasionally emerge from his cottage to stare vacantly out into the North Sea.

And another painter, Erich Heckel, for whom all attempt at social activity was an object of ridicule, an attempt which only exposed human weaknesses. Relations between men and women could only be grotesque, animalistic and the only escape was to return to nature, as he does in his numerous landscapes — a nature emptied of human activity, nature as a void.

And yet another artist, a favorite along with Nolde of Goebbels, the sculptor Ernst Barlach. His obsession with the emaciated medieval human figure, wasted flesh, burned-out monks feverishly reaching out for an object beyond human existence. And Ernst Kirchner who amused himself by painting the human species as a gay carnival mob. In all cases these artists fled from social existence as from a trap. Social existence meant subordination, humiliation.

The philosopher who hovered over these modern German artists was Nietzsche. For him there was no creative process of development through others, no perfecting but only perfection. Art was a beautiful illusion. It was the best in man but was untrue. He predicted, "The artist will soon come to be regarded as a splendid relic, and to him, as to a wonderful stranger on whose power and beauty depended the happiness of former ages, there will be paid such honor as is not often enjoyed by one of our race."

What was required in social life was not creativity but a will to power. Nietzsche analyzed every phase of this act which fascinated him: after acknowledging that in every act of willing there are first a multiplicity of **feelings**, above all the feeling of wanting to get **away from** and **to** something else, then an impulse to act upon those feelings in the form of thoughts — the phase of willing which begins to give commands — Nietzsche discovered that ultimately one single passion takes over: the passion to command. What is called freedom of the will is essentially a passionate superior-

ity toward a someone who must obey. And then he says, "But now let us note the oddest thing about the will because we, in a given case, are simultaneously the commanders **and** the obeyers and, as obeyers, know the feeling of forcing, crowding, pressing, resisting, and moving which begins immediately after the act of the will: because, on the other hand, we are in the habit of glossing over this duality with the help of the synehtic concept 'I.'"

Nietzsche had discovered the hell of the bourgeois ego. From the submission which he assumed was inherent in species-existence he extrapolated to the process of mentation itself a chain of command, thus destroying it as a creative process. The mind was like a well-run bourgeois community, following the rank-relations of bourgeois life which disqualified it as creative mentation.

Because species-existence was a slave existence and not the condition for the realization of freedom, Nietzsche, in a moment of casual concern for the working class, advised: "The workers in Europe should declare that henceforth **as a class** they are a human impossibility, and not only, as is customary, a harsh and purposeless establishment. They should introduce an era of a vast swarming out from the European beehive, the like of which has never been experienced, and with this act of emigration in the grand manner protest against the machine, against capital, and against the choice with which they are now threatened, of becoming **of necessity** either slaves of the state or slaves of a revolutionary party."

4.

The year 1933-34 marked a decisive turning point. The tension between the left and right wing of the Nazi party had to be settled. The July 1933 Schmitt-Hitler pact had made that clear. Schmitt, the general director of the largest insurance concern in Germany, became Minister of Economics and negotiated an agreement with Hitler — himself as spokesman for light industries and chemicals, Thyssen for heavy industries, and Hindenburg for the regular army leaders and the Junkers. Schmitt made it clear that he wanted neither revolution nor reform, only capitalist economic stability.

The point had arrived when the revolutionary art which Goebbels had been defending had to be attacked, and Rosenberg with his conservative Combat League dutifully launched a campaign against it. The point had been reached when the autonomy of the SA would have to be crushed in order to be assimilated into a state military apparatus, the **Wehrmacht**. The cry for a "second revolution" which came from Roehm, chief of the SA, was displeasing to the large capitalists which were now backing the Nazi party. And the point had been reached when the NSBO together with the SA had to be

converted into an institution which could take over and destroy the SPD trade unions. As Goebbels said, "We shall make May 1 [1933] a grandiose demonstration of the will of the German people. Then, on May 2, we will take over the union headquarters...For a few days perhaps there will be some commotion, but then we will be in. We must no longer hold back."

The Day of National Labor in 1933 presented the rector of Heidelberg sharing a festively decorated brewer's cart with a worker, and Hitler saying, "I acknowledge only one nobility — that of labor." Then the next day, Ley directed the SA and NSBO jointly to take over all trade union installations — buildings, co-operatives, trade union banks. It took one hour since there was no resistance, except sporadically in the Ruhr. That same month the German Labor Front was founded and the liquidation of the NSBO proceeded by implying that they were to be the leading cadre of this new larger "labor" organization.

By 1934 the liquidation of the left had taken place. So had the massacre of the SA leadership. And as for the art expressing the spirit of the "revolutionary" wing of the Nazi party, Hitler himself finally intervened in the dispute between Goebbels and Rosenberg. At the party congress of 1934 he summed up his views on everything saying, "To be German means to be clear!" The National Socialist art policy was adapted to the requirements of capitalist power. Hitler decreed politics to be an art! And what did he mean by art? Art was the ability to do something well, he said. "We must not dismiss a businessman if he is a good businessman, even if he is not yet a National Socialist, and especially not if the National Socialist who is to take his place knows nothing about business. In business, ability must be the only standard."

A massive purge began of the modern painters, now no longer just in the provinces but even in Berlin, and an innocuous German living-room culture took over through the cultural institution of the Strength-through-Joy operation. All unstable elements of German life were overhauled to streamline the apparatus for capitalist recovery. The weight had shifted to the

stable side of Hell, away from anarchic institutions to the systematization of the irrational required by a fascist war machine. There was to be no world-historical process of expanded reproduction and consequently there were to be no creative individuals.

5.

At this point in history the bourgeois ego is a serious obstacle to humanity's capacity to make a socialist revolution. Left as only a peripheral concern to the revolutionary movement as it has always been, left unresolved, there will be no creative mass movement of the kind required. The individual revolutionary leader will have to submit himself with serenity to the process of being wrenched out of his former illusions about himself, knowing that the replication of the changing of the laws of the universe in himself is a process which he submits to at the same time that he controls it.

The strength to follow the morality of revolution at every turn in one's personal life means that there is no longer a distinction between the individual's sensuous, irreplaceable existence and history. Individual development is historical development — but with this warning. To those that would once again only too gladly subjugate the turmoil of their newly awakened passions to the needs of a mass movement it must be observed that those historical needs can no longer serve as a super-ego, telling the individual that he is not ready to experience the new discoveries of his species sensuously. The transformation of Necessity will become a hard, unfeeling act, political blunders will be made unless the most delicate human feelings, the kind formerly only reserved for love and art, are brought into the organizing process to fuel the new world-historical identity of other organizers.

The epic has to be filled in at the same time that its sweep is being conveyed to masses of people. It has to be filled in by awakening the most tortured and urgent passions of men and subduing them through the morality of socialist revolution. As in Beethoven's music, the most diverse human experiences are tamed to produce a sustained, continuous and patient revolutionary process.

Beyond Psychoanalysis

by L. Marcus

Over the period since September, 1972, organizations of the Labor Committees in North America and Western Europe have been given preliminary exposure to techniques more advanced in some aspects than have so far been known to professional psychology. These approaches are being developed as indispensable auxiliary means for directly overcoming the fatal internal flaw of all socialist organizations, Lenin's included, up to this time. The application of psychological knowledge in this process has been a means, not an independent end.

Although the general basis for this has been identified in published items earlier and the program broadly detailed in Spring, 1973 internal transactions of the Labor Committees, several ends are served by a public account of the matter at this juncture. It is of relatively trivial significance that our report will remove credible basis for continuation of the sort of reckless, scandal-mongering speculation which the project has recently stirred up among certain nominally socialist groupings. More relevant, we provide qualified professionals with an adequate guide to their own contributing studies and reflections along the lines we outline. More important, we shall illuminate one of the most important, and hitherto fatally neglected problems of socialist organizations.

1. Motives for the Project

Although the writer's collateral work in related fields includes scattered projects over a period of a quarter-century, the focussing of that background into the present project originated in the effort to solve certain critical problems of pedagogy in the teaching of dialectical method and Marxian economics. The elementary notion of a dialectical method itself and those

Marxian economic conceptions subsumed by the notion of "extended reproduction" are ostensibly so difficult of comprehension that there has been no competent secondary writing on the dialectical method until recent years. Of all well-known Marxian economists, only Rosa Luxemburg attained a credible comprehension of Marx's notion of extended reproduction.(11a) From studies of the outstanding secondary literature and experience with well over a thousand students in the writer's course in Marxian economics, it was possible to isolate the form of the mental blockage which usually prevents comprehension of notions of that order. It was clear that remedial methods lay beyond the scope of curriculum design per se.

A more immediate prompting for the current form of the project was developed out of work undertaken under such rubrics as "The German Ideology Today." Currently, in addition to the intensive continuing study since 1968 of the development of fascist movements out of "counter-culture" and anarcho-syndicalist ferment, for over a year Labor Committee task forces drawn from (presently) each of the major branches of Western national cultures have been critically examining the origins and dynamics of the special form of capitalist ideology more or less characteristic of the dominant working-class strata of each contemporary national-language sector. The cited, "The German Ideology Today," has already begun the process of publication with a series of preliminary papers. Projects in the French, Italian, English, Latin American, Greek, and Swedish ideologies today are in various stages of maturity. The dominant capitalist ideologies of workers in the U.S.A. are being analyzed by focussing on the distinctions among the U.S., (English-speaking) Canadian, and English forms of ideology.

- **Motives for the Project**
- **The General Thesis: Humanism**
- **The Cartesian Theorems**
- **The Case of Beethoven**
- **The State of Modern Psychology**
- **Freud vs. Feuerbach**
- **Freud's Error On Society**
- **A Social Approach to Individual Psychology**
- **The Psychology of Mass Organizing**

The practical political feature of such investigations can be made obvious enough.

If each individual will look ahead, imagining himself permitted one last recurrence of consciousness at his own funeral, he must imagine himself thinking then, "I wonder what that was all about?" Notably in the present period, when the mythos of "Zero Population Growth" is rampant, the individual considering himself as an isolated individual must find it difficult to argue against the indictment that he has been using up scarce resources, space and "employment opportunities" otherwise available to other individuals. Objectively speaking, can he "**competitively**" justify his existence to society?

To the extent that the individual worker (among others) in capitalist society views himself as a mere self-evident individual, his "detached" assessment of the existential question must impel him toward the most profound despair, and even perhaps toward suicide. If he reviews each year of his adult life in detail, he has a picture of the following sort. He arises, weekdays, perhaps at about six in the morning, wretchedly bustling to get out and begin commuting to work. During the remainder of the day, his sixteen or less waking hours are apportioned somewhat as follows. Eight hours work, one to two and a half hours commuting, a half hour for lunch — a total of about two hours a day for meals and cleaning up for meals. One to three hours for chores about the house or automobile, and an hour or so propped in front of the "boob tube" sucking at a couple cans of beer or highballs. Each year, one to three weeks for a vacation — when the budget will tolerate that, and throughout it all, the years pass one by one in greying banality.

For example: in West Germany the typical young adult worker of today was "tracked" into a miserable **Volkschule** early in his education, from which he was "graduated" at the age of fifteen, when he became an apprentice, earning perhaps the magnificent monthly sum of about 300 D-marks. This is a miserable pittance on which he could not support himself, but which usually represented a much-needed supplementary income for his parents' household. After completing this apprenticeship, during which he has acquired a skill or semi-skill which in a majority of cases is already obsolete, he rose typically to the magnificent monthly income of about 1,000 D-marks. If he is fortunate, he, his wife, and two children spend about 300 D-marks monthly rent for a tiny three-plus-room apartment, and perhaps eventually buys a small automobile, which is used more as a curb-space display fetish for polishing than for driving (since his budget can ill-afford gasoline). Yet, this oppressed West German worker typically takes pride in the fact that he is an appendage of his firm and thus a minute cog in the so-called "economic miracle" of his country.

In each country, the worker is protected against the suicidal despair of an objective view of his individual qua individual life, by seizing tightly to a set of illusions. These illusions give his individual life a fictitious sort of importance and, not accidentally, locate that fictitious importance in accepting the prevailing capitalists' rules of life for a dutiful wage-slave. The general form of such capitalist ideologies is ultimately identical from country to country, but each national sector tends to be distinguished by a peculiar sub-species of that ideology, to the effect that the secondary problems of organizing workers differ correspondingly from one such sector to the next.

Consider a summary comparison of the English and U.S. workers' capitalist ideologies. Both of these English-language capitalist cultures are characterized by pragmatism, but there are important differentiations between English and U.S. pragmatism. The U.S.A., at least until the most recent period, was characterized by an outlook of the sort addressed by the 1960 John F. Kennedy presidential campaign's "New Frontier" appeal to U.S. ideology. Depreciating British capital, at least for the past sixty years, distinguishes England from the U.S.A. by that vicious stagnation and **relative**ly stone-like social immobility otherwise expressed in the British monarchy's support from the Labour Party.

These broad distinctions underly contradictory special distinctions between the U.S. and British labor movements. Because of greater social mobility and "frontier" outlooks in the U.S. working class, the U.S. worker has relatively greater individual combat potential. Connected to this greater relative combativity, since the U. S. is a society of change relative to the English situation, the U.S. worker is quicker to understand and accept the notion of **changing** things.

Yet, during the past thirty-odd years, the English worker has been in effect more combative in class struggles than the U.S. worker! The irony of this is that the U.S. worker, just because he is more inclined to foresee change, is more vulnerable to the recurring illusion that U.S. capitalism is about to change for the better, an inclination to foresee favorable change in his personal situation which ameliorates his feeling of desperation **as an individual** under oppressive circumstances. The British worker has less confidence in his ability to individually get ahead of his mates (to find alternatives much nearer than Australia), and regards existing oppressive circumstances as something which has to be faced up to along class lines.

In net, the combativity of the English militant worker, just because of the English ideology, tends to be conservative (defensive) militancy rather than the potentially revolutionary militancy of fighting for change. The British worker tends to fight along traditional-goals lines of resistance to employer and capitalist-state encroachments, by contrast with the U.S. worker who is more disposed, relatively, to fight for innovations.

In each national sector, the general task of the socialist working-class organizer remains **fundamentally the same**. His essential task is to strip away the bourgeois **persona** of the worker, making it possible for the worker to tolerate the awful objective truth thus confronted by offering the worker a new, positive basis for his personal identity in the political class-organizing process. Although the general form of capitalist ideology gives this problem the same basic form and programmatic remedy in all advanced capitalist sectors, the differentiations of specific sectoral ideologies require the psychotherapeutic aspects of the effort to subsume somewhat different concrete secondary forms in each such sector.

For example, the case of Italy today. The entire Italian Left demonstrates nothing so clearly as that it seems to have learned nothing, "organically" or otherwise, from the experience of 1919-1922. The best the Italian Left today could do would be to occupy the factories individually, as it did in the great upsurge of the post-World War I period, and then wait for the fascist **squadristi** to pick off these factories one by one. The reason for this hysterical blindness to the lessons of history is located more immediately in the predomi-

nance of interconnected **machismo** and derived anarcho-syndicalist parochialist tendencies in the individual Italian worker. Like the French and Hispanic cultures, the Italian culture is closer to the peasant-like petit-bourgeois world-outlook examined by Karl Marx in the **Eighteenth Brumaire** and **Poverty of Philosophy**. He has a peasant-like **asociality** — relative to the more socialized American or English worker — which demands of him a massive outer layer of **persona**, protecting a terrified secret "inner Self" underneath. Existentialism is not accidentally the suitable ideology of such Latin **machismo** cultures, and suicide not-accidentally the only complete existentialist act. Without ripping away the Italian ideology from the Italian worker — and similar psychological surgery on the French — to speak of actual revolutionary movements in those countries is purely idle chatter.

Exemplary of the anarcho-syndicalist variant is the proto-fascist D.H. Lawrence's self-revealing criticism of Walt Whitman. Lawrence charged that Whitman "leaks," referring to the American tendency to "spill the gut" even with mere acquaintances. D.H. Lawrence's reactionary social tendencies are underlined by the notorious theme of Lady Chatterly's lover (although the same bestial **Weltanschauung** permeates all Lawrence's writings). Sexual relations for Lawrence are animal, not human relations; they are a realization of the bestial sensual element of the partners, in opposition to a sensuous celebration of a human love relationship. Lawrence's sexual partners are tightly self-encased "pure individuals," using one another as objects in turn. Lawrence cannot conceive of a mutual sensuous relationship between human lovers. The proto-fascist petit-bourgeois character-type is an isolated asocial (heteronomic) individual who finds nothing so abhorrent and frightening as the notion of sharing one's innermost thoughts with other human beings.*

Consider the implications of ideology for the cadres of a socialist organization. It should be obvious that all talk of socialist organizing is merely pathetic chattering unless the organization involved first settles account with the characteristic capitalist ideology chaining the minds of the workers of that sector. The cadres must first begin to settle accounts with that same ideology in themselves: the educator must himself be educated.

* Some Europeans and American cultural relativists will see in this a tendency toward American chauvinism. In certain respects, the U.S. industrial worker is more culturally advanced than his European brothers, sisters, and, literally, cousins! That is a simple fact, despite the notorious philistine anti-intellectualism of the U.S. society generally. The greater social mobility, the higher material standard of living, the higher standards of public education, the greater rate of technological development and change, the greater ratios of leisure time and activity in the U.S.A., especially respecting the past sixty years of mostly misery, war, and stagnation in Europe, have given the U.S. worker certain actual and potential material and cultural advantages over his European brothers and sisters. However: send a U.S. worker to a Volksschule, apprentice him at fifteen, and limit him to 1,000 D-marks monthly income (of which 300 D-marks goes for rent of tiny quarters), and perhaps he would not do so well in these conditions as his German brothers; material conditions of life do not count for nothing!

That is merely the negative aspect of the organizer's task. Strip away the worker's persona (his ideologized self-estimation) and, if one has done nothing more, one has merely confronted the worker (qua individual) with intolerable objective reality respecting his conditions. To organize the working class one must effectively answer our hypothetical question of the funeral: "What was that all about?" One must be able to give the worker a self-conscious social identity as a person whose existence is necessary to the entire human race.

The immediate empirical location of that new self-estimation for the worker is generally in the worker's activity in organizing other workers. The worker must be able to see the importance of his "inner Self" as reflected in the positive changes in world-outlook he is effecting among other workers. To communicate this new sense of self to the worker, the cadre himself must have a clear self-consciousness of his own identity in the same general terms.

It will be clearer toward the later parts of this present report that the two problems, that of Marxian pedagogy and that of overcoming ideology, are ultimately the same matter. Retrospectively, this is now clear to the leading layers of the International Caucus of Labour Committees and the National Caucus of Labor Committees. It was not quite so clear in fact until the Fall-Winter, 1972-73 months, when the ICLC's growth confronted it with the urgency of conceptualizing a practice based on understanding of national ideologies. It was not quite so clear until the work of organizing employed and unemployed, Black, Hispanic, and "white" workers into a common NUWRO formation confronted the entire NCLC membership with certain ugly ideological difficulties to be overcome as a precondition for organizing the U.S. working-class forces en masse. As the result of a self-conscious reflection on such experience, the Labor Committee tendency was forced to begin pushing the bounds of applied psychology beyond the scope of existing conceptions of psychology on certain "fronts." The tendency was compelled, like Marx, to locate the individual cadre's personal resources as a socialist organizer in creative qualities of mind which extant psychology generally did not imagine to exist in that form.

2. The General Thesis: Humanism

The greater part of the material we introduce to psychology is by no means new in itself, but has long existed as established knowledge outside institutionalized psychology per se. Because the fundamental conceptions were successively developed by Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, we may properly define the specific enlargement we now introduce as the contribution from "Marxian psychology."

Although we have not previously situated this body of established knowledge as the specific basis for psychology, apart from several internal Labor Committee transactions and **Dialectical Economics**,(11a) we have frequently cited the general body of systematic evidence on which the basic principles are premised. That includes the 1970 convention resolution draft of "Founding Principles of the Labor Committees." It is sufficient to summarize that general thesis again here.

The eruption of scientific knowledge which occurred in Western Europe from the middle of the sixteenth century is characterized by the notion we properly term **Humanism**. This notion arose in circumstances in which a few centers of Europe were enjoying rapid advance in contrast to pervasive depopulation and decay around them. The progress of these exceptional centers, taken in contrast to the ruin, stimulated the conception known as the **Necessity for Progress**:(12f) that progress of the sort then typified by emergent capitalist development was necessary for the **successful** perpetuation of human existence **generally**. This progress, in turn, was associated with innovations in social, political, and technological forms, innovations which were substantially attributable to the creative initiatives of individual minds. Taken together, this portended the view that **Freedom** (creative initiatives by gifted individuals) was **Necessity**. To the extent that the capitalist notion of political freedom represents qualitative progress in the human condition over all pre-capitalist forms, the capitalist notion of political freedom is a banalized expression of the Freedom/Necessity concept just identified. The other term from this notion of Freedom/Necessity is **Humanism**.(11g)

Humanism, as a practical way of describing such notions of Freedom/Necessity, begins with attention to the creative individual, whose inventions make general progress possible. Freedom means initially the conditions favorable to the discovery and propagation of new fundamental laws, new ways of doing things, by individuals. Humanism is therefore also occupied with the conditions required to produce such gifted individuals, the material and political conditions necessary to produce the numbers and varieties of gifted individuals society requires for maintaining the necessary rate of general progress. As a corollary, humanism is also occupied with the material and political conditions of the population more generally, its mobility, cultural development, and material preconditions of cultural development: **that new inventions might be realized for practice by a general society culturally qualified to assimilate the conceptions involved in such practice.**

This **capitalist** discovery proves, on systematic examination of human history and pre-history, to reflect a general law of human existence.

The discovery of Humanism (Freedom-Necessity) as a concept belongs to capitalist development, since capitalism is the first form of society to make progress (change) the immediate, conscious feature of the process of expansion of the productive forces. So capitalism, by creating the practical conditions demanding discovery of this notion, made possible and necessary man's knowledge of his own history. The whole realm of human experience, to the extent that expanding collations of evidence and other artifacts could adduce it, has provided the empirical resource for testing the Humanist hypothesis against the totality of man's experience. Hence, to the extent that History first developed as a serious discipline under capitalism it abandoned the sterile (e.g., Hellenic, Roman, etc.) forms of mere narratives, genealogies, and homilectics, and became a new body of systematic inquiry, a testing of the hypothesis that the course of human existence was adumbrated by a principle of progress. (Serious historiography today thus has no **internal** systematic resemblance to Ancient or other pre-Renaissance predecessors.)

With the evidence so accumulated and analyzed to this time, the hypothesis has been conclusively proven.

Systematic study of human pre-history today begins with the biosphere. The following elliptical summary does not distort any of the essential points in its simplification of the account.

It is permissible to discount the sources of energy (geothermal, radioactivity) for life indigenous to earth (**in earlier periods**) and to interpret the processes as functions of the throughput and accumulation of solar radiation. (N.B. thermonuclear power development today is an **apparent** exception.) **Three connected parameters then summarize analysis of the biosphere as a whole.** First, we measure the **total caloric content** of the biosphere, next the **rate of growth** of this caloric content, and finally the **acceleration of this rate of growth.** The last parameter, exponential tendencies associated with the rate of growth of the caloric content of the biosphere, **subsumes the other two.**(11a)

We trace the evolution of the biosphere in the following general terms. If we assumed a fixed rate of growth for the caloric content of the biosphere, we would first encounter the hypothetical limit at which the mass of biosphere had reached the relatively-finite spatial and resource boundaries for the "inorganic" earth for that mode of expansion. However, a fixed mode of growth could not simply stagnate at that limit; it would have to regress as the boundary values were approached. Thus, **the principle of exponential tendencies is proven by the continued existence of the biosphere** — as well as by its intriguing biochemical history.

Competent ecology rejects the Darwinian approach. The question of the viability of a new variety in a certain relative magnitude is a question of the effect of that variety's existence on, (1) the total caloric mass of the biosphere as a whole, (2) the rate of growth of the biomass, (3) the rate of increase of the biomass's growth-rate, with the third parameter again subsuming the other two. This relationship to the biomass is reflexive; the conditions for existence of a variety represent as aggregation of kinds of species and biological processes, which, in turn, are the preconditions for propagations of a variety in a certain magnitude. This larger aggregation, the conditions for reproductive existence of the specific type, corresponds to a parameter of the third type: that is, **the existence of such an aggregation is determined (subsumed) by a specific value for the third parameter!**

With the emergence of man, the form of evolution of the biosphere changes qualitatively. As man begins to use even deliberative cooperative forms of food-gathering, and then begins to employ the simplest tools, his rate of reproduction exceeds the prior rate of evolutionary adaptation of the biosphere generally. Consequently, each mode of social existence represents what we can retrospectively identify as a specific technology, a technology which, in turn, defines certain aspects of nature as implicit "resources," which are inevitably relatively-finite for that technology. Consequently, human existence is characterized by a continual overtaking of such boundary-conditions, such that the more successfully a society even simply perpetuates a constant population in a specific mode, the more it exhausts the material basis for continued human existence in that mode.

Hence, human development, or the Necessity of Freedom.

In general, the existence of man demands successive modes of "Technology" (and parallel, qualitative alterations in the organization of human activity). Although these do not necessarily occur **unilinearly**, and although progress is not inevitable for each society, progress in some stems of the development of society does represent a successive ordering of human existence. The increase in population, since the Pleistocene, to approaching four billions persons today is a summation of that progressive development of "technology" and appropriate social forms.

This exceptional feature of human evolution noted, human development otherwise fits the general ecological model we summarized above. If we include the "caloric" throughput content of man **and all his activities** within the biomass, we have the approach (including man and his activities with the total biomass) through which human evolution can be fitted into a competent general "thermodynamical" ecology.

In this approach, we determine the ordering of human societies as follows. Our first parameter is the **per capita caloric content of human consumption per se** (including all objects of human consumption); this rises, and its rate of growth tends to accelerate. We must also consider the **per capita caloric content of all human productive activities** (over and above consumption per se). This defines, for capitalist or socialist economy, the **real** magnitudes of V (Variable Capital), C (Constant Capital), d (Capitalists' Consumption). The expansion of this mass defines a ratio, $(S-d)/(C+V)$, which is, obviously enough, a "free energy" ratio. **The exponential growth of this ratio, relative to the equivalent of current per-capita values for C, V, d, provided that the total biomass is also growing, satisfies the preconditions for evolution of society.**

Such facts pose the question of whence the **negative entropy** of evolutionary development? Wolfgang Koehler's famous experiments with chimpanzees circumscribes the class of phenomena to be more directly investigated.(9) Given the task-oriented setting of necessity for rises in $S/(C+V)$, the objects presented (as objects of consumption and production) to man by his own productive output can be crudely regarded as similar in implication to the potential tools set in the cages of Koehler's chimpanzee subjects. The synthesis of a **Gestalt** by the chimpanzee, the rudimentary form of **creative mentation**, is an empirical proof of the existence of the kind of phenomena we must isolate for the investigation.

The evolution of man is absolutely contrasted to the existence and behavior of any of the lower beasts, chimpanzees included. In the lower beasts, including the higher apes, virtually no alteration in **the range** of behavior occurs progressively from generation to generation. The per capita caloric throughput and the rates of potential growth of that species of biomass material are essentially fixed — at least in range. With man, the physiology of creative mentation, exhibited in a more rudimentary fashion by Koehler's chimpanzees, has led to deliberately synthesized new technologies, equivalent in effect to a species' deliberately turning itself (**by will**) into a higher species (higher negentropic values). It is, indeed, man's study of his own progress through such processes of deliberation which makes possible and is scientific knowledge.

Kant and Hegel properly emphasize this distinction between man and the lower beasts.(6a,8) In place of a learned response to **fixed** classes of phenomena, man's deliberative process of development of his mode of behavior addresses itself to principles underlying transformations in otherwise apparently fixed classes of phenomena. It is the adduction of such underlying principles, enabling man to implicitly (at least) predict that a new form of behavior will be superior to an old form, which yields those same principles which are the subject and substance of human knowledge in general.

It is our thesis, continuing the successive development of the same kind of thesis by Descartes,(2) Spinoza,(6c) Hegel,(6a) Feuerbach,(3a) and Marx,(12b) that **the "primary substance" of human mental processes is creative mentation**; this view is in direct and absolute opposition to the prevailing, reductionist conception of psychology.

Reductionist psychology locates the primary data of mind in mental events which exhibit the form of logic, in terms of discrete images or psychological material susceptible of being made conscious in the form of discrete images. Like logic, reductionist psychology accounts for the motivation of those images (elements) in terms of metaphysical notions of relations (e.g., "instincts," "drives," etc.). Even those forms of radical behaviorist psychology which pretend to deny the existence of "drives," "instincts," etc., do nothing more than rather hysterically ignore the necessary implicit assumption of such axiomatic "drives" in their schemas. We insist, on the basis of the kind of evidence cited, that **the process associated with creative mentation is the "primary substance" of the human mind, and that all other mental phenomena are determined (subsumed) by those primary processes.**(11a)

That, in brief, is the case for the general thesis within which the question of human psychology must be circumscribed. The analysis of the mind is necessarily limited in usefulness and even tinged with reckless incompetence until psychology accounts for that which is the deliberative processes underlying the whole sweep of human history and pre-history in the ecological terms we have prescribed for that history. Such a view of history, Marx's view of man as a world-historical being,(12b) is the constant criterion to which every conjecture must be submitted for criticism before one advances to hypothesis. **Any facts respecting psychology are obviously either false or are obviously grossly misconstrued unless they represent knowledge bearing on such an historical view of the human deliberative processes. This is our general thesis.**

3. The Cartesian Theorems


In the emergence of fundamental new scientific conceptions and entire new world-outlooks, one properly distinguishes among various proto-discoveries, which occur as improvisatory glimmerings or intuitions, and the initial systematic demonstration of some new, comprehensive principle. Throughout the Renaissance from approximately the latter part of the thirteenth century, Humanist ferment does not begin to appear as a systematic world view until Giordano Bruno (murdered by the Inquisition in 1600). Yet his writings do not stand on their own feet; it is only when we look backwards at Bruno's writings from the standpoint of Kepler (1571-1630) and Descartes (1596-1650)(2,6e) that we can isolate the germ of Kepler's and Descartes' systematical humanism in Bruno.

Unlike Descartes, who we shall examine here as the founder of scientific psychology, Kepler offers no direct attack on the problem of the form and content of human thought. Yet, once we look beyond plausible edification to concentrate on the fanatical determination behind Kepler's founding of modern physical science, we are compelled to adduce that philosophical outlook which impelled and regulated his discovery and proof of the existence of universal law.

A certain crude, empirical conception of physical science did of course exist prior to and following Kepler, but the advantage of Kepler over, for example, the outlook of Galileo is qualitative, not one of degree. Before Kepler, as with those who maintained or regressed to the pre-Keplerian thrust toward empiricism, the notion of the study of the regular order of nature was "pluralistic." Various categories of phenomena were treated as if separate categories of the Divine Will, within which narrow confines man could explore regularity through observation and experiment, hoping thereby to adduce the specific regularity of God's Will (Dispensation) for such classes of phenomena. Kepler cut through such pathetic forms of inquiry, specifying that **the entire universe was subject to a single principle of lawfulness, which subsumed all other, more particular forms of law.** Kepler expressed this view in the argument that God's infinite (i.e., unique, comprehensive, existent) Will was **rational**, i.e., susceptible of being mastered as human knowledge of even human individuals.

We have two, ultimately interconnected sorts of evidence of the determining importance of this philosophical premise in Kepler. Immediately, his papers suffice to demonstrate that he could not have sustained the effort to produce his great universal laws without the impetus and critical rigor supplied by this premise. More broadly, respecting the empiricists' objection that the general development of physical science is not shown (to them!) to depend upon such philosophical assumptions, the whole history of scientific development, from Kepler through Einstein, shows that the seminal conceptions governing the critical advances in science have been contributed chiefly by individuals in whom the kernel of Kepler's philosophical outlook operated as a largely self-conscious motivation and critical faculty for their creative work.

We shall shortly show exactly such concern in the case of Descartes. As for Newton, and other representatives of that branch of Descartes' "family," the conceptual basis for the practical advances of Newton, Euler, Lagrange, et al., is principally directly taken from Kepler and Descartes. Leibniz's perception of the problem of the epistemological fallacy of entropy ("God's clock") and his efforts to develop an analysis situs, are exemplary of a different branch of the same influences. Empiricist cynics may disparage the overview of eighteenth-century physics advances by Kant



JOHANNES KEPLER: The virtual founder of modern science. Expressed the kernel of Giordano Bruno's humanism in the notion that the universe was governed by a coherent principle susceptible of rational human comprehension, in opposition to the "pluralist" notions of "repeatability" of mere empiricism.

and Hegel. Despite these cynics, all the great formal achievements of the latter half of the 19th century, exemplified by G. Riemann, G. Cantor,⁽¹⁾ F. Klein, depend upon individuals who were passionately self-conscious of the kind of contradictions in science cited by Hegel. Moreover, the principal actualized achievements of modern science (e.g., epitomized by Planck, Einstein, Schroedinger, et al.) could not have occurred except as a consequence of precisely such philosophical preoccupations of Riemann, Cantor, and Klein.

Kepler's thrust of self-development, resurrected in a more advanced form by Einstein's Riemannian approaches, distinguishes between two possible approaches to physical universalities, the continuous and the discrete, recognizing that the discrete is a lower, adumbrated form of the continuous.

In the simplest classroom sort of illustration of this point, one can emphasize the fact, formally proven by Cantor,⁽¹⁾ that even in an "infinite" period of time it would be impossible to identify all of the points which can be located within any line segment, or that the curve cannot be developed from the straight line. Consequently, the attempt to discover universal laws of the complete order of nature from an ordinary algebraic (formal-logical) standpoint must ultimately fail. Hence, any interpretation of the universe which assumes the

universe to be an aggregation of either elementary physical particles, or of elementary discrete sense-perceptions of the continuum, is necessarily false as a basis for representation of **fundamental** physical law. Consequently, Kepler's converging toward his partial demonstration that fundamental physical laws of discrete motion were properties of such continua, is an awesome achievement for his time from the retrospective view of modern knowledge. From the standpoint of Einstein and Planck (as partial realizations of Riemann and Cantor), we must regard Kepler as the virtual founder of all modern physical science.

We shall see that the necessary preference of the true continuum, over the universal aggregation of discrete elementarities, is of absolutely decisive importance respecting the nature of the human mind. In citing Kepler's case in the terms employed above, we have moved toward that result for psychology, to the extent we have indicated that the deliberative processes of creative mentation, by which man makes fundamental advances in the material precondition for his continued existence, are processes coherent with the notion of **universal continuities as the unique elementary (primitive) substance**.

The essence of Humanism (and modern fundamental scientific achievements) is summed up in the Spinozan view of two theorems from Descartes: "Cogito ergo sum" (**properly translated**: " 'I think,' therefore I am being.") and "the existence of perfection." We shall restate these in symbolic form.

Cogito ergo sum: Every particular of human knowledge exists uniquely in the form: "I think that x_i " ($i = 1, 2, 3, \dots$). No x_i exists as a predicate except as a predicate of an existing subject, "I think." Therefore, if some x_i actually exists, the universal subject, "I think," not only is existent but has a superior certainty of existence with respect to that of any predicates.

Even in this form, "Cogito ergo sum" states the first approximation of the modern dialectical method. In contemporary academic jargon, "I think" is a **meta-logical** existence relative to the aggregation of particular predicates. "I think" is the existence of the class for which all x_i are merely members. The "independence" of the existence of "I think," as the existence of the class as such, is demonstrated by the impossibility of including "I think" as one of the members of the class, as a member of the class which can be prescribed to exist by logical induction from even any large number of other members. The aggregation of members of the class does not logically subsume the existence of the class itself.

Although formal discussion of this problem is more or less restricted in modern times to mootings within pure mathematics and formal logic, the essential paradox (antinomy) encountered in some formal investiga-

tions is a sub-species of the same essential predicament confronted constantly in everyday psychological life. We shall demonstrate that connection, with increasing force, as we proceed. Immediately, the reader should bear this point in mind respecting the relevance of the material we are treating at this phase of the present article.

To situate Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" in the terms of reference respectively employed later by such figures as Hegel and Cantor, we argue that Descartes is wilfully avoiding the induction fallacies of "bad infinity." We offer a limited view of that problem as follows. As Cantor proves formally (respecting the "power set of all sets"), even an "infinite" enumeration of the terms of a class could not completely identify the totality (Gestalt) of the class. No amount (Descartes insists) of experience of the sort by which we "know" any x_i could possibly reach knowledge of the human in terms of x_i . The class as a whole ("I think" as an existent subject, the existence of the class as a whole) determines the existence of the particular members of the class, but is neither determined by them nor as one of them.

Yet, foreshadowing the kernel of Cantor's notion of transfinite numbers, from the existence of the predicates we do know the actual existence of the class as a whole dialectically. The difficulty immediately confronting one at such a point of the investigation is that the argument of "Cogito ergo sum" conditionally proves a proposition which has to be explored further before we can account fully for what the first theorem has proven. To restate the point: the argument of "Cogito ergo sum" proves the existence of the subject (the human self = "I think") **by demonstrating the absurdity of a contrary judgement**. It is a "negative" proof, not yet positive knowledge of the human self (i.e., Mind). The first theorem thus begs the second, "perfection," such that the two must be regarded as interconnected, interdependent.

"Perfection": Modify the symbolic statement to read: "I think that x_{ij} ," in which, for any value of i , $j=1, 2, 3, \dots$, are successive orderings of advancement in knowledge respecting any species of experience. Employing the same dialectic used to determine the existence of the subject, "I think," for "Cogito ergo sum," what is the quality of the same subject for the expression "I think that x_{ij} "? **Relative to any fixed ordering of knowledge** (e.g., for $j=1$ throughout any "complete" class of enumerations, "I think that x_{ij} ,") **"I think" has the self-evident quality of self-developing progressive change**.

The attempt to interpret this from the standpoint of elementary discrete sense-impressions (e.g., empiricism, logical positivism) must be rejected as a reading of Descartes' argument. I.e., x_{ij} cannot be treated as an elementary or self-evident sense-impression, since it is not only changing, but its "motion" of **change** is the

primary datum (predicate) of the "set." E.g., instead of treating each x_{ij} as a self-evident factual datum, the "cell-form" of human knowledge becomes, as first approximation for hypothesis, **the process of change** linking any x_{ij} to its successor $x_{i(j+1)}$.

However, the subject can no longer be treated as empirically equivalent to the particular individual self. Since the advancement of knowledge in individuals is dependent upon developments occurring throughout contemporary society, and since the "set" of predicates for the subject of this theorem is not completed except in the future and past, the advancement of knowledge in the individual is itself merely a predicate of something **infinite: universal, unique, and comprehensive**. The existent subject defined by "I think that x_{ij} is an infinite existence of the motion of self-perfection of human knowledge, which is actualized through the creative contributions of particular individuals as immediate predicates of that infinite being.

If Spinoza's interpretation of Descartes is correct in this argument, and it is absolutely correct **as far as he proceeds**, then, setting the evidence for the general thesis in conjunction with Descartes' two great dialectical theorems, the motion of the human mind (its primary substance, being=self-perfection), must be coherent in form and nature with the primary substance of the infinity which is the physical universe. **The form of "matter" itself must be that of a self-perfecting continuum, and neither an aggregation of discrete elementary particles nor a simple, linear continuum.**

This reading of Descartes was first developed by B. Spinoza (notably, his *Ethics*) who adduced from such dialectical insights the notion that the creative principle of universal mind and universal matter-motion were coextensive infinite "substances," infinitely **extended being**. Spinoza was also the first to articulate the notion of an actual infinite in opposition to "bad infinity," situating this distinction in respect to the ethical predicament confronting each individual in society.(3b)

From a modern standpoint, ~~with~~ the application of crude engineering-school thermodynamics to industrial engineering knowledge of production and distribution proves Spinoza's specific notion on this point.(11a) The material preconditions for the existence of any individual in capitalist society (or, the U.S.S.R., China, etc., as well) depends upon a worldwide network of interconnected production of both material conditions of life and of the households in which workers are acculturated to be productive in terms of modern technologies. This network could not be broken up into smaller units without reversing technological development and general social productivity. The existing human population would then be largely wiped out and the residue degraded to a medieval material and cultural condition, by such autarchical "reforms." In such a world-histor-



RENE DESCARTES: The giant of the 17th century, founder of systematic inquiry into the nature of the human mind. (One of those cited in Newton's: "...I stood on the shoulders of giants.") First defined the notion of a dialectical method appropriate to the modern, humanist conception.

ical organization of production every creative contribution to the advancement of, or realization of innovations increasing the negentropy of the network is of universal benefit to the human race present, future — and, implicitly, **past!** Such acts of creative mentation (e.g., either in creating new knowledge or realizing its application) make each human individual responsible for these an **actually infinite being, a concrete form of infinite being, a concrete universal.**

Spinoza's argument becomes lucid when he is read in terms of our illustration of the point. The task of the individual, he prescribed, is to locate the necessary form of progress for one's society, to also locate the "handles" of social development accessible to one's practice, and in that setting make one's active existence (creative acts) a positive and permanent (i.e., "infinite") contribution to the existence of humanity.

The individual who has competently adduced his Spinozan ethical task for his time and place, and who also self-consciously governs his actions with scientific competence to such ends, is by definition an un-alienated man, a true human being. His value to society is located not in the mere specific acts ("predicates") which are useful, since the completion of the act would annul his further importance to society. His value to society is located in his **self-conscious activity**; he is valuable to society not merely for what specific contributions he has made, but as he represents continuing resource, a self-conscious activity engaged in

continuously struggling to make such contributions. That is the kernel of the Spinozan dialectic and Spinozan Humanism.

There is another major conceptual difficulty to be overcome in connection with the Descartes-Spinoza dialectic. Hegel's devastating quip on Joseph Schelling suffices to illustrate the problem involved.(6a,8)

Schelling earned personal honor in philosophy by rejecting the dominant, fatuous proclivity of the eighteenth century to disregard Spinoza as a "dead dog." Yet, Schelling himself proved incapable of understanding the actual content of either Descartes or Spinoza. He accepted the idea of as "infinitely extended being," simultaneously mind and substance, but he had no notion of this substance as being actual self-movement, actual self-perfection.

The attempt to establish a "unified field theory" illustrates the point to be made. If one interprets the implications of Riemann's discoveries only in a certain limited way, pathetic fallacies are introduced which prohibit the advancement of useful experimental hypotheses respecting a comprehensive notion of universal physical law. If one interprets "continuum" as signifying a **simple** energy continuum, the cognition of the universe as a totality leads only to a notion of an infinity of Unending "Blah." Or, as Hegel demolished Schelling on precisely this account in his **Phenomenology**, one's efforts to conceptualize an infinite continuum in this way leads only to "a night in which all cows are black."(6a)

To conceptualize the physical universe as a true continuum, it would be necessary to supercede the notion of simple energy by a notion of a universal continuum of negative entropy, just as exponential values for the expression $S'/(C+V)$ define a self-developing continuum for socialist society (when the elements of the ratio are proportions of total productive labor and changes in values are compared with existing per capita rates of throughput of C and V).(11a) It would be necessary, in the case of universal physics, to approach the formulation of observational and experimental hypotheses from the standpoint of recognizing that the "fundamental laws of the universe" (as we now understand the notion of the application of those laws to nearby "macro" space) must be defined as **changing in some ordered fashion**. As a result, the fundamental metric of the universe must probably evolve **in some fashion** appropriate to the general, progressive evolution of the universe in general.*

For the reason indicated respecting Schelling's case, the elaborated comprehension of the accomplishments of Descartes and Spinoza begins with Hegel, and is essentially completed by Karl Marx's resolution of the uncompleted contributions to Spinoza and Hegel of Feuerbach.(12b) With Hegel the notion of a universal (actually infinite) self-developing creative process as **primary substance** becomes the center of scientific inquiry. Indeed, all the preconditions for psychological science are completed with the successive work of Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx: as we shall show in a general way in due course.

4. The Case of Beethoven

The major practical problem confronted in the Labor Committee project of this past winter and spring was that of providing the members with some accessible empirical demonstration of the actual existence within themselves of powers of the form of Cartesian perfection. Although the essential and ultimate proof to be desired is found best in the political organizing process, we had the problem of communicating the necessary notion at a time when the few hundreds workers directly affected by our organization **do not yet** represent the advanced quality of mass-strike ferment in which these human qualities become overwhelmingly evident. For reasons to be indicated immediately below, an approximation, temporary substitute, and preparation for the mass-organizing experience is available in an individual's self-conscious experience of the creative qualities in a great work of art. Notably: the instance of the great compositions included among Beethoven's last forty opus numbers (from approximately Opus 95 onward).

The writer had developed a preliminary thesis on art to this point during the 1948-53 period, and had extended the inquiry in several bursts from about 1960 onwards. The thesis had been in circulation in the organization since late 1969; it had been furthered in some respects by considerable, growing research efforts within the organization respecting the direct correlation between a "counter-culture" and the spread of proto-fascist and actually-fascist movements among youth in Weimar Germany and in the U.S.A. and Western Europe today. Significant work had been done on applying and advancing this thesis by a gifted young composer, whose creative powers had also been the basis for her rise into a leading position in the organization. All that taken into account, the thesis we outline below was summarized to this member this past winter, with the urgent request that she develop a seminar focussed upon the slow movement of the Beethoven Opus 106, as a means for communicating a

* In stating this, it must be understood — as the case of Kepler and Riemann suggest from different aspects of the problem — that merely opening one's mind to the search for hypothesis of that sort does not **in itself** make one iota of progress in theoretical experimental physics. It is essential to create the systematic basis for observational and experimental hypothesis, as Riemann, Cantor, Klein, et al., did for the revolution in physics which exploded at the turn of the century. It is also necessary to have Keplers, Plancks, and Einsteins working from an overview of the detailed observational and experimental work of lesser figures in the field, Keplers who fanatically fight through at all costs to bring actual material into the form they know it must latently represent.

sensuous comprehension of the dialectical notion of "inner self" required for mass-organizing work. That work has been the basis for a series of seminars and subsequent public classes, and will undoubtedly be written out and published at some time in the early future. We identify here those broader aspects of the matter which have direct bearing on the subject of this present paper.

Any intensive effort to learn to compose like Beethoven confronts the musician with a fundamental antinomy apparently identical with that adduced by Immanuel Kant. It is possible, to a certain extent, to develop from Beethoven's compositions various phases of evolution of what seem to be definite rules of composition. Yet, no matter how gifted the musician so equipped, he could not realize a single composition in this way that would not be immediately distinguishable as a mere parody. This demonstrates that the peculiar power and identity of any important Beethoven composition is located in qualities which are beyond comprehension in terms of any possible fixed set of formal rules. This demonstrates that the essential feature of such compositions is something which lies outside the domain of any understanding in terms of formal logic, etc. Yet, like Descartes' "I think," it exists.

Proceeding from that initial predicament, the next phase of the formal investigation is properly implied by the nature of the problem. To understand Beethoven systematically, that is self-consciously, it is indispensable to master the rules, the canons, to adduce certain evolving such canons for Beethoven's work as a whole, and to also adduce the new canons developed in that way. This professional competence is indispensable precisely to be able to isolate those features of the composition in which the prior rules are diabolically violated. Concentrating for the moment on the major compositions from approximately Opus 95 onwards, it is sufficient for present illustration to identify two general kinds of "tricks" he introduces to give these works their living substance, their existence, the ruses of an hubristic/genie engaged in using and even creating the rules apparently precisely to violate them. We emphasize the special use of counterpoint and "arbitrary" surprise to achieve such ironies.

The case of counterpoint — especially as Beethoven develops this essence of Western music — emphasizes the meaning of irony in this setting. Counterpoint, properly realized for its creative potentialities, is a means for exploiting a set of canons to canonically reach "structural relations" within the composition which are potentially in more or less rude violation of those same canons. Surprise is a basic approach to realizing the same effect in the opposite fashion. One introduces an ostensibly alien feature, and then guilefully makes its existence appear to be canonical through development which resolves the contradiction in an

apparently lawful way — through the creation of new formalities.

Beethoven's "late" discovery of the fuller potentialities and significance of the fugue is the most powerful demonstration of the creative principle within music. The introduction of ironical improvisations into musical composition by itself would be merely a petit-bourgeois anarchist irrationalist's act. **Truth**, especially in the sense that Beethoven is a fanatic for truth in music, lies outside both the Apollonian bathos of pure formalism and the Dionysian anti-intellectualism (i.e., anti-humanism, bestialism) of the capricious violation of "law" for the sake of asserting an animal sort of "freedom" from law. **Freedom** in Beethoven is as totally bounded by **Necessity** as it is in the same principled way for Karl Marx!(12f) His great late fugues most exactly express that principle of Truth.

To understand the reasons why the fugue, in its various developments (e.g., fantasy-fugue, variations and fugue, etc., in Bach, Beethoven) is the highest achievement of musical composition to date, it is necessary to see music as created to celebrate that quality in the composer, performer, and audience which otherwise expresses the noblest human qualities of daily life.

Turning our view of daily life to that subsumed by our general thesis, on the most primitive level of overview of the human condition, **Necessity** is represented in terms of fixed natural and man-made laws. Reality, presented to society and the individual in terms determined apparently by such laws, is constantly a struggle for existence. In this view, **Freedom** appears as the problem-solving mental activity, and realized practice, by which such **Necessity**-bounded problems of existence are resolved. On a higher level, man-made law and technology are seen as evolving, with the result that the notion of **Freedom** is also enlarged in a similar way. **Man**, in this second view, is free to synthesize changes in **fixed** man-made and technology laws, but not in a totally arbitrary (i.e., not in an anarchistic) way. The **Freedom** through which man-made and technological laws can be changed for the benefit of the individual and society's existence is itself restricted by a **Necessity** governing this.

Arbitrary or anarchistic "freedom" in art evokes properly the same degree of intellectual interest as crude cheating at solitaire. **Freedom** in musical composition becomes moving, exciting when it expresses a solution to the problem of lawfully altering fixed **Necessity**. The late Beethoven fugues express this principle in the highest form found in art, since the peculiarity of the form is that it is so emphatically the creation of a new order of **Necessity**, through the introduction and development of those selected expressions of **Freedom** which accomplish the transition from one set of old canons to a new set.

The same principle is encountered in the admittedly rare great work of poetry. To the extent that a poem locates its subject-matter in literal or symbolic features of the composition, the poet has accomplished little better than to represent prosaic ideas in a precious fashion. Bad poetry, in this respect, is associated with an emphasis on forms as such. By this standard, for example, T.S. Eliot is not a poet, and the fascist poet, Ezra Pound, is actually only a semi-poet (by contrast with the banality of Eliot). The subject of a great poem is never identified within the body of the poem, neither literally **nor symbolically**. Rather, the predicates of the composition uniquely demand the reader's conceptualization of a subject-matter which thus seems to lie outside the poem as such; the identity of that subject-matter, exactly like Descartes' "I think" in this respect, is none the less precise. This does not mean that poetry is properly a clever method of circumlocution; the subject-matter of poetry is properly the sort of definite notion which does not admit of communication in extant prose forms.

By this standard Shelley is inferior to Heine as a poet. For example: Heine's ironical juxtaposition of loved persons and places in such a fashion that neither can be competently adduced as the subject, but the subject is nonetheless powerfully definite as the dialectical content. Such unearthed, unartificial compactness Shelley rarely masters. Yet, his "Ode to the West Wind" is a suitable clinical case for illustrating the principle we have cited.

It is, admittedly possible to offer a banalized reading of the "Ode...", provided one degrades the change of seasons into a matter of symbolism. This bowdlerized reading of the poet's intention evaporates for us the instant we take into account the fact that the true poetic faculty is associated with the most powerful kinds of agonized feeling-states. No great poem could be written with the kind of personal detachment which the symbolic interpretation of the "Ode..." imputes to Shelley at the time of composing.

Any person who has tasted the capacities for creative poetry within himself has probably frequently experienced the following sort of circumstances as those in which the impulse to write poetry overcame him. The poet experiences moments in which there is a conjunction between profound concern for others and a simultaneous agony respecting his incapacity or limited powers to aid those others. This conjunction challenges his identity in the most profound way, challenging him to create within himself, to force from his unconscious processes some new power for consciousness, without such a new power, he must fail at that particular conjunction, threatening his deepest sense of inner self-identity (the real inner self, as distinct from the persona).



LUDWIG van BEETHOVEN: The pinnacle of the Enlightenment, from which peak subsequent art generally represents stages of descent.

Ignorant outsiders, including numerous literati, conclude from the discernment of agony in great poetic works that some ordinary sort of personal disappointment, bereavement, etc., must therefore be the prompting of the poem. In certain examples, undoubtedly, there is a specious germ of truth in such edifications. What mere educated men — that is, men lacking a sense of creative powers in themselves — fail to recognize, is that the creative personality has a different sense of inner identity than exists for the proverbial "ninety-nine and forty-four one-hundredths per cent" of the population of capitalist society (in particular). Where the ordinary alienated individual vaguely senses the existence of some inner "little me", as a kind of banalized monad, the creative individual, especially the great poets and composers, locates as his inner self precisely his power for creativity. While such a poet may also experience the ordinary sort of agonies, his development of self-conscious creative powers has endowed him with a capacity for a kind of agony which is generally unknown in this way to alienated persons. The alien pressure to be an "ordinary" person, the

difficulty in communicating certain kinds of conceptions to a banalized audience uniquely, problems characteristic of self-conscious creativity, confronts the creative person with a recurring fear of a special kind of "death:" fear of the day on which these egregious, fragile creative powers will cease to exist for him. It is that agony which he invariably experiences whenever he is in the throes of creative effort, and that agony which is at the same time his most powerful motivation for creative output. Hence, to be confronted in any way with the image of a human problem he cannot solve **with his existing knowledge** confronts the creative artist with the most powerful motive for drawing new qualities of knowledge from his creative powers, and at the same time threatens him with a kind of agony which few persons experience, the dreadful thought that perhaps his creative powers have mysteriously vanished ("died") since his last creative output. It is in that way that the fear of "death" of the creative inner self produces great agonies as the circumstances, theme, and motive of most of the great creative artistic productions of our culture.

The "Ode to the West Wind" can be understood as we locate the dialectical subject-matter uniting Shelley's revolutionary outlook with his deep-felt personal agony respecting the fear of "death" of his inner, creative self: the fear of living biologically as the husk, the conscious coffin of a dead "spiritual" self. His "A Defence of Poetry" permits one no doubt on this. In periods of great social upsurge, he argues correctly, there is a qualitative transformation of broader populations, to the effect that they suddenly acquire power to impart and receive the most profound communications respecting man and nature. Suddenly, then, the creative artist finds an audience capable and zealous in receiving and comprehending the kinds of conceptions which more directly reflect the creative processes within him. The enlivening of the minds of his audience in this way gives the inner self of the artist a social reality. As the kinds of conceptions expressing his creative processes are suddenly susceptible of life within an ennobled audience, this audience, as the expression of society, gives reflected social existence to the inner self of the creative artist. In such periods, these inner creative powers, so given social identity, are awakened to the boldest exercise of their potentialities. The artist is astonished to find in himself the nearly-constant outflow of such profound understanding as he had not imagined possible during earlier periods.(13b) He, his inner, creative self, has become alive, has an active social existence. Then, with the ebb of social ferment, his audience lose their powers of comprehension — lose their souls — and become again the old, familiar schlimihls, capable of receiving and enjoying only philistine banalities. These audiences are mystified as to what even they themselves had admired and understood in the creative works they embraced so enthusiastically during the preceding period of ferment.

That sort of relationship between the creative artist, and society (through the mediation of his audience) is the constant ironic theme of all great works of art; the life-death struggle of the artist's inner self, his creative faculties. It is the content, the deeply personal, sensuous content, he locates in every other subject and sensuous experience upon which he draws. The greatness of Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind" is that it expresses in a more concentrated and exact way that same topic which is merely circumscribed through prose in his essays, "On Love" and "A Defence of Poetry."

Anyone who has written poetry expressing sensibility of the creative process as his own identity, must sadly concede the obvious superiority of music over poetry as a creative artistic medium. The fact that poetry is so closely linked to prose in its predicates causes extraordinary difficulty in the effort to uniquely force the dialectical subject-matter into the perception of the reader. The longer a poem becomes, the more monstrous this problem becomes: literal aspects, symbolic aspects constantly threaten to give credence to unwanted banal interpretations of the subject-matter. A great poem must perforce be a short poem, which through its economy and concentration, permits no reasonable communication but that intended. The fact that Western musical development has created a medium which is a sensuous medium and yet distanced from commonly literal employment of its predicates establishes music as a medium in which the impossible desire of every great poet can be attained: the development of a single conception over the duration of an audience's prolonged attention-span. Yet, music is not "abstract" in the bathetic sense of "abstractness" sought by such zombies as the serialists or by the non-objective schools of the plastic forms. Its essential predicate, musical sound, has developed from the root of prosody in language, and thus expresses the most immediate sensuous aspect of social relations in intensely abstracted fashion. It is the most advanced art form for this reason: it is the medium in which we can most freely and intensely exercise the creative process in a medium of concentrated socialized sensuousness.

In this section so far, we have confined our attention to the most general and essential aspect of the content of great art: art as a medium for communicating, celebrating and strengthening the creative processes in artist and audience. We have not yet attempted to get inside the process itself, to discriminate among the differing qualities of affective states ("moods") which the creative process — and its productions — may represent as differentiations of itself. Mentioning our awareness of that omission should suffice to dispel any fears we have ignorantly overlooked such further considerations.

Social Roots of Creative Art

Situating a great Beethoven composition within our general thesis, we note that the quality which he expresses, and so evokes from his audience, in the creative identity of the whole development of the composition, is nothing but that quality which distinguishes man from the lower beasts. What distinguishes man from the lower beasts, the quality within him which enables him to live and develop as man, is the creative power for deliberately developing new technologies, etc., through which man overcomes the entropy of outlived forms and supercedes these outlived forms by rising to higher states of negentropy. To the extent that an art form is an elaboration of the connection of Freedom and Necessity, as the definition of that is developed by Marx, it is essentially a celebration of that in man which is distinctly human.

This has the most profound implications. From this standpoint, we cannot regard great art of any medium as either mere entertainment or indifferent to scientific criteria. Art, as a medium for the concentrated expression of the creative faculty by artist and audience, addresses itself to that in the individual which is human, those qualities of mentation upon which the advancement of society, even the mere perpetuation of society, depends absolutely. To the extent that any form of art contains and expresses creative activity of the form of Freedom/Necessity, it is a special and indispensable form of **universal labor**; (11b, 12e) the artist, as the great abstract mathematician does in a different way, arouses and shapes new creative powers in the audience at the same time his work celebrates and strengthens those powers which are already matured.

By contrast, any art which is merely an application of established artistic canons, mere repetition of sensuous gimmickry without creative development (bestialized art: e.g., Rock, "socialist realism," etc.), is anti-human, reactionary. Art could not be a matter of personal taste-preferences; it is not personal tastes which properly judge art, but art which judges the mental condition reflected by the symptomology of taste. To the extent that any individual prefers Rock or serial-composed music to Beethoven, that evidence alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the individual has been bestialized in his self-estimation; no person could "enjoy" Rock or regard serial-composition as honest music unless his alienation had become sufficiently pathetic that he no longer even desired to recover those human qualities he has been denied. As for the person who "likes both Beethoven and Rock," that is sufficient, too, to prove that he has lost the power to listen to the content of Beethoven's music.

The object of Beethoven seminars in the Labor Committees, like the object of this outline of the case here, is to provide the means by which the individual

can become self-conscious of his "power to be powerfully moved" by that quality of great art which defies elucidation by ordinary formal criticism. Since one is able to demonstrate, along the lines of the Cartesian "perfection" theorem, that the essential content, the identity of great art, is located in the expression of the creative process, the individual is so enabled to identify that within himself which responds to this as his own creative processes. By making himself self-conscious of the way in which Beethoven, for example, attains such effects, the individual is then equipped to locate those feeling-states in himself, as empirical knowledge of those states, which correspond to the experiencing of the creative moment of the work of art. In general, the positive function of artistic criticism is to assist audiences in so "isolating" and self-consciously conceptualizing such a relationship between the creative content of art and the responsive movements of the creative potential in themselves.

The objective and potentiality of self-consciously studying Beethoven in that fashion is to locate in oneself that quality which must become one's sense of "inner Self" identity, as a precondition for becoming either, specifically, an effective political working-class organizer or, in the future, a true human being.

There is nothing mysterious, generally speaking, in Beethoven's continued preeminence as the most advanced musician down to the present day. Although certain kinds of progress have occurred in music since Beethoven, up to approximately the end of the last century (e.g., Mahler, Wolf), the dynamic of creative development in music shifted after Beethoven, from its former general upward sweep into him, down hill. No musician after Beethoven has actually comprehended, and thus built upon, the **full** implications of his last period of work. For music to advance today, it would have to begin its advance by going back to Beethoven and adducing from his last period the proper point of departure for actual, comprehensive progress. Respecting what was accomplished after him, these are secondary advances whose positive features could be duly assimilated into the general progress.

This matter of contrary long upward and subsequent declining sweeps is not principally a result of anything which can be comprehended within the bounds of music or musicians per se. Beethoven, like Goethe, Shelley, Heine, reflected and embodied the culmination of the greatest mass-wave of intellectual ferment in human history, the great upsurge of Humanism from the Renaissance through the culmination of the French Enlightenment in German culture. In this respect, Beethoven is to be compared to Kant and Hegel. Kant and Hegel epitomize the flowering and further advance of Humanism in backward Germany at the very point that upward development in philosophy had come to a halt in the countries of its origin, notably England and France. Although the effort to locate the motivation of Beethoven's compositions in specific aspects of the

social and political revolution of his time is "program-musical" edification, Beethoven expresses the Enlightenment in Germany in precisely the fashion implied by Shelley's "A Defence of Poetry." If there might have been some specific influences of political events on Beethoven, such demonstrations would have very little bearing on anything of importance here. The relationship to the creative artist to periods of revolutionary ferment is not so much to the political and social movements as such as to the effect of these developments upon the mental powers of his audiences.*

If we consider Beethoven's development as a musician, his youthful training in Bach, his saturation in Mozart, etc., and also examine the milieu in which he developed later, he was a product of a closely-interwoven fabric of Humanist musical development throughout Western Europe which had persisted with increasingly bold advances since the Renaissance. He enjoyed a developed audience as well as a setting amid such a great proliferation of the most gifted composers as the experience of no living person could approximate. This musical world, despite its considerable antipathy to the French Revolution and the merest hint of sans-culottism, inevitably reflected, like the French Enlightenment of Frederick the Great, the intellectual upsurge of the Enlightenment, despite its own immediate political intent.

As to what the impact of these forces was upon Beethoven, his music from the Bonn period onward leaves us with no basis for doubt. Beethoven's music, early steeped in the most hubristic sweep of bold improvisations, represents the successive phases of self-development of what might at first seem to be sheer musical creativity (Freedom) for its own sake. Yet, throughout, the dominant feature of his hubristic impulses is a powerful moral force, amounting to the most concentrated expression of the principles of Freedom-Necessity. It is proper to regard him therefore as the consummate revolutionary of his time, provided we do not banalize the notion of "revolutionary" as the early nineteenth-century equivalent of "Socialist Realism." Beethoven's revolutionary impulse is essentially focussed in the conception of himself as a man; his conception of what his activity must be as a musician-man is the most concentrated elaboration art has produced of the notion of Freedom-Necessity.†

5. Psychology

None of this historical evidence respecting the nature of the human mind enjoys better than a peripheral and

indirect reflection in professional psychology. For this we properly restrict our attention to two branches of inquiry, psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology, making no more than the unavoidable references to such pathetic factions as "classical psychiatry" or behaviorism.

Both psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology are developments emerging at the turn of the century. Consequently, the occasion for their belated appearance predetermined that psychology would evolve in pathetic ignorance of its extant prerequisites. The characteristic flaws of and respective distinctions between these two branches of psychological inquiry are typical of a period of general intellectual decay in every field of fundamental inquiry but the physical sciences.

Sigmund Freud took perverse pride in his pathetic illiteracy in philosophy, a streak of naked philistinism in him perhaps sufficiently understood by examining the post-1848 thrust of Viennese painters as well as the bankrupt political and moral condition of the Austrian monarchy. Christian Ehrenfels and his principal epigoni, Wolfgang Koehler and Max Wertheimer, recognized the existence of the creative process in systematic terms, exactly where Freud and his principal disciples commit a fundamental flaw of omission in psychoanalytical "metapsychology." Yet, Ehrenfels, who looks for the creative process in Mind precisely because he reflects the dialectical influence of Riemann, Cantor, Klein, et al., implicitly denies the social determination of conscious (and unconscious) processes, and thus founds a valuable branch of no direct clinical therapeutic applicability.

We should first summarize the implications of Ehrenfels' approach as they are best known through Koehler's chimpanzee experiments.(9) It is most relevant to consider the epistemological reasons why Ehrenfels could discover the existence of the creative process where Freud, a thorough clinical investigator, with extraordinary creative powers of his own, shows not the slightest sensibility of the problem involved.

The notion of a **Gestalt** corresponds epistemologically to the dialectical subject, "I think," in Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum." To Ehrenfels, et al., as for Descartes: For a plenum of particular predicates of experience, there exists a subject, the **concept** of the class of experiences as a totality, which is not a simple member of the aggregation of predicates, which cannot logically

* In any case, Beethoven, if the authoritative Thayer is correct, was notoriously ingenuous respecting any form of politics. He apparently adduced from the freedom he was permitted to insult political celebrities and to make even publicly the most frank political criticisms, that Austrian society shared the same freedom. Beethoven, who was self-conscious of his greatness as a musician, was apparently consolingly indifferent to the reasons his eccentricities were so casually tolerated by the Austrian regime.

† Indeed, the only indisputable specifically "political" element in Beethoven's work is his treatment of the subject of the "ideal woman." In those few locations, typified by "Fidelio," the music, more sturdy evidence than a libretto, attests to Beethoven's notion of what kind of a woman would match his thus most intimate notion of the personal quality and most intimate personal relationships of the kind of humanity he sought in himself.

be induced from even the most intensive and prolonged analysis of its predicates.

Ehrenfels located a paradigm for solving such a problem **experimentally** in the notion of **invariant**. The significance of this is implicit in analysis of the fundamental antinomy of line-points relationship. In one important sense, limiting our view of Riemann's work to this subsumed feature, the notion of **invariant** resolves the problem of experimentally identifying the relationship of whole to its subsumed particularities for all kinds of simple configurations and alterations of configurations of predicated particular features. **Implicitly**, and this bears upon the more important frontier-like aspect of Riemann's work even to the present day, we must consider the impossibility of conceptualizing a whole as primary (elementary) with respect to its predicates (as, relatively, constructs) unless the invariant feature of the whole is self-development.



WOLFGANG KOEHLER: Employed Christian Ehrenfels' use of the notion of an invariant to experimentally demonstrate the existence of creative synthesis of Gestalts. Employed this to demonstrate the incompetence of the notions of mentation advanced by such behaviorists as Watson and Skinner.

Given the general thesis, it should be evident that any effective experimental approach to psychological behavior which aimed at isolating the phenomenon of invariant for the historic relationship between concept and particularities, would represent the efficient approach for experimentally demonstrating the existence of the creative process! Indeed, what Ehrenfels and his

leading epigoni demonstrated in fact is Hegel's point that **even simple perception is a reflection of a creative process.**(6a) The simplest sort of discrete mental image, including those of abstract logic, is not primary (self-evident sense-phenomenon), but a "mere construct" of a physiology premising the human creative process of mentation!

Provided one extends such experimental and observational investigations in the obvious way, we encounter the fundamental antinomy in the most dreadful form. On the one hand, we naively regard the particularate form of sense-phenomena and conscious mental images as self-evident, and consider it unthinkable to begin interpreting any aspect of reality as primitive except as one begins with "discrete images," "isolated simple facts." Yet, experimental investigation of the content of perception suffices to demonstrate that the axioms of discreteness are self-contradictory, even absurd!

This should signify to psychology that it must locate the fundamental substance (the elementary facts) of human mental processes beyond what are taken to be the conscious forms of conscious and unconscious activity. In the ordinary form of the conscious processes, thought is immediately in approximately the form it is abstractly represented by formal logic, a plenum of discrete object-like images being moved about by relations in the form of "feelings." (**Cathexis** in psychoanalysis.)

As we indicated, Freud is clinically powerful exactly where Gestalt psychology fails. His founding of psychoanalysis is the discovery that the clinical feature of human psychology is socially determined, rather than a biologically-determined function of individual experience: that the form of consciousness itself, as well as the regulating principle of judgment (ego-ideals) is created within the individual by society, principally, in the initial period of extra-uterine gestation, through the mediation of his parents and siblings. To that extent, Freud **unwittingly** replicated a crude approximation of the accomplishments of Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach.

The greatness of Freud is centrally situated in his application of his considerable powers of insight (creative powers) to examine the dynamics of individual psychology, always guided by a special passion for truth. In this side of this work, Freud rejected the organized lying which is empiricism, and so never created a category of clinical psychodynamics except as the kind of phenomena defined actually existed as distinct **Gestalts** for clinical work. In empiricism, by contrast, categories are treated with epistemological indifference as mere inductive constructs; if induction from an aggregation of arbitrarily or otherwise assembled predicates repeatedly demonstrates a similar pattern of correlation within certain tolerances for "significance," the empiricist blithely presumes that he is free to assert his inductive interpretation of the data as if

such an edification were itself an existent reality. Hence, the complementary feature of empiricist intellectual immorality is the contempt for "theoretical work" among laymen and even the "theoreticians" themselves. Empiricism, the dominant intellectual immorality of contemporary capitalist culture, permits one to impute existence to all sorts of fictional rubbish; so, the reaction to this pathetic behavior is that all scientific judgment is regarded as "mere theory," as distinct from any ignorant man's "superior" (impressionistic) interpretation of an isolated "hard fact." Freud's clinical categories (unlike his metapsychology) are all experimentally demonstrated to be empirically-isolatable causes, or empirically known states. One sympathizes with and admires Freud's moral abhorrence for what he regarded rightly as irresponsible speculations in such students as the wild Wilhelms, Stekel and Reich.

The shortfall of Freud's method becomes epistemologically clear when we consider his treatment of a certain aspect of the unconscious processes as **categorically unconscious**; (4b,c) he regarded certain aspects of unconscious processes as intrinsically not susceptible of being made conscious. His various efforts to develop a "metapsychology," are inevitably permeated with reductionist metaphysics, a metaphysical fantasy-world of "instincts" and other crudely mechanistic epiphenomenal categories of mentation.

The powerful contrast in implicit epistemological outlook of two of his more widely-read writings gives an indication of the difficulty for him. In **The Future of An Illusion** (1927), his outlook is essentially that of Feuerbach, and not distant from the world-outlook of Marx. Two years later, we have **Civilization and its Discontents**, an almost Dionysian revel in pessimistic reductionist metaphysics. The profitable approach to comparison of these two works is to recognize that their differences in outlook can not be sufficiently explained from Freud's work and experiences during the intervening period. The mechanistic tendency is strong in the "metapsychology" studies of the earlier war period, and elsewhere in the general development of the notion of the "Id." (4b,c) Freud vacillated between the two tendencies, the semi-dialectical and the reductionist, throughout his work.

One effective approach to the distinctions between the works is to recognize that in **The Future of An Illusion**, Freud is relying upon the aspect of his practice which bears more directly on his clinical work, upon his fundamental achievements. In the works dominated by the opposing tendency, he is veering into regions where he is epistemologically incompetent to judge the significance of his own clinical findings.

This leaves us with two immediate lines of discussion to be considered, to get at what psychoanalysis does accomplish and to get underneath its clinical superstructure to locate the wretched epistemological foun-

dations which prevent it from developing psychology more profoundly. We treat the first here, and the other in the following section on Marxian Psychology.

Basis for Clinical Work

In the phylogenesis of the typical adult petit-bourgeois personality ("character-structure") of U.S. urban regions comparable in this respect to Metropolitan New York City, we can readily distinguish the following distinct phases, each with its actual and otherwise potential contribution to the successive phases. Usually, the happiest phase is that of infancy, during which reasonably sane parents generally extend undifferentiated love toward the infant, so nourishing every variety of increase in the infant's powers. The misery begins with the second phase, usually highlighted by efforts to induce "bowel training." Undifferentiated love ceases, love is increasingly withdrawn for certain kinds of the child's development of his powers and continued only for others. The child is subjected to distinctions of "good" and "bad," in terms of the continuation and withholding of parental love respecting the development of his powers. One has the image of the more revealing child of this phase, who strikes out at his mother saying, in one fashion or another, "Why don't you love me when I'm bad, too?" The third phase is still more cruel. "Good" and "bad" become more complex, as the awarding and withholding of love from the parents and siblings tends to be mediated through the opinions of "others" outside the household; teachers, playmates, and other such "outsiders." As puberty approaches, an aggravation of this estrangement occurs. At the same time the child now experiences a qualitative increase in lessening of parental love (both by his parents and by virtue of his own internalized ideals), he begins to be made aware that he can look forward to a surrogate for lost parental love in the form of a relationship like that between his mother and father. He adduces from hints, gossip, and what-have-you the report that the lost feeling of "being loved," that which he has lost since infancy, can be regained by the performance of some mysterious act with a peer of the opposite sex. He also learns that it is "too soon" for him to reach such a paradisiacal state. For most such persons this is the "awkward age" between the accelerating loss of active parental love and the distant future gaining of a replacement. The fifth phase begins as he comes to regard himself as "sexually mature," in a social as well as a biological sense; the assuming or self-denial of a paired mating relationship (or, being externally denied this), becomes a central preoccupation. Then, usually at a time approaching the end of baccalaureate matriculation for the exemplary strata under consideration, we enter the sixth phase. He is being "economically" semi-weaned in the social identity he outwardly, and privately, affords to himself. Somewhere between twenty-four and thirty, for typical cases, the individual enters "middle age," sensing his life now almost finished.

There are two immediately discernible approaches to the interpretation of this phylogenetical process. The banal, reductionist approach treats the regulating principle of "love" in this development as an epiphenomenon of the genetical, as a more or less reified "biological sex drive." The extreme pathological version of such views in psychoanalysis is exemplified by the case of Wilhelm Reich, who brought hysterically reductionist prejudices into his psychoanalytical training, and whose later charlatanism of "orgone energy" is essentially nothing but a consistent if pathetic extension of the mechanistic conceptions of sexuality which govern his writings of the pre-Hilter period. We have a hint of the hysterical element in the notion of the "biological sex drive" even in the mild and ambivalent form it recurs in Freud's own work. The attempt to make pubertal and post-pubertal "love" a reified epiphenomenon of a "biological sex drive" compels the reductionist in Freud to contort the sensuous aspect of sociality, to impose the fiction of the "sex drive" upon even the defenseless infant.

The opposite approach, which is not without merely apparent but apparently monstrous epistemological difficulties, is to regard the post-pubertal "sex" drive as a predicate of the need for love. Love itself is the primary phenomenon. The basis for this approach was developed by the successive contributions of Spinoza, Hegel, and Feuerbach. To settle the problems incurred by this approach, we must refer the matter to the next section, where we examine the problem of the distinction between human and animal psychology.

Immediately, we must finish our summary respecting the unique positive, clinical basis for psychoanalytical work.

Effective clinical work must approach the genesis of neurotic disturbances from the at least implicit correct assumption that consciousness and the principal features of unconscious processes involved are socially-determined, through some sort of successive phases of individual development corresponding to the mode of maturation of the population from which the clinical subject is drawn. As *The Future of An Illusion* would imply to the perceptive reader, neurosis and its appendages are to be treated as a special case of **ideology**, in the sense we earlier attributed ideology to the prevailing self-images among workers of various capitalist sectors. (5a, 5d)

Obviously, psychoanalysis is not (at least generally) a program intended to turn subjects of capitalist society into true human beings (i.e., socialists), so the analyst is inhibited by conscience as well as by his own ideological prejudices from engaging in the more fundamental effort of stripping away **entirely** the ideological muck which constitutes the individual persona. Since the analyst is unable to offer his subject a mass-movement orientation in which to locate a new, positive

social identity, if the analyst were concerned to strip away the persona, the result would be frequent psychoses and suicides among the individuals so stripped of those protective illusions which hide from them the emptiness of their **individual qua individual** lives. The analyst has more limited objectives, **approximating the form and technique which would be employed properly in totally stripping away the bourgeois persona.**

If one accepts such a limitation, as Freud and most other analysts have, the competence of clinical work is restricted to two somewhat interconnected results. Firstly, to the extent that the individual's neurotic **dysfunctioning** represents behavior which does not correspond to the reality of his individual life-situation, his problem tends to be of the form of reflected pressures acting upon him as internalized images of actual or synthesized individuals and groups **from his past**. To the extent that such problems can be brought to consciousness, the subject freed of his internalized oppressors with the aid of the analyst's role as a surrogate father, the individual can be "cured" of much of that behavior and internal suffering which is out of correspondence with the reality of his bourgeois individual existence. Secondly, the individual's dysfunctioning is frequently enough linked to circumstances which are themselves destructive of his functioning as a bourgeois individual; also the individual may have brought additional such poisonous circumstances upon himself as a result of his neurosis. In such connections, the subject may be induced to willfully alter his circumstances — job, personal relationships, and so forth — as an essential practical concomitant of his attack on the historical roots of the problem.

The essential feature of this process is **love**. The point is perhaps best illustrated by referring to a development which either predetermines **potential** revolutionaries by the age of about five or six, or otherwise, contrary character-development, the "schlimihl syndrome."

Every individual who has manifest significant creative output in later life can undoubtedly recall incidents from approximately that age which parallel the following example. He experiences a relationship which was later soiled by the self-degrading response of that playmate to social pressures. The playmate, under social pressure, would "hear the cock crow thrice" and thereupon repudiate or otherwise reject an interest or opinion which he had earlier professed in the course of the exchanges between the two playmates. In the years that followed, the future creative adult was increasingly pained to observe members of his peer groups undergoing changes in passionately-held opinions and tastes in more or less perfect synchronization with prevailing fads. "Why do you do that?" he perhaps had asked such labile playmates and peers. The probable response, "Because it's good," or "Because I just like

it," was, of course, singularly unconvincing. He began to regard such persons — the majority of his age-group — as persons without "souls of their own," persons whose convictions were proverbially "mortgaged" to varying extents to whatever peer-group they wished to propitiate at that moment.

What, one should reflect most intensely, is the basis for the determining difference in personal character, even at age five or six, between the rare creative individual and the overwhelming majority, victims of the schlimihl syndrome? To make short of the point, the creative individual develops from the child who was better loved in infancy and whose first phase of childhood, uncharacteristically for our culture, did not so undermine his sense of positive identity (the quality of meriting love) that his self-estimation depended largely on **short-term** favorable peer-group opinion. The creative individual develops out of the child who has been loved for his development of his powers such that he has internalized a powerful self-confidence in progressive development of his powers of judgment.

The dynamics of this should be obvious from the standpoint of what we identified as the second and third phases of the child's development. (In the succeeding sections, we shall be considering the underlying epistemological basis for this approach.) The withdrawal of love is, in form and implicit content, a withdrawal of the social basis for the child's sense of identity, his sense of having the rights and privileges on which his existence depends — as those rights and privileges exist for him in his power to command the behavior of others in the interest of his existence. If we examine the problems of the second phase of development of the individual, we see the source of major disturbances in personality development here, even if we assumed that the prior period of infancy was "virtually perfect." Perhaps for an instant one is angrily impelled to consider eliminating this second phase entirely. Yet, that "solution" neither exists in practice, nor is it to be desired "even in a socialist society." The child's increase in powers beyond a certain age become the capacity for **ignorantly** destructive and self-destructive acts. The child must develop a sense which acts, under what circumstances, are positive, and which to be abjured correspondingly. The question of the second phase is therefore not of how to eliminate it, but of what constitutes the desirable approach to the necessary socialization of the post-infant.

There are two general alternatives. The one most in use is "negation of the negation," more or less as Kant described this in his **Critique of Practical Reason**. The individual of post-infancy "knows" that his existence (his power to mediate his existence through rights and privileges) depends chiefly on the love (implicit commitment to his desired rights and privileges) of his parents. He must "please them," thus perpetuating and increasing their love for him. Consequently, in

such a "negation of the negation" determination of the socialized personality, the child seeks to maintain the love on which his power to exist depends, by negating those "impulses within himself" which his society (his parents) negates: the "schlimihl syndrome."

Rarely, in contrast, he may be socialized by an alternative approach, that corresponding to a **self-subsisting positive**. He accepts responsibility for mastering the knowledge by which he can determine "rationally" those forms of his behavior which make his existence valuable to his society (e.g., immediately, his parents and siblings). This approach cannot be merely limiting his acts to those which are immediately beneficial to others. His value to others, especially at that age, chiefly demands his developing his power of discovery, of those forms of activity which are socially positive under varying circumstances: notably, his creative powers. Although this is the program to be desired for child-rearing between the ages of approximately eighteen months and five years, the post-infantile individual can assimilate such opportunity only to the extent that his infancy has prepared him for such freedom — **and responsibility!** The extensive mooting of the proper approach to the "problem of bowel training" exemplifies the extant, crude, almost trivial insight into these alternatives.

In principle, the development of the self-subsisting positive form of childhood socialization is constantly premised on the focussing of parental love for the child upon the development of his powers to make independent discriminations of what is positive social behavior. Since the "schlimihl syndrome" is not only the characteristic molecular expression of bourgeois ideology, but also the mediation principle of neurosis, the analyst properly extends **but also limits** love to the subject for the subject's development of the powers to judge what are positive acts. At the same time, on the basis of this "support," the analyst impels the subject to discriminate sanity, stupidity, and so forth **among the various internalized voices** stored up within the neurotic, creating an approximation of a healthy reconstruction of the post-infantile socialization phase.

We need merely acknowledge that the analyst must have competent knowledge of clinical psychodynamics, and to thus be able to steer the subject's self-critical processes in productive directions. More important is the analyst's ability to match an appropriate (corresponding) kaleidoscopic array of "feeling states" within himself to the succession of such states which the subject is experiencing.

The analysts' most urgent duty is to direct the explorations in such a way that he can piece together precisely such a replication of the patient's feeling-state dynamics **within himself**. It is not only the succession of feeling-states as such which is involved here. The feel-

ings exist for the subject only as attached companions of object-images (cathexis), internalized images which are variously persons, specific experiences, and so forth. By establishing the pattern of feeling-states and discerning the cathetical connections, the analyst is enabled to take the subject's mind inside his own. There he can now examine this replication, the operation of insight. The powers to accomplish this are not acquired by whim, although there are laymen throughout society who have more or less unconsciously developed approximations of the same capacity. Almost equally significant in the process is the fact that the "taking in" of a replication of a neurotic pattern into one's own mind is a dreadful experience. Only an ingenu of a pathetic individual would profess a desire to take another person's mind inside his own for entertainment; more often, the experience is so sickening and debilitating that the analyst himself must develop the capacity to experience the replication without becoming the victim of his subject's pathology.

Experiences approximating this analyst-subject relationship occur in daily life among ordinary people. Most instructive in that connection is the corollary of this, the nature and widespread use of devices by which individuals ordinarily block out deeper insights into the mental processes of others. Reflect! How often have you "felt" yourself beginning to assimilate a replication of another person's troubled mental state into your own mental processes, and have quickly stopped the process by a commonplace ruse. You probably blocked the process of assimilation by quickly and insistently giving a **name** to the phenomenon confronting you. "In other words," you say, "the problem is..." adding the **name**. Immediately, you follow that glib naming of the phenomenon by suggesting a "canonical" remedial action "for such problems," proceeding as if to suggest you had suddenly looked the name of the phenomenon up in some medical textbook and have begun reciting the glosses on etiology, prognosis and treatment, thus, by chatting away in that fashion, happily closing your mind against further insight into the actual phenomenon.

Analogous behavior is commonplace among members of socialist groups. The member, confronted with the problem of introducing a preliminary working notion of socialist politics into the mind of an interested contact, escapes the difficulties of the situation by reciting some cant, such as "dictatorship of the proletariat," all the while with a glint of hysteria in his own eyes as he recites such anaesthetic banalities. Exemplary of the point: "dictatorship of the proletariat" is a term developed by Karl Marx to identify an actualized intermediate form of the **political class for itself**. The term was developed by Marx to situate the empirical actuality of certain tendencies in the Paris Commune within a broader and more fundamental conception, the class-for-itself process, earlier explicated in such loca-

tions as the **Communist Manifesto** and **The Poverty of Philosophy**. Interestingly enough, one frequently meets Leftists who deride the class-for-itself conception by insisting that that notion is an idealist's rejection of the revolutionary-practical "dictatorship of the proletariat. They so employ the recital of what is **for them** a cant phrase to protect their minds against (actually) the threat to their **bourgeois ego-ideals** implicit in even a formal assimilation of Marx's outline of the **class-for-itself concept**.

In a similar way, most of the significant internal features of clinical psychoanalytical work occur, perhaps unwittingly, as commonplace transactions within the socialist movement. This is not to merely emphasize that the socialist movement shares such tendencies with society more generally; there is a qualitative distinction between the Left and society generally on exactly that point. Because the activity of socialist groups is task-oriented toward attempting to explore and remove bourgeois ideology, and since the psychodynamics of ideology are only the more general form for the psychodynamics of neurosis, the intellectual preoccupations of the socialist profession properly impel the movement, however reluctantly, to converge upon much of the work of psychoanalysis in that respect. This aspect of the matter is complemented by the "official pariah" status of being a member of such an organization, a circumstance of social stress which brings certain crises of the carried-forward bourgeois character-formation to the fore in a way approximating that appropriate to the psychoanalytical session.

The Fraud of "Spontaneous Remission"

By contrast with psychoanalysis, "classical psychiatry" and various forms of "behaviorist" therapy are charlatany. This is not to deny that both varieties sometimes produce apparent "cures" **in a certain fashion**. The point to be made is forced into focus by a quick overview of the myth of "spontaneous remission."

The so-called "objective studies" of "spontaneous remission" have been employed as libels variously against both the psychoanalysts and the anti-analysts. In all cases, the point is to argue that the ratio of neurotics recovering without treatment is not significantly less than among those receiving it. The same method may be used to pretend that classical psychiatry secures as high a ratio of remission as psychoanalysis. Either way, the statistics are worthless: the conception of "spontaneous remission" used for such actual and fictitious studies is buncombe.

The dominant conception of "mental illness" has only an accidental correspondence to any scientific notion of mental health. It may be a cause for public shock to hear muckraking reports that the majority of the

aged committed to public snakepits are incarcerated chiefly because it was convenient to their grandchildren or others to get rid of them in this fashion. There is nothing in this atrocity inconsistent with the corpus of prevailing psychiatric practice! The definition of "mental illness" used generally is that some person's behavior, condition, or even mere existence is regarded as a nuisance by other persons. When their existence and conduct is no longer considered a serious nuisance, or when shrinking state budgets demand reducing mental health care services, "suddenly" and "mysteriously" the "mental illness" enjoys "remission."

Some of the more popular methods of treatment are especially instructive to the same effect. At the head of the list, one might place electric shock "therapy," which Freud exposed as charlatanry at the time of the inception of this barbarous practice. Significantly, electric-shock "therapy" was developed by the Kaiser's Army during World War I, as a disciplinary procedure for terrifying and torturing combat fatigue cases back into the trenches. It works, in a certain manner of speaking; given a patient "guilty" of untoward behavioral episodes, a certain degree of "improvement" in their conduct could be effected, even for profound mental problems, by the following procedure. It is irrelevant whether the shocks are applied to the head, nor are any expensive hospital facilities required. Indeed, the stronger the resemblance of the treatment room to a medieval torture-chamber the more certain the ensuing "remission." Strap the subject securely to a stout plank and, optionally, sloshing the nude body liberally with salt water, apply the contacts from a high-voltage coil to the genitalia. If the first "treatment" does not induce "remission," repeat the "medication" in increased doses until the desired remission or death occurs. One can guarantee an impressive ratio of short-lived apparent "remissions."

Psychosurgery and the less drastic approximation of the same result, saturating the victim with drugs, are of the same general quality as psychological medicine. Psychosurgery or saturating the case with pills "works" by means of aborting or reducing the level of mental functioning. One way to suppress symptoms of mental dysfunctioning is to lower the level of possible activity of the nervous and endocrine systems below the "threshold level" at which episodes will appear. The mindless do not exhibit active mental disturbances.

Only one concession could be offered for "chemotherapy" from the standpoint of psychology. There are certain forms of neurotic patterns, as some manic-depressives, in which the episodes themselves are self-aggravating or may involve destructive behavior by the subject. Since the object of treatment is to ensure that the patient survives to the day when treatment can produce results, a restrained employment of the minimal required level of chemical "inhibitions" may be permissible or necessary. However, in no case could chemotherapy cure the dysfunction itself.

"Conditioned reflex" and other behaviorist clinical methods are all of a homogeneous kind of charlatanry. At best, they are subtler versions of the crude electric-shock "therapy" ruse, applying techniques perfected in the training of pathetic performing animals and fleas to the analogous training of people. The worst feature of behaviorist therapy is not the speciousness of the claims which represent animal training as human cures, but the fact that behaviorist methods necessarily, in all cases must produce a significant reduction in the subject's intelligence and at the same time make the individual more vulnerable to "nervous breakdowns" and actual psychoses.

More broadly on "spontaneous remission," the following points are sufficient. In most people who experience significant neurotic episodes at some time in their lives, these episodes have been latently there all along, merely awaiting the suitable circumstances in which they would manifest themselves. After either that specific stress has been removed, or the episodes have otherwise served their purpose for the subject, the subject will frequently revert to the more "normal" form of his neurosis he exhibited before the incidents. Does this sort of remission represent a return to mental health? There are admittedly the instances in which a person experiencing an episodic crisis will be driven to some positive improvement in his underlying mental functioning. Confronted with the threats to his identity itself, expressed in threatened job, marriage, etc., the individual may be driven to face certain problems and accomplish an approximation of what he might better have done with psychoanalytical help. In this sense, there is unquestionably what one intends by "spontaneous remission." Such instances are not at issue. What is at issue is that the criteria of studies of "spontaneous remission" do not discriminate between these instances and mere temporary remission of the episodic manifestation.

The definition of mental health generally employed in this society goes no deeper than classifying the symptoms of personal behavior as either approximately "normal" or egregious. As the use of electric-shock, psycho-surgery, pill-pushing, and toleration of behaviorist charlatanry attest, capitalist society has very little concern with anything more than the desirability of outward behavior. Such a crude fallacy of composition says very little about the systematic features of mentation.

This is not to exaggerate, to insist that all non-psychoanalytical psychiatrists are totally incompetent respecting mental disorders. The fact that a culture, by its specific nature, must produce a limited number of types of characteristic mental disturbances, and that each such type will frequently conform to a prima facie etiology, symptoms, and prognosis, permits tolerable performance, by capitalist standards, for the practice of

“classical psychiatry” as a purely administrative procedure, a crude screening procedure by which this case is given a standard label and sorted out for this treatment accordingly, or discharged with a certain probable prognosis of remission. One must also add that over and above the intrinsic incompetence of psychiatry’s claim to science, the individual classical psychiatrist may, by personal commitment and insight, rise above the banality of his learning and thus develop positive skills **despite his formal learning.**

In the context of capitalist culture, the psychoanalyst is constrained to aim at behavioral results which conform to those demanded for clinical psychology of all forms. Behind such surface considerations, the actual improvement in mental health which may occur would be considered an “intangible” by the prevailing conventions. The proper objective of psychoanalysis, which it has been frequently clearly demonstrated to achieve, is a positive increase in the subject’s capacities and social value as a human being. What might ordinarily be regarded as the cure effected would therefore occur as a mere by-product of the essential result. We have already identified the reason for this. The focal feature of effective therapy by these methods is the use of the love of the surrogate parent, the analyst, to assist the subject in developing a stronger sense of inner personal worth, a result which tends to develop as the analyst focusses parental-like compassion to the effect of “rewarding” the subject for progress in developing autonomous powers of creative insight into the wilful determination of useful social behavior. To the extent that the subject develops a stronger sense of “inner self” in this way, he has in that a greater ego-strength to free himself of the “schlimihl syndrome,” both with respect to persons outside his skin, and with respect to the internalized persons who harrass him within his mind. Since the neurotic disturbance is invariably focussed on the “inner self’s” imagined relationship to some or all of that internalized gallery of personalities, to the degree the subject is able to become less a schlimihl he is able to free himself of the compulsion to propitiate or anti-propitiate (e.g., “kill”) fetishistically the internalized persons who oppress him.

6. Freud Versus Feuerbach

The obvious shortcoming of Koehler’s work for theoretical psychology in general, in its own terms, is that the emphatically useful demonstration of creative mentation in higher apes and other species fails to distinguish between those qualities of mentation which in turn distinguish the mind of the ape absolutely from the human mind.

The distinction to be made overlaps the urgent inquiry into connected issue of human psychology itself. In this latter connection, the demonstration that even perception itself requires precursors of creative menta-

tion confronts us with the need to test the hypothesis that there is a qualitative distinction between creative mentation respecting perception itself and some other order of creative mentation associated with the discrimination among ordinary and creative minds. The two issues are interrelated in the respect that Koehler’s apes — and even animals much lower in intelligence than the apes — obviously embody something akin in some way to the creative processes associated with human perception.

The fact that there is a qualitative distinction of the human mind from that of the higher apes is already established in several major aspects of the matter by our general thesis. To treat this inquiry definitively, we begin here with the writer’s much-used pedagogy for presenting Feuerbach’s notion of the determination of self-consciousness. (See Figures 1,2,3)

Figure #1: Naive Schema




Figure 1 depicts the most naive of the reductionist interpretations of mental processes. (Cf., Locke, et al.) Both the individual person and the object (x_i) of his knowledge are axiomatically (explicitly or at least implicitly) taken as self-evidently elementary. The object’s existence impinges upon the sensory apparatus of the individual, through which connection he is presumed to “know” the object. The obviously pathetic fallacy in this schema is this. The assumption is demanded that the universe has been so prearranged that, on the one hand, the sensation ostensibly emanated by the object to the sensory apparatus is an appropriate code for the intrinsic nature of that object, and that, on the second hand, the mind of the individual has been predisposed to call forth an appropriate image

of the external object through mere interpretation of the sensation as a code for that object-image. In addition to the implicit requirement of such wild metaphysics, the schema eliminates the possibility that the human mind can acquire the power to identify objects from experience of the outer world, and in that way the notion of what human knowledge can become is limited to the exploration of the sequence of events as a sequential array of sensations of objects.

Figure #2: Kantian Schema




Figure 2 represents a variety of proposed remedies for the monstrous assumptions of the first schema. Both the Kantian view (8) and the view sometimes originating from modern "information theory" are examples of this second outlook.

This schema has the advantage, relative to the first, that it eliminates the complete precoding of the sensations ostensibly emanating from the object. Knowledge of the **quality** of the object is not viewed as secured through isolated acts of sense-experience. Individual sense-experiences are assumed to provide the individual with little more than knowledge of the location of the object in both his **subjective** space and time orientations. Knowledge of the object **in particular** is then explained in terms related to those employed by John Dewey for **reflection**. The cognition of the quality **subjectively** attributed to the object not by isolated sense-experiences per se, but through a packet of combined sensations and actions. The obvious fallacy of the first schema, in which sensory knowledge is the outcome of a **passive** individual relationship to the act of sensation, is superceded by the notion that the individual's knowledge is both passive and active. It is re-


garded as the outcome of a succession of interwoven sensations of the object and actions upon the some objective point of reference. In this second schema, the first schema's passive experience of the object is superceded by the notion of a **practical experience** of the objective point of reference. The paradigm for developing knowledge of an imputed quality of the object is the notion of a statistical correlation of some kind within the patterns of changing actions and sensations aggregating to make up the packet of practical experience. Hence, it is not assumed that the individual actually knows the object **in itself**, as such; this schema limits the question of competent knowledge of the quality of experience-packets to the packet itself. It relinquishes further concern for the quality of the object per se with the presumption that the adduced subjective quality attributed to the packet corresponds with increasing appropriateness to as much knowledge as is necessary to man for his existence in whatever unknown physical universe per se may exist beyond his direct cognition of it. Gestalt psychology is the only useful consequence of this approach, since it supercedes inductive fictions with actual Gestalts.

This second schema pares down the proliferation of metaphysical aprioristic assumptions significantly, relative to more naive views, but it itself depends on a few arbitrary assumptions which are beyond the power of the pragmatist to more than assert hysterically as necessary to the perpetuation of his schema.

Taking such aprioristic assumptions in the order of their obviousness, we have the following principal features to consider. Firstly, the location of the sensation respecting subjective space and time demands a priori aesthetic qualities, such that the second schema merely simplifies the aesthetical apriorism of the first while preserving the actual essence of the fallacy. Secondly, the act of judgment through which the packet of practical experience is determined as a discrete quality of experience is arbitrarily invoked from outside the realm of experience itself, replacing the "look-up table" metaphysics of the first schema with the built-in "logical self-programming" metaphysics of the second. Thirdly, the whole schema is arbitrarily situated within the sweeping assertion that the fundamental order of the universe is that of an aggregation of self-evident discrete existences.

From those aprioristic axiomatic fallacies a whole array of fallacious theorems are inevitably adduced. In the case of Kant, such predicaments are variously explicitly and implicitly acknowledged. His recognition arises principally from sensibility of the necessary existence of universals and of the consequent fundamental antinomy in his world-view.(8) In those who have narrowly parodied the secondary features of Kant, as with John Dewey, or with the empiricists and logical positivists generally, the development of the schema is pervasively trivial. The exponents of these modern

Figure #3



views, are pathetic and intellectually dishonest even relative to Kant, notably in their effort to **hysterically** deny the existence of devastating metaphysical paradoxes, by the shyster's ruse of arbitrarily refusing to permit discussion of the problem of universals.

Figure 3 represents the interpretation of the problem introduced by Ludwig Feuerbach.(3b) This model, with certain essential alterations by Marx, is the immediate basis for Marxian psychology.(12b,f) An approximation of the same model is employed by Freud to establish the entire principled basis for psychoanalysis.


Feuerbach's solution was not wholly original with him. He, like Hegel, proceeded explicitly from the preceding advancement of the general thesis in its Cartesian-Spinozan form.(3b) Like Hegel, his approach to Spinoza's conception was substantially informed by Kant's Critiques, especially the **Critique of Practical Reason**. Finally, in all but one critical feature, the entirety of Feuerbach's schema had been elaborated by Hegel in the **Phenomenology of Mind**. As to Marx's alterations of Feuerbach's achievements, we shall reach the place for treating that shortly.

In our initial exploration of Figure 3, we take the individual under consideration as a sensuously purblind infant. In his existent state as an individual infant, there is no a priori quality within him by which he could acquire practical knowledge of nature. His existence is not functionally situated within his individual relationship to the world of objects around him; his existence

depends wholly upon the intervention of certain adults who care for him into that world of objects.

In that primitive condition, the active principle for his continued existence is what we may identify as the notion of the individual infant's **rights and privileges** in the minds of the adults around him. They act on the world for him both without regard to the infant's manifest states, and also according to the way they are prepared to respond to certain of his manifest states as his commands for exercise of those rights and privileges which he possesses **within those adults**. As he develops through early infancy, knowledge occurs for the individual in a fashion we may approximate by initially considering certain similarities between Figures 2 and 3.

Treating all of the solid directed lines among the individual, the adults, and the x_{ij} of Figure 3 as forming a packet of practical experience, we have the following. The adult society maintains a packet (implicit Gestalt) of practical experience with the totality of x_{ij} . This adult society's immediate knowledge of the universe of predicates, x_{ij} , requires no aprioristic assumptions; the adult society acts on the universe of experience in terms of historically developed and acquired knowledge. No abstract, wild "Robinson Crusoe"-model assumptions are introduced respecting the origins of adult society's knowledge. The universe of predicates, x_{ij} , acts both on the infant's purblind sensorium and on the adult society. The adult society acts upon the predicates. The infant's states, as objective states, act upon the adult



LUDWIG FEUERBACH: Like Hegel, a self-consciously creative intellect who set the stage for Marx's discoveries by detailing the connection between the sensuous content of mentation and the extra-uterine social synthesis of the individual human mind.

society, by which they are interpreted according to the criteria of the infant individual's explicit and implicit rights and privileges.

In addition, we have the dotted directed line from the adult society to the infant, representing actions on the infant by the adult society.

So, the external world for this infant is not the objective location of reference of Figure 2, but the packet of experience represented by his relationship to the combined adult society and the object-world on which that adult society acts. Hence, the problem of knowing the objective world per se does not exist for the infant of Figure 3. From such a packet of practical experience the individual could obtain, obviously, neither subjective knowledge respecting the objective world by itself nor adult society by itself. Only a kind of combination of the two could ever be adduced as knowledge, even assuming, for this approximation, the individual of Figure 2 to be situated in the location of the infant in Figure 3.

The possibility of practical action by the infant is therefore limited as follows. Taking firstly, only the solid directed connecting lines of the figure, his packet of experience would be limited in type to his actions on the adult society and the actions of the universe of x_{ij} upon him. From the standpoint of the assumptions employed in respect to a Gestalt approach to Figure 2, the notions of causality he would attain from his packets of

practical experience would be notions of **socialized causality**, a universe of x_{ij} in which the acting will of the adult society was the universal lawful quality of causation with that universe!

Adding to this representation the further link represented by the dotted directed line from the adult society to the infant, he must "see" himself as a special object within the packet of practical experience.(3b) He must begin to abstract the "immediate" coupling of the sub-packet of his relationship to adult society as modifying the causality of the socialized universe of x_{ij} for him. It is not simply his action upon the adult world which determines the lawful sequence of events for him, but the ultimate significance of his action varies within the social sub-packet of practical experience. The adult society is for him both his master and his slave, and through this relationship, the whole universe is similarly made to seem alternately his master and slave. (**Freedom and Necessity!**)

His practical existence, as he is able to adduce a notion of his existence from such a packet of practical experience, does not exist within himself, but is the Gestalt of those combined explicit and implicit rights and privileges which exist for him outside himself, which exist within adult society. To locate his practical existence in the entire world, to discriminate himself as somehow distinct from the universe in general, he must locate the existence of himself as an actual, practical existence in the practical idea of his existence uniquely located in **others**. His feasible perception of himself exists only as a reflection upon him of that right for existence which is located within others.(3,3b)

This schema, at least as so far developed, does not eliminate all hypothetical assumptions.(12b) The power of discrimination must exist within him, otherwise no quality could be imputed to the packets of practical socialized experience. Without elaborating here the systematical study assigned to other locations, it suffices to abstract from this report of those conclusions that the only qualities required of the infant is the appropriateness of his physiological processes to discriminate for two interconnected criteria. In first approximation, we have the need to determine judgment according to what enhances his biological existence as such. Yet, that which accomplishes this end is the **development** of his biological human powers. Furthermore, his existence demands development of his powers of judgment, to determine that which is necessary for enhancement of his biological existence and powers. The only necessary assumption respecting the infant is the appropriateness of the physiological processes of pre-blind pre-mentation to judge practical socialized experience in terms of the enhancement or impairment of his existence. Not his biological existence as a monad, but his biological existence as the development of his powers to exist.

In short, the only necessary assumption for criteria of judgment in the purblind mentation of the infant is of the form and order of the kind of **universal**, the kind of invariant adduced in the statement of our general thesis.

The form of development of these powers is not his individualized relationship to objects per se. He is not discovering the "natural laws" of nature in an individual way. He is acting upon and being acted upon by socialized nature, whose laws (whose order of causality) are of the socialized form nature assumes in the practice of that specific society.(12b) Every object of his acquired knowledge is imbued with the qualities of social causation, a notion of the (causal) qualities imputable to objects which is inseparable from his notion of the Gestalt of his rights and privileges existing in others.

We have thus located the determination of the specific qualities of his developing knowledge within the qualities attributable to the world of experience, by the intelligent form of causation given to the world for the individual in society by that society's wilful practice. Consequently, any effort to account for the existent, empirical forms of human behavior in terms of the experience of the isolated biological individual must be bankrupt fallacy of composition, and steeped in the wildest and most ingenuous sort of metaphysical rubbish. The mind of the individual man is formed by his society, not by his biological inheritance as such, and the source of the specific intelligence which the individual exhibits in the development of knowledge is the ready-made intelligence of socialized causation.

The relationship of the individual's existence to society's implicit if evolving notion of his rights and privileges "reduces" to an abstractable quality we know as "love." This emotion is synthesized in the infant in the same processes through which his sense of self is formed for him. This quality, the feeling of love, thus becomes the active (feeling-state) expression for what we otherwise distinguish as the invariant principle of judgment.(3b)

"Scientific Knowledge"

We are at the kernel of scientific knowledge when we insist perversely that for human knowledge there are no "abstractly correct" answers, but only **lovable** answers. Indeed, the terms, **good, right, lovable** are interchangeable terms in this respect. To be a loved person is the same thing as saying "I have the right to exist" **because I enjoy those essential rights and privileges on which that existence depends.** The terms, **correct, right, logical, scientific**, and so forth, as terms of approbation for the quality of judgment **manifest by the individual toward society**, do not identify qualities of judgment independent of society, but exactly the opposite; the use of the terms, **correct, right, scientific**,

and so forth to attribute abstract objective qualities to judgment perversely reveals the pathetic subjectivity of the processes of so-called scientific or logical reason in capitalist society (in particular). Such terms are a pitiable effort to disguise and hysterically deny the essentially **propitiatory** content and quality of the processes governing the selection of those judgments which the individual manifests for the propitiatory edification of his society (or particular surrogate for society as a whole).

Such evidence of the "merely subjective" quality of individual rational knowledge in capitalist culture (in particular) does not eliminate but only resituates the question of the ultimate objective truth of so-called scientific knowledge. Immediately, as Durkheim emphasizes correctly, the notion of scientific law is a subjective, ideological notion: at least, as we presently know scientific work. That implies that extant knowledge is permeated with a certain falseness on account of this subjectivity. Such is indeed the case, as the intrinsic antinomies of formal mathematical knowledge reflect this fact. Nor is our knowledge of the error limited to the repeatedly demonstrated fact of such antinomies. The fundamental antinomies of formal science have been exposed not only as vicious errors within that knowledge, but are able to diagnose those errors as reflecting a very specific form of pathology. The adduced pathetic feature is not surprisingly the characteristic ideology of capitalist culture (in particular). Yet, this same ideology-riddled knowledge is at the same time **muddled** self-consciousness of the most effective body of human practice yet known.

Hence, in Freud's terms, science must be regarded as having developed a certain degree of appropriateness to the specific (capitalist form of) tasks of human existence it has been developed to assist. The solution to this contradictory picture of general scientific ideology today is that the question of the objective correctness of the individual's "right answers" according to the terms of prevailing scientific canons is a misplaced question. Whether his "right answers" are indicative or not of what should be done in practice is properly settled by considering first the approximate degree of appropriateness of the existing mere ideology to the form of tasks of human existence confronting man in capitalist culture. The pathetic feature of the naive notions of **rightness, correctness**, and so forth, in human scientific judgment is the slave mentality embodied in the conceit that the canons of prevailing scientific practice are an approximation of **absolute science**, the pathetic slave mentality which credulously grovels before the mythos of a mere capitalist science apotheosized as "pure science."

Epiphenomenalism

The contrasting fallacy of Freud's metaphysical epiphenomenalist notion of "love" drives our attention

to the same issue otherwise posed by the question of distinguishing between the creative mentations of higher apes and man. Freud himself repeatedly demonstrates that he suffers ultimately from the same essential ideological difficulty as the Gestalt psychologists on this point. Insofar as Freud limits Individual Psychology to the more immediate clinical problems-forms of cathexis, he is able to approximate Feuerbach's psychophysical parallelist discoveries of the social determination of the contents and categorical features of the conscious and unconscious processes with which he deals. He fails to advance beyond a worse-than-Kantian "negation of the negation" notion of the positive social determination of consciousness, repressed unconsciousness, ego, and so forth. Yet, within the consequences of such a fallacy of composition, he fulfills his ego-ideal of the brilliant scientific investigator. The root and hereditary difficulties arising from the fallacy of composition become conspicuous as he attempts to locate the basis for the "self-moving feeling states" which are the abstracted active constituent of cathexis and psychodynamics generally. For him, these "instincts," etc., are to be taken as more or less axiomatic by psychology. His treatment of **love**, on which this writer finds Freud's metapsychology wretchedly explicit (despite the apologetic temporizing on this issue of interpretation by Reik and other well-intentioned epigoni),(5b) is the model for Freud's mechanistic tendencies in this and other respects.

Freud attempts to rationalize his notion of love (as a variously reified "sexual drive" as such) by two interconnected ruses. Both of these share the common feature of avoiding the qualitative distinction between human and lower-beast mentation. In the first of these, the approach he initiated earlier, he attempted to account for the development of the potentialities of mentation in a certain interpretation of the history of evolution of the nervous system: **metapsychology**.(4b,e) Later, he supplements his earlier rationalizations with efforts to trace the evolution of modern human qualities according to stages of historical development, beginning from an hypothetical "Primeval Horde."(4a,e) He brings the two approaches into conjunction by correlating certain later aspects of the process of physiological development with the stages of progress of man himself from the origin in a Primeval Horde.

From the standpoint of our general thesis, the conclusive manifestation of a qualitative distinction between human and lower-beast mentation is the evidence of the general tendency for a negentropic advancement through a multilinear evolution of society. Even limiting oneself to the Cartesian form of the dialectical method, this suffices to demonstrate that human mentation is **qualitatively** distinguished from that of even the higher apes by an **invariant**: the negentropic practical aspect of human creative mentation.

This interpretation of the invariant has the same form we adduced from the developmental model of the biosphere as a whole. That similarity might mislead some to put off further efforts to define a qualitative distinction of that sort in human existence. One might, on such grounds, limit oneself to the ecologist's casual truism, that the negentropic rates of human development are of a significantly higher order than for the rest of the biosphere, mammals generally included. The difference may so appear to be merely one of degree, but there is nonetheless a fundamental, qualitative distinction to be isolated. In the rest of the biosphere, the expression of this invariant respecting particular species within sub-ecologies is located in the evolution of new arrays of varieties and species. For man, this evolutionary principle undoubtedly still acts upon his biological development as it does for other species; however, that aspect of the matter absolutely fails to account for the qualitative difference in rates of negentropy characteristic of society. **With man, the evolutionary principle has been situated within his processes of collective deliberation.**(11a)

At this point that very aspect of Gestalt psychological investigations which seem, initially, to represent a barrier to the wanted distinctions becomes the means for uncovering the exact nature and location of the qualitative difference between man and the higher apes. **We find that Marx has already definitely resolved the problem.**(12b,f)

What fundamentally distinguishes man from the lower beasts, according to Marx's "Feuerbach," is **man's evolving (i.e., negentropic) production of the material preconditions for his species-existence.**(12b) Hypothetically, situate the selective actions of biological variation on some advanced hominids existing in a Pleistocene model of a baboon-like hominid "culture." Consider the conditions in which some hominids achieve higher relative rates of negentropy for their variation, on the basis of a deliberative alteration in the form of cooperative relations within the "troop." At that "first instant" of breaking the chains of ostensibly genetical determination of the mode of extra-uterine hominid gestation, the hominid species has become a domain of the most remarkable transformation. The hominid has become proto-man, and the mere hominid troop has suddenly become a proto-human "tribe." This deliberative element, to the extent that it provides higher rates of negentropy for proto-man, advantages his social-reproductive rates over those of the various stocks of hominids from which he has thus begun to differentiate himself. Those Pleistocene variations in the physiology of mentation which enhance this feature of proto-human existence consequently tend to establish themselves as the biological distinction of a new

species, directly at the expense of other hominid and proto-human stocks which contiguously suffer the productive depletion of their outlived mode of existence. To restate: a small advance in differentiations of the physiology of mentation to this effect would rapidly determine a dominant hominid biological stock. We have only to emphasize in this connection the relatively devastating effects of the smallest shift into this qualitative domain of proto-human development. As to whether this particular hypothesis conforms to the exact pre-history of proto-human hominid differentiation, we insist upon nothing but this: we have created this hypothetical account as a pedagogical device for imparting a representation of the necessary conditions for human development.

It now becomes most useful as well as collaterally necessary to debunk a prominent methodological fallacy in Freud's metapsychology. Freud locates the "seat" of specific functions of mentation in the various "historically emergent" organs of the brain (principally), falling into the wildly ingenuous assumption that the evolution of higher organs of the brain, etc., permits the subordinated "older" tissues to continue their former specific function with a large degree of organ-autonomy. Freud's presumption on this point may enjoy specious experimental support from the efforts to isolate the specific functions of various regions of the brain by traumatic (surgical or other) impairment of such tissue. If it is acknowledged that the emergence of



SIGMUND FREUD: Independently discovered a limited version of Feuerbach's thesis. The founder of scientific clinical psychology, prevented by bourgeois ideology from breaking with an ultimately reductionist conception of the "metapsychological" basis for "instinctual" features of mentation.

a new dominant function not merely subordinates but reifies the dominated function as its predicate and that the physiology of mentation interacts as a whole to effect perception or higher forms of cognition, the traumatic demonstrations of specific **impairment** prove absolutely nothing **respecting the point at issue**. Freud's blunders respecting metapsychology cohere with and are indeed subsumed by the most conspicuous factual blunder in the entirety of his psychoanalytical writings. **Nowhere does Freud take the holistic quality of creative mentation into account**. In his effort to speculatively adduce the physiological basis of the "instinctual" features of mentation he **disregards the most essential empirical fact respecting the holistic nature of synthesizing mentation itself**.

Return for a moment to Freud's discoveries, respecting cathexis. The contents of consciousness and repressed-unconscious material for Freud is limited to a kaleidoscopic interplay of "feeling-states," with each such feeling-state momentarily identified (association) with one or more particular object-images. Concerning ordinary consciousness and even those aspects of unconscious processes which are ordinarily susceptible of being brought forward for consciousness, this portrait of cathexis is an accurate model of the phenomena...**up to a point! Nowhere in Freud's dynamical overview of cathexis do we find acknowledgement of the processes which synthesize new objects, Gestalts??!!!!**

The Case of L.S. Kubie

Psychoanalysis as an ongoing practice has not wholly overlooked this problem. The case of L. S. Kubie is notable.(10a) However, Kubie makes several errors in the course of otherwise assembling and synthesizing important insights into the matter. Generally, Kubie ignores the dynamics of "task-orientation" in the determination of creative mentation in his writings; in fact, when recently queried on this specific point at a lecture, he acknowledged that he had not taken such problems into consideration and was otherwise content to rest his case with the view that mentation as such was a self-evident good without respect to task-oriented determinations. Broadly, otherwise, he aborts the rich further development his work immediately implies by adhering too closely to the canons of Freudian metapsychology.(10a,b) In this respect he declines to risk upsetting the Freudian tradition so profoundly by the obvious course of exploring roots of creative mentation in the "deeper" (**categorically**) unconscious processes. To this effect he situates creative mentation in the "preconscious processes," overlooking the Gestalt argument which properly applies to his own conception of the role of the "shaking" process in creative mentation. (10b) Finally, directly bearing on the point under consideration, he recognizes the phenomenon of creative mentation but adheres to those precise metaphysical notions of mentation which coincide with Freud's ignoring noetic phenomena entirely. He attempts to limit creative processes to a kind of "shaking" upheaval in

the cathetical realm of events, resulting in original arrangements not predetermined by psychological experience; this model obviously is not the content of the creative processes of mentation.

To identify the essential point to be argued here, we are permitted to grossly oversimplify the form of dynamics in the following way. For this illustration, assume that cathexis involves a single object-image attached at any one time to each specific (determinate) feeling-state in motion in the mind. In Kubie's approach to representation, the outcome of a massive upheaval in the mental state would be an original reallocation of object-images among feeling-states, or some more complex transformation of the same primitive type. Transformations of the sort Kubie describes do occur as an important part of mental life, and are phenomena whose exploitation is indispensable to the most ordinary progress in clinical work. Unfortunately for Kubie's thesis, these are not the processes of creative mentation.

The Gestalt evidence underlines the fallacy of composition in Kubie. In actual creative mentation an object-image is **synthesized**. This occurs in such a fashion that two principal changes in mental states ensue from this. Firstly, a significant number of previously-existing object-images either vanish or are totally reified as mere predicates of the new Gestalt. Secondly, integration of a new Gestalt effects the ensuing unfolding of a sweeping reordering of the world-outlook characteristic of the individual's mental processes. Contrary to Kubie's plausible misplacement of the phenomenon, the act of creative mentation is not characterized merely by upheavals in the cathetical states, but by a synthesis of a new object-image by a process qualitatively distinguished from perceptual synthesis and is accompanied and succeeded by a number of sweeping alterations in world-outlook "around it."

In both instances, Freud's and Kubie's, the obvious common fallacy is the attempt to explicate the psychodynamical processes in terms agreeable to a reductionist interpretation of the contents of conscious states. They are victimized in that sense by the fallacy of logical induction. This is the same essential fallacy as that of the modern angle-trisector or the ingenué ignorant of modern mathematics who pathetically presumes that in an "infinite" period of time all the possible particular points locatable on a line-segment could be enumerated. From this standpoint the obvious common formal error of Freud and Kubie is their implicit denial of the existence of actual cognitive processes, their ignoring evidence of cognitive processes by which the mind directly synthesizes "true infinities" from partial arrays of predicates.

Despite our harsh criticisms of Kubie in those respects, the practical object of his work on the creative process is not only commendable respecting prelimin-

ary matters, but goes directly to that extent to the kernel of the problem which occupies the leadership of the Labor Committee tendency: that **the absence of manifest powers of creative mentation in any individual in capitalist society (in particular) is not a result of his lack of adequate genetical endowment, etc., but is a consequence of a neurotic impairment of his mental powers.**(10b,c)

Mechanistic Physiology

The reductionist prejudice expressed as the epiphenomenalist features of Freudian metapsychology is that since knowledge (and other mental behavior) is particularate in form, brain physiology must be correspondingly adapted to both the "pluralistic" generation of instinctual motivations and the warehousing of a growing aggregation of specific discrete packets of experience. Once we have demonstrated the case against a universe as an aggregation of discrete elementarities, we have thus demolished the conventional, reductionist or formal-logical notion of the ordering of real knowledge of the Lagrangian universe. When that fact is compared with the experimental (Gestalt) evidence of the non-algebraic form of fundamental mental processes, and when the outcome of these deliberative processes is judged in terms of the whole of human history and pre-history, it is clear that Freud's and Kubie's epistemological approach to defining the essential content of mentation is false to the primitive reality of mentation. We are then left with no alternative but to approach the analysis of mental processes with the same notion of the form and significance of an **invariant** as we have adduced for our general thesis.

That established, the existence of such mentation prescribes that the physiology of mentation must be in appropriate correspondence to this form of mentation. Otherwise, the existence of distinctly human mental phenomena must be entirely attributed by honest investigators to the *deus ex machina* of a metaphysical "soul."

At this point we again resort to a pedagogical hypothesis as an efficient way of communicating necessary preconditions. (We do not prescribe that this hypothesis actually represents the physiology of mentation, but merely that it is one of several alternative hypotheses which satisfy the preconditions we know to prevail.) It would be plausible to suggest the possibility, since mentation is characterized by the negentropic tendency we otherwise locate in progressive evolution of varieties and species, that the emergence of human mentation (in particular) involves the reification of the function of "genetical processes" within certain tissues, such that each experience induces a pervasive alteration of the state of that tissue taken as a whole. It would be consistent with this possibility to suggest that thought-images are not specifically stored as discrete images, but that the totality of "reified genetical ma-

terial" acquires the assignment to reproduce such an image de novo as ordinary genetical determination differentiates organs, etc. The obvious immediate difficulty presented by such an hypothesis from the standpoint of biology would be that since the determinations of creative mentation are negentropic, the evolutionary ("genetical") processes reified to perform this function are themselves **positively** negentropically, oriented, rather than "random." To argue otherwise would, again, require the assumption of the existence of a "soul" as the source of creative mentation, and an **elan vital** to explain the existence of life itself.

This hypothesis, or any other satisfying **the same demonstrated preconditions**, would signify that the uniqueness of the form of extra-uterine human gestation **creates** fundamental determinate categories of mind, which do not exist in any preceding species. This would be necessary since the noetic element in socialized causation locates the essential quality of individual (creative) mentation in its development, as the origin of mediation of innovations in the mode of general reproduction. This would, in turn, demand that the fundamental "emotive" feature of human mentation would be of the form we attributed to **love**. It would, in turn, determine a complementary "emotion" (**anti-love**) corresponding to "entropy respecting the individual's sense of socialized identity.

This would indicate that Freud's notion of love is inside out. Rather than **love** as a reification of a "sexual instinct," sexual union would become a necessary central feature of adult human behavior as a determined realization of love.

Two primary considerations are involved.

Firstly, the production of viable new individuals for society depends, most emphatically, on the role of parental love toward the infant, the key feature in the effective extra-uterine gestation of a new human personality. In this relationship, both the parents and the infant are what we term **concrete universals** (actual infinities). Each is a particular human being through which the other mediates his or her relationship to society as a whole. To the infant, the otherwise vague sense of his social rights and privileges — as they are scattered throughout society in various persons, each in part — is superceded by the more precise determination of an exact Gestalt of rights and privileges concentrated within and mediated through a single concrete adult individual, e.g., his mother. It is a corollary of this point that one could not imagine any more effective way of maximizing the incidence of psychotic and otherwise crippled personalities in capitalist cultures (in particular) than by replacing the paired-mating relationship household with creches staffed by a plurality of (inconsistent) mother-father surrogates. The infant's opportunities for developing a stable exact sense of reflected social identity would be minimal. Respecting

the role of the infant for the parent, for the mother (especially) capitalist and earlier cultures had assiduously conditioned the young girl such that in womanhood she frequently experiences the most profound crises at the thought she might "fail" to become a mother; not to become pregnant, or not to be a mother of a child, is to fail to be a "real woman." The specifics of capitalist cultures aside, societies arrange that the mother (and other responsible adults) should obtain from "command" and "responsibility" for the infant and child a mediation of her social identity, such that the child becomes to that extent a concrete universal for her. The "roles" of uncles, fathers, aunts, and so forth in various societies for various phases of the child's development are similarly controlled.

This has two bearings on paired mating relationships. For the product of such a household, the paired mating relationship in adulthood becomes the only way of replacing the kind of identity-establishing love he or she enjoyed in infancy. Apart from that specific, the "permanent form" (i.e., "infinite" form) of attachment to a particular individual of the opposite sex is a uniquely effective instrumentality for sustaining the individual's sense of identity. The rights and privileges which exist for him (or her) in the love of another concrete individual becomes a basis for reflecting one's identity as a loved person into oneself as one's reflected self-consciousness of one's identity.

The problem in attempting to adduce the principles involved from empirical sources is that virtually all paired love relationships in capitalist culture are necessarily pathological to a significant extent. The absolutely necessary degree of identification of this point is accomplished by citing the classical paradigm. The male selects a woman for a mate by "settling for the best bargain" he imagines within his means. The quality by which he, broadly speaking, determines the "price-scales" for comparing his and the woman's respective eligibilities, is the desirability of himself in the eyes of a certain strata of women and to corresponding desirability of himself in the eyes of a certain strata of women and the corresponding desirability of the women among a certain strata of men he wishes to "impress." By possessing the object which other men desire, he commands their favorable opinion of himself. This concentrated model, with all its involuted derivatives (such as "reaction formations") implicitly considered, exemplifies the "negation of the negation" form of all capitalist social relationships.

Thus, to state the basis for adducing the essential content of the "infinite" form of the concrete-universal relationship in capitalist society, we must situate the statement of the case in terms of the kind of healthy society which could be established for the present technological development of the productive forces. It is within that context that we can identify the reasons why the relationship between love and sex is exactly opposite to that argued by Freud.

7. Freud's Error on Society

In the "Introduction" to his 1921 "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," Freud goes as far as he is able to go there or elsewhere in conceding the social determination of the human mind:

...In the individual's mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, as an opponent, and so from the very first Individual Psychology is at the same time Social Psychology as well — in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words.

The relations of an individual to his parents and to his brothers and sisters, to the object of his love, and to his physician — in fact all the relations which have hitherto been the chief subject of psychoanalytical research — may claim to be considered as social phenomena, and in this respect they may be contrasted with certain other processes, described by us as "narcissistic," in which the satisfaction of the instincts is partially or totally withdrawn from the influence of other people. The contrast between social and narcissistic — Bleuler would perhaps call them "autistic" — mental acts therefore falls wholly within the domain of Individual Psychology, and is not well calculated to differentiate it from a Social or Group Psychology.

It is the contrasting residue of that short book of Freud's which chiefly occupies our attention. In this we emphasize exactly those evidences, respecting the connection of the individual's mentation to social processes, by which Freud exhibits in the most telling way his pathetic assumption respecting social processes, the assumptions on which his reductionist tendencies in individual psychology depend.

The book as a whole is ostensibly an extended critical review of a then recently published book on the **Psychology of Crowds** by the French reactionary psychologist, Le Bon. This aspect of Le Bon, Freud locates and underlines plainly enough; following what proves to have been forced deference to Le Bon in the second chapter, Freud arouses his critical faculties from their preceding chapter of semi-slumber:

Everything that he says to the detriment and depreciation of the manifestations of the group mind had already been said by others before him with equal distinctness and equal hostility, and has been repeated in unison by thinkers, statements, and writers since the earliest periods of literature.

and, shortly thereafter, he qualifies this:

The assertions of Sighele, Le Bon, and the rest relate to groups of a short-lived character, which some passing interest has hastily agglomerated out of various sorts of individuals. The characteristics of revolutionary groups, and especially those of the Great French Revolution, have unmistakably influenced their descriptions....

Freud's efforts to establish a corrective to such a one-sided diatribe against crowds are initially almost promising.

Le Bon himself was prepared to admit that in certain circumstances the morals of a group can be higher than those of the individuals that compose it, and that only collectivities are capable of a high degree of unselfishness and devotion....

and,

As regards intellectual work it remains a fact, indeed, that great decisions in the realm of thought and momentous discoveries and solutions of problems are only possible to an individual, working in solitude. But...It remains an open question, moreover, how much the individual thinker or writer owes to the stimulation of the group in which he lives, or whether he does more than perfect a mental work in which the others have had a simultaneous share.

and, emphasizing the point that a group is by no means a simple massing of individuals:

...a condition has to be fulfilled: these individuals must have something in common with one another, a common interest in an object, a similar emotional bias in some situation or other,...

Thereafter, Freud's efforts fail entirely, except in two interrelated respects. He fails precisely in the ironical respect that he actually accomplishes a secondary task, rather than his stated purpose. He fails in the respect that he sets out to examine group psychology as a lawful phenomenon, but represents as the empirical basis for adducing such laws what is merely a pathological aspect of social relations in capitalist society. Consequently, insofar as he touches on the sort of "short-lived group" which represents the contrast of a "choppy sea" to the "ground-swell" of stable institutions, what he depicts with a certain accuracy is the dynamic of **a fascist mob!** — the group psychology, in fact, of Hitler's prophet, Stefan George!

Perhaps the most efficient approach to this little book is to compare Freud's conception of the dynamic relationship of the individual to society with Kant's treatment of the problems of heteronomy in the **Critique of Practical Reason**. The usefulness of such an approach is in no respect accidental. A full century before Freud's establishment of psychoanalysis, Kant had examined the **abstractable form** of psychological repression and of bourgeois individual/societal relations with far greater competence than Freud. "Negation of the negation" is a concept developed by Kant in this connection,⁽⁸⁾ both to deal with repression of censorable individual impulses, the problem of the determination of the ego, and the determination of ego-ideals. Cohering with the superiority of Kant's such systematic features over Freud's, Freud remains ignorant of the systematic (dialectical) implications of the problem of heteronomy, and consequently Freud premises his criticism of societal/individual relationships largely on an element which Kant rightly recognizes to be pathological.

In general, the kind of society which Kant dissects with such consummate powers of insight is nothing but

capitalist society. Hence, since Kant's **Critique of Practical Reason** subsumes entirely the special case of societal/individual dynamics which Freud ingeniously assumes to be manifestations of more general psychological laws, we can directly apply the corpus of our established criticism of Kant directly to Freud. In short, Freud's individual is the pathologically-determined, i.e., heteronomic, individual of capitalist society, and his notion of lawful social relationships is nothing but the attempt to bring society into conformity with the perpetuation of heteronomic individual psychopathology!

It might appear, at first reading of this little book, that the regrettable shortcomings of the later chapters reflect his failure to maintain the high level of approximate insight manifest in the opening pages. Yet, after considering the invariant qualities of the whole text in respect to the Kantian **Critique**, we see that Freud's systematical notions of social determination of individual psychology is entirely within the bounds of a society based on heteronomic individuals. Consequently, the principal ironies of Freudian psychology are placed in better focus by study of this text. Freud, as a gifted empirical investigator and clinician, is impelled to reflect the evidence much as it leads him in the course of actually solving problems of **ameliorating** neurotic disturbances. Yet, despite those commendable features and outstanding achievements as a clinician and clinical theorist, Freud balked at that evidence which would have compelled him to break free of the ideological bounds of capitalist culture. His heteronomic conception of the individual's lawful psychodynamics and his cohering acceptance of the extension of social heteronomy into abstract thought, e.g., reductionist epiphenomenalism respecting the so-called "instinctual" aspects of mentation, are the most immediately apparent expressions of his bourgeois ideological premises.

The Marxian criticism of Kant, coinciding with our earlier emphasis on Freud's ignorance of creative mentation, points up a vicious error which is a more fundamental expression of capitalist ideology. Or, to restate the case on this point: the commitment to heteronomic "norms" is to be regarded as a derivative flaw relative to this more fundamental error.

Kant's fundamental antinomy divides the evidence of human knowledge into two antagonistic but nonetheless interpenetrating classes.(8) On the one side, there is the evidence for the form of logical thought embodied in Lagrange's physics: the universe as entirely ordered by physical laws susceptible of algebraic representation. Yet the "free will" of man, to the extent this will is realized as human practice, thus becomes a determining cause for the ordering of the universe, and creates incontestable proof in defiance of the universality of ordinary kinds of physical laws. The systematic, devastating correction of Kant on this point by Hegel (6f) and Marx(12b,f) shows that Kant's fundamental

antinomy is only an abstract disguise for everyday capitalist alienation.

Beyond Alienation

The negentropic feature of social progress, those creative conceptual advances involved in the synthesis and realization of both new technologies and new forms of socialized practice, is as we have noted categorically identified by Marx as **universal labor**.(12e) It is this aspect of human thought and practice which expresses the active principle absolutely distinguishing man from the lower beasts.(12b) Yet, in capitalist society, this aspect of the totality of human thought and activity is suppressed and otherwise estranged from what is regarded as ordinary mental and practical life.

The model for this is wage-labor. The wage-laborer sells a segment of his life to the employer, to the end that labor subordinates itself to the will of the employer and exerts itself in a fixed way. For the period the wage-laborer works in this way, he is dehumanized, degraded to a beast-like status. Like a mere beast, he is treated as if his specific (fixed) skill were the genetically determined mode of behavior of a mere animal; or, to be more exact, by fixing his behavior in this way, his human behavior is bestialized in form. He is denied the prompting or exercise of his creative (human) potentialities. He is not, however, denied some bumptious creative powers he brings to his employment; long before he began his first employment, virtually all his human creative potentialities were virtually destroyed.

"Destroyed" in this instance does not signify that the workers under capitalism are denied some qualities which adults enjoyed in some preceding society. In no society up through capitalism have adult social relations been premised on an actually human form of the individual identity. For, to be human in that sense, individual man would not only have to consciously participate in formulating the developmental and related policies for his entire society, but he would also have to locate his sense of importance to his society in the exercise and development of his creative mental powers. Capitalist society, as we have emphasized, gives man the potentiality to discover what it might be like to become human, precisely because the capitalist world-historical form of development of interrelated productive forces is dependent upon a more or less continual explicit advancement in technology and social organization of the mode of social reproduction. Capitalist society is therefore the first society in which the decisions made by anyone respecting social-reproductive development are addressed to negentropy in the productive forces! What capitalist society suppresses and denies is only what capitalist development situates man within reach of becoming. Although individual human potential appears to a certain extent in every society, and is brutally suppressed in every society so far, it is

only at the appearance of capitalist society that the suppression denies man human qualities **within his reach**.

This involves a further dimension of irony. The common feature of every form of society presently known, and the necessary feature of even those forms yet to be detected and examined, is that society must begin the process of extra-uterine gestation in a form somehow appropriate to the limited development of creative mentation in the new individual. At a certain point in childhood, the same society must then subject the same new individual to brutal processes of destruction of the same creative qualities. The comparison of the first and second phases of maturation in a model modern petit-bourgeois development only exemplifies this. In some fashion and period, after an initial period of infancy, in which the building of the child's sense of identity occurs, the processes of negative socialization are introduced, always of the form best generally described as a "negation of the negation" battering of the child into the mold adult society will require him to fit. He is induced to regard his positive identity as that pathetic residue of his creative impulses, a residue which is principally occupied in self-repressing that aspect of himself which society instructs him to endungeon.

The summary description of the role of the individual worker in formulating programmatic policies of extended socialist reproduction locates an alternative "normal" form of adult identity and functioning from which we can adduce a form of post-infantile socialization which does not replicate the brutal traditions passed down from one specific preceding social form to its successor. It is the process of socialization wanted to transform children into adult universal labor which affords us a basis for counterposing to Freud such knowledge of the actually normal, healthy psychodynamics of the individual.

In general, to establish the general setting for our summary examination of socialist planning, the role of the individual worker in the formulation of programmatic policies of development is an individual who must responsibly formulate the optimal developmental policies for his entire society.(11b) Since he typifies the self-interest of the working class, his initial impulse must seem to be that of maximizing material consumption and leisure, at the expense of "saving" for development of the productive forces. For the pseudo-socialist, the notion of planning in an "ideal socialist state" ends with that single impulse. The pseudo-socialist must necessarily presume that in this ideal state there is so much super-abundance that capacity and productivity have thus outrun any imaginable greed by the working class. In reality, the rate of development of the productive forces seems to depend upon maximizing the rate of accumulation at the expense of consumption and of leisure. Yet, the possible rate of consumption, and of leisure, entirely depends upon the rate of devel-

opment. To the extent that the worker-planner opts for maximum consumption, he lowers his rate of consumption and leisure. Yet, if he were to opt for the other extreme, reduction in present levels of consumption and leisure, this would result in a strong tendency for a decline in the rate of development of the productive forces, since the productive potentialities of the working class are a function of its increased rates of consumption and leisure! So, it must appear that the worker's problem in formulating policy is to hit upon the optimal proportions; it must seem, at first, that this optimal program is the one which yields the highest aggregate combined consumption and leisure for some period up to a "horizon" point. In a sense, that is the required solution, but...

The task of hitting upon the optimal rate of accumulation has a bad taste, and rightly so. What is the useful purpose realized by drawing the entirety of the working class into the executive function of calculating this optimum? If it is merely a matter of calculations, were it not more efficiently and speedily accomplished by an elite? Is "democratic socialist planning" then merely a sop? Is the point of setting up this grand participation scheme to induce in the worker an illusion of self-importance? Is it all such a maudlin charade? If so, then it could not be argued that the worker achieves any realization of the necessity of his existence through such a mere charade! If so, then all this talk of socialism is a mere chimera; if so, then what is wanted is a non-capitalist, centralized economic dictatorship ruled by a beneficent elite, which thus ensures that each receives that which is best for him within the terms permitted by the prevailing negentropy value for productive development.

Is there something critical to successful socialist planning which demands the self-conscious participation of every worker in the formulation of programmatic policies? Just so — once we lift the statistician's ideological fog from our view of the planning task. The means for hitting the right numbers in determining the accumulation rate for planning is not locatable within the realm of statistics. The numbers are important but they are the mere spoor, not the substance, of the problem to be overcome. What statistics merely reflect is a reality composed of specific technologies, susceptible of being employed in alternative ways. The individual worker's role in formulating policy thus absolutely does not represent billions of individuals on earth each individually calculating and then debating and then recalculating the optimal accumulation rate.

In a simplified (and thus distorted) illustration of the actual planning process involved, there is a centralized agency (typified by a "vanguard cadre party") which issues a set of alternative draft programmatic proposals. These proposals initiate the process of formulation of policy within the class as a whole. Going over this budgetary study, each worker locates means by which

the bill of consumption, process sheets, and so forth can be improved. He may, in one instance, recognize that the drafts overlook a potential alternative product from the particular industry in which he is immediately employed. This alternative would correspondingly shift the possible rate of general accumulation upwards. In another instance, the program may misconceive the specific form of bill of consumption need most appropriate to that worker and numbers of workers like him. In general, a centralized agency, initiating the process of formulation, begins with proposals which reflect the optimal rate of accumulation for **known technologies of production and consumption**. If the budgetary drafts merely specified figures, this would give the workers receiving the drafts little enough to contribute. However, if the drafts also identify the bottlenecks of technology, the variable, problem-areas of determining consumption-needs or the available modes for satisfying those needs, the specialized experience and knowledge of every worker can thus focus on the significant **qualitative** aspects of the program, to the thus-mediated end of improving the realizable reproductive rate.

However, even that explanation presents the role of the individual worker as more passive than it must be in fact. The planning process is not an annual or semi-annual festivity, but in constant operation. The individual worker participates not merely by passing judgment on draft proposals issued to his scrutiny for this purpose. The existing technology of production and consumption, existing practices generally, are already an implicit program. The worker's identity in this process is located in his increasing **leisure** activity as a consultant and executive for the entire society of which he is a part. In this fashion, as he manifests himself as a continuous process of proposals which improve social productivity for the entire society, his continuous existence represents a positive necessity for every other person in that society.

The objective of democratic planning is not to provide the individual worker with consoling "participation" in deciding on a statistical formulation. The objective of socialist planning is to provide a (Spinozan) form through which the creative potential of every member of the society can be efficiently realized to the benefit of the entire society. In this process, reciprocally, as the society thus enables itself to benefit from the workers' unique creative contributions, the worker is obtaining the identity of a human being whose existence is universally acknowledged as necessary by the entirety of his society. He is recognized as necessary, as an important individual, not because of his personality, his past accomplishments, etc., but precisely because of the importance of developing further his human qualities, his powers of creative mentation.

Hence, in the process of childhood socialization of the new individual for such a society, the discrimination between "good" and "evil" acts by the isolated heter-

onomic individual ceases. The basis for socialization of the individual is his dread of failing to exercise his ability to develop, to the effect that development enables him to satisfy the ego-ideal provided him by his parents, parents who are identified for society by their participation in the planning process. The heteronomic or "competitive" approach to individual development is junked.

To any parent, the feasibility of such extended task-oriented permissiveness is not so obvious. In today's actuality, up to a certain point every increase in the infant's powers is a source of unqualified pleasure. Then, one day, the further increase in these powers means that the child has begun to develop **destructive** powers. The point at which this change in valuation appears is no sense peculiar to the biology of human infants. The degree to which parents must regard the child's freedom as potentially destructive is a variable, determined in the more general fashion symptomized by the notion of "baby-proofing" a house or apartment, or by the cretinism of the social worker who recommends "permissive child rearing" to a ghetto welfare-recipient mother of several children. The possibility of providing a child with the physical setting in which he can freely exercise a developing attention-span, respecting emerging physical and mental powers and impulses, determines the possibility of minimizing the amount of stultifying forms of socialization of child behavior. Generally, without the corresponding material prerequisites for a more **permissive task-oriented** childhood development, no significant change can appear. Without the material prerequisites one can only exercise self-consciousness of one's unavoidable crimes against the mind of the child, and thus ameliorate the effects of those crimes against the child, abuses which one's material circumstances and prevailing bourgeois regimentation of life compel one to impose. (There is undeniably a stink from Marie Antoinette's grave, "Then, let them eat cake," in the petit-bourgeois liberal's efforts to "uplift" the "blue-collar" worker and unemployed from vulgar "material demands" to "spiritual reforms.") Any thoughtful parent who is self-conscious of his or her cruel obligations to brutalize a child of eighteen months or more **in such unavoidable respects**, already has negative insight into the fact that the increase in per capita material consumption and a simultaneous increase in leisure is the material precondition for advancing the human qualities, the intelligence, of a new generation. This painful truth is only the more obvious and concentrated complement for the knowledge that it is a lack of material consumption and lack of leisure which compels the adult also to brutalize (banalize) his own mental life.

The object of child-rearing is to realize the Spinozan ethic as the replacement of the present (capitalist) "negation of the negation" form of determination of the new individual's motivation, self-consciousness, ego-ideals, etc.

The implicit potentiality and need for democratic socialist formulation of programmatic developmental policies shows up more clearly what the worker is denied in capitalist society (and, also, in the alienated culture of the Soviet Union). The location of his importance as an individual to society in his performance of a fixed, learned mode of behavior mislocates the basis for his sense of social identity in a bestialized, alienated form of his human activities. By denying almost the existence of his creative mental powers, and pervasively denying him the right to make such creative powers the basis for his social identity, the society degrades man to a beast-like status. Society thus alienates the individual from his human qualities, his power to develop and realize his power for **universal labor**.


The "Rule of Law"

Hegel's devastating criticism of Kant's "negation of the negation" goes to the kernel of the ideological problem:

...by the conversion of opinion held on authority into opinion held out of personal conviction, the content of what is held is not necessarily altered, and truth has not thereby taken the place of error.[6a]

Kant's "respect for law," which is only a circumlocution for "respect for bourgeois law," is not merely a matter of subjecting one's individual will to dread of the force of courts and police agencies. Although, indeed, the hallowed lie that bourgeois parliamentary constitutional system establishes a "rule by law, not by men," is of no small significance as ideology.

This ideology is exposed as an hallowed lie, indeed, when we consider that the entire corpus of bourgeois constitutional law is premised on the enforcement of debt-obligations, such that the person's rights themselves, under bourgeois constitutional law, are merely those grudgingly acceded to a "corporation sole." The entire body of bourgeois constitutional law, its invariant feature, is that it is a rationalization for the policeman's pistol in the enforcement of debt-obligations to the capitalist system. If the constitutional system is to a certain extent a "rule by law," that law itself is ruled by the interest of a definite body of men, the capitalist class. The significance of the systematic law is that parliamentary and judicial proceedings are occupied in maintaining a certain degree of consistency in the corpus of law as a rationalization, to the end of preventing the law from becoming the means for setting its own authority against itself **in such a way as to overthrow itself**. "Respect for law," in the sense of the "rule of law," is one of the thinnest of ideological devices employed to console the individual that such "respect for law" is principally the act of credulously grovelling before a ruling class of men. Not even the most ingenious forms of rationalization of capitalist constitutional law have been notably successful in concealing the truth from a sufficiently skeptical critic: "social con-



G.W.F. HEGEL: His *Phenomenology of Mind* cannot be adequately appreciated until it is studied as based on discoveries of the actual form of the mental processes as this knowledge is uniquely accessible to a self-consciously creative intellect.

tracts," "compacts," and such ideological refuse-fictions invariably emphasize the form of the contract (e.g., the bill of exchange, the debt), and otherwise identify the notions of individual right in nothing but heteronomic terms of reference.

It is not therefore inconsistent that socialists should zealously defend every bourgeois constitutional guarantee of civil liberties and rights to the maximum. Ironically, just to the extent that capitalist reproduction depends upon the development of productive individuals according to advancing forms of technology and advancing social-political forms as demanded by technological change, capitalist law is compelled, however grudgingly, to make certain humanist concessions. In the fashion of a society which must create human qualities in the infant and then begin to destroy those same qualities in the child, capitalist accumulation grudgingly depends upon the development of labor-power, which cannot flourish without both degrees of individual political freedoms and also giving limited protection to the individual's efforts to further his development as labor-power through struggles for material consumption and leisure forms. These limited humanistic contingencies of capitalist law are always to be exploited to the maximum possible. The socialist finds himself often in limited common cause with liberals on this, insofar as the maintenance and augmentation of existing individual freedom tend to force the capitalist system to modify its practices in directions appropriate to capitalist accumulation itself. Notable is the 1954 Supreme

Court "Civil Rights" decision, which augmented the freedom of black workers in more or less exactly the directions then-coincident in the dominant U.S. financial and corporate interests in "runaway shop" exploitation of the cheap-labor southern states. The socialist exploits these contradictions of capitalist law not only because he is a Humanist per se, but, more positively, because the material preconditions for advancement for the cognitive powers of the working class are a precondition for increasing the revolutionary potential of that class.

This struggle for individual right indeed becomes implicitly revolutionary at the point that the liberals show a decided tendency to break away from the civil liberties struggle.

This latter is exemplified by several notable trends toward reactionary policies on civil liberties by U.S. liberals since approximately 1969. The outright bonanza granted to New York real estate interests, with the support of the city's liberal machines, meant a rise in welfare payments to slumlords at precisely the point the current dollar (to say nothing of the constant dollar) subsidies to recipients were being drastically cut. The nationwide reversal of the liberal policy for improving the quality of education has recently been superseded by a virtual mania, with widespread liberal support, for deschooling. The widespread liberal support for bestial educational forms of repression, approaching or even exceeding the "fascist" regimentation of the "Cureton methods," is an absolute turnabout from pre-1969 emphasis on enrichment of cognitive development. This epitomizes a pervasive drive, with liberal support, toward increasing repressiveness, a reaction against individual liberties correlating with the anti-libertarian bias of Supreme Court majority decisions. In all these and other instances, the reason for the abandonment of civil liberties by the overwhelming majority of former liberal strata reflects a capitalist "economic motive." The capitalist system, veering ever-more deeply into a depression, is therefore engaged in reducing individual freedom as its immediate "historic" thrust, and cannot tolerate anything but a reduction in those individual rights and liberties which represent real-wage costs or costs of public services. Nor can it permit anything but a reduction in the freedom of individuals to assemble and organize against such repressions. It is at such points as this that the essential feature of "respect for bourgeois law" reveals itself: behind the law there is the policeman's pistol, and behind the police, the ruling class of capitalist men. The reactionary trends currently dominant among former liberal strata reflect that the rights and liberties of the individual are granted by law only to the extent that the exercise of those rights and liberties is within the bounds of self-interest of a ruling class of man.

Behind this relatively formal aspect of the "respect

for law" there is the more fundamental implicit law expressed sometimes by the philistine's apotheosis of "horse sense," "common sense," "the way to get things done," "the way things work," "let's be practical." This entire array of bourgeois-ideological cant essentially expresses a belief that the order of behavior and relations in society is essentially fixed. "I have a fixed skill" is the epitome of this bourgeois-ideological notion. "My social identity depends upon society's continued positive valuation of the sort of fixed qualities of productive behavior represented by my skill," profession, and so forth. In general, although capitalist development (and, thus, the historic basis for capitalist accumulation) depends upon the exploitation of the human (creative) qualities of the individual, the value, the identity afforded to the individual essentially denies any importance to those human qualities, and locates the value of the individual in the bestialization of an ostensibly fixed form of the individual's behavioral development, and, like Freud, a preference for "fixed institutions" over the "choppy seas" of changing institutions.

As we noted earlier respecting the pathetic aspect of Schelling, it is impossible to conceptualize a universality as long as that universality is conceived in terms of simple extension, fixed laws. Conceptualization of universals can occur only when the extension characteristic of the whole is a principle of self-development (invariant). Every effort to conceptualize a whole in terms of simple extension (fixed laws, "strict constitutionalism") reduces the notion of the whole to that of an "algebraic" aggregation of self-evidently discrete primitives (elementarities). This is precisely the correlative of "respect for law" in capitalist culture. The individual is degraded into a primitive being, a bestialized heteronomic individual. This heteronomic individual is in "competitive" relations with all other individuals, each aspect of the interconnected productive forces is reified as in "competition" with others, and man himself is pathetically viewed as "in competition" with the biosphere of which he is the leading and most essential feature!

Consequently, Hegel, recognizing that creative mentation was the essential human quality of man, and recognizing the evolutionary principle of social existence, was able to proceed from his demonstrations to discredit the entire pathetic aspect of Kant in almost a single sentence. A few further passages from the **Phenomenology** illustrate the point:

Since I have taken the **self-development** of the notion to be the medium wherein science really exists,...[emphasis added]

The series of shapes, which consciousness traverses on this road, is rather the detailed history of the process of training and educating consciousness itself up to the level of science. The resolve presents this mental development...in the simple form of an intended purpose, as

immediately finished and complete, as having taken place; this pathway, on the other hand, is, as opposed to **this abstract intention, or untruth**, the actual carrying out of that process of development.[emphasis added]

...what is actual and concrete is the same as its inner principle or notion simply because the immediate qua purpose contains within it the self or pure actuality. **The realized purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement and development unfolded. But this very unrest is the self;...** [emphasis added]

8. A Social Approach to Individual Psychology

The contradiction of individual development in capitalist culture (to which we have several times referred), obviously determines the specific forms of psychodynamics apparent in study of the mind of the adult in this way. The main features of the mind as described by Freud are more or less exactly an accurate description of this phenomenon, within the limits of Freud's flawed method of judging that evidence. Apart from the consideration that Freud was obviously prevented from competently judging the deeper implications of his essentially accurate descriptions by his enslavement to bourgeois ideology, a certain perverse kind of apology can be made for him. Had Freud broken beyond the bounds of capitalist epistemological prejudices to pose the experimental and observational hypothesis wanted for a competent deeper exploration of the evidence, the type of clinical cases required by such hypotheses would be needed as well. These cases would be from the ranks of those extremely rare individuals in which creative processes have become a self-conscious aspect of mental life.

This need would not efficiently be satisfied by the individual who is merely creative. A still rarer individual is wanted. Experimental work demands the individual who has become self-conscious of creative mentation as a distinct phenomenon, and who has in that process relocated his sense of social identity in that sort of activity.

Our Experimental Authority

At this point, the writer's authority to develop his case depends critically upon the particular empirical investigations he conducted, especially over the past decade and a half.

Through an examination of himself included in this, he discriminated distinct phenomena which could thus be sought out as reflected in the persons and work of other contemporary and historic individuals distinguished for their creative activities. The first kind of phenomenon sought in these individuals was the effort to communicate certain kinds of conceptions which necessarily appear as working ideas only in those who are self-conscious of the distinct forms of creative menta-

tion in themselves. Kepler, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Shelley, Goethe, Heine, Beethoven, Cantor, Felix Klein, Emile Durkheim, Albert Einstein, were the principal cases explored.

The most important of such phenomena is the notion of a dialectic itself, which is usually situated (by the "systematic" creative thinkers: philosophers, scientists, etc.) in a specific kind of conceptual approach to solving the class of antinomies portended by the point-line paradox. What distinguishes the self-consciously creative personality in this respect is not necessarily a satisfactory solution to the problem — the case of Kant is exemplary here — but rather an awareness of the concept of the problem, and of certain specifications of the conception sought as a solution to that problem. In creative artists, the emphasis tends to be immediately on the notion of self-movement as the content of the artistic conception, and the accompanying recognition that the content of the work of art in that respect is nothing but a reflection of a similar empirical existence in the kind of mental activity by which the artist conceived that work.

The criteria used for judging progress in the self-analytical aspect of this inquiry have been those which any even merely creative individual would commend. The person who has been prompted to locate his sense of social identity in output of creative work is plagued (as we noted in discussing Shelley's "Ode...") by the fear of loss of the specific kind of mental powers on which that production depends. This problem is the commendable focus of Kubie's inquiry, in which he attempts — and rightly so — to locate the cause for loss or attenuation of creative powers in neurotic disorders. The nature of the work coincides in this respect with the general approach of competent psychoanalysis, in which the proper goal is to identify, and hence to either remove or check, those internalized "noises" which abort the individual's wilful command over his powers of reason and acting on reason. The measure of effectiveness of self-analysis of creative processes is similarly to discriminate between the desired and dysfunctional elements of mental life, and to gauge progress as increasing wilful control of creative activity through removing the dysfunctional and enhancing the self-consciousness of the desired aspects.

The two interconnected theorems of Descartes are a paradigm for creative thought in general. The unique feature of **self-consciously creative** work, thus distinguishing it from logical problem-solving merely assisted by the intervening impulse of creative processes, is the **wilful** synthesis of an empirically demonstrable universal from an array of predicates. The duration of attention-span over which one is able to sustain consistent advances toward such objectives, the ability to marshal one's appropriate mental processes for such work at will, and subsumed considerations, are the tests employed.


The writer was also most advantageously situated for this investigation, especially in recent years.

The unique feature of the now-international Labor Committee tendency, distinguishing it qualitatively from all socialist organizations heretofore established, is that expressed by its adopted "Founding Principles" among other locations. The central conception regulating the political judgments of the organization is the interconnected notion of the **class-for-itself** and of a **fundamental law of evolutionary social reproduction**. Consequently, the recruitment of members and the principal collective activities have been regulated by the propagation and realization of conceptions whose origination is uniquely representative of self-conscious creative mentation.

The location of the writer's personal identity in the process of communicating an increasingly appropriate approximation of these conceptions, and conceiving and motivating the realization of them, represents a situation exactly analogous to that we attributed to the creative artist in our discussion of Shelley and Beethoven. The motion reflected in the enhanced consciousness of the organization's members, in the workers and others directly affected by this organization, is in part a social reflection of the writer's own "internal" universal labor. This advantages him by affording him an extraordinary degree of actually human identity even within capitalist society. The access to the realization of universal labor in this way provides him with an objective measure of the relative "productivity" of his output in those same terms.

These positive features of his self-analytical situation are complemented by the resulting means to isolate, in himself and others, those psychological phenomena (and associated social behaviors) which correlate variously with the ebbs and flows of concept-assimilating capacities within the organization and its peripheral social strata. Furthermore, the advancement of a significant number of individuals' mental powers in the organization as a general **Promethean** process has produced a considerable extension of the investigation of the problems of ideology and mass-neurosis by a rapidly-growing number of special task forces established within the various sectoral groupings of this international tendency.

To emphasize the focus this investigation enjoys, we report that the degree to which significant numbers of working people (and others) are drawn toward or briefly ebb away from collaboration with the Labor Committees is governed **principally** by tendencies or counter-tendencies toward agreement with the class-for-itself conception on which all the principal organizing campaigns and tactical undertakings of the groupings are premised. Hence, the more progress Labor Committee members effect in themselves as political organizers, the more exactly and profoundly their "molecular"



BENEDICT SPINOZA: The active link between the most advanced features of Descartes and German critical philosophy. His ethics embody the kernel of the notion of "socialist man."

exchanges with individual working people adduce manifestations of deeper motivations operating within those peripheral strata. This molecular intelligence-gathering, linked to the "ideology" projects, represents the first actually scientific empirical study of mass psychological phenomena to be undertaken.

At the same time, study of the correlations between ebbs, flows in concept-comprehension and personal behaviors, etc., has provided experimental hypotheses through which to test the adduced psychodynamics respecting creative processes within the organization itself. Notable in this connection are studies of the consistent tendency of academic identity-roles to abort the individual's powers of concept-formation (coinciding with Kubie's observations partially to the same effect), and the **immediate** correlation between banalized sexual relations and an almost total temporary loss of conceptual powers.

Psychodynamics

To those with an ego-investment in their knowledge of psychoanalytical nomenclature and glosses, the most shocking aspect of the criticism we have to offer Freudian psychodynamics is undoubtedly our denial of the existence of the "Id." This is complemented by the related finding that there exists no categorical unconscious in the sense of processes of mentation not susceptible of being made conscious (at least, in a certain modified sense of consciousness).

Ordinarily, until we introduce the phenomena of creative mentation as empirically deliberative processes, the definition of **consciousness** is restricted to the cathected form, logical thought. We use "logical" in the broad sense of arrays of object-like images "connected" by feeling-states. This broader usage of "logical" is entirely justified, and indeed mandatory in this instance; if we recognize that the feeling-state aspect, the "color" of so-called conscious thought, corresponds to the notion of "relationship" in a logical system of object-images, no other term but "logical" will do. From the standpoint of ordinary consciousness, the existence of such consciousness is associated with both the point of reference of consciousness (ego) and an associated, shadowy but existent, **persona-maker**, the ego-ideal. (Actually, there may be several distinct sets of ego-ideals in effect, a prominent feature in certain types of disturbed personalities.)

In this view of consciousness in terms of "respect for law," **the consciousness of alienated man**, the executive agency (ego and ego-ideal) is vaguely present as the producer and traffic-manager of consciousness, the so-called "pre-conscious." This "pre-conscious," insofar as we can determine, must be regarded as essentially identical with the so-called Freudian "super-ego," and the terms, super-ego, ego and pre-conscious, must be regarded as signifying only distinctions of dynamic and descriptive aspects of the same actualities. In addition, there is unconscious thought-activity constantly in motion, thought-activity of the sort which tends to be reflected as conscious thought, but which, for reason of the pre-conscious "traffic management," is generally kept from appearing to consciousness at that particular moment. Using the term, "repression," in its broadest functional terms, this aspect of mentation represents the apparently **repressed unconscious processes**. In addition, so long as we continue to adhere to the naive notion of ordinary consciousness itself, there is a "deeper" aspect of mentation which is not susceptible of "being made conscious," in the sense that repressed unconscious processes are so susceptible.

Once we approach the mind from the standpoint of the fact of self-conscious creative mentation, the description changes. In creative mentation, the productive activity of the mind is under **deliberative** control of a different form (and content) of the Ego, and therefore the term, consciousness, must be employed in the sense of **deliberative**, but the dominant mental activity under such deliberation (executive control) is not object-like images. Yet, at the same time, an object-like stratum of awareness exists. (The feeling one has in experiencing shifts back and forth between a self-consciously creative and ordinary state, is that this stratum becomes relatively "thin," reduced to a minimal "buffering" region between deliberation and communication, when creative production is occurring.)

The most efficient way in which to identify the distinctions to be made is this. In abstraction of ordinary consciousness, the control of mental productions and communications is associated constantly with notions of one's self. Perhaps the individual ordinarily does not reflect on this, and ordinarily is therefore usually unaware of the existence of these executive controls; it is not difficult to provoke such awareness (indeed, a skillful operator in a "therapy group," or in any group which can be directed to act as a "therapy group," can readily force the attention of virtually all participants to such "feelings" very quickly. Once one has done this several times, the ability to replicate the effect becomes almost automatic.) In ordinary states, the form of these notions of ego-ideals is what one would best describe as feelings about attributes of a monad-like "little me." In general, the instant one succeeds in "cutting through the persona" of an individual to force his reflection on these "feelings," the usual sensation experienced by the "opened-up" individuals is "I am a fraud." ("Original Sin"?) There is a more or less immediate recognition that the self one presents to the outer world is a synthetic character, a mere persona, a manufactured (e.g., artificial) product created for the propitiatory edification of the credulous. Thus, one's self as presented to the world is not "the real me," not the "soul." Very quickly the affected individual can begin to discover and detail "how I operate." Accompanying this enlarged awareness there is usually a growing depression, associated with the sense that the "real self" is a kind of monad, a "little me." The fact that such a monad could only be an empty construct forces the individual to regard the criteria "by which I operate" as necessarily the only existent qualities attributable to the "little me." Consequently, these being the same qualities associated with the production of the "fraudulent outer self," the persona, the "little me" is a degraded thing, intrinsically "unloveable." ("How could God love my miserable little soul?")

At bottom, in this respect, the effort to get at the "inner self" brings us, in the ordinary case, to a little hard ball, a monad of sorts, from which apparently emanate the qualities, the "feeling-states," "instincts," etc., which one otherwise encounters in cathexis in consciousness and semi-consciousness. Ostensibly, any effort to probe the self more deeply, to "get within" the monad, results in locating only an "it," an Id. In fact, precisely such results can actually be obtained.

When the same self-analysis is effected in the case of individuals in a state of self-conscious creative production, the phenomena of the monad are not obtained. The ego-ideal and the notion of "inner self" are instead united in a single quality. Examined more superficially, one could obtain the apparent result emphasized by Kubie. At first inspection, the idea of creative activity for its own sake is the ego-ideal, a form whose content is the activity of "negentropic synthesis" itself. Ac-

cordingly, if one studied artistic and other personalities who are merely creative, or only yet potentially self-conscious, one would tend to concur with Kubie's argument that the creative process must be regarded as a virtue in itself.

Such a superficial, one-sided view of the "inner self" overlooks the paramount fact of mental life. The feeling aspect of thought is a movement, a disposition to act, a kind of kinaesthesia in abstract, which connected to a definite object-image is nothing but the impulse for a definite action ("sensuous" thought in Feuerbach and Marx). All acts are related to the "ego," not only by the executive control of conscious and semi-conscious thought, but by the actual or imputed consequences of the specific act for the identity of the self. The idea of the freedom to express itself as an act without socially-reflected consequences for the identity is an understandable pathological misconception, **from the standpoint of the heteronomic individual.**(8) The actual significance of every act or imagined act for the ego is some change in the external world which, in turn, increases or diminishes rights and privileges, and which increase or diminution is reflected back as an enhancement or weakening of the social identity.(8,6c) Consequently, "pure creativity" (for its own sake) could not be a self-evident attribute of identity of an inner self. To that extent it might appear to be self-evident, there is inevitably some pathology afoot attempting to thereby conceal the reflex aspect of the creative impulse.(6a)

In every important case of self-conscious creative personalities, as with Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, the efficient sense of inner identity is demonstrably the consequence of creative inner activity as a realized improvement (perfection) of the universal. The first approximation of this result for each of them is an increase in the self-consciousness of persons directly influenced by them, which immediate effect is imputed to be the mediation of a positive development of the universal. The sense of self in these cases demonstrably coincides with the ego-ideal of the creative artist, as the enhancement of inner creative powers through the reflected increase in creative powers among the individuals contiguous to one's existence. In this sense, the form and content of the sense of identity in the creative individual are not freedom per se, but Freedom-Necessity.

This point can be strengthened by returning attention to our earlier discussion of the "schlimihl syndrome." This notion was initially conjectured from the writer's own experience and shaped and established as a notion through broader investigations. The interesting question posed in this example is whence comes the source of that sense of identity which enables the rarer individual to be relatively freer of the pandemic pathetic gregariousness? At first glance, some would argue the "independent individual" is more or less of

the Nietzschean type, an asocial specimen narcissistically distinguishing himself from "the herd." Yet, in fact, neither this specimen nor the strict Nietzschean fits the "autistic" etiology; **exactly the opposite!**

The independent individual locates his independence in his confidence in his powers of judgment. Not as fixed, already "perfected" powers, but in respect to his confidence in his ability to develop those powers (creativity) to the point of arriving at responsible judgment. He is not asocial; he justifies his social practice by argument with others, and is qualitatively affected by the systematic content in arguments of others much more than the gregarious type. What he rejects is the authority of external opinion for its own sake: **he demands that he be convinced — not as a professional "pluralist" skeptic — and is readily susceptible of being convinced** by any argument or other demonstration which can upset the assumptions on which his preceding opinions were premised. He proceeds always from the at least implicit standpoint of a lawfully holistic universe in which action is properly determined by lawful reflection accessible to his individual creative powers.

In personal history he is usually intellectually gifted, but at the same time usually a poor schoolroom student. Since he demands that he be convinced of each conception before assimilating it to belief, a sanitary mental self-discipline causes him to resist any pedagogy premised on the assertions of arbitrary authority. He is not therefore unwilling to act (at least not by nature) until he has "independently" settled everything relevant to the action in his own mind. He is willing to act on the basis of external authority, provided that the competence of following that external authority relative to concepts has itself been rationally established.

Whence this independence? It should be obvious, at least as an hypothesis for observation and experiment, that such a confidence in the perfectability of mental powers corresponds in form to the case of the child who has to a certain extent escaped the strict negation-of-the-negation form of socialization. Instead of an arbitrary abortion of the use of powers under repression by external authority, the child has in some way concentrated on channelling his powers into positive social acts (e.g., the Spinozan ethic). How this occurs is reflected in the familiar "Why?" of children during the period in question. Instead of the abrupt and arbitrary "Because I say so" form of reply to his "Why?," the child has frequently enjoyed an explication which situated the motivation for a certain course of action in love for his immediate society (e.g., parents, siblings). This illustration is only a feature of something more general: the experience of parental, etc., love respecting the extension of his infantile and childhood powers, an experience extended to the development of his powers of reason. His ego-ideal is made to be, through

some combination of circumstances, to "think it out for yourself" to the end that he can by such resources arrive at a positive social act.(3b,6a)

Examining the subsequent history of the five-to-six-year-old "independent" child, in cases considered we see him developing in one of two principal alternative ways. The determining feature of this development is reflected in his attitude toward the pathetic gregariousness of his peers. Either he combines enmity for their pathetic behavior with love for them as sickened persons, or he permits hostility to their gregariousness to alienate him, to determine his reductionist equation of the victim to the victim's pathology. Undoubtedly, a principal source of our most gifted physicists, mathematicians, chessmasters, and so forth is the "independent child" of the pathetic second evolution. The extreme might be the creative "pure mathematician" or astronomer, who thus exercises his independent powers for society while also getting as far removed from "the herd" as possible. In the first instance, we have the potential revolutionary intelligensia, who must realize love for humanity by eliminating the disease of schlimihlism.

The case of Nietzsche is actually relevant here. The positive features of his work — his keen historical insight in philology, his perceptive hostility to the renegacy of Richard Wagner — attest to the unusual potential of the five-to-six year old Nietzsche. Yet, he has gone the way of the brilliant astronomer; the world of real people around him has died, and he is left alone to await the coming of a new human race which "speaks his language" (creativity). He has acquired the hostile impulse to reject attempting to change his fellow-man — **although not with total success**. Since he is creative, he knows he must have been produced by a species that was actually human, but since the people around him are ostensibly merely schlimihls, that **human** race must have died. He sprawls on his Italian exile-bed, periodically roused, no doubt by his sister's arranging his pillows and coverings, craggily muttering his role as the prophet foretelling the doom which has already occurred. His assumed identity is the last dying Dodo of an extinct race.

Nietzsche is in no sense a true existentialist. The true existentialist is typified by a Latin peasant or petit-bourgeois French, Italian, or Spanish. Nietzsche has merely degenerated to mimic the existentialist pathology. The true existentialist, like the farmer, or the Latin petit-bourgeois, knows no real human relationships, even in the ordinary sense. The Latin existentialist has the thickest of personas — his Machismo — within which a totally isolated "little me" shrieks and moans as it rolls in its own perfect alienation like a pig in mud. His inner self desires nothing but the individual (totally asocial) act, which because it is a totally asocial act is the actualization of a null-identity-suicide, and thus the realization of the psychological death of a monad. The true existentialist could not be a Nietzsche, whose pathology is his hostility toward his lost capacity for human relationships, of which he is so morbidly sensible. The true existentialist is one never capable of knowing human relationships. The true existentialist is a French petit-bourgeois anarcho-syndicalist or aggrege, an honor-stricken Sicilian, or, in the worst extreme, the proto-fascist animal, D.H. Lawrence.*

The form of "modified consciousness" experienced in the creative process is that of the **motion** connecting x_{ij} to $x_{i(j+1)}$.(6a) It would seem, from the standards of ordinary, alienated consciousness, that the definiteness of the object-images has been replaced by blurs. Indeed, creative processes, at least for persons developed in an alienated culture, are preceded by an accumulation of definite facts, after which the mind wilfully runs these object-images into one another, so to speak. The form in which this occurs has a certain resemblance to ordinary conscious deliberations in another respect, and necessarily so. The ego functions as the executive agency of thought, but it is the changed, creative form and content of the ego. The quality of this executive agency is the self-motion of the creative impulse. It is this self-motion, thus supplying the necessary principle for the conceptualization of a universal, which makes the "blurring" process a phase of synthesizing universals for an array of predicates as definite Gestalts. ("Impressionism" reflects, hence, the neurotic abortion of the creative process at its onset phase.)

* There is a form of the "schlimihl syndrome" whose victim often disguises his pathetic gregariousness as "healthy skepticism." This specimen affords us the proverbial exception which tends to prove the rule. Two connected examples of the disorder, the "hard Bolshevik" and "independent radical," exemplify the etiology of the general sort of rationalized behavior encountered.

In our pedagogically simplified representation of the successive infantile and two earliest childhood phases of development of the petit-bourgeois individual, the rudimentary notion was more easily conveyed by assuming the purely hypothetical case in which the parents are jointly and separately an integrated packet of rights and privileges for the child. In actuality, the parents are much more complex problems for the infant and young child. Out of the antagonisms between and within the parents necessarily emerge contradictory notions of identity for the child. These contradictions of the personality developed within the household become a susceptibility for the further contradictions experienced respecting the respective authority of the household and the outside world.

The most vicious aspect of the parental relationship to the child is associated with the fact that the child represents a concrete universal for the parent. The child becomes the hapless victim of pathological behavior which may be more obvious in the pathetic form the same syndrome occurs between the parents themselves. The fact that the individual is a concrete universal is translated into the psychology of the heteronomic (alienated) personality as the quality of fetish. For example, the fact that the wife is a propitiatory device for the husband's sense of social identity makes her the **object** (hostage) to be punished for society's failures toward the husband, and vice versa. We commonly see paired mating relationships are governed by a "struggle for goods and services"; in response to the failures of society

The prerequisite phase of accumulating ordinary forms of knowledge as predicates should not be interpreted as necessarily requiring a suppression of the creative processes during that phase. Rather, each fact assimilated in this phase is assimilated for a creative process by being assimilated with a certain "fuzziness" of the sort which Hegel identifies as skepticism of a positive sort. The fact is not assimilated as a self-evident fact, but as a challenged appearance of factualness. The root of skepticism of this sort is the role of the creative ego in regulating this process. The ego "recognizes" that each of the facts is of an unsatisfactory form and applies the appropriate question-mark to it at that time. The ego is at the same time constantly testing the process of accumulation for the possibility of creative hypotheses leading toward a new Gestalt.(6a)

The "blurred" form of the predicates suggests that the form of cathexis in creative states is such that the awareness of the feeling-state is much stronger in this

form of deliberation than in ordinary consciousness. This is precisely the case.

Another way of interpreting these phenomena is to compare the mental processes in deliberative creative activity with certain heightened states of empathy. In such forms of empathy, which are incidentally a prominent feature of the mental activity appropriate to mass organizing work, the blurring effect arises from the "taking in" of the replicated cathexized states of the masses in respect to comparable patterns from one's own mental experience. The art of the mass organizer depends on knowing in that way what the masses "are thinking." This knowledge focuses not merely on what those masses have been consciously thinking; the art of the mass organizer depends upon anticipating what they can be induced to call forth by suggestion. He accomplishes this result by replicating their mental states within himself and critically examining the processes so replicated, so effecting experimental foreknowledge of what further states are susceptible of production by various means of suggestion.

to adequately gratify the sense of identity, the mate is blamed for this failure, as a fetish. At the same time that the need to hold onto the mate is giving an hostage to society, the mate is treated as the hostage taken from society. If the individual mate's sense of identity (rights and privileges in society generally) is threatened, it is the partner who must be punished as a surrogate for society. The child is similarly a fetish, directly so for the mother and in a more complex fashion for the father.

In one commonplace form of this, the child is the mother's fetish, becoming thus a basis for the mother's asserting a social identity in opposition to the father. To the father, the possession of the child becomes an escape for the mother threatening the father's control of rights and privileges (identity) from the mother, at the same time that the father's obligations to the child are his hostage to circumstances. The mother uses the child against the social authority represented by the father, and father struggles to assert compensatory rights in the child's sense of identity. The father struggles in this way both to contain the mother and to find in the child a substitute concrete universal for the mother.

At bottom, the dynamics of two-parent experience for the child should be a "healthy" influence, a means by which the child would be able to situate his or her identity within the microcosm of social relationships. The location of the child's rights and privileges in both parents simultaneously is what ought to be obviously the basis for healthy socialization of the child's social identity and associated judgmental processes. The pathetic character of the relationship between the bourgeois parents, subsumed by the alienated form of each parent's identity, makes what should be an essential, positive feature of having two parents into a source of vicious pathologies in the child's development.

Through the heteronomic, pathological form of the relationship among parents and child (and other siblings), the child immediately "internalizes" the fetishistic "goods and services" relationship as the proper content of interpersonal relationships generally. The heteronomic dualism of the child's rights and privileges in the parents means a corresponding pathetic feature in the child's own ego-ideals. This dualism is manifest as a pathological quality of skepticism. "But mommy says..." and "But daddy says..." become pathetic devices by which the child seems to adopt, alternatively, the practice of surrogate for the conflict role of one parent against the other.

We emphasize that the differences between the specific approaches of two parents to life is not necessarily a pathological element in the child's situation. Provided that both parents reflect, at bottom, the same positive (Spinozan) world-outlook, the particular differences in individual approach to immediate problems are predicates of a common world-outlook. If the outlook of the parents were sane, then the child would be continually forced to acquire an independent knowledge of the underlying world-outlook from the predicated differences between the parents in each particular situation. If the implicit outlook (Gestalt) expressed by the conflict between the parents is a pathological one, the child will acquire that one instead.

Since the pathological outlook of the typical intrahousehold conflicts are those of heteronomic relationships, the child acquires an heteronomic world-outlook, and the kind of pathological skepticism in individual social practice which is formally represented by empiricism or existentialism.

Skepticism, exemplified as alternation between the contrasting heteronomic rationalization of two parents, becomes a kind of moral indifferentism otherwise expressed by pluralism or "cultural relativism." The object of skepticism in the child's behavior is not to determine the discrepancy between a particular theorem and a coherent world-view; the object of pathetic skepticism is to assert that no coherent world-view exists, or that there are as many world-views as there are conflicting individuals. Otherwise expressed, the child develops the sort of skepticism which is properly identified as an anti-theoretical outlook. The typical petit-bourgeois child rejects the notion that there exists any overriding, universal law which ought to govern individual human behavior, and tends to the "bourgeois-feminine outlook," which regards the heteronomic feeling-impulses of the individual as primary. Law becomes for the child merely a set of procedures by which an aggregation of heteronomically autonomous individual "innate" impulses can be satisfactorily accommodated to one another.

During the succeeding phase of socialization (in which the mediation of authority outside the family acts selectively on the love received within the family), the pluralism of the household itself is amplified to the effect of increasingly setting the authority of the external peer-group (for example) against the household. The child "reasons": "If you yourselves have made the approval I gain from outside authorities [teachers, peer-groups, etc.] the basis for determining the love I secure from within the household, then that external authority must have a corresponding higher authority than my direct relationship to you."

Consequently, the contradictory forms of "rights and privileges" the child obtains from various adult authorities and peer-groups

The process required represents a rapid shifting among various alternative "cathexes" for the same patterns of feeling states, and also location of new feeling states, which can be brought forward in the course of such shifts. To a considerable extent, the mass organizer thus strips away the persona of the mass, creating a new persona for it at the same time. Wittingly, or perhaps unwittingly, his employment of empathy in this way can be, properly directed, a means for reaching self-conscious control of creative processes in himself.

Empathy demonstrates the means by which the notion of feeling-states can be conceptualized or abstracted from ordinary mental processes. The notion of the

feeling-state is abstracted as the relative subject for the array of predicated specific object-images with which it is associated. If the process of abstraction from association is pursued to a sufficient extent, with concentrated and prolonged attention, the result is a kind of deliberate (if reflected, negative) awareness of the "contents" of the deeper unconscious processes. When such phenomena are examined in respect to deliberate creative mentation, it is evident that these abstracted "pure feeling states" have the most direct relationship to creative processes.

At that point, the last vestige of a topographical interpretation of **conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious** evaporates. The distinctions among these cate-

outside the household lead ultimately to those pathological forms of skepticism we meet in "I'm from Missouri," or in academic empiricist skepticism. Truth, as a body of underlying law (Freedom/Necessity) properly governing individual behavior despite momentary prevailing opinion, virtually ceases to exist for the developing new individual. "Truth" is reduced to moral relativism, to a policy of effective propitiation of whatever authority or peer-group from which the individual is concerned to secure love. Consequently, the form of cynicism which is mistaken for "healthy skepticism" among, for example, the academic petit-bourgeoisie. "Truth is reduced, in such pathetic cases, to earning a "passing grade in recitations" from whatever peer-group or other authority the "independent" individual is preoccupied to propitiate. The pseudo-independence which apparently preoccupies this pathological type of "healthy skeptic" is nothing but independence from any obligation to reason and act according to some law independent of such authorities. Skepticism is a form of hysterical blindness to the fact of one's own credulous grovelling.

One cannot systematically know the pathology of most Left groups and "independent radicals" except from this analytical standpoint. In the "workerist" versions of this, the group focuses on propitiating the prevailing prejudices of militant workers. Such groups villify, as either "idealism" or "elitism," the notion that there exists some immediate self-interest for workers which is either independent of or opposite to (not merely an extrapolation of) the prevailing prejudices of militant trade-union "rank-and-filers." Hence, they reject Kepler's outlook, that the interests of (workers as) the whole, and therefore the actual interests of the individual (worker), are governed by some underlying rational principle which can be known only by rising above the heteronomic conceits of self-interest of (worker) monads. This is reflected in the fact that most of such Left groups can be, in one instance trade-union chauvinists (when they are attempting to propitiate trade-union "militant rank-and-filers"), and in another instance union-busters and job-busters (when they are propitiating the adduced narrow prejudices of unorganized oppressed and unemployed workers). They are incapable of discerning the common class-interest which is lawfully common to both groupings and which is thus in opposition to the pathetic heteronomic immediate impulses of each. The anti-theoretical attitudes, or "healthy skepticism" toward theoretical determination of necessary policies, must be understood not as a point of view, but as a lawful reflection of bourgeois ideology.

The form of "academic" debates within the Left reveals the same "schlimihl syndrome." Choosing idealized authority (Lenin, or Mao Tse Tung, et al.), the Left group argues its point of view in terms of canonical glosses on canonical literary extractions or canonical interpretations of practice of these "authorities." Obviously, here the question of lawfully demonstrating a principle is brushed aside in favor of the academic norm of seeking "a passing grade for recitations." Or, among "independent Leftists," we see the refusal to commit themselves firmly to any policy but that of the "need to have rational discussion among the various points of view." As soon as any one discussion is apparently "settled even in this miserable fashion, the "independent Leftist" dredges up notice of some other alternative, which has to be discussed in its own terms, before commitment can be entertained.

The differentiation between the two such tendencies (so-called "Marxist-Leninist" "hards," and "independents") is real, but still demonstrates the common quality within which those differentiations are subsumed. The "hard" has chosen to act in a certain way, and resorts to the same sort of skeptic's rationalization of strong personal impulses ("constituency" rights of heteronomic impulses) as the "independent," who uses the same skepticism as the inexhaustible basis for rationalizing moral indifferentism toward any definite Left commitment. The "independent" is only the more immediately obvious symptom of the quality shared by both. The "independent," by rejecting any identity-commitment, poses the question of whether he is able to act on anything at all in life. Almost invariably, **we do find him committed to something: the pursuit of individual, personal gratification of himself as a "little me," according to the dictates of his persona.** This shows more obviously what is nonetheless obviously the case for deeper inquiry into the "hard." Neither accepts the existence of any deeper, fundamental body of lawful determination. Both are schlimihls, exploiting pathetic skepticism to distance themselves from obligations to any law but that of the universe of heteronomic little egos. Both reject the Spinozan notion of the individual's obligation to Freedom/Necessity, in favor of a moral rule agreeable to a world of monad-selves each fundamentally regulated by pursuit of autonomous impulses. Both the "hard" and the "independent" reflect this in the opposite ways they interpret the conflict between world-historical undertakings and the contrary right of the individual for a "meaningful personal life" qua heteronomic individual life.

The "Why?" of actually healthy childhood skepticism to which we refer in the text is not the sort of pathetic skepticism we have described in this extended footnote so far. **The "Why?" of actually healthy childhood skepticism is a Keplerian "Why?,"** preoccupied with the search for fundamental laws, independent of the opinion of any particular other authorities per se. It seeks the universal which properly regulates the judgment and practice of both himself and those others.

This actually healthy skepticism does not specify rejection of all external institutional authority. Rather, it limits its submission to external authority to that authority which has demonstrably shown itself to reflect **systematic deliberations respecting fundamental law.** It submits conditionally only to what it properly judges to be **external scientific authority of that sort.** Ironically, it is just that sort of external scientific authority which pathetic skepticism rejects. Pathetic skepticism counterposes the universal external law of heteronomy (empiricism, pragmatism, existential views) to the authority of systematic comprehension of universality. It rejects the approach from the standpoint of fundamentals (universal principles) in favor of the authority of aggregations of particular heteronomic opinion and isolated experiences.

gories is in no way analogous to distinct functions as if of distinct organs, but rather these categories represent different phases (determinations) of an indivisible process.

The explication of this flows readily from two considerations we have already developed. Firstly, the Feuerbachian schema, as modified to agree with Marx's notion of actualized creative processes (Freedom/Necessity). Secondly, the contradictions arising between infantile and socialization phases of development of the new individual in capitalist culture.

The Feuerbach schema defines consciousness as the act of mediation of the social relations of the individual, a form typified by language. It also determines a distinction between the **subject** (universal = ego) and its **predicate** (the particular act).(3b) Both the ego and the predicated act are specifically determined. The ego and act are thus abstractable forms, reflecting a reality which is otherwise the continuous process of mentation, a process which has the quality of its development, its invariant and predicated specific powers.

The contradictory development of the alienated individual limits the incompletely positive (infantile) form of the ordinary ego and predicated acts to the alienated form imposed by capitalist culture (in particular). Thus, for capitalist norms, that which is reflected as self-consciousness is that which is functionally acknowledged as the basis for the development of the inner infantile ego's rights and privileges by capitalist society. Thus, the ordinary (infantile) form of the ego and ordinary consciousness must be regarded, for practical purposes, as specifically bourgeois.

From this standpoint, the Freudian "Id" does exist in a certain historically-specific sense. Where the society does not recognize the creative processes of the human mind as the primitive basis for individual social identity, the form of the ego must be that of the monad which, stripped of its persona qualities, becomes a mere object lacking in any social identity, an "It." This alienating judgment of the society must be, and is, a determined internalized (reflected) quality of the individual's mentation! **In that sense** it exists. (The fallacy of the Freudian "Id" is suggested by Jung's happier term "social unconscious.") The qualities located within it are just those human powers developed by society in the new individual infant, powers suppressed by the negative socialization of the immature ego. Since their exercise is controlled by negation of the negation, these powers have been stupified (made imbecilically destructive) in most individuals.

A crude example suggests the kind of problem involved. One has undoubtedly watched an infant in the process of learning to reach directly to an object, undershooting, overshooting, missing, proceeding in his

development from lunges and over-inhibited muscular thrusts, toward the **Gestalt** of an effectively directed coordination of muscular movements. (We emphasize **Gestalt**, in rejection of the specious, pathetic "feedback" learning" edification.) Apply the same principle of necessary development to certain mental powers. Abort their development before it could be completed. Imagine, then the consequence if those aborted infantile powers are summoned forth in a fully-developed adult; compare the case of the muscular, 250-pound young adult who never learned to reach directly, but suddenly attempted to reach out to a friend to steady him: he might kill him! The point to be conveyed by such admittedly glib arguments is that the negation-of-the-negation socialization process results in the degradation of potentially essential human capacities into the restive impulses of an imbecile.

That glib illustration is premised on actual knowledge of various persons who have astonished and terrified themselves for a period at discovering what unwanted results can occur in the course of poorly-informed efforts to gain direct control of the feeling-states in their creative processes. The result could too easily be psychosis or suicide. This occurs occasionally and inevitably in such undertakings at self-development because of the creative individual's early recognition of the prominence and identity of "feeling-states" in noetic processes. He rather understandably concentrates on the effort to directly recall such feeling-states at will, and then sometimes finds himself evoking a maddened imbecilic genie whose rampages he is unable to control.

Any musician or committed music-lover should be able to locate the means for understanding the point. In the work of arriving at a proper interpretation of a composition, the direct ("rational") approach to the objective aspects of the formal composition is superseded by "phrasing" the articulation of clusters of notes under the control of a selected combination of "feelings." The public performance or private hearing-interpretation of the thus-familiar composition is then conceptually controlled by that Gestalt, with the feeling-state recall tending to dominate. Related problems are reviewed by Hegel throughout the **Phenomenology**, notably in the chapters on the "Understanding," "The Unhappy Consciousness," "Absolute Freedom and Terror."

The creative person attempting that approach to direct control of his noetic potentialities is not fundamentally in error in presuming that these "forces" potentially represent a powerful "good." The source of his difficulty is that he is calling upon powerful **imbeciles** (as is done in the "get-ugly" "spiritual" aspects of "martial arts" or training in bayonet-drill or bodily-contact "sports.")

The example of music serves us further on this point. In Western music generally, it is not difficult to distinguish three distinct qualities of music from a "feeling" standpoint, the Apollonian (e.g., most of Brahms), the Dionysian (e.g., in the extreme case, the actually proto-fascist forms of "Rock"), and the Promethean (Beethoven).^{*} Along the lines we indicated earlier, it is feasible to justify the objectivity of such "emotional judgments" from analysis of the formal and anti-formal features of composition, but we must also emphasize that affective judgment respecting the music is first reached without any such calculated objectivity. The same principle of "emotional intelligence" is demonstrated throughout life, representing aspects of mental life as essentially susceptible of deliberative control for positive results as the weaker reflection of these "feeling-states" when such emotions are brought forward by the calling-forward of cathexized object-images in "rational" thinking. Indeed, the deliberative control of such feeling-states as such is a major aspect of creative mental life, and is only most evident in the greatest expressions of artistic production.

This is necessarily the case. The **abstracted** feeling-state as thus an apparently "pure" feeling-state, cognized as such, is a potential universal relative to the plenum of predicates with which it is associated. All creative work is, by definition, focussed upon nothing but the synthesis of universals (**Gestalts**) relative to an array of predicates. In great art, such as that of Beethoven's Promethean productions, the object is to celebrate a mood of the Freedom/Necessity quality of creativity as such independent of any predicates but the sensuous medium in which the representation (communication) occurs. The different qualities of various compositions all converging commonly on the same objective are the result of the varying kaleidoscopic arrays of feeling-states (**motion**) which are arranged to provoke a Gestalt of that aggregation.

In the composition of poetry, a similar process applies. The initial conception of a great poem exists for development as a mood and a snatch of some line, usually the opening line. The conception of the whole poem exists at the initial point of elaboration as a kaleidoscopic fabric of feeling-states, a would be Gestalt of such feeling-state patterns identified by that bit of thematic line. **This is the subject of the poem.** The poet unfolds the poem from this, words marching in phrase-groups, feeling-states and feeling-state clusters seizing upon the appropriate cathexis which comes to the fore from unfolding association with the thematic snatch of line. The end-result has ostensible symbology, metrical and other prosodic subtleties, such that from those isolable features foolish, banal critics may indeed attempt to fashion a logical interpretation, but their effort is pathetic. The intent of the poem's elaboration was to communicate to the reader the Gestalt from desire for

which the elaboration began for the poet. This is more emphatically the case for great music — as we have already emphasized.

Love

The primary feeling-state is **love**, the affective content and form of recall of the creative process itself, the invariant human quality of the mind. To understand the dynamics of love, one begins by inquiring as to what practical expression can be given to the direct calling forth of the universal for all particular expressions of social creative activity. Every detail dissolves; the mind is dissolved into pure creative ferment, the universality of the creative act. What, then?

We have emphasized that thought is the demand for an act. The omission of the act for the thought is a denial of the reflected benefit of the act for the identity, and correspondingly a diminution of the identity. The force (emotion) of the thought would therefore seem to be in direct proportion to the force of reaction against the sense of identity (anxiety) experienced by frustration of the act. Experience substantiates such an hypothesis. Furthermore, it is demanded that the act must be in proportion to the force of the thought.

Then, what is the act corresponding to the "pure emotion" of love? What, but the intensely sensuous concretized celebration of creative sociality in general? The mood must seize upon a concrete individual as its object. Either a concrete universalizing (social) creative act — as a great work of art, or sensuous loving of a concrete (universal) person.

The poet Heine has the greatest clinical interest as a creative artist for this facet of the inquiry. A few preliminary contextual qualifications:

If we use the term, "Romantic," to identify the tragic outcome of the great creative potential in a Robert Schumann, or the tragic limitations of the magnificently gifted Hugo Wolf, then Heine does not become a Romantic until his last wretched years of despondency. In form, Romantic art expresses the tragic interplay of Apollonian and Dionysian moods in the poets and musicians, especially, who are best identified with that movement.

Wolf efficiently expresses the kernel of the tragedy at (this would please Hegel!) the point the Romantic period in art had been essentially completed. Wolf's pathology is efficiently isolated for clinical study by his setting of three Goethe poems, "Ganymed," "Grenzen der Menschheit," and "Prometheus." In the first two, Wolf's setting is definitive representation of the poem.

^{*} Although as able a musician as the late Bruno Walter, among others, misplaced the feeling in identifying Beethoven with the Dionysian camp.

In the third, excepting some brilliant passages (second, third, last segment of fourth, and fifth stanzas), Wolf fails to comprehend the essential conception brilliantly situated as the subject of the Goethe poem itself; as a setting of that poem, the ironic theme of Wolf's composition leads to a brilliantly executed artistic failure. This failure is not an incidental lapse, but the outcome of a systematic flaw which Wolf shares with the world-spirit of the Romantic period. The subject-matter (world-outlook) of the three Goethe poems gives the evidence required. "Ganymed" is the almost pure Apollonian mood, "Grenzen der Menschheit" a conflict between the Apollonian (fixed laws beyond alteration by man) and restive Dionysian (heteronomic) submission to that condition. Both moods Wolf captures perfectly, expressing thus the best powers encountered in the Romantics generally. The "Prometheus" reflects Goethe's genius in adducing the world-outlook of his own most revolutionary period of life, with a marked resemblance to Marx's "Theses On Feuerbach" — in contrast to Goethe's preoccupation of his philistine moods, fixed "Iron Laws." Wolf, perhaps the most fertile creative talent of the late Romantic ferment, shares the tragic flaw of that current, that he can comprehend only the Apollonian and Dionysian moods, and reflect the struggle between the two within himself. His creative potential is aborted at the point of solving that antinomy; he can not resolve the Dionysian-Apollonian contradiction in a Promethean Gestalt. Prometheus, for him, can attain only to anarchist's insolence, not all-conquering **hubris**.

These three moods are affective (active) forms of what are otherwise three distinct epistemological world-outlooks. The Apollonian mood corresponds to naive "respect for law," the **hysterical** state of false-positiveness within general negation-of-the-negation determinations. The Dionysian mood is heteronomy unhinged. As its extreme expression, fascist movements, exhibits the point, the Dionysian tends toward the blind assertion of individual pathological freedom (i.e., hysterical existentialist "Libertarianism"), in insolent defiance of what anarchism otherwise slyly acknowledges to be the unchangeable "Iron Laws" of fixed Necessity. The Dionysian can not conceive of creating a positive new Necessity to conquer the old; he can conceive only of sly or exhibitionist smashing of a few artifacts of what remain for him unchangeable laws. The Dionysian (variously, fascist, anarchist, or "Third Camper") is entirely the subject of bourgeois ideology in every turn of his logic, his epistemology; his rebellion is limited to exhibitionist acts of pathetic insolence against the mere tokens, predicates of what he

otherwise accepts as an unchangeable order of things. The Promethean mood, best epitomized by Beethoven in art, is that of our general thesis.

Heine is located affectively and epistemologically on the last upsurge of the French Enlightenment, standing in outlook and reflective consciousness alike between Kant and Hegel.(7) Artistically, he belongs to the same species of German culture's advancement of the French Enlightenment as Goethe, Beethoven and Hegel, adding to this the critical element of relative genius which is relatively the persisting phenomenon of the creative intellect among assimilated Jews.* Beethoven is the peak dividing the ascent from decline in art throughout the history of capitalist development. Heine belongs to what is still the ascent phase; after Beethoven, there is generally decline, for which the Romantic artistic movement is the opening and less degenerate form.

The Romantic artist's notion of love converges upon the love of the love-object as an object of heteronomical social relationships. His fixation converges increasingly upon the banal. Romantic art's conception of love tends to become degraded to the apotheosis of banalized bourgeois love.

In Heine, love is a world-historical act. This notion is underlined by such ironical devices as the interdependency of the poet's love for the beloved person, the beloved place, and the beloved upsurge in human potential through which emergent development the poet, the beloved person, the beloved place, and the beloved human potential of peoples are unified. For Heine, the tragic element of the act of loving the person, the place, the peoples, is that each in its immediate "here" and "now" are mere alienated predicates of the process of self-perfection, which can not be gigantic enough as such predicates to contain the infinite scope of his love (creativity, self-perfecting self-movement).

Reflect for a moment on the tragedy of the creative poet's search for a beloved person (his concrete universal). He encounters in capitalist culture a banalized woman who portends momentarily all those qualities of humanity which might reflect (potentially) his own creative self-activity (as the rights and privileges of his thus beloved identity), a woman whose creative activity he could not only arouse but reflect. He is overwhelmed, thus, by the **potential** act of love, the sensuous thought of creating loving. The act of loving touches the woman, who reflects nothing of the poet's inner identity. She is a banalized, bourgeois woman, in whom creative processes lie inert, unwakeable. The poet desper-

* If we understand Marx on "The Jewish Question," we understand Spinoza, Marx, Heine, and other lesser figures the Enlightenment influence produced among such a disproportionate incidence of creative Jewish intellects. The Jew, whose medieval cultural identity adaptively reifies itself to the universalizing tendency in capitalist development, can cease to be a pariah (a Jew) either by becoming an ultra-nationalist chauvinist (e.g., the pathetic, hysterical French chauvinism of Emile Durkheim, or of Zionism) or becoming a revolutionary, an expression of world-historical man (e.g., Spinoza, Heine, Marx).(12a)

ately wills to arouse her creative inner self with the sheer force of his creative outpourings, but she remains dead, inert. The idea of a concrete-universal love-relationship for him so becomes a facet of his eternal migration in search of the "land that speaks my own language." It is a land of Life, of Springtime (Life born), and the awakening of great peoples. Yet, eternally, that desired place remains perpetually what the haunting voice within says to be always where he cannot be. Florestan's mate, Fidelio, the Claerchen of "Egmont," revolutionary (creative) woman, does not yet exist for him. This notion of tragic artist's love is absolutely in opposition to the maudlin banalities of the Romantic period. The creative poet does not will to die for lack of such a love; he is perversely strengthened by the fact that the land of the philistines has no Delilah who can seduce him, banalize him. His tragedy is turned into a positive force; he becomes a revolutionary against all extant "Iron Laws," either a revolutionary per se or a revolutionary as all creative artists are revolutionaries.

This poet's tragedy is elaborated constantly in the life of every adolescent and adult. The positive (creative) impulse in each individual, as this is more or less more conspicuous in virtually all children, seeks a social identity for itself as the inner self through love-relationships in which other persons become the concrete universal — the person who echoes the creative impulses of the loving one, the person whose creative impulses are reflected in oneself. Yet, in capitalist culture (in particular), the social identity, including that employed in mate-selection, is that of the persona. This persona is developed to establish the individual's value as an object in a world of fixed relationships, and thus locates the identity (persona-identity) in that which denies the existence of the creative impulses. The suppressed and repression-deformed creative impulse, a poor Caliban of a secret self, seeks realization of its deformed self, which is secured in a pathetic fashion by a surrogate for a concrete universal, a mating relationship premised on the bargaining of persona-qualities. Certain persona qualities in the opposite sex are made ideals for the alienated individual, the apparent qualities of physical appearance and "personality" (persona) which it is desirable to possess in another. Instead of actual love of the sort sung by Heine, selecting a concrete universal, the object-images of these "secondary characteristics" become "triggers" of a weak feeling of a stultified love "feeling-state" through cathexis relationships. (One's "it," the monad, is only implicitly loved "for itself.")

Nonetheless, despite the fraudulent form and content of the prevailing paired relationships of this culture (in particular), this pairing, especially pre-climactic phases of the sexual act, becomes the closest approximation of a human relationship (love of the "inner self") which occurs generally in capitalist social relations, just because this pathetic mechanism does evoke a weak and

pathological form of the generally suppressed human qualities of the individual. At the same time, for both better and worse, the mate does function as a surrogate for an actual concrete universal. A concretized sense of personal identity is supplied through the Gestalt of rights and privileges represented by the mate's love, and by making the sense of identity dependent upon the terms of perpetuation of that love. **Love, the instrument for fostering creativity is deformed into an instrument for suppressing and even destroying creative impulses!**

This is most viciously developed in this culture respecting women. The woman is accultured to be a repository of banality (anti-intellectual, at least antagonistic toward the creative aspect of creative life). Even women of marked creative potentialities exhibit this in the anti-intellectual form of "feeling insights," "intuition." The woman is banalized by her principal oppressor, her mother, and becomes in the paired relationship as well as in the adolescent and adult mating process a catalyst and policeman of the bourgeois cult of banality.

These connections of love and paired relationships to the creative processes in general are of the utmost importance for socialist groupings. Any toleration of the mythos of the woman as a creature of "feeling," in its "cultural relativist" forms of advocacy of "women's liberation" as well as the "chauvinist" practices, not only destroys the human potential of women in the movement, but has almost equally destructive **reflected** consequences for the men. Similarly, the cult of "sexual liberation," which imagined itself to be a revolt against the "bourgeois hang-up" of paired relationships, is absolutely guaranteed to destroy the intellectual powers of both the men and women who submit to such pathological "freedom." Love, as the expression and complement of creative mentation, is not an isolated act, but a process of **development**; for the period of its duration, the love-relationship must be a "permanent (infinite) form" of paired mating — otherwise the mental powers of both participants will be qualitatively impaired by the relationship.

The specious argument against this is that sexual union with a number of people, as replacement for the paired relationship, does nothing but overcome the "hang-up" against following-through on one's love for "one's comrade," etc. The fallacy in this is that the love one extends to most people has the form of a predicate of a universal love for a class, etc. The quality of love appropriate to a paired love relationship among creative (e.g., revolutionary) individuals, is the universal act, in which all the predicates "dissolve" into their corresponding universality. The sexual act (or, a developing process of sexual acts as the sensuous distinction of a love-relationship) is uniquely the act which corresponds to that universal feeling of creativity. The loving in the particular relationship to others already has its appropriate, necessary sensuous realization in

the predicated **particular** act; to introduce sexual acts into this sort of predicated particular relationship is to introduce an act which nothing in healthy mental life demands, and which could therefore contribute nothing to a healthy mental life. However, it is obvious whence arises this argument in defense of casually loving "one's comrade" sexually. This is nothing but the pornographic "sexual liberation" otherwise seen in the "sexual delicatessen" practices of the happily-defunct Weatherman SDS cult. This is nothing but a rationalization for the "community of women," the pathological bourgeois impulse so aptly discredited by Marx in his **1844 Manuscripts**. Indeed, it cannot be considered accidental that the socialists or otherwise demonstrable creative potentials lose those creative capacities during the period they are committed to "liberated" sexual behavioral outlooks, and that these powers can be rather readily reestablished once the individual liberates himself, through appropriate self-examination, from the bourgeois ideological fetish of "sexual freedom."

Because of the importance of the sense of identity in the dynamics of creative mentation, it is urgent that the socialist (individuals and group) insist on the best standard of paired mating-relationships. Specifically, there must be a sharing of mutual struggle to realize identity for one's creative powers, which as an array of predicates of particular creative activity, demand the corresponding Gestalt of universal creativity. The healthy internal life and outward functioning of a socialist group demands a socialist standard of paired relationships, in which the sense of identities involved is premised on the mutual struggle to realize the creative potentialities in oneself and the other, not as a pedagogical relationship of teacher to pupil, but as a relationship in which each is drawing upon the creative ferment in the other and realizing himself or herself in stimulating and receiving that ferment in the other.

9. The Psychology of Mass Organizing

In political mass organizing, the socialist propagandist and individual organizer in effect strips away a critical aspect of the persona of the worker, and so momentarily implicitly reduces that worker to the wretched state of a "little me." The general possibility of that **negative** aspect of mass-organizing work varies in effect to the extent that the practical habits of the workers' bourgeois ideology have ceased to work. Trade-union forms, for example, have ceased to provide efficient means **within themselves** for securing the worker the circumstances which coincide with his bourgeoisified illusions. More generally, depression conditions, unpopular wars, etc., have undermined the authority of those apparent "fixed laws" which correspond to the workers' bourgeois-ideological "respect for law." The anxiety which the workers have experienced through the failure of acts corresponding to their bourgeoisified ego-ideal has weakened their sense of

identity (passivity) and has undermined the authority of the bourgeois-ideological ego-ideals. These are circumstances in which aspects of the persona may be more readily stripped away.

Stripping away such elements of the persona, by itself, obviously does not produce socialist impulses in workers. Quite the opposite; it produces an alternation between pathetic passivity and wild, imbecilic heteronomic rage. Oppressive conditions, etc., absolutely do not make workers class-conscious, revolutionary, etc. Nor could stripping away the persona in itself accomplish this.

Socialist organizing is directed to the mobilization of workers around a new sense of social identity replacing the "little me," a new sense of identity which the propagandist and organizer must **synthesize**. What is to be done is, in effect, to realize to the extent possible the possibility for reconstructing an actually human individual from an adult acculturated by capitalist society. The partial stripping away of the persona is at best merely a precondition for the positive work; moreover, this stripping-away should be carried out only to the extent that the debridement is accompanied by the beginnings of a new sense of social identity in the worker. This new sense of social identity is an approximation of the creative identity.

The object of organizing is to replace the old persona-determining ego-ideals with new criteria, formally identifiable by the concepts of **class-for-itself** and of **socialist expanded reproduction**. This transformation cannot be accomplished by a mere pedagogical relationship to the workers involved in this program of personal reconstruction. The advancement of the process depends upon the individual's acting in such a way as to establish such criteria through acts which approximate the realization of class-for-itself and expanded reproduction. The new qualities of the worker's identity can be developed only as his developing human powers for actualizing those qualities in the outer world.

The solution to this apparent difficulty appears in the understanding of the point that all abstract (formal) ideas, to the extent they reflect or are susceptible of actuality, are nothing but concentrated social relations. In this view of the tasks of mass organizing, the two conceptions, class-for-itself and socialist expanded reproduction, reduce to a single process-conception as follows.

The immediate practical basis for developing rudiments of the class-for-itself conception in the worker is that otherwise identified by the term **motion**. The socialist cadre induces the scintilla of a change in the individual worker, who replicates that by inducing a scintilla of change in other workers. The spread of this process, under the conditions that the affected individual workers are being brought together to "reenforce"

the tendency by unifying their forces on this basis, is the deliberate determination of a **movement** of social forces corresponding in principle to a mass-strike process. The psychodynamics of the relationships among workers in this process are those of love (e.g., "comradeship"); the individual realizes his inner identity by positive developments in the conceptual powers of other workers, and depends upon them in turn, for development of his conceptual powers. These are not abstract conceptions as such, but sensuous conceptions, in the sense that the conceptions in themselves imply and demand appropriate collective action and represent the potential basis for common such actions otherwise impossible.

In this process, up to a certain point, the process of organizing a broader force is itself the sensuous activity which feeds the development as a whole. The elementary laws of mental life demand superseding that condition. Since the failure to execute an appropriate collective act destroys the will and weakens the conceptions associated with new social identity, the organizing process under capitalism must become the basis for a strike process. The conception must be sensuously actualized.

Once we consider the sensuous acts corresponding to this mass-strike organizing process, the importance of the notion of Freedom/Necessity in this process becomes obvious. What is the conception that properly demands actuality? Essentially, the mass must act to realize the necessary acts corresponding to the potentiality of its actual powers. The mere impulse to "free" itself from the objective chains of capitalist oppression, which would ordinarily be an irresponsible, suicidal act, represents only the pathetic notion of the new creativity of the worker's identity. Freedom must be realized as a scientifically known means for developing the powers to overthrow existing, oppressive laws.

The practical point for the socialist cadres is identified by noting the bourgeois-ideological idiocy of the typical members of Progressive Labor, International Socialists, etc., which prompts them to limit their efforts to exciting the workers to greater militancy around **linear** slogan-impulses. If one instructs the workers that militancy is what is wanted, then how can one restrain the militant group of isolated workers from undertaking almost any sort of premature, futile heteronomic act of suicidal desperation? The idea of mass-organizing cannot be a simple linear notion of freedom; it must be introduced and constantly reestablished as a concept embracing Freedom/Necessity, such that the criteria of the mass-act are presented as subsumed by the notion of Freedom and vice versa.

Already, we have identified a rudimentary approximation of the tasks of organizing. We have eliminated

the problem of the pathetic monad-self by giving the worker the sensuous realization of the real inner self of his creative life. This is socially located (and thus reflected) for him, to become an actuality, through his activity of reciprocally advancing the conceptual grasp of the situation with a growing number of workers. Instead of "little me," as a fixed monad, the worker begins to locate his inner self as the socially-reflected **self-perfecting** activity of increasing his mental-sensuous powers. In practice, he begins to realize this advancement in his mental and social life by working in concert with socialist cadres to effect the rudiments of similar changes in other workers.

The instant this begins to occur, the worker becomes virtually class-conscious and revolutionary. The instant he breaks with the notion of his inner self as a monad-like thing, he has also broken with the "organic" epistemological outlook on the world around him as a world of **fixed laws**. He is open to judging possible ways of effecting even sweeping changes in the way society is organized, the way "things are done."

The change which occurs in this way is efficiently illustrated by reviewing the bourgeois myth that the axiomatic principle of individual human behavior is "individual material greed." It should be obvious that the person who accepts such a false axiom is giving prima facie evidence of his own state of internal mental life; he obviously has a bourgeois character-structure, with its reductionist monad-persona dynamics and its cohering reductionist outlook on the universe of the monad's experience. This pathetic element of the worker's usual bourgeois character-structure is at the same time an axiomatic basis for rationalization of the inevitability and permanence of capitalist control of the productive forces. **A society of individual-greed optimizing monads could only be a pluralistic parody of a capitalist form!*** "Human nature will never change." "I'm minding my own business." "We can take care of our own interests by ourselves without outside interference." "That's his problem; I've got to get mine where I can." "You couldn't understand, since you're not black and not a woman." "Local control." These and similar prima facie evidence of a bourgeois character structure more or less directly indicate the reasons why no socialist transformation could occur without an accompanying and preceding destruction of the personality characteristics reflected by such alienated, anti-human rubbish as these commonplace slogans. Indeed, precisely as the cynical critics of socialism charge, to have socialism it is first necessary to "change human nature," or, more exactly, to conquer the bestiality of the bourgeois character-structure.

The previous review of socialist planning focusses on the complementary features wanted to locate the social basis for actualizing the notion of Necessity which accompanies the sense of the Free (creative) inner self.

*Marx and Engels in 1875 describe the pathetic view of the social-democracy. The present-day society without certain of its defects.

The very existence of the human species in the quality of life (material conditions and leisure) presently existing at any time already demands development of the productive forces as a whole. Without modified technology, measured by greater negentropy of the productive forces as a whole, it would be impossible to maintain the prevailing quality of life within relatively-finite resources of a fixed technology. This development, which is thus the unique self-interest of even each individual qua individual, depends upon the process of expanded reproduction involving the entire world's working-class population. Within this, expanded reproduction occurs as the extension of the existing productive forces through productive employment of the unemployed. This productive employment occurs through the realization of the surplus product produced through the employment of employed productive labor. Hence, if employed labor attempted to maximize its immediate consumption at the expense of expanded employment, the consequence must be a reduction in the material consumption and leisure of employed labor. If unemployed labor attempts to maximize its consumption by undermining the employment conditions of employed labor or at the expense of productive development, the material interests of unemployed labor are thereby undermined.

That is only the crudest aspect of the problem.

The more profound truth is located in the lawful means and consequences of the development of the increased productive powers of any individual worker in the world. The development of productive powers is the development of the individual's creative (cognitive) powers. This obviously suggests the increase in the individual's powers to invent technological advances of universal benefit. Less obviously, but of equal significance, this development, epitomized by education, is essential to enable employed labor to realize the productive benefits of new technological developments embodied in the productive process. This advance in cognitive potentialities of individuals is limited by the rates of advance in both the material quality of consumption and the ratio of leisure.

We emphasize this point by means of an illustration we have frequently employed before this. It is obvious enough that the cheaper the cost of copper (among other essentials) to the U.S. sector, the higher the rate of social productivity in the U.S., and the higher the standard of consumption and leisure possible in the U.S. To obtain cheaper copper from the underdeveloped copper-exporting sector, it is essential to generally advance the material conditions of productive technology, and of material consumption and leisure throughout that sector. To fail to do so lowers thus the possible quality of existence in the U.S. sector.

This is the kernel of socialist humanism. The creative powers and the development of the creative powers of

every other potentially-productive individual in the world (as either or both universal and cooperative labor) is in the concrete interest of every other such person in the world.

In the organizing process, this principle has several interconnected immediate applications. Broadly speaking, as education, discussion of such scientific evidence is the pedagogical device for communicating the rudiments of potential socialist program and human conceptions to workers. In the negative aspect of socialist propaganda, this same evidence provides the clearest contrast between what the working class can accomplish for itself after taking over existing productive forces and capitalist decay, underproduction. It gives thus the negative motivation for socialist struggle. In the positive aspect of propaganda work, it provides the worker with a meaningful notion of socialist expanded reproduction, and arouses his mental powers for contributing to the specifications of socialist program: he begins to act in the mode of the socialist individual worker engaged in formulating socialist programmatic developmental policies, he begins to think and act as socialist man. In the organizing process, these notions provide him with class-consciousness respecting the workers whose bourgeois traditions set into "competition" with him. He can now see directly the importance of the unorganized or unemployed worker to himself, and his importance to that worker. He overcomes chauvinism toward workers of other races and nationalities, and recognizes his importance to them.

This organizing work depends upon the socialist cadres who are the unifying and leading organ of the organizing process as a whole. The organizing of the class cannot be effected unless a significant number of such cadres can become the kind of mass organizers our outlined approach demands of them.

This is no mere sweeping generalization, no mere truism. The instant one deploys large proportions of a socialist group's membership into direct organizing of sections of the working class, all sorts of dismal and even sometimes hideous difficulties appear. The persisting, actually **neurotic** bourgeois deformations of the personality of the individual cadres result in behavior which proves to be nothing but an unconscious intent to sabotage the organizing work in which they are purportedly engaged! Since the majority of cadres of an initiating group for any socialist party are drawn from an exceptional stratum of petit-bourgeois youth, it might appear that the unique source of the difficulties is the characteristics of the stratum in which these cadres have been accultured. The instant one notices the not-unrelated form of unconscious sabotaging by cadres directly drawn from the working class itself, the truth confronts us.

The petit-bourgeois background of many cadres does indeed involve a special, vicious form of problems. In

academic life, truth is of the propitiatory neurotic form we identified earlier. To express the problem most concisely, the characteristic neurotic behavior of the petit-bourgeois socialist cadre is summed up by the notion of "passing one's classroom recitations and quizzes." Success in life, to the petit-bourgeois, is largely restricted to the task of being heard by the right people reciting the proper phrases. This more fundamental form of characteristic petit-bourgeois disorder is often maintained by internalized images of actual or synthetic academic authorities or peer-groups; the victim of this pathology is constantly looking over his shoulder, even when he is apparently addressing a worker, to reflect on the increase or diminution of status in the eyes of those academic authorities and peer-groups, should these authorities and peer-groups witness his performance in front of the worker. In addition to academic authorities and peer-groups as such, the typical such petit-bourgeois cadre is also "conscience-stricken" respecting the relationship between his academic status and the ego-ideals developed in the family. The neurotic behavior immediately controlled by reference to these internalized authorities may be either direct adaptation or counter-adaptation. Many members of socialist groups (such as the case of the typically anti-intellectual academic instructor who has joined PLP, etc.) restrict their socialist "politics" to merely acting out rebellions against internalized authorities, an actually harmless sort of delayed-adolescence prankishness which, even in its inversions, faithfully follows the guidelines of the academic neurosis. On this account, it is absolutely indispensable that the socialist group rip apart publicly the easily-demonstrated ideological content and (in many instances) outright objective incompetence of authoritative academic views, showing that the pathetic features of credulously respected academic authority are removed once the field in question is critically examined from the standpoint of the Marxian method. The socialist organization must create psychological distance between the mind of its members and academic authorities and peer-group opinion. This is not effected by simple negation, but by demonstrating the superior authority of the Marxian method in selected fields of such academic authority. If this drives certain potential recruits from the socialist group, such a selective process is to be desired. A few painful examples of the behavior of the petit-bourgeois academic outlook in mass organizing suffices to convince one of the need to select.

The issue here — the real issue — is ultimately identical with that confronting the socialist organization from its working-class social strata. The pathetic feature of academic ideology and influences for mass-organizing work is precisely the fact, as study of individual Ph.D.'s shows, that the **academic ideology systematically destroys the creative potentialities of the student.** The root of the nonsensical antics among petit-bourgeois cadres sent into mass organizing is their lack of creative activity; if this assumes the form of overt

anti-intellectuality among worker cadres with the same neurotic disability, the two cases are no less the same in the final analysis. It is the forms through which the neurosis is mediated which differ significantly.

It should be obvious, from our emphasizing on the stripping and rebuilding processes, that the tasks of the cadres are distantly related to those of the psychoanalyst. The kernel of the consequent practical problem involved: **unless the cadres themselves have developed their creative powers and identities in terms of class-for-itself and socialist-expanded-reproduction criteria, they are unable to direct their efforts toward the positive reconstruction of the worker's sense of inner identity.**

Where those qualities are lacking, the resulting foolishness of cadres invariably assumes one of three general forms. The most common form of neurotic behavior by organizers is that of adaptation to the backwardness of the workers they are assigned to organize: so-called "workerism." The backwardness of the workers in effect organizes the cadres. The second form is one which perhaps has a higher incidence among Labor Committee novice-organizers than those of other groups. Because the members have some formal knowledge and experience of the significance and of some techniques for stripping away aspects of the persona, the member who applies such techniques without having yet developed a working grasp of the dialectical method rather inevitably accomplishes only the **negative** aspect of the "molecular" organizing task. He succeeds in either organizing or estranging worker-contacts on the basis of induced heteronomic rage. (Either way, the organization is thus confronted with a bit of a mess to be cleaned up.) The third neurotic form is commonplace among those most closely bound to the academic ego-ideal (or, to its simple inversion). The socialist, in this sickening sort of incident, hides himself from any real contact with the workers by throwing up a pathetic persona-mask of chanted or shouted ritual slogans or other cant. He is not organizing anyone: he is acting out a pitiable neurotic episode. He is attempting to artifice an appearance of belief in his own role against the reflected skepticism he actually meets or projects on the workers.

Consequently, every engagement in mass-organizing deployments properly forces the socialist organization to concentrate on the conceptual problems of the dialectical method and Marxian economics. The inability of socialist members to master the dialectical method for themselves is the inevitable root of their probable failure as mass-organizers.

From our discussion of related matters, it should be evident that the difficulties of comprehending certain conceptions in dialectical method and Marxian economics are not pedagogical problems in the ordinary sense. The cause of these difficulties is nothing but a form of

hysteria in the proper clinical sense of that term. The difficulty in comprehending the notions of class-for-itself and expanded reproduction **in more than a merely descriptive fashion** is singularly located in the fact that these notions are insusceptible of comprehension to ordinary (bourgeois-ideological) forms of consciousness. No person who experiences (or would experience) a sense of a monad-like "little me" inner self through the stripping-away of his persona could possibly conceptualize the notions of class-for-itself or expanded reproduction.

Hence, the persisting difficulty of comprehending these notions must be regarded as *prima facie* evidence of a severe neurotic disturbance, which must be examined and treated as such a pathology. Undoubtedly, ordinary psychoanalytical work can contribute significantly toward the ultimate remedy. Competent psychoanalytic work would reduce the force of crippling secondary neurotic disorders, and increase the individual's "ego-strength" to the point of making more feasible a direct attack on the more fundamental pathology. However, so far, psychoanalytical methods and conceptions necessarily have failed to develop the competence to directly attack this grandfather of all neurosis, bourgeois ideology itself.

The hazard in utilizing the powerful concentrated social forces of an entire organization to effect forced therapy ought to be more or less obvious. As the representation of the problems and goals indicates, the approximation of clinical group confrontations **within the limits of** clear and restricted task-orientations is absolutely mandatory. However, this would fail if these practices degenerated into mere "therapy-group" sessions, which must occur unless the process is under rigorous control of qualified leading individuals and unless the notion of **task-orientation criteria** is positively focussed in such a way that the participants can locate thus an approximation of positive identity.

A preliminary period of several weeks of intensive sessions by member groups in the U.S.A. and Western Europe has made the requirements clearer, but has also shown results in the form of discernible qualitative improvements — with an absolute minimum of in-

stances of neurotic episodes in individual participants. Despite the disturbing, although much-reduced incidence of neurotic behaviors of the sort which would have occurred in any case, the result of months of successive phases of work on this problem has been a grudging but marked improvement in performance, both in the quality of intellectual productions and in organizing work.

A remark on the history of the socialist movement gives the necessary focus. The socialist organizations have been characterized by handfuls of actual mass organizers, around which the general membership otherwise operated as apparatus functionaries or as unskilled auxiliary aides to the actual mass organizers "in the field." These handfuls of qualified organizers developed as such more or less "spontaneously," and the socialist movement, up to this time, had developed no systematic notion of practice by which it could wilfully (self-consciously) increase the incidence of such persons within its membership. At the same time, every socialist organization has depended for its effective political leadership on the "spontaneous" incidence of a handful of such rare persons, to the effect that the "decapitation" of that group in terms of the loss of one or at most several such figures meant the effective destruction of the continued effective development and tactical direction of the organization. In both instances, the basis for these critical limitations on such forms of creative development has obviously been the same neurotic problem examined in this paper. Viewing such problems in the context of the brief period available to establish socialism (before an otherwise inevitable fascist holocaust), and considering the tiny nucleus of viable organized socialist forces available at this very late phase of the process, without the wilful production of an increased ratio of qualified mass organizers and political leaders from "mere ordinary" socialist cadres, there would not appear to be much hope for the continued existence of the human race during the remainder of this century.

The limited but nonetheless unequivocal advances we have effected during the past months substantiate the conviction that our plunge a few steps beyond psychoanalysis in this respect contributes to saving the human race from the threatened new fascist holocaust.

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