

The CAMPAIGNER

Vol. 4 Published by the National Caucus of Labor Committees

No. 1

Fidel "Joins" the Labor Committee

Dialectics of Art

Greece at a Turning Point

Towards a Socialist Perspective for Ireland

War and Revolution in the Middle East

Winter 1971

75¢

The CAMPAIGNER

Vol. 4

Published by the National Caucus of Labor Committees

No. 1

Fidel "Joins" the Labor Committee

Dialectics of Art

Greece at a Turning Point

Towards a Socialist Perspective for Ireland

War and Revolution in the Middle East

Winter 1971

75¢

**TO CONTACT LABOR COMMITTEE
MEMBERS IN YOUR AREA**

Call or Write:

ANN ARBOR: Peter Rush, 515 N. 7th St.,
Ann Arbor, Mich. 48103. 313-769-6557

BALTIMORE: Bob Kaufman, 2730 Reister-
town Rd., Baltimore, Md. 21215.
301-523-3703

BOSTON: Paul Gallagher, 15 Green St.,
#2, Cambridge, Mass. 02139

ITHACA: Mary Bailey, 611 E. Seneca,
Ithaca, N.Y. 14850. 607-272 6820

DETROIT: Rich Freeman, 313-866-5079

NEW YORK: POB 49, Washington Bridge
Station, N.Y., N.Y. 10033. 212-569-6992

PHILADELPHIA: Vin Berg, 5006 Pent-
ridge, Philadelphia, Pa. 19143
215-GR4-0522

ROCHESTER: Rochester LC, POB 1824,
Rochester, N.Y. 14603 716-325-1733

SEATTLE: Steve Ludwig, 1419 37th Ave.,
Seattle, Wash. 98122. EA4-3851

SUFFOLK: Harris Kagan, T5 220A,
SUNY, Stonybrook, L.I., N.Y. 11790
516-246-7536

WASHINGTON: Eric Lerner, 1831 Belmont
Rd., NW, Washington, DC 98105

THE CAMPAIGNER

The Campaigner is published four to six times a year by the National Caucus of Labor Committees.

Editorials represent the majority view of the Labor Committees.

Subscription rate: \$2.50 for 6 issues; \$4.00 for 12 issues.

Address all correspondence to: The Campaigner
Box 49, Washington Bridge Station
New York, New York 10033

Editorial Board: Carol LaRouche
L. Marcus
Alan Snitow
Ed Spannaus
Webster Tarpley

Managing Editor: Carol LaRouche

CONTENTS

Volume 4, Number 1

Winter 1971


Fidel "Joins" the Labor Committee	3
Echoes from Copenhagen	12
Toward of Dialectics of Art by Christine Berl	15
Greece at a Turning Point: Three Years After the NATO Coup by Nikos Syvriotis	23
Toward a Socialist Perspective for Ireland by Peter Brand	32
Prospects for War and Revolution in the Middle East by U. Parpert	
Document: British I.S. Perspectives	51
Comment by L. Marcus	52

bomb plot conspiracy

"The clearest incident of deliberate police frame-up yet presented before the American public."

"On the basis of the evidence presented to me by the Fraser-Borgmann Defense Committee, I support and publicly call for the early formation of an independent National Commission of Inquiry to hear and judge evidence of police frame-up in the pending Philadelphia "conspiracy" trial of Steve Fraser and Richard Borgmann."

**Noam Chomsky
Douglas Dowd
Eugene Genovese
Christopher Lasch
Howard Zinn**



Order this important 34-page pamphlet from:

P. O. Box 49 Washington Bridge Station New York, New York 10033

50¢

Fidel "Joins" the Labor Committee

On July 11, the National Committee of the Labor Committees held an open meeting attended by approximately one-quarter of the national membership. This unusual turn-out was prompted by the preceding announcement of the presentation for internal discussion of a draft emergency program attuned to the historically-immediate threat of liquidity crisis in the U.S. This program, topically entitled, *How To Lick A Depression In A Single Day*, was discussed and adopted and published as a four-page insert to the August 21 *New Solidarity*. Later, during the Sept. 4-7 national conference, the program was re-adopted with one explicative amendment inserted.

Resorting to the terminology of socialist "orthodoxy," this program is summarily characterized as a transitional view of the process of establishing a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the U.S. during the few years just ahead.

The program summarizes the proposed process by which the presently-fragmented masses of working people and their potential allies are organized as a democratic majority force to become the state. The program also defines the immediate objective tasks which that majority force must undertake or risk failure and fascist counterrevolution. The program is defined as "transitional" (in 'orthodox' terms) because it presents appropriate demands and policies of present day-to-day struggle as an organic part of the process leading toward the act of establishment of socialist government.

Meanwhile, *The New York Review of Books* (Sept. 24, 1970) has published the full text of Fidel Castro's much cited July 26 (1970) address on the current crisis of Cuba, with an introduction by journalist Lee Lockwood. We say "meanwhile" because a comparison of Fidel's speech with the Labor Committees' draft program is one of the best ways in which the pro-socialist layman can begin to understand the deeper implications of either document.

Thus, the title above. While Castro has taken no public notice of the Labor Committees' existence, when one examines the stated world-outlooks of socialist groups around the world, the view of the labor process expressed by Fidel in this address seems relatively identical to that almost unique, outside Cuba, to the Labor Committees and our cothinker organizations abroad. By contrast with what many U.S. socialists, anarchists, and liberals have previously reported Fidel's point of view, a careful comparison of the July 26th address with the Labor Committees' draft program might suggest that he has "joined" the Labor Committees.

Fidel As A Revolutionary "Poet"

It is the delusion of even the majority of socialists, who have never comprehended the rudiments of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, that science is occupied with "facts" in the sense that the most philistine bookkeepers define "facts." On the contrary, the "facts" of all aspects of human existence, whatever their "objective" ground in the final analysis, are judgments by human faculties

respecting human activities and tasks. It is the unfortunate reality of alienated forms of human existence (capitalist society included) that the human mental processes are generally damaged to the extent that most educated persons (among others) are unable to resolve the unconscious connections between what are dichotomized as "feelings" and "facts." It is the need to circumvent this dehumanizing division of the human experience which compels each form of human culture to produce what we loosely term "art."

The most typical expression of this activity is great poetry, with its associated forms of great music. It is in this sense that any memorable revolutionary document which unifies the "economic" and the human is properly regarded as great poetry -- whatever its prosodic qualities as such. It is in that sense that we say that Fidel's address is superbly revolutionary by virtue of its pervasive poetry, i.e. its humanistic conceptual ironies.

For example, "infantile ultra-leftists" interpret Marx's "dictatorship of the proletariat" in a fashion agreeable to anarchist-populist "emotionalism," as the imperative of "smashing the capitalist state" and essentially nothing more. "Smash" (like "iron") has a satisfying, rounded, all-inclusive ring -- to the childish mind. These unhappy if well-meaning fellows react with horror whenever a serious revolutionary individual or grouping purposes to define "dictatorship of the proletariat" in terms of such "banalities" as concrete economic tasks.

To the infantile leftist, "socialism" must maintain its purity (as emotionalism!) by conceiving of (purely imaginary) future societies in which "economic accumulation" no longer occurs, in which "growth" has been expunged from society in favor of a religious chiliast's unending simple equal redistribution of abundance. The infantile leftist conceives of socialism essentially as a Fourieristic phalansterie, as a utopian "restructuring" of institutions.

Such infantile utopianism, such populism, such anarchism within a shabby "socialist" disguise, admittedly flows from the problem which leads to production of great poetry. Instead of solving that problem as the true poet does, the utopian writes and chants mere declamatory doggerel,

"resounding phrases" (like the anarchist pseudo-poet) -- or, to use Lenin's term, "clowning and phrasemongering." The basis for this dismaying mental disorder among socialists is the flight into anti-intellectual emotionalism, based on a failure and incapacity to actually bridge the practical and emotional -- the widespread anti-intellectualism of so many "left" tendencies.

For example, we have observed a number of university professors and lecturers attracted to groups such as the Progressive Labor Party. With unfortunately few exceptions, the accompaniment of this political conviction is the professor's retreat even from the poor level of intellectual performance of capitalist academic life into a practice of the most "low-browed" emotionalism, sloganeering and posturing -- as if the new recruit were expiating the guilt of intellectual life by such miserable devices.

In this particular connection, Castro's speech distinguishes him from such childish ultra-lefts by the excellent poetry with which he comprehends the humanistic interpretation of Lenin's point that socialism is accounting and electricity. It is the way in which Fidel deals with the concrete tasks of just that point of view which makes his address coincide in certain fundamental economic conceptions with the Labor Committees' draft emergency program.

Man's conscious mastery of his existence (the subject of creative science and poetry) depends upon his mastery of the process of producing the material means of his existence. This means, in turn, comprehending the exact potential of existing productive forces in terms of the productive potential of an actually existing population -- at a certain level of education, productive skills and material-cultural level of existence in general. It is vulgar emotionalism to state simply that socialists must advance demands in favor of reducing hours of labor, raising real wages, etc. Revolutionary socialism begins once one considers how to employ existing productive forces to make possible reductions in hours and raised real wages. Revolutionary socialism develops as one proceeds to comprehend the actual interconnections among the quality of personal life and concrete economic programs. Once one has begun to achieve the latter, one's revolutionary outlook attains the indispensable scientific level of poetry.

The Poetry of Revolutionary Socialism

What do we mean by the term, "socialism" -- or, rather, what **ought** we mean by that term. It is in this connection that principal achievements of the July 26 address are to be defined.

Karl Marx defines all the essential features of socialism in the first section, *Feurbach*, of *The German Ideology*. Man distinguishes himself actually from animals as he begins to produce his material means of existence. The simplest expression of successful human existence is that expansion of production of wealth through which population increases as the same level of existence are made possible, i.e. **Accumulation!** All possible forms of human existence are distinguished from mere animal existence by **accumulation!** However, in producing human existence in this way, society inevitably exhausts the natural and man-improved means of production, which are always relatively finite in respect to any given society with its given mode of social reproduction through accumulation.

Thus, true humanity is achieved through the process of successive transformations of the mode of production and social relations, on which continued human existence inevitably depends. True humanity, the objective of socialist transformation, is established by societies which not only successfully transform their modes of production and social relations in this way but which do so consciously -- in which a whole people consciously decides its mode of production and social relations and thereby successfully overcomes the contradictions constantly imposed as the countervailing threat to successful expanded social accumulation.

Thus, socialism cannot be (for these and implied reasons) a matter of centralized planning by a beneficent elite supervising a credulous mass of the population. Socialism can only be centralized planning as a act of the collective consciousness of the population as a whole.

Socialist Man

The result of such a development of society is a new quality of individual. Not the vulgar "collectivist" man of the anarchist and fascist bogeys. Rather, the image of man as hazily conceived by Spinoza, to use the precise phrase:

individual man as "extended being." Individual man who defines his existence such that society as a whole is augmented by his active existence and would be diminished by his loss. Individual man defined as Hegel attempted to define the "Hero," individual man conscious of the necessary course of human development, who finds his identity in his positive contribution to history in that sense.

Socialist society is a mass of such "Hero" individuals, a consciously interacting mass of such "Heroes," formulating "economic" policy positively as a product of their "debates." Socialist society is one in which every individual is a policy maker in centralized "economic" policy-making, and every individual is an executive carrying out the implementation of those policies in ways appropriate to each particular aspect of the society with which he is immediately, responsibly associated.

Revolutionary socialism, more broadly defined, is the activity of a growing vanguard of individuals engaged in the process of bringing socialist society into being.

That is the poetry of revolutionary socialism, on which counts Fidel shows himself as beyond all celebrated revolutionary figures of the past quarter century.

Castro In Particular

Lee Lockwood identifies what we consider the most essential characteristic of Castro's historic importance as the "Hero" (in the Hegelian sense) of the Cuban revolution. "...but how can there be any true democracy in a society whose press does not even furnish the people the essential information needed to teach decisions on matters of vital concern to themselves? In fact, the Cuban press is so mediocre that even Fidel can't stand it..."

To which Carlos Franqui supplies the answer as reported by Lee Lockwood: "In Cuba there is only one newspaper. It appears irregularly, from time to time. It is Fidel, when he speaks to the people."

Which should be compared with a relevant passage from the Jan.-Feb. 1970 *Campaigner* (L. Marcus, *Centrism As A Social Phenomenon*; p. 58):

“It is in precisely that for which the bourgeois press has the greatest contempt, Castro’s long-winded, painfully-detailed addresses to mass audiences, and coherent measures that a socialist world-outlook is approximated among the Cuban masses. It is the elaboration of a programmatic understanding of the practical connections among circumstances, policies and results of politics-in-terms-of circumstances, that a class-for-itself programmatic outlook is at least approximated among the masses of Cuban young people, despite the plain evidence of errors in certain aspects of this and other political policies...There is a vast difference between masses mindlessly committed to hysterical recitation of Mao Tse Tung’s ‘thought,’ mere cant, and the attempt to shape the consciousness of the actual connections between practice and results in terms of the whole society.”

Castro’s July 26 address confirms that *Campaigner* report with a vengeance. Here is revolutionary socialism actually expressed and with an electrifying quality which has not been seen anywhere in the leadership of governments or mass organizations since the early 1920’s in the Soviet Union.

Contradictions of “Castroism”

This is not to imply that the National Caucus of Labor Committees now reduces itself to U.S. “retailers of Fidelism.”

We continue to disagree with what has been the more or less official Cuban version of the “theory of the Cuban Revolution” as a model. Cuban promulgation and endorsement of the anti-Marxian and suicidal hypotheses of Regis Debray is not only a grave error but has resulted in the decimation of Latin American cadres, and has assisted in the disorientation of potential cadres in the U.S.A. to a very significant degree.

In fact, the most hideous varieties of “Maoism” in the U.S. movement initially organized themselves on the basis of an impressionistic, anti-working class interpretation of the “Cuban experience,” finding in Mao’s actually Menshevik “theory of the peasant revolution” a rationale for what they initially regarded as the “higher form of Fidelism.”

Secondly, there are aspects of the Cuban state and party, to which Fidel alludes in his address, which are hideous to us. There is indelible evidence from a variety of sources, especially the miserable quality of the official Cuban press in general, which attests to the most pervasiveness of bourgeois philistinism (including a tendency to regard the “people” as “stupid”) within the state administrative apparatus and party. Admittedly, most persons under capitalism (most contemporary leftists in the U.S. included) are clinically stupid in respect to even the rudiments of actual revolutionary socialism. This same characterization cannot be tolerated respecting the masses of people once their attitudes are being transformed by mass struggles, especially when these attitudes are expressed in such heroic practices of ordinary Cuban workers as reported in Fidel’s address.

It is by contrast with such philistine “socialism,” the sort of centrist philistinism which is the real ideological content of what used to be termed Stalinism, that Fidel stands on the last July 26th as a revolutionary socialist of the first magnitude. We disagree with Castro on many points, but we stand with Fidel against the the prevailing stupidity of the philistine “left.”

Fidel’s Method And Our Own

In his address, Fidel starts from the methodological standpoint previously demanded by Rosa Lyxemburg, that economic analysis start from an analysis of the economy and its productive forces as a whole, dialectically determining the significance of each particular aspect from the standpoint of the whole. This is the most violent contrast to Luxemburg’s socialist critics of her *The Accumulation of Capital* (such as Ernest Mandel), who view the Law of Value in anti-Marxist terms, as a matter of the sum of localized Value Added in terms of concrete, particular (localized) labor times.

To make the point clearer, populist economics, and the economic conjectures of populists in socialist (even “Marxist economist”) liveries, starts from the assumption that Value is autonomously produced by localized groupings of workers at the local point of production, and that profit represents the capitalists’ theft of part of the product produced autarchically by that local group of workers.

Admittedly, the theory of Value developed by David Ricardo agrees with such an ignorant economic "model" in certain elementary respects; thus, many pseudo-Marxists have abstracted a Ricardian (anti-Marxian) conception of the Law of Value from *Capital* by virtue of seeing only the Ricardian form which Marx criticizes to reject and supersede. They commit such widespread blunders because their sociological world-outlook is populist (e.g. Mandel's early-1960's opportunist affiliations with Renardist communalism in Belgium).

When this same point of view is encountered among organized labor (or imminently organized labor), we have the syndicalist or anarcho-syndicalist point of view, or what Lenin attacked as the "Economist" perspectives of Martov's factional allies in the Jewish Bund and Russian Social-Democracy more generally.

In all these cases, the anti-Luxemburgist view of socialist economic theory, whether populist, Mandelian, anarcho-syndicalist or the "economic theories" of the "left" trade-union opportunist, proceed from the local grouping of workers or others as the elementary, more or less autonomous basis for social value creation.

In contrast to Mandel et al., Fidel, having (consciously or not) approached the issue of applied economic theory from the same sort of vantage-point as recommended by Rosa Luxemburg, develops his analysis of the Cuban economic situation in a uniquely dialectical fashion. He begins with the social division of labor as whole, starting by defining productive labor as determined by the entire labor process.

One starts with the entire population, distinguishing those who cannot directly produce because they are young, still committed to education, old, etc. One then views the problem of meeting the material conditions of improved life for the entire population in terms of the potential product created by the entire productive sector of the population. In analyzing the process of accumulation needed to meet those human needs, one always analyzes first of all the changes in the actuarial composition of the population from a Marxian standpoint.

Continuing to apply what philistine U.S. socialists deride as "Labor Committee theory," Castro examines the fundamental contradictions of socialist accumulation. If the population is to

increase its production, he details, it is necessary to increase real wages in the form of increased education, better housing, and so forth. That is, the only way to solve the problems of humanity is to examine the over-all social division of productive labor in terms of proportions of the labor force divided into S (social surplus), V (means of human existence), and C (repairs and improvements in natural and artificed means of production). To solve problems of existence one must absolutely increase the mass of S and also increase the value of the ratio $S/(C+V)$. However, to raise the rate of social productivity (S/V) it is imperative to increase the absolute level of consumption of the population (increased expenditures for housing, education, health, etc.). On this Castro is most explicit and forceful.

The central problem of socialist accumulation is that of increasing the ratio of $S/(C+V)$ under circumstances in which the costs, $C+V$, are rising relative to yesterday's "productive efficiencies." In sum, there can be no socialist society without a conscious policy of rapidly increasing efficiency. Only an ignoramus could study Fidel's address and not adduce that universal lesson.

The practical question is "whose consciousness?"

Without an "intellectual elite" socialist program cannot be initially developed. Without a stratum of competent economists, all talk of program is idle chatter; to discover what can be done to actually solve the accumulation problems confronting the working-class forces one must have a competent overview of the entire economic process, at least of the general quality Fidel exhibits in his July 26 report to the people of their economy.

To progress from such a correct program developed by a revolutionary "elite," by a "revolutionary intelligentsia," it is absolutely necessary that this program be assimilated by the masses of working people and their allies. Making ordinary working people practical masters of what some foolish socialists deride as "intellectual bullshit" is the very essence of socialist practice.

Not only is that understanding essential to mobilize socialist victory in an advanced capitalist sector country, but, in fact, there can be no competent practical shaping and development of economic program without the active participation of broad layers of working people representative of every principal sector of the process of production and consumption.

Economic theorists are absolutely indispensable to developing policy, but production does not actually occur in the general form susceptible of encapsulated abstractions. Actual production and distribution depends upon a wide variety of "nuts and bolts" questions. Actual socialist planned production depends upon a competent interpretation of economic policies at the "nuts and bolts" level of daily life, and on a process of "feed back," through the masses of workers, by which problems of implementation of general policies are more or less accurately foreseen in advance of adoption.

This involves a most advanced theoretical conception, which for that reason we are compelled to identify here in a negative way. Economists generally are accustomed to a credulous LaPlaceian fantasy that given a sufficiently giant computer, fed sufficient "statistics," economic planning can be carried out to the nth refinement of detail by a technocratic elite. Hegel's fundamental contribution to humanity was to dispel the credibility of such fantasies (among actually intelligent and educated people) for once and for all.

Statistics are collections of "facts." Hegel demonstrated that "facts" as such do not exist, rather that all so-called "facts" are mere judgments. In actuality, the very best quality of facts (from a practical standard of quality) are those short-lived judgments which have rather ephemeral appropriateness to practice for a relatively short period of history.

Of course, as Kant, Hegel, Feurbach and Marx all thus far agree, there is a vast gulf between a moot judgement of existent circumstances and an assertion bases only on the paralogisms of pure speculation. Vis-a-vis speculation, especially the deductions of "proper" tactics from literary doctrines of "orthodox positions," we of course stand firmly for "facts."

The point is that the appropriateness of a fact is limited to the historically specific circumstances under which it is developed.

Since it is the essence of socialist planning to change existing "factual" relations substantially, conscious planning of production demands not merely massive "fact-gathering" apparatus, but the massive judgmental, social process through which

mew "facts" can be effectively defined for radically changed forms of organization of production and distribution as a whole.

In sum, from the most advanced theoretical standpoint, it is clear to the dialectical economist that the role of the revolutionary intelligentsia (or "elite") is limited to that of initiating the development of program, of defining those immediate massive policy changes respecting the transition from capitalism to workers' economies. As theory thus contends, so the history of various workers' economies demonstrates, that without the conscious organization (mobilization) of the masses of working people to correct and innovate further in matters of economic policy, every effort to manage a planned economy must run from crisis to crisis, with blunder after blunder.

This preceding point must not be misconstrued to mean that that crisis of the Cuban economy today is essentially caused by disfunctions of the planning mechanism. On the contrary, as Castro himself depicts the problem with sufficient accuracy, the fundamental crisis of the Cuban economy is imperialist encirclement -- not only military and economic encirclement in the crude sense, but the fact that Cuba is an "underdeveloped" economic sub-sector whose existence depends upon directly or indirectly trading on a world market dominated by prices set by the most technologically developed capitalist sector. The economic planning and management problems of Cuba must be defined in terms of what is necessary and possible within the context of imperialist encirclement.

Existing Workers' Economies

It is consistent with pro-capitalist economics that the question of socialism in underdeveloped countries is often posed in terms of "comparative economic and social systems." It is the pro-capitalist apologists and similar mentalities who attempt to define socialism vis-a-vis capitalism by comparing the material and related conditions of life in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, China, or Cuba with those in the advanced capitalist sector.

Bourgeois ideology in the socialist movement used to inspire U.S. Communists and "fellow travellers" to wishfully describe the Soviet Union as a "workers' paradise," when in fact capitalist

encirclement, compounded by the Soviet bureaucracy's blunders, etc., imposed the greatest hardships on the Soviet people. Even without the blunders of the bureaucracy, simple economic ratios prevailing would not have permitted the Soviet people to achieve a standard of life comparable to that of employed workers in the U.S. or Western Europe. "Third Camp" socialists proceed on the basis of the same capitalist ideological method to "conveniently" disencumber themselves of political responsibility for the U.S.S.R., etc., by insisting that it is some new form of "state capitalist" or "bureaucratic collectivist" "imperialism."

On the contrary, we regard the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, etc., as embattled organizations of the political working-class movement, which have from the outset of their existence as workers' economies suffered the combined monstrous adversities of civil war, imperialist interventions and blockades, capitalist-imposed underdevelopment, a want of the quality of leadership needed to minimize the effects of initial backwardness and encirclement. In most instances these problems have been exacerbated by the emergence of a state apparatus and economic management embodying the most swinish philistinism.

The attitude of the revolutionary socialist toward these nations is properly derived from that general view expressed by Rosa Luxemburg in her pamphlet, *The Russian Revolution*. "The Bolsheviks have shown that they are capable of everything that a genuine revolutionary party can contribute within the limits of historical possibilities. They are not supposed to perform miracles. For a model and faultless proletarian revolution in an isolated land, exhausted by world war, strangled by imperialism, betrayed by the international proletariat, would be a miracle...In Russia the problem could not be posed. It could not be solved in Russia."

The same is true of Cuba. The responsible course is to support the viable political tendencies, of which Castro, despite all his actual and alleged past mistakes, is exemplary, and to do this mainly not by giving Castro lip-service support from the spectator's benches, but by accomplishing the socialist transformation in the advanced sector -- without which principal dedication all criticisms of the U.S.S.R., China, Cuba, etc., are degraded to childish literary speculation.

The essential immediate point under consideration here is that putting the problems of the Cuban Revolution into context, to uncover through study of Fidel's July 26 address the valuable lessons to be applied to study, program and perspectives in even our own national sector.

Weaknesses Of Cuban Regime

The principal source of weaknesses of the Cuban Revolution's present leadership is located ironically in the exceptional circumstances by which Cuba became a workers' economy as if by "accident." As in the instance of the Chinese revolution, the 26th of July Movement was a petit-bourgeois revolutionary reformist (pro-capitalist) movement.

Mao Tse Tung restored the plants to the capitalists from the hands of the workers and sincerely pronounced himself against a socialist revolution in China not only during the entire period of the Popular Front, but even after the seizure of power by the armies of the CPC. Mao & Company were forced to undertake a later socialist revolution by circumstances of the Cold War in general and the Korean War in particular, as well as the danger of counterrevolution constantly arising from the tendency for capitalist layers and less impoverished peasants to combine.

In the case of Cuba, the revolution after the first 1959 revolution is more astonishing. The CPC was at least nominally Communist in ultimate purpose and in centrist-reformist versions of "Communist" ideology. In Cuba, the July 26th movement was explicitly a capitalist national (lawyers') liberation movement.

The Cuban socialist revolution after the July 26th movement's initial revolution is a product of two extraordinary circumstances. Generally, its successful occurrence reflected internal policy difficulties of the U.S. ruling class relative to the emerging "Third Stage" policy vacillations which prevented immediate bloody crushing of the Cuban revolution when the nationalizations began. However, this would not have been sufficient; the character of the July 26th leadership, especially the cadres closest to Fidel, was decisive in exploiting this situation, defending commitments to the Cuban peasantry and rural proletariat by the resort of expropriating the major capitalists, and taking the next step, of orientating toward the Soviet Union as the only possible basis for Cuban independence in the face of U.S. imperialism and the capitalist world market forces.

For the outside world, the result among many naive and simply opportunist “lefts” (including most existing socialist “parties” in the U.S., Europe and the colonial sector) was that it “seemed” that Castro and the others had pioneered in developing a new method for establishing socialism. To a significant extent, the Fidelistas themselves have shared this delusion, as we see in their lamentable support for the Regis Debray nonsense. This history and the manifestations of Debrayism and other blunders demonstrate why the Cuban leadership has lacked insight into the problems of socialist revolution and strategy in general and has lacked the intellectual development of its leading cadres which even the Bolshevik Party brought to the October Revolution.

It is thus all the more important to note the extremely advanced theoretical development of Fidel Castro reflected in the July 26th address. There is no evidence yet at hand to suggest that Fidel is self-conscious of the implicit theoretical position he has implicitly taken in economics relative to the Rosa Luxemburg and other long-standing controversies within the socialist movement on this subject. Yet, he is not too far removed from such awareness, at least, since many of the formulations employed in his address are too sophisticated to permit the conclusion that he is merely an autodidact.

No metaphysics are required to explain Fidel’s “mind” on these counts. The speech itself shows that the conclusions submitted are based on a practical theoretical overview of the Cuban economy in its world-market context. Castro developed the conclusions he submits by applying to his concrete experience precisely that method which so many critics of the Labor Committee find reprehensible.

The point is to understand the problem of Cuba exactly as Fidel describes it, which means to approach comprehension of the tasks of socialism in the U.S. from the same methodological point of view -- precisely as the Labor Committees have done in the Draft Emergency Program.

“Dictatorship of the Proletariat”

The “Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” which is the subject of the Labor Committees’ Draft Emergency Program, is not simply a matter of

“smashing the capitalist state,” with the appended implication that somehow thereby all the major problems will begin to be automatically solved. **Why “smash the state?”** The point is that the capitalist “state” (as it is usually loosely defined) is essentially the body of social institutions which provide the “gun,” both the actual guns and their ideological equivalents, which enforce the property-relations associated with capitalist “paper” (stocks, bonds, bills, etc.). To take over the entire financial system, immediately liquidating all stocks, bonds, notes, mortgages, and so forth, eliminates the capitalist system and its state at a single stroke, provided that this is accomplished by the political class-for-itself as an organized ruling institution.

How in the world does one imagine the class-for-itself actually seizing the financial system!? Those “lefts” who chatter interminably about such ABCs as “smashing the capitalist state” reveal by what they do not say that their socialism consists of no more than a sort of utopian emotionalism, mere “phrasemongering and clowning.”

The question is: **Why is it necessary to seize the banking system and liquidate all capitalist “paper?”** Precisely because the banking system (and the paper) and it is now organized and enforced (by guns, ideology, etc.) is the principal impediment to certain urgent tasks of economic “accumulation” which is the only possible basis for actually solving the leading problems of life confronting oppressed minorities, organized and unorganized labor, and radicalized youth.

Admittedly, this has been more or less true throughout the past half-century. Throughout this half-century, despite “absolute economic expansion,” the benefits of the capitalist economy have been limited to an ever smaller proportion of the capitalist world population as a whole, because capitalism refuses to employ the existing basis for economic growth sufficiently to meet human needs generally.

To meet the problems of humanity through economic growth it is essential to get the capitalist system out of our way, so that we may do the job of “economic management” urgently required. Immediately, the question of socialist transformation is now posed by the accelerating

movement of the capitalist system toward a new breakdown crisis, in which the conditions of life in even the advanced sector are being or about to be sharply worsened. Thus, now, we have both the enhanced impulsion and the opportunity to do what is historically necessary.

What is historically necessary is to seize power in order to unleash the productive potential developed under capitalism. This is not a matter of merely unleashing some vast, raw, undifferentiated "force," it is a matter of consciously applying concrete productive resources programmatically, to a certain amount of housing, a certain definite increase in the level of material consumption, and certain quite specific tasks of developing the means of future production. It is these specific, concrete historic tasks, as Fidel otherwise identifies the

specific economic tasks in Cuba, which represent the socialist program.

The important thing is not to constantly reiterate "smash the state;" the important task is to get beyond mere idle chattering about the ABCs of socialist transformation to mobilizing mass forces around the programmatic tasks of reconstruction which provide the historically specific motive for immediate socialist transformation.

Considering the anti-intellectual self-debasement, the philistine cavilling with which most U.S. socialists have received the Draft Emergency Program, we must insist that U.S. socialists worship Fidel Castro a tiny bit less and seriously study his latest address a little bit more.

Emergency Reconstruction Program (Draft)

- 1** *How To Take Over An Economy In A Day*
- 2** *How To Organize The Population
To Run The Economy*

Published by the National Caucus of Labor Committees

Order from The Campaigner Price: \$.10

Echoes from Copenhagen

As a ruling class veers drunkenly into a threatened breakdown crisis, it is that class's acts of omission which sometimes have the most decisive significance. This is the appropriate view of the recent International Monetary Fund meeting in Copenhagen, a display of "parliamentary cretinism" among leading bankers best compared with the tragic ineptitude of (essentially) the same group in Switzerland March 8, 1968.

On March 8, 1968, after several weeks of the most portentous rumblings in the international monetary system, the leading bankers assembled to moot remedial measures. At the conclusion of those sessions, (then) Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, William McChesney Martin, appeared on the steps of the meeting to report the bankers' affirmation of confidence in the underlying soundness of the monetary system.

The monetary system itself immediately rejected that Panglossian view. Beginning the opening of money markets on Monday, it expressed its own opinion of itself in a galloping gold crisis that took the world capitalist economy to within inches of a new world depression.

Whereupon, on the instigation of the U.S. government and concurrence of Threadneedle Street in London, the monetary system was hastily shut down while the same bankers (who had expressed confidence the week before) were hastily assembled for another meeting in Washington, March 15, 1968. At that meeting, the world monetary system was abruptly taken off the gold standard — with discussions of 1934 U.S. dollar

devaluation reverberating throughout the world's financial press.

The fast reaction of March, 1968 was one of those coincidences which most sharply illuminates a whole period of history. Copenhagen's IMF meeting has not yet been measured in so dramatic a fashion. Nonetheless, the point to be made is essentially the same. The world's bankers fiddled while Rome proceeded to go on burning.

Why The Bankers "Punted"

It was most appropriate that the Copenhagen IMF conference should have been convened so conveniently proximate to the Tivoli Gardens. The IMF sessions' simulation of a Ferris Wheel was most convincing. There were large rhetorical sweeps, reaching far heavenward but always returning to the same point of indecision from which the speaker began — much oratorical motion, progressing not one inch from the policies with which the proceedings started.

This ludicrous spectacle is by no means an accurate measure of the intelligence and insight of the world's leading bankers taken individually. Most instructive, in this connection, are the non-motions presented at length. Apart from World Bank President (Robert) McNamara's pleas for a more vigorous "Third Stage of Imperialism" (Development Decade) program, the only significant conversation reported from Copenhagen amounted to a contemptuous overview of current Nixon Administration policies. All this criticism — resulting in no resolutions! — amounted to no

more than an irrepressible uneasiness among those British, French, German and other governments who are, in the final analysis, mere employees of the U.S. bankers. The ability of the IMF to act is bounded by what the current Nixon Administration will permit. Thus, the prevailing economic cretinism in Washington, echoed by a recent Nobel award (to Samuelson), extends like a pall of stupidity, over the deliberations of ruling financial groups in every nation of the capitalist world.

Exemplary of the point, therefore, is the "nature" of the U.S. recovery from the near-depression of last Spring. The net liquidation of about \$100 billion of purely-fictitious paper value from the U.S. economy took sufficient steam out of the depression-forces to permit a temporary technical recovery in financial markets. However, without a growth in real production and productive employment, such "recovery" represents nothing but a further expansion of the inflated debt-related paper values which caused the Spring debacle and will inevitably lead toward a new and more forceful explosion in the period ahead. The Nixon administration and its financial "advisors" has absolutely no notion of what to do to prevent the impending new world depression from breaking loose within the immediate months or few years ahead — it has nothing in view but ultimately futile, rear-guard delaying tactics — apart from a growing determination to massively gouge real wage-levels of trade-unionists and others throughout the capitalist world.

It is becoming increasingly clear to even the most vulgar empiricist on the "left" that the only answer which the world's leading bankers have for the impending world depression-threat is a massive effort to crush the labor movements throughout the advanced capitalist sector. The 1968 "Emergency Laws" in Germany, the post-1968 "law and order" measures in France, the move to "Americanize" British labor practices, the mooting of police-state anti-labor laws in Belgium now, and Trudeau's use of executive "war measures" powers in Quebec against the labor movement on the mere pretext of Quebecois anarchist activities, are "where it's at" in current capitalist world-economic policies. The real "solution" to the current economic situation, from the banker's point of view, has very little to do with Special Drawing Rights ("Paper Gold") or other "built-in stabilizers." As we see building-up around the U.S. itself in the context of the recent UAW strike, the

ruling class is being driven to its last economic resort, the knout. Anything else is being degraded to empty chattering, as at Copenhagen.

Contrary Views

There are contrary opinions, even on the "left." During the process of formation and consolidation of the Labor Committees around Columbia University (initially) during the Fall, 1967-Summer, 1968 period, our organization assimilated and adopted an analysis of the world-economic developments which had been disputed within the U.S. and European socialist movements since as early as 1957. That is, the conjunctural view that beginning about 1965, the post-war "recovery" would begin to unravel, and processes would emerge — as has been the case — leading toward an accelerating probability for a new general breakdown crisis of the entire capitalist system. These estimations, which have become the reality of the post-1967 period, were not accidentally widely ridiculed by virtually every leading spokesman for the socialist movement or New Left. Despite the massive repudiation of the mistaken views of (for example) the Socialist Workers Party and Paul M. Sweezy on this account, those persons continue to attempt to understand the current situation by means of the same methods of economic and political analysis they employed to develop their now-discredited estimations from the pre-1968 period.

In the main, our disoriented socialist critics have based their estimations of the current economic situation on "facts" and assessments gleaned from such "authoritative" journals as the New York Times, or in the few more sophisticated instances, on a credulous reading of either *Current Business* or opinion-publications of the President's Economic Advisory group — an astonishing lack of hubris among professed "Marxists!" That is essentially the case today. Much of the "left" believed that a near-depression had to be considered (during last May) precisely because the NY Times said so. In the same vein, they are convinced of a capitalist victory over that danger now, precisely because the NY Times says so. Again, the sophomoric muttering about "built-in stabilizers" proliferates on the "left," much as toadstools proliferate in untended damp places.

The record of the NY Times, and especially its leading financial columnist, Dale, deserves analysis

on this account. We shall merely indicate the line of recommended analysis here.

On Nov. 5, 1967 Dale contributed to the magazine section a lengthy article he might wish were soon forgotten, in which he announced the essential stabilization (through new "trade-off" arrangements) of the world monetary system. In response, the British economy plunged into collapse **the following week**, with the NY Times compelled to acknowledge the fact of British devaluation by Nov. 17, 1967.

The immediate assumption in circles like those of the NY Times' financial journalists, that the British **technical** correction had induced stability in an essentially-sound world monetary system, was shortly followed by the events of March 8-15, in the course of which Time magazine quoted a British financial authority, "The World is Lost."

The late-1967 — early 1968 NY Times (and other journals) contemplations of the powerful and stable French Franc's ambitions to drag down the dollar, was also suitably expressed by the French devaluation of that Autumn.

Nixon's early-1970 opinion, more or less naively endorsed by the NY Times, that no recession was in the making, was "confirmed" by the near-depression crisis of this past Spring. The present Pollyannah views of the NY Times and its credulous "left" readers, have essentially the same merit. Although, admittedly, Monthly Review often mistaken but hardly stupid (as Progressive Labor and such Labor Committee critics), has systematically acknowledged the current reality — however belatedly, beginning with the Sept., 1970 issue, and the Communist Party's Economic Commission has also awakened itself to the fact of fundamental changes manifest in the economic situation.

Economics Becomes Politics

Thus, the "parliamentary cretinism" of the Copenhagen IMF conference reflects the general "inevitability" of an early world depression — to the extent that this question is considered from an essentially "economic" standpoint. The ruling class has no more economic-technical answers to the threatened depression of its own making. Its would-be answers now lie mainly in the domain of anti-working-class politics, in a ruling-class's uneasy and still-vacillating movement in the direction of breaking off the labor-Democratic alliance in the U.S.A. and in risking destruction of labor-organization and ruling class alliances of a parallel form through the advanced capitalist sector.

It is not quite that simple. As the recent years maneuvers in Italy should illustrate, stepped-up anti-labor measures are accompanied by efforts to neutralize the potentiality of the working class and its allies to organize **effectively** against capitalist breakdown. Until the ruling class actually develops the social forces on which a police state or actual fascism depends, it will continue to depend upon its ability to resurrect the 1935 French "Popular Front" in one form or another, relying on the parliamentary cretinism of mass Communist parties where they exist (as in Italy or France today or as in Greece during the 1963-67 period) to neutralize the combat-potential of working people through alliances with the "left" wing of the capitalist political machines. It must be emphasized, as the case of Greece illustrates, that the capitalists have no intention of ruling through "Pop Front" governments; as in the case of the first (1935) "Popular Front" in France, these short-term tactics are aimed merely at inducing the Communists to discredit themselves, as part of the tactical preparations for institution of police-state or outright fascist regimes.

"Popular Front" maneuvers of all kinds taken into account, the essential economic policy of the ruling class is that recently displayed in Quebec .

Toward a Dialectics of Art

By CHRISTINE BERL

“The chief defect of all materialism up to now (including Feuerbach’s) is, that the object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of the **object or contemplation**; but not as **sensuous human activity, as practice**; not subjectively.

Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,”
1846.

“We believe that the supreme task of art in our epoch is to take part actively and consciously in the preparation of the revolution. But the artist cannot serve the struggle for freedom unless he subjectively assimilates its social content, unless he feels in his very nerves its meaning and drama and freely seeks to give his own inner world incarnation in his art.”

Andre Breton, Diego Rivera,
“Manifesto: Towards a
Free Revolutionary Art,”
1938.

“Philosophy is thus expected...not so much to bring chaotic conscious life back to the orderly ways of thought, and the simplicity of the notion, as to run together what thought has divided asunder, suppress the notion with its distinctions, and restore the **feeling** of existence. What it wants from philosophy is not so much insight as edification. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, love — these are the bait required to awaken the desire to bite; not the notion, but ecstasy, not the march of cold necessity in the subject-matter, but ferment and enthusiasm — these are to be the ways by which the wealth of the concrete substance is to be stored and increasingly extended.”

Hegel, “Preface” to
The Phenomenology of Mind,
1807.

The severance of consciousness from self-consciousness has led to the artistic degeneration of our time in which art, only appropriately, should find itself playing the part of seducer into a world of an equally degenerate state of human knowledge. All questions of aesthetics ultimately become questions of epistemology, and any serious Marxist critic of art must go beyond the usual questions such as “who is art for?” to **propound a theory of knowledge as revealed in art**. That is the purpose of this article.

The creative process at its finest is simultaneously intuitive and conscious, or in Hegel’s terms a process of self-consciousness. Great artists in the past have always sought a fluidity between theory and practice. The resistance that they have met with in existing on that level is grotesquely illustrated in the story of the great Surrealist poet, actor, theoretician and founder of the Theatre of Cruelty, Antonin Artaud.(1)

Invited to lecture the students and professors at the Sorbonne on “The Theatre and the Plague,” he began by first tentatively advancing the theory that great works of art occurred when the artist was whipped by the fear of death. Then imperceptibly, to the horror of his audience, his face became contorted, his eyes dilated and his muscles contracted as he began to act out dying by the plague. When he finally collapsed with a last gasp on the floor of the schoolroom, he was greeted with laughter, hissing and comments of disgust from the audience who was totally unable to cope with such a performance. They didn’t understand that Artaud made no separation between knowledge arrived at as a theorist and as an actor.

Similarly, André Breton in writing his “Manifesto of Surrealism” (1924) obliterates this distinction by using Surrealist method to put forward Surrealist method. Is it theory, poetry?

What Hegel claimed for philosophy in *The Phenomenology of Mind* must today be claimed for art if art is to once again become capable of the most profound social transformation. For the artist to merely refer to society does not fulfill this function, as is the case with so many so-called "political artists" who merely graft social references on to an art of alienated and fragmentary perceptions of the world. The self-sufficiency of a great work of art consists in this, that it summons up by means of the process of self-conscious consciousness the whole of man's knowledge about the world in symbolic form. When the delicate balance that exists between consciousness and self-consciousness is disrupted, decadent elements creep in.

The Romantic movement had the tendency to destroy the balance in favor of intuition; the music of Schumann is a good example of a very fine intuition disintegrating first into banalities and finally into insanity. In the opposite case, Arnold Schoenberg's *Quintet for Wind Instruments*, op. 26 remains unconvincing, not because the twelve-tone theory, or any theory for that matter, is inimical to composition, but because the theory had been but incompletely transformed into sensuous material. More than just a tendency away from the dialectical creative process, however, are the more drastic departures taken by some of the artistic developments of the twentieth century.

Flight

In a society where true creativity is prevented from functioning, it is not surprising to find that the artist himself is no longer certain where to locate his creativity. Suffering frequently from the delusion that creativity is to be found in pure intuition, he resorts to desperate acts to recover that intuition and thereby to exorcize the spectre of his own impotence. He often refers to this as the recovery of his "freedom." Because he sees all social avenues of communication blocked, he comes to associate his freedom to be creative with asocial behavior.

It is at this point that he turns to Freud and the unconscious; in Hegelian terms, he has chosen consciousness over self-consciousness. In this regard, it is interesting to compare Kubie's concept of the preconscious process, as put forth in his book *Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process*,

to Freud's concept of the unconscious. Kubie's "preconscious" is liberated from blind neurotic compulsion and reaches its ultimate fulfillment in social relations. What fascinated artists, however, about Freud's "unconscious" was that it made acceptable their feelings of hatred for society and a desire for revenge.

This distorted view that sees freedom inextricably bound up with social irresponsibility has had, of course, its justification in what social responsibility has come to mean in the swiftly deteriorating capitalist society of the twentieth century. As the economic basis of that society became increasingly unstable and threatening to the ruling class, the demands made on the individual by that ever more desperate class brought the individual closer to self-annihilation.

Many artists in the twentieth century saw this only too clearly. Hence the subject matter of much of their work was concerned with the question of how to escape. The theme of perpetual flight in the writing of Anais Nin and the pleasure associated with taking on different social identities so brilliantly displayed by Mann in the character of Felix Krull are some among many examples of the artist's awareness that for the individual to allow himself to be responsible to the demands made on him by capitalist social relations is tantamount to committing suicide.

Flight Into Insanity

The deflection of creativity away from social relations towards duplicity in order to maintain a freedom denied by society (the theme of the double in *Felix Krull*) brings us to that frontier of art bordering on insanity.

Insanity, like art, often has its origins in the necessity of extricating oneself from the repressive mechanisms of an exploitative society. Hence the Surrealists' "rebellion" against logical certainty has as its counterpart certain pathological states of mind. While totally engrossed in sensorial dissociation, the victim of insanity asserts his "freedom" by taking from a question posed to him only that material which is of use to his subjective preoccupations. For example, in the symptom of mental disorder known as echolalia, the answer to a question such as "how old are you?" would be "you." From the question "what is your name?" the patient extricates himself by answering "forty-five houses."

Speaking of the insane, Breton writes: "I am willing to admit that they are, to some degree, victims of their imagination, in that it induces them not to pay attention to certain rules — outside of which the species feels itself threatened — which we are supposed to know and respect. (Breton is wrong here; he should have said **inside** of which the species feels itself threatened.) But their profound indifference to the way in which we judge them and even to the various punishments meted out to them, allows us to suppose that they derive a great deal of comfort and consolation from their imagination, that they enjoy their madness sufficiently to endure the thought that its validity does not extend beyond themselves. And, indeed, hallucinations, illusions, etc. are not a source of trifling pleasure."(2) He is speaking of the madman but he is also speaking of the artist. In answering the question who, the doctor or the madman, got the better of the exchange, Breton, identifying with the madman says that it was he who got the better of the exchange because he was **not the person asking the questions** (Artaud imposing his method on the audience). The sources of Surrealism can be traced back in part to this perversion of dialogue.

From the artist and the madman, it is not far to the artist and the criminal, as Genet has shown. In present capitalist society, the unleashing of creativity becomes a "criminal" act. Breton, with his characteristic irony remarks: "Whatever reservations I may be allowed to make concerning responsibility in general . . . however difficult it may be for me to accept the principle of any kind of responsibility, I would like to know how the first punishable offenses, the Surrealist character of which will be clearly apparent, will be **judged**. Will the accused be acquitted, or will he merely be given the benefit of the doubt because of extenuating circumstances? . . . as soon as Surrealist methods begin to enjoy widespread favor . . . a new morality must be substituted for the prevailing morality, the source of all our trials and tribulations."(3)

Escape to Childhood

The flight into childhood — not accidentally an occurrence in both Romanticism and Surrealism, both of which have opted for consciousness over self-consciousness — is another wrong turn taken in search of a way to restore the damaged creative

process. Breton, praising the state of childhood, writes: "There, the absence of any known restrictions allows him the perspective of several lives lived at once (again Felix Krull); this illusion becomes firmly rooted within him; now he is only interested in the fleeting, the extreme facility of everything."(4) The facility, too, with which Felix Krull takes on different social identities displays nothing less than artistry. The key words here are "the fleeting," "the extreme facility of everything," (Breton speaking of dreams, "the ease of everything is priceless"), fragmentary phrases that act as "the bait awakening the desire to bite," which awaken the desire to catch hold of the whole creative process.

If Breton continues to use childhood as "bait" it is only because he incorrectly locates creativity in the realm of the unconscious. Comparing the Surrealist method to childhood, he writes: "The mind which plunges into Surrealism relives with glowing excitement the best part of its childhood. For such a mind, it is similar to the certainty with which a person who is drowning reviews once more, in the space of less than a second, all the insurmountable moments of his life. Some may say to me that the parallel is not very encouraging. (It is at this point that Breton senses the incompleteness of his knowledge and the danger inherent in only recognizing half of the dialectical process: that of losing the whole, of drowning) From childhood memories, and from a few others, there emanates a sentiment of being unintegrated and then later of **having gone astray**, which I hold to be the most fertile that exists."(5)

Here finally it is clear that Breton holds the key only to a fragmentary state of knowledge. Ironically, he saw in the Surrealist method of psychic automatism what Hegel had seen in philosophy, the means by which to express the actual functioning of thought; but what a difference between that which each regarded as thought.

Unable to integrate opposite modes of consciousness, Breton's attack on formal logic leads then to the disintegration of his own mind. "The only thing that might prove fatal to me would be the slightest loss of impetus. Words, groups of words which follow one another, manifest among themselves the greatest solidarity. It is not up to me to favor one group over the other. It is up to a miraculous equivalent to intervene — and intervene it does."(6)

While he rejects the linear progression of formal logic, he doesn't notice that he has accepted that same linear progression as the organizational principles of his associations. The clue to the grasp of the whole that he misses is the notion of simultaneity. Breton plunged himself into this form of mental suicide in 1924, a plunge that marked the beginning of the Surrealist movement as one of the significant intellectual movements of the twentieth century. Fourteen years later, in 1938, Breton and Diego Rivera were to publish a manifesto in which was written "we cannot remain indifferent to the intellectual conditions under which creative activity takes place, nor should we fail to pay all respect to those particular laws which govern intellectual creation."(7) The two modes of consciousness that he had attempted to sever with his experiments in automatic writing were brought together again as he now struggled with the difficult problem of becoming a Marxist artist.

Degeneration of Music

In music today, two unacceptable choices confront us that correspond to the separation of phenomenology and mind. There is the music of "pure experience" such as Rock (aleatory music of the Cage school and the music of certain untalented composers today in whose hands "free" atonality pulverizes into meaningless sounds would also fall in this category), a music which usually prides itself on its spontaneity and its "liberation" from theory. When we examine what goes under the name of "theoretical" music, best exemplified in the post-Webern school of composers, Milton Babbitt et al., associated with Princeton University, it becomes apparent why the reaction against theory has taken the infantile form that it has. Just as Breton in rejecting formal logic in favor of the unconscious found himself temporarily in a state of childhood, those musicians who come in contact with the absurd formalism of logical positivism applied to musical theory, as exemplified in the Princeton school, are forced to conclude that theory can explain little and experience is all. Those musicians who are struggling to restore an intellectuality to music that sheds light rather than destroys the ambiguity of musical creation find themselves uncomfortably located in the interstice between the other two unacceptable choices.

The problem is further complicated by the social implications of what would otherwise have

remained an epistemological controversy. The "experience" school of Rock and Cage has given evidence recently that it thinks it is on the side of revolution. Only half conscious of itself, however, it is not surprising to discover that its consciousness of present historical conditions is also rather feeble. It falls into the category mentioned earlier of most "political" art at present, which is to say that its musical language still retains all the defects of bourgeois knowledge through which an occasional glimmering of the need for revolution sometimes penetrates.

Furthermore, Leftists who see in it the music of the present and future Socialist movement fall into the trap of assuming that everything written for the least musically developed person automatically has social relevance. (Is Marx's *Capital* socially irrelevant because it cannot be immediately understood by everyone?) Needless to say, the Princeton school on the other hand dissociates itself from any concern with the role of art in the transformation of society, continuing the tradition of so-called "pure" art which, as Breton correctly points out in his "Manifesto" "generally serves the extremely impure ends of reaction."(8)

Rock: A Reactionary Development

The myth that Rock is or will become the music of the revolutionary Left must be once and for all dispelled. The existence of Rock on a purely phenomenal level — for to see ideas of far reaching consequence in already rudimentary musical concepts would only further reduce them and finally threaten them out of existence — has disqualified it as the embodiment, in the symbolic form of musical language, of Marxist world outlook. Nor does it occupy a revolutionary place by any means in the history of musical thinking. Furthermore, taking it on its own terms, its pretensions to spontaneity and rhythmic complexity are utterly fallacious, as will be proven in the following.

Those who defend Rock maintain that it has brought the rhythmic element, always subordinated to tonal relations in classical music,(9) to the fore. But in reality, it has done precisely the opposite; the classical conception of rhythm, namely regular meter, having been in fact **perpetuated** by Rock, only in the more rudimentary form of a "beat."

What Stravinsky said about jazz in 1959 applies today (because of certain recent developments that have taken place in jazz since) more to Rock. In his famous caustic remarks on jazz (a music which incidentally, he subsequently admits respect for), he says nonetheless: "the stage has to be set, and there must be heat. The percussion and bass (not the piano; that instrument is too hybrid and besides, most of the players have just discovered Debussy) function as a central heating system. They must keep the temperature 'cool,' not cool. It is a kind of masturbation that never arrives anywhere (of course) but which supplies the 'artificial' genesis the art requires. The point of interest is instrumental virtuosity, instrumental personality, not melody, not harmony, and certainly not rhythm. Rhythm doesn't exist really because no rhythmic proportion or relaxation exists. Instead of rhythm there is 'beat.' The players beat all the time merely to keep up and to know which side of the beat they are on,"(10)

antagonistic rhythmical and harmonic elements in *Le Sacre* which contributes to the magnificent instability of that work was perfected to such a degree that the work has had as yet no issue in the half-century since it was written. To explore this asymmetry further it will be necessary to do what Marxists writing on music always avoid doing, namely to show how the dialectical process manifests itself in the music itself.

In the *Danse sacrale* of *Le Sacre* Stravinsky makes use of two opposite rhythmical forces. The opening measures can be at first broken down into three rhythmical cells: A, the rhythmical cell associated with the repetition of the opening chord marked in the example below as I; B, the rhythmical cell associated with the melodic-harmonic phrase marked II; and C, the rhythmical cell associated with the melodic-harmonic phrase marked III.(11)

Stravinsky, *Danse sacrale* · MUSICAL EXAMPLE

The musical example shows three measures of music from Stravinsky's *Danse sacrale*. The first measure is labeled 'A, I' and features a single chord. The second measure is labeled 'B, II' and features a melodic line with a harmonic accompaniment. The third measure is labeled 'C, III' and is further divided into sub-cells by a dashed line and a bracket labeled '8'. The score is written on four staves (two treble and two bass clefs).

Stravinsky and Debussy

The real attack on classical notions of rhythm came not from Rock but much earlier from Stravinsky via the rhythmical as well as tonal ambiguity of Debussy (cf. the superimposed measures in 6/4 and 4/4 in *Nuages* with *Les Noces* and *L'Histoire du Soldat*). It was Stravinsky who developed asymmetry and the tension of opposites as the basis of rhythmic complexity and development. The idea of simultaneous levels of

While it appears that three elements are in play, the underlying force is in fact dialectical. As the *Danse sacrale* unfolds, the three rhythmical cells appear in linear succession. The order that they appear in varies, as does the number of sixteenth-note divisions per cell. This can be represented as follows, using arabic numerals to indicate the total number of sixteenth-note divisions per cell: A-7, B-7, A-5, B-7, A-3, C-8, A-4, B-7, C-5, A-5, B-4+3+4, A-8; B-4, A-2, B-4, A-8, B-4, C-7. (The semi-colon indicates the binary division of the section under discussion.) Behind

the appearance of three rhythmical elements, is the duality of the changing and the unchanging rhythmical cell (B is unchanging in each section). Furthermore, B undergoes a transformation from a unit of 7 divisions in the first part, to become a unit of 4 divisions in the second, a change from a prime to a non-prime number. The opposition of the variable and invariable rhythmical cell here and its perpetuation on two levels simultaneously (B in relation to A and C; B in relation to itself) is an example of an idea that both illuminates the musical material and transcends it.

Compare the opening measures of the *Danse sacrale* with the opening measures of 'Street Fighting Man' from the Stones' album *Beggars Banquet*. Throughout the latter the length of the measures remains invariably the same, although certain elementary rhythmic shifts (known as syncopation) take place within this uniformity. Almost all Rock is consistently written in simple meter, in the simplest in fact, that of 4/4. In *Beggars Banquet* the only deviation from this are the two instances of compound meter in the songs 'Dear Doctor' and 'Factory Girl' which are in 6/8.

Ideas in Music

In this manner it becomes possible to talk about ideas in music, not only about the ideas imposed on music by its social and intellectual context.

Most Marxist writers on music, underestimating the difficulty of mastering musical concepts as they are revealed in musical language, ignore the former and, subsequently, can only incompletely grasp the significance of the latter. These are usually the same people who too readily declare that music, in order to be socially relevant, cannot exist independently of words. Such philistinism was even maintained by someone like Eisler, a pupil of Schoenberg who collaborated with Brecht in the thirties and forties. Quite the opposite view was taken by the Russian Hegelians in the 1830's and '40's around Alexander Herzen who used to have endless debates about the ideas expressed in Beethoven's music. Today, because most musicians as well are convinced that music doesn't exist in the realm of ideas, they would sooner look for ideas in Beethoven's letters than in his music.

The fact remains that to deny the importance of instrumental music is to say that ideas can only be transmitted in words. To deny the existence of ideas in the symbolic form of musical language is

to trivialize music, to reduce it to the pure sensuality of phenomenal experience.

It is apparent that Rock has not as yet become acquainted with the year 1913 as regards rhythmical development in music. What of the sad demise of tonality? Has the news reached those "avant-garde," "experimental" groups such as the Stones or The Who, groups which continue to write not only tonal music but tonal music employing relationships so limited that one wonders if they had access to equal-tempered instruments?

Tonality, like modern capitalism, reached its definitive stage as a result of scientific progress, namely in the discovery of equal temperament. Prior to that, the older, unequal systems of tuning were useless when the harmonic demands of the early 18th century reached out toward modulations to more remote keys, requiring the use of semitones which, until then, had not been tempered to produce a uniform set of intervallic relationships. The first quarter of the 18th century saw remarkable progress in establishing a truly equal temperament, and the masterpiece crowning this achievement and at the same time pointing the way to the full possibilities of the tonal system in the future was Bach's *Wohltemperiertes Klavier* (the two volumes of which appeared in 1722 and 1744 respectively) consisting of preludes and fugues in each of the twenty-four major and minor keys. It is interesting to see that the very process that brought tonality to its highest stage, the extension outwards to more remote tonal relations, also brought about its downfall — an idea that should not be unfamiliar to Marxists.

The history of the development and disintegration of tonality runs parallel to the development and disintegration of capitalism. The threat to tonality which had manifested itself after 1870 with the increasing tonal ambiguity of Debussy and the chromaticism of Strauss and early Schoenberg was also the period in history in which capitalism began to be noticeably inimical to the progress of civilization. Arnold Schoenberg who, in his twelve-tone system (established more or less in 1923), succeeded in freeing the twelve notes of the chromatic scale from the diatonic associations they had retained as vestiges of the tonal system even under chromaticism, like Marx saw this system as a historical necessity and always insisted that his theory was not a break with the

past but a continuation of the most important achievements thus far in a historically appropriate musical language. Thus he regarded what subsequently became known as the Second Viennese School (Schoenberg and his two "pupils" Alban Berg and Anton Webern) as having been born in the womb of the earlier Viennese School of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven (the chronological link was Brahms) and in that sense part of the classical tradition.

Today, tonality as the musical language for our time is about as viable as capitalism. Tonality is dead, and any music pretending otherwise is ahistorical and reactionary. (it should be absolutely clear that I am speaking here of the musical language as used by contemporary composers, and not the language of tonality at its appropriate historical period, the brilliance of which was one of the great achievements in the history of music.)

However, as was suggested earlier, the Rock scene has not as yet heard and one cannot help but feel like Nietzsche's madman as one runs with a lantern in the morning to tell them the news. To the extent that the breaking down of tonality can be seen as the mirror in art of the dissolution of capitalism, the fact that these Rock groups look back nostalgically towards a past, out-moded musical language reveals the inconsistency between the revolutionary pretensions of many of them and the underlying bourgeois constructs of their thought.

This doesn't mean, of course, that Rock doesn't try to appear "modern," just as capitalism tries to put on a progressive face. In fact, the reactionary musical language of Rock is frequently veiled by certain instrumental effects, as often as not electronic, in an effort on the part of the Rock musician to establish himself as "contemporary."

An examination of the correspondence between sound and idea in music reveals to what extent the dialectical process is or is not functioning. As we have seen, in Rock the sound is extraneous to the musical concepts. In the case of much electronic music, its present state of decadence can be explained as a plunge into the purely phenomenal experience of sound severed from musical ideas.

Compare such degradation of the sensuous qualities of music to Debussy's masterful use of sound to capture the most subtle inflection and

transformation of musical idea — a true act of love. As Debussy said himself, speaking of *Images* in 1908, "I am trying to introduce something new — realities, so to speak. What idiots call 'impressionism.'" (12) (This idea would seem to have its visual counterpart in the paintings of Arshile Gorky, so remarkable for the swiftness with which ideas attach themselves to sensuous forms.)

The shift away from idea in sensuous material towards a seeking of pure sensation is the dominant trend in art today, and understandably has had its corresponding degradation in the personality of the artist himself.

While a change in social and intellectual conditions in the coming years may move musicians to grope for a revolutionary consciousness, their music will not reach the level of a historical necessity until they have mastered the process of self-conscious consciousness as manifested in the dialectical relation between sound and idea. Until this happens their music will be inappropriate as an embodiment of Socialist world outlook. But just as Marxist theory of knowledge cannot be mastered without having thoroughly assimilated the intellectual tradition that Marx himself continued, it is impossible to bring music today to a level of self-conscious consciousness without having mastered the most advanced musical thinking of the past.

Not only are Rock musicians incapable of this with their present mental equipment, but they are even totally unaware that there is such a past, finding great novelty in their "independent" discoveries without knowing that they already occurred, developed and declined several centuries ago.

The present narrowness of the Socialist movement, due in part to the alienated conception that socialism is only concerned with economic and political issues, will make it very difficult for significant intellectual and artistic movements to take place within it. The resistance meeting attempts to establish a Socialist art within the movement will be a tribute to the vigor of bourgeois ideology still struggling for supremacy among us.

Other obstacles exist as well. As long as socialists continue to believe that to become a socialist the individual has to sacrifice his individual identity to a collective, homogenized, group identity, artists and creative intellectuals in general will stay clear of the movement. This is particularly true in the case of the artist who realizes to what degree the vitality of his art and its impact on society depends on his knowledge of himself.

Vulgar Marxists, with characteristic lack of imagination, conclude that it is necessary to

suppress individuality altogether because they are incapable of locating it creatively in society. Thus, while the individual is prevented from realizing himself socially under capitalism, the vulgar Marxists have seen to it that he should also be prevented from realizing himself under socialism. Until the artist is given a place of importance in the Socialist movement, which he will hold because of his ability to reveal the highest stage of knowledge man is capable of (a knowledge which must be at the center of socialist thought), the ghost of Mayakovsky will continue to haunt us.

Footnotes

1. As told by Anais Nin, *The Diary of Anais Nin 1931-1934*, New York, The Swallow Press and Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966, pp. 191-193.
2. Andre Breton, "Manifesto of Surrealism" (1924) in *Manifestoes of Surrealism*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1969, p. 5.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
7. Andre Breton, and Diego Rivera, "Manifesto: Towards a Free Revolutionary Art," *Partisan Review*, Fall 1938, p. 49.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
9. The term "classical" as used here applies chiefly to the music of the late 18th and early 19th century, although the concept applies to a considerable degree to the music that preceded it and followed it as well. The definitive break with the classical concept of rhythm, however, was not made until the 20th century.
10. Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Conversations with Stravinsky*, London, Faber and Faber, 1959, p. 116.
11. Based on Pierre Boulez's analysis in his essay "Proposals," included in Pierre Boulez, *Notes of an Apprenticeship*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, pp. 61-71.
12. Quoted in Herbert Eimert, "Debussy's 'Jeux,' " which appeared in *die Reihe* no. 5, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, Theodore Presser Company, 1959.

Greece at a Turning Point

Three Years After the NATO Coup

By Nikos Syvriotis

The outstanding feature dominating Greek public life in the last seven years is the utter collapse of any programmatic consensus in the ranks of the ruling capitalist layers. It was this hard fact of life that triggered the demolition of the political coalitions represented in the bourgeois parties and brought about, after the King's intervention, the practically formal halt of parliamentary politics in July 15, 1965. In the chaos that ensued, everybody concerned was given ample opportunities to be convinced -by the hard-won experience of that two-year interregnum that no viable realignment of the bourgeois political forces was possible. In this sense, the bonapartist takeover of the colonels' came as a relief to the leading banking and industrial interests -if not to their political lieutenants.

For a brief, approximate interpretation of the programmatic disintegration of the Greek ruling class, we quote from the magazine *Epanastasi* no. 5-6 : "At the end of the infrastructure development phase, as stipulated by the Marshall Plan, there followed a period of relatively large industrial investments (ESSO-Pappas, Pechiney, joint Greco-Japanese shipbuilding ventures, etc) from 1963 to '65, and precisely then the programmatic decomposition of the Greek capitalist class was first detected. In a simplified way, it can be said that the cause of this decomposition was the general disagreement over the terms of collaboration between 'local' and 'foreign' capitals. This, of course, does not refer exclusively to the dog-fights that developed around the Litton and ESSO-Pappas contracts. It refers mainly to the whole broad field of controversy

regarding the overall direction of economic policy in Greece. The financial, commercial and industrial interests with a domestic market orientation (of old comprador-levantine descent) were proposing an expansion of the domestic market by means of liberal wage and fiscal policies, and in this respect they succeeded in striking a (short-lived) collaboration with newly formed layers of the so called technical intelligentsia, which tried at playing a role in public affairs for the first time in Greek history. On the other hand, the serious capitalist circles, the internationally oriented sector of financiers, the foreign funded and export-oriented industries and the State leading bureaucracy which is absolutely dependent on international finance by means of 'loans', had accurately diagnosed that the time of selective concessions was for them gone and were already deploying their forces to combat the approaching financial storms. For two years (July 1965 to April 1967) these two factions were struggling to form viable political coalitions that would implement their programs. And for two years they were demonstrating the futility of their intentions....(enter the junta)... The express mandate that was given the junta was to create a viable political coalition of the ruling class, which would undertake the implementation of the international "austerity" policies that have been launched for the rescue of the U.S. dollar and of the international credit system (the safeguarding of the Middle East oil resources is also included in this policy). The junta did not succeed in forming such a coalition, did not succeed in hatching the 'succession scheme' and still clings on to the power seats, itself implementing the 'austerity programs...' "

The other determining political parameter is, of course, the disintegration of the traditional left working-class parties, KKE (the communist party--outlawed since the late forties) and EDA, the former's legal front-organization. The history of this disintegration goes back to the criminal blunders that were committed during the armed bid for power in 1946-49 and is too long to reconstruct here.

For the purpose of understanding the present correlation of class forces, it will be sufficient to say that when the entire KKE bloc--which in Greece was the only massive depository of revolutionary working class tradition--found itself in a mass strike situation from 1963 to 1966 it was taken entirely by surprise. Its belated response was to channel the mass movement into parliamentary-reformist channels, violently inhibiting class-programmatic orientation.

This general political-programmatic decay created favorable conditions for the inexorable bonapartist onslaught which was evident as far back as in 1965. The conservative section of the reformist Center Union party was used by the right-wing "National Radical Union" to topple the parliamentary hegemony of the Papandreou pere cabinet. The National Radical Union's remnants were used by the Palace to oust the moderate-right coalition and install a radical-right one. The Palace and the radical-right were used as props to assist the junta's capture of power in April 1967. Finally, in Dec. 13, 1967, the military junta expelled the King, persecuted the court politicians and generals and dropped its right-wing political allies.

For the first time, the regime was disembodied, suspended mid-air, with no class support, irrelevant to society and itself, solely concerned with retaining power. As in another, very old, well chronicled, such bonapartist regime, "the bankers ruled!" With a slight modification this time: it is not the hand of the concerned international bankers that guides our colonels, but rather the various branches of the large, inertial bureaucracy at their disposal -- the C.I.A., the Pentagon, and the State Department. A previous *Campaigner* article has documented the sheer physical presence of these agencies in Greece.

Given the sociological circumstances of Western Europe, the Middle East and of course, the entire developed sector of capitalism, one can make a

number of approximate estimates of the junta's rate of internal disintegration, of the ability of the ruling local capitalist layers to patch up an ephemeral coalition and of the chances of a mass strike upsurge under conditions of military dictatorship.

But first, let us see by what measures the regime is trying to generate political support for itself -- and why it has, so far, failed.

A House Divided

From its first day of existence, the junta tried to create the legal fiction of its so-called transitional, "parenthetic" character. During the first week of its life, it claimed the King's support (while the King was protesting), in order to paralyze the resistance of the royalist officers' corps. Simultaneously, it claimed itself to be the temporary arbitrator of political affairs who would prepare the necessary conditions for "healthy" parliamentary life -- a pretense that was meant to win the neutrality of right wing politicians. In the time that was gained, the "revolutionary council," composed of about thirty officers ranking from major to brigadier, consolidated its position in the army and the civil administration by means of massive purges of all "unreliable" elements -- which mostly meant royalist, conservative right-wing and center-union officers and civil servants. It took them some time, but they did it.

During this process, Colonel G. Papadopoulos, a CIA darling, emerged as a figurehead in the "revolutionary council," in the role of arbitrator, head of the cabinet, and armed forces, and compromise-man between the warring factions of the "council." He was the first to sense the precarious balance on which his regime was based, and the first to propose measures to remedy the situation.

The wage-freeze-and-inflation fiscal policy excludes at present any attempt at stabilizing the regime on labor support. The primitive accumulation steamroller of the Mansholdt Plan in agriculture, forces the large peasant masses away from the junta's tiny field of influence. Quite sensibly, Papadopoulos counted only on the traditional capitalist layers for eventual political support. Overtures have been made to the Palace, which mostly represents early comprador and proto-industrial circles established

in the last eighty years — mainly before World War II. Certain National Radical Union politicians, mostly expressing Marshall Plan upstarts and black-marketeers of the German occupation period, have also been given a free hand with selective censorship lifts, as they begin to court the role of a “loyal opposition” to the junta.

Papadopoulos and his hand-picked personal staff have been the exclusive initiators of these overtures. And at each step they have been bitterly opposed by the overwhelming majority of his fellow conspirators at the “revolutionary council.” These men are, for the most part, hard core old-fashioned Nazi’s, with long records of service in Hitler’s armed forces during the German occupation. What they lack is a genuine, grass-roots fascist movement. They are quite insensitive to today’s realities of political power, but they are vaguely aware of the fact that they represent a future option for the ruling class. Nevertheless, they have got their timetables wrong.

Constant exposure to the practical necessities of executive power, but also understandable sensitivity to the CIA’s search for a more stable formula, have forced Papadopoulos to seek alignments with non-military circles of political influence (previously denounced by the “revolutionary council” as corrupt). At the same time, the premier is enough of a conspirator to realize that he couldn’t carry out his intentions if he lacks the raw power to curb the anti-Papadopoulos faction inside the “revolutionary council.” Hence his persistent efforts to create his personal power apparatus both in the government bureaucracy and the armed forces.

Ever since the premier gained notoriety as a “moderate” member of the junta, he’s been noted to appoint relatives and old personal acquaintances to key government and army positions. He has also lifted a good number of nonentities to positions of power, making them wholly dependent on his person. Such are the cases of the Minister of Propaganda, G. Georgalas (a former Stalinist functionary), of Papavlachopoulos Minister of Agriculture, of Totomis, formerly of the Public Security, of brother Constantine Papadopoulos — chief of the newly formed Marine Corps etc.

At the same time, the premier had been accumulating a number of ministries under his

personal control. He is, now, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, of Foreign Affairs, of Education. In his last expansion-consolidation cycle, in July 1970, as soon as he acquired the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he passed “Royal Decree No. 500, in re: composition and function of the Cabinet. According to the decree “the Premier determines and expresses the policy of the Government” (article 2). Article 4 defines the composition of the “Government Political Council” which “elaborates and enforces programs of economic, fiscal, social and national policy.” This council is made up of nine ministries, four of which are in the hands of Papadopoulos. In addition, he has the support of article 2.

With the additional power, vested in him by R.D. 500, he took the offensive in mid-summer, opened negotiations with the King, promised early “elections” and replacement of the “shadow” of martial law by the 1968 “constitution.” He also released 500 political prisoners, eased censorship on the “loyal opposition.” Most significant of all was the formation of a personal Papadopoulist political party, the “Social Union of Scientists” — a gathering of about a thousand engineers, doctors, specialists, lawyers etc. — a Greek version of the Spanish “Opus Dei,” whose presence indicates the premier’s intentions to broaden the political arena and institute some kind of elections in which he would take part, and which would somehow legalize his rule.

The reaction of the junta’s hard-liners was heavy, prompt, but also desperate: Reliable underground sources reported a secret meeting of the “revolutionary council” on August 26 at the National Defense Headquarters, during which, the anti-Papadopoulos bloc — numerically superior — protested the “liberalisation” measures, made charges of nepotism, and attempted to annul the R.D. no. 500.

A document was signed by the majority, demanding that all national and political decisions be made by the “revolutionary council,” and that appointments of ministers and all cabinet changes be approved by it. Papadopoulos is said to have retorted with threats of resignation and Oct. 31 was set as a tentative deadline by both sides.

A further secret meeting at the Regent’s house on September 3, debated the possibility of the King’s return, again without clear results, as the army seems deeply split over this matter. Gen.

Angelis, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a Papadopoulos choice boomeranged as he insisted that the King's return would be suicidal, as the pro-king officers' factions would become defiant and the anti-king fascist tendencies would rebel. This matter was also tied up with the general political problem and the Oct. 31 deadline.

As it turned out, both factions bid for time and accepted a compromise formula by mid-October. The formula contains a moratorium on the matter of the exiled king, the proclamation of a fake "election" in which ten thousand hand-picked "electors" will vote for a so-called "small advisory parliament," made up of industrialists, appointed "trade-unionists" and professionals, without any legislative power. The whole thing is obviously a publicity stunt, whose only function is to delay the confrontation inside the junta. It is also a poor attempt at establishing the classical fascist "corporate state" — without, of course, any underlying fascist movement at the grass roots.

In short, since the King's ouster on December 13, 1967, the junta continues to exist in a social and political vacuum, without any basis apart from military violence and the threat of violence, but, during this time, it has been transformed from a solid institution into a faction-torn collective.

As a matter of fact, a sort of "dual power" system is in the making, as the various members of the junta make public distinctions between the "revolution" (i.e. the junta) and the "government" (i.e. the personal apparatus of Papadopoulos). Without a doubt, the virus of programmatic disorientation of the ruling class has contaminated the bonapartist regime of Athens.

Another House Divided

The capitalist class in Greece lords over a predominantly agricultural economy, 45% of the produce is exported, 35% marketed inside the country, and only 20% consumed by the agricultural producers themselves. The production and distribution of all agricultural commodities is tightly controlled by the Agricultural Bank of Greece — a united front of the two major commercial banks, the central bank and the higher state bureaucracy. The purchase of seed, fertilisers, pesticides, etc. are minutely regulated. State *dirigisme* stops only to allow a free hand to a handful of commercial monopolies who after each harvest season blackmail the small producers into selling their produce below cost.

On the average, under prevailing conditions, the

cost of cultivation per stremma (1/10 of an acre) is about 150 drachmas higher than the income per stremma. That is, the Greek owner of land subsists on that part of the cultivation cost equation which is calculated as "labor costs" — his markedly substandard wage — and at the same time is perennially indebted to the Agricultural Bank, which makes "cultivation loans" effectively at 10% annual interest — and 12-14% for overdue bills.

This being the solid basis of capitalism in the Greek sector, serious problems have emerged for the bankers and financiers who want to maintain an agreeable rate of profit. To begin with, productivity in Greek agriculture ranges from 1/4 to 1/8 of its average European counterpart, depending on the kind of cultivation. The main obstacle to higher productivity is lack of appropriate equipment and educated manpower, but there is also extreme land fragmentation. (Size of average plot being 0.3 of an acre).

The ruling circles maintain that putting an end to this fragmentation and creating large farm holdings will be the necessary prerequisite for introducing modern equipment and technique to the countryside. Their peculiar idea for reaching this objective is, by fiscal and price policies, to encourage massive bankruptcies and emigration of farming households. As a result of this Mansholdt-type-plan, 250,000 people have abandoned the countryside during the last three years of military rule.

Needless to say the high-cost-credit and low-selling-price policy for agricultural products — actually a primitive accumulation policy — has in no way led to cheaper foodstuffs or other commodities for city dwellers. Quite the opposite.

City laborers had, in the first thirty months of the junta, to submit to a 20% increase of the consumer-commodity index. Items such as water (British concern) and electricity (international consortium and Greek government) have doubled. Transportation fares increased by about 15-20%. Olive oil (a staple) doubled in retail price, potatoes are up 80%!!! etc.

At the same time, industrial producers were faced with increasing production costs and a bad international climate. Greek industry as a whole is a joke. Apart from the small-scale nineteenth-century-style enterprises that have existed since the early '20s, the only remarkable

units are those that were built in the 1963-65 period, mainly in the chemical, oil refining, and metallurgy fields. Manufacturing taken as a whole hardly manages to account for 28% of inflated GNP.

The manufacturing-development policy which has been the vehement, long-range credo of capitalism for the last decade, would require a policy of cheap foodstuffs, cheap raw materials and energy resources — objectives that have been crushed during the last three and a half years. When it is an urgent question of immediate options, our bankers know how to dump their long-run aspirations. This, though, has not been a straight line — nor has it left all partners happy.

As a matter of fact, the whole story of the junta's policy in the economic and social fields has been one of bewilderment, indecision and vacillation.

The Junta took power during a recession/inflation period. Immediately it adopted a credit-expansion and wage-freeze policy, a combination that Nixon seems to admire at the current period in the U.S. The "Greek" bankers, not plagued by the global worries of their New York brethren, readily fell for this ingenious provincial improvisation of Keynes — only to retract with burned fingers a short time later. The regime, still hoping to attract foreign investors, imposed a series of legislative measures declaring an open season for international speculators such as Litton, Onassis et al.

Nevertheless, the recession carried well into 1968 and the beginning of '69. During this same time, the only "foreign investors" who took advantage of the new legislation were the First National City Bank, the Chase Manhattan (whose "you have a friend at Chase" slogan was rendered a cute translation into the local language), and a number of less illustrious names of international banking — but almost no new manufacturing investment came forth.

The Greek shipping magnates, Onassis and Niarchos, were happy to sign fabulous half billion dollar investment contracts, which are now running their second year, and they are still searching to find financiers to back them up. The only investments that took place during the period were mostly of speculative character — mainly

international loans to the government and uninhibited floatation of public issues. Public debt is running as high as almost two billion dollars — about 30% of the GNP.

At any rate, manufacturing production did recover by mid-1969. It had hardly done so when the banking system was forced to impose a two percentage point increase of the prime rate, as a result of the prevailing distress conditions in the world money markets. The measure caused such an uproar from the ranks of merchants and industrialists that it was hardly contained at all by the government censorship of the press. As a matter of fact, the Association of Greek Manufacturers has been very outspoken on the subject. Dissent was apparent among those bankers who were seriously committed to the long-run development policy of their class. Constantine Thanos, deputy director of the Bank of Greece, resigned from his post and issued a public statement explaining that the reason for his resignation was the government's abandonment of its long-range program of "deep structural reform".

Under the circumstances, 1970 seems to have been a year of no policy. Tight credit was maintained overall, but certain sectors such as speculative construction and export trade were exempted. The controversy over long-range policy still rages fiercely and a number of controversial reports — such as the one by the director of the "National Bank" — have come to light.

In the meantime, the squeeze on labor and farm incomes has been still greater, since this is the one policy which meets the unanimous approval of all concerned parasites. For the time being, they still have a sufficient political margin to allow the continued pursuit of this labor-power-depleting policy. Two factors though are militantly against it: increasing disunity in the ruling circles, including the Junta, and increasing militancy in the ranks of (crudely) organized labor.

The summer that just passed marked the first determined defensive stirrings of workers since the 1967 coup. Though still inside the "legal" framework of the regime, a feverish atmosphere accompanied by agitation for strikes, was observed in the public utilities, in construction, in transport, among dock workers in Peiraeus, among ceramics and bakery workers. The regime, still testing its slippery ground has been unable to crack

down on these spontaneous ripples, and was forced to retreat on at least four occasions. It temporarily abandoned a bill to kill social security, it agreed to a 10% wage increase for construction and bakery workers (for both of whom it imposed a longer work-week) and it abandoned its intention to annul an act providing a modest financial assistance to laid-off workers.

The way is open only for more conflicting policy, actual and proposed, among the capitalists, more disunity inside the Junta, more austerity measures, inflation and labor-income squeezes which will inevitably lead to more daring -- if fragmented -- response from among the laboring masses.

A Third House Divided:

The Case of the Communist "Party"

All of the warring factions of what is left of the KKE (the Greek CP) are utterly oblivious of the large (and of the small, to be sure) problems that have been tearing Greek society to pieces for the last five years. The factional fight is being waged over the best way for implementing a fantastic popular-front formula that would include all "patriotic anti-junta forces, from King to CP." They explain the Junta as a "barbarous fascist regime" which was "imposed by a handful of mad conspirators" with the help of the (now proverbial) "dark forces," just at the time that "Democracy" was about to triumph at the polls.

Outside the hilarious, tiny "Maoist" splinters (and they are numerous, finely subdivided by their varied "positions" in relation to the . . . Ussuri river incidents!) there remain two main factions of the ageing and decimated old guard which once led a brilliant anti-nazi resistance and a desperate armed struggle for power in the late forties: A pro-Moscow central committee of exiles mainly in eastern Europe and the USSR, and a gathering of dissident CC members combined with former EDA (the CP's legal branch) parliamentarians leaning toward the Italian party's exotic polycentrist tendencies -- poly-Centrist indeed, considering the bewildering variety of petty careerists, little vulgar "intellectuals" and plain opportunist apparatchniks that make up this tendency.

Although each faction is trying to outdo the

other with hysterical calls for pop-front unity, they are distinct from each other. To begin with, the pro-Moscow sect is still maintaining a pro-working class posture in its pulpit jargon for reasons originating from the factional fight. Mono-Centrists that they are, they are opposed to the polycentrists' efforts to merge the KKE with the "fellow-travelling," "radical petty bourgeois" EDA. Then of course, there is the hair splitting argument about whether leadership should be exercised by a general staff from abroad, such as the pro-Moscow CC, or from "inside" the country, where they are "closer to reality" as the "renovators of marxism," now residing mostly in Western Europe, sincerely believe.

Apart from their own shattering lack of "unity," the two factions have to live with the daily tragedy of seeing their frequent calls for unity with the bourgeois "anti-juntists" go unheeded.

The popular front never came close to becoming a reality during the last three-and-a-half years, mainly because the bourgeoisie itself is so badly fragmented and busy trying to mend its own fence that it abhors the prospect of the additional complications that an impossible popular front with the "communists" would offer. Undoubtedly though, many bourgeois politicians would be happy to see communists lead a successful resistance against the Junta in the name of a paper pop-front and then hand the power over to some of them. But that is just the thing that is not going to happen.

The CP's present leadership lacks the authority and moral capital required to successfully engineer such a historic bluff this time. The present adult generation experienced three such popular front debacles in its life. One in 1936 - and it led directly into the fascist dictatorship of I. Metaxas. One in 1944 -- and it led to the annihilation of a fully armed popular movement that once counted millions in its ranks. One in 1963-67 -- and it resulted in the present Junta.

Each one of these devastating defeats left deep, bloody scars in the memory of the masses. The combined weight of executions, deaths in the battle field, concentration camps, exiles, jails, daily harrassment and intimidation have left the combatant contingents of a whole generation decimated, bled to death and demoralized. No recruiting grounds are left for the leadership that is

so obviously and so criminally responsible for all these bloody debacles. And this is a fact.

The net result of this horror story is that today, those grouplets of former leaders that still keep the KKE's cadaver unburied, have been utterly denuded of the rank and file of the traditional membership. The task of the new party that will emerge, will not be to win members away from them. It will be to infuse new faith, new determination and concrete programmatic orientation to the demoralized layers of workers and peasants who once formed the striking fist of the class and who are still the living and legitimate bearers of an old spritely, bloody and stubborn tradition.

These people, some with guilt, some with relief, have abandoned the present comi-tragic "leadership" and are temporarily away from any active involvement. Of the handful that remains, some are regular organization hacks and some are actual working class fighters who cannot bear the thought of living outside their traditional political organization, and accept the consequences of having to submit to a discipline that they neither understand nor like and which, in fact, they abhor. One could say that they bide their time and wait for the alternative.

As things stand today, maintaining the title of member doesn't involve any more than participating in an occasional ritual ceremony -- such as signing a party document, passing resolutions for Lenin's centenary or, if one is abroad, calling for better treatment of the political prisoners. According to the best estimations, all meaningful, organized resistance and other political work inside Greece has collapsed not so much because of the effectiveness of any policing techniques, as because of the complete indifference with which the masses greet the occasional pop-front slogans that prop up here and there.

The large mass of energetic young agitators and organizers that once, in 1967, set up the "Patriotic Front," has completely withdrawn ever since a handful of apparatchiks, assisted by their own blunders, took over the clandestine machine and subsequently ruined it. Many of these younger people have expressly denounced both party factions. They unceremoniously baptized their own tendency "The Chaos" and have gone home to wait for "something new" -- as the saying

nowadays goes in occupied Greece.

It must be said that the combined effect of all this demoralisation and deliberate inactivity has been the breakdown of the main clandestine communication arteries. Consequently, whatever starts now, starts from scratch. No police force in the world could have done the clean job that pop-front politics have done in this country. This is a priceless object lesson for the other European revolutionaries whose countries have yet to go through the Scylla of a military junta and the Charybdis of popular front.

The central programmatic issues which the KKE systematically ignores, and to which the emerging (embryonic as yet) class-for-itself tendency in the Greek sector addresses itself are: redistribution of a 50-60 billion drachma annual waste in military and state and corporate bureaucratic spending, reallocation of the 18-20 billion drachmas annual corporate profits loan interests and debt service. Yet even these resources would be insufficient to put to effect the urgent tasks of large scale mechanization of agricultural production, of rapid tempo formation of requisite modern agriculture support industries such as fertilisers, power supply, chemicals, transportation. Such a radical orientation toward socialist industrialisation would from the outset start creating over one hundred thousand new productive jobs a year, provided that the necessary social payments are made in the sectors of education, health, housing, general culture, etc.

Politically, it means that the main axes of programmatic class alliances in Greece will be farmer-worker, organised-unorganised, employed-unemployed. Notably, the extremely fragmented groups from each such category have been putting up worthy rear-guard defensive battles during the dictatorship. What they obviously lack is coordination -- or even awareness of each other's existence -- programmatic coherence and actual conceptual or organizational links.

The prevailing mental class-in-itself setup is utter atomization, even among those layers with a crude syndicalist craft-union organization. This, of course, is mainly due to the fact that trade-unionism could never flourish in a country where even such a modest reformist aspiration tended to be forced to extreme political expression.

The apparent policing domination of the junta seems to have reinforced this atomization. But only superficially. In fact, the impossibility of reformist "struggles" tends to accumulate heavy political charges in people which ultimately lead to sudden, powerful eruptions. In the span of the last thirty years it has been demonstrated repeatedly in Greece that apparently intimidated or apathetic masses are capable of sudden sustained offensive which, supplied with appropriate revolutionary leadership, can easily capture power. Such was the case of the civil war which started spontaneously and was imposed on the leadership, such the case of the 1958 recovery of the movement (only eight years after its military defeat). Such was also the case of the 1962-67 mass strike wave which overthrew the 8-year long Marshall Plan parliamentary dictatorship of Karamanlis -- to be subsequently stabbed in the back by the pop-front parliamentary cretinism of the KKE.

The question at the present period of panicky retreat is not how to infuse false hopes or to bully people into a so called patriotic resistance against the "black colonels." Rather, the task of the day is to provide and constantly expand the programmatic links among temporarily fragmented defensive skirmishes of the fighting rear guard. The next eruption must find us adequately prepared for coordinated programmatic wedges on a national scale that would result in broad class alliances with concrete platform and objectives. It is this eventuality that will pull the rug from under the feet of the divided and quarreling bourgeoisie.

Only a Subsector in the European Theatre of Operations

At this instant, the question of international correlation of forces becomes an urgent consideration. Obviously, the socio-economic and political impasse in which capitalism finds itself in Greece is only a corollary of the present critical predicament of the system. Liquidity strains, high interest rates, fall of real productive investments are phenomena originating in the main international capital markets. The subjective intentions and political expediencies of an obscure, parochial regime and those of the somewhat more illustrious financiers and international speculators operating locally in Greece can hardly ever be expected to turn the flood, at a period in which giants like the Penn Central collapse and others like G.M. are ready to follow suit. Indeed, given the direction and tensivity of the current capitalist crisis, one can

safely conclude that the internal division and strain of the ruling capitalist layers in Greece (including the junta) have not even reached their apex yet. The regime's instability is, for the time being, taken as a constant parameter.

On the other hand, the massive austerity programs and the large scale attacks on working class incomes that capitalism has unleashed on a global scope, extend also in Greece setting thus the stage for a new mass strike process. The phenomenon should be properly studied in its common international characteristics.

After the May 1968 French general strike, the mass strike process has been very conspicuously spreading in Italy -- with extremely dramatic developments -- in Great Britain -- where this year it assumed 1926 proportions and promises decisive confrontations -- Sweden, Spain, Turkey, recently in Western Germany, and -- why not -- Yugoslavia.

The pattern is almost identical and the timing almost simultaneous: the regimes adopt austerity programs, higher interest rates, impose higher prices, curtail productive investments, spread unemployment, almost synchronously in the entire developed sector. If there ever was an "invisible hand" this must be it. The masses of workers, almost in all cases respond in similar manner: increased militancy, wild-cat actions, mobilizations, strikes, drifting away from the ideological influence of reformist-syndicalist institutions. The process cuts across national boundaries as if they were butter.

Unless the masses of Greek workers and peasants are willing to starve to death -- a proposition for which they've shown little enthusiasm -- they are bound to be hurled into this international tornado. Their spontaneous, defensive skirmishes will inevitably assume broader scope and scale. The regime's own very precarious balance and indecision immensely facilitates such developments. Besides, it should be borne in mind that another mass strike wave, that of 1962-1967, started under conditions of virtual dictatorship under Karamanlis. The social phenomenon of the mass strike process simply cannot be legislated out of existence.

Granted that the immediate task of Greek revolutionaries is to provide the necessary

programmatic coherence and socialist organization to these spontaneous upsurges, we still have to consider the battle order of Europe-wide class confrontation. The very survival of a socialist victory in Greece will depend, from its first days, on the military correlation of forces in the Continent and the Mediterranean zone. Without the effective arrest of any military manoeuvres in West Germany, Italy, Turkey and the various Sixth-fleet ports, there can be no prospect of survival. This of course, puts the revolution in Greece in its proper international frame. The programmatic consolidation of the mass strike in Europe must necessarily acquire the capacity to at

least immobilise the movement of NATO troops, by means of strikes, massive support mobilizations, agitation, propaganda, by a general elevation of political work in every section.

The new revolutionary movement that is now emerging in Europe must, from its very first steps, acquire an international understanding of its tasks. In this proper context, there is no doubt that, those serious Greek revolutionaries who are temporarily in forced exile in Western countries, will spare no energies in the effort to work out those programmatic prospects that will necessarily lead to an integrated socialist movement not only through Europe but also, across the Atlantic.

Towards a Socialist Perspective for Ireland

By PETER BRAND

Every self-proclaimed socialist endorses the goal of a workers' republic as the only solution for the Irish question. Most differ fiercely on the religious question in the six counties which form Northern Ireland, and on the approach to national unification. How must the struggle against British imperialism and for a socialist Ireland be conducted? My conclusion, after several weeks of observation and discussion with radicals in both the six and the twenty-six counties of the Irish Free State: the unity of Ireland on any terms is impossible without the previous success of an all-Ireland socialist movement which will unite Protestant and Catholic workers around a clear class program. The national struggle in itself has no direct bearing on the defeat of imperialism. New "national" forms — i.e. a united workers' republic — must be determined by the class movement.

Major Chichester-Clark, Prime Minister of the British-sponsored Stormont government of the six counties, has planned to traverse this summer with all the caution due to a political minefield. Massive demonstrations of militant Protestants held annually throughout Northern Ireland in July and August amount to a yearly commemorative insult in the view of the Catholic minority. Vaunted under the sponsorship of the Orange Order, a venerable Protestant fraternal lodge which claims the membership of the entire Stormont government, the Orange marches feature endless rows of grim participants in bowler hats and orange sashes, scores of grammar-school fife-and-drum bands, colored square banners of the variety associated in New York with the St. Patrick's Day parade, and assorted perfunctory historic trappings.

This July 12 was the two-hundred-eightieth anniversary of "Protestant" King William of Orange's victory over "Catholic" King James II at the River Boyne, when the latter monarch in alliance with native Irish forces was routed by "Good King Billy" in alliance with the Pope. One hundred thousand Orangemen paraded through heavily guarded and restricted routes, assembling to affirm their loyalty to Britain and the Queen, rallying for the continuance of a Protestant Ulster, and failing conspicuously to move their traditional resolution of fealty to Stormont.

In the past the Orange Lodges have acted as the "secular arm" of the Stormont government. This year right-wing antagonism against Chichester-Clark's center-Unionist Party politics was ominous. As Orangemen convened following the Belfast march, the head of the order in the six counties argued, "How can you be a moderate Unionist? You're either pledged to the Union (with the United Kingdom) or against it. . . The Orange Order is the last stronghold of Ulster — if it falls, it is no exaggeration to say our country will fall. We are sick of craven concessions. The government must begin to express the will of the people who put it there, and it must begin to govern."

Clusters of youths danced with Union Jacks at the fringes of the parades, and old women sat behind card tables selling photos of the Reverend Ian Paisley, Protestant right-wing extremist and newly-elected representative to the Westminster parliament. Until this year, Unionist government ministers invariably joined the parades. This time Chichester-Clark announced that security measures required his ministers to meet in subcommittee, and on this pretext the Government declined to march as scheduled.

Since partition of Ireland in 1922, the Unionist Party has ruled without interruption and with insignificant competition. However, with the rise of Catholic militancy embodied in the civil-rights movement during the last two years, the right-wing split to form the Protestant-Unionist Party, led by Rev. Paisley. Paisley has attracted great attention by making demagogic appeals to workers on material issues with which he has no intention or capacity to deal. Most left-wing commentators have drawn a parallel between Paisleyite sectarian populism and the pseudo-socialism of the fascist movements in Italy and Germany between world wars.

To the immense relief of almost all concerned, this "Twelfth" passed without violence, despite widespread rioting during the preceding fortnight. Eighteen thousand security men, British troops, Royal Ulster Constabulary, and Ulster Defense regiment personnel (Home Guard) materialized, under government orders to keep the peace. Orange marches were cancelled in Dungiven, a small town with a large Catholic majority situated between Belfast and Derry. They were rerouted elsewhere to bypass Catholic districts where post-celebration disturbances have in the past led to trouble.

No one, however, expects the end of sectarian violence during the near future. As the breach between Catholics and Protestants yawns wider, both sides seem propelled toward civil war, unwillingly but inexorably. Underneath Orange loyalist rhetoric, the nearly hysterical Protestant middle classes cower. They face conditions of economic stagnation while the Catholic civil rights movement threatens to encroach on their meagre share of the poverty. Neither side envisions an alternative other than pursuit of their sectarian interests to the point of violence. One Catholic shopgirl, predicting the worst, explained: "It'll be Catholics fighting Protestants — which is stupid — but you've got to fight for your rights, don't you?"

The Transformation of British Imperialism

The first step toward formulating socialist policy for Ireland is a concrete analysis of the economic developments which set the stage for the political drama. British imperialism functions quite differently in Ireland today than it did in 1916, when James Connolly and a tiny group of revolutionaries attempted a violent break with the British Empire. The economic pattern is not simple looting of the land and peasant-income — one of the original cornerstones of British capitalism —

but heavy trade and industrial investment. The Irish Free State is now Britain's third most important trading partner. British and American capital account for half of all new investment in Irish industry in the twenty-six counties. The nationalist Fianna Fail government (including the expelled ministers Blaney, Haughey, and the extreme right wing) offers nothing but anti-imperialist bluster and continually closer ties with Britain.

The mounting violence, which followed Connolly's abortive rising, forced the British to relinquish their statutory control on the twenty-six counties. At this point, the Irish nationalists divided on the questions of unification of Ireland and economic relations with England. Free Staters (favoring close economic ties and willing to accept division) battled Republicans (demanding immediate unification and protectionist economic policies) through the Civil War of 1921-22. Although the Free Staters crushed the Republicans militarily, the shards of the Republican faction assembled in the Fianna Fail parliamentary party became dominant. They have governed almost without break from 1933 until the present.

Until 1959, Fianna Fail proceeded under the illusion that domestic capital could industrialize Ireland to the level necessary for Ireland to compete on the world market. Consequently they maintained protectionist tariff barriers. In 1959, however, Fianna Fail abruptly reversed its policy of a quarter-century, and opened the Irish Free State to foreign trade and investment. In so doing the former Republicans co-opted the program of the ineffectual Fine Gael, opposition party of the old Free Staters.

Now that their former nationalist opponents proved amenable to the tasks of a client government, Fine Gael found itself without a clear rationale for its own existence. They suffered a decade long decline. However, Fine Gael long starved for power may soon find a *modus vivendi* with the Irish Labour Party, also in similar straits. Left-wing observers expect a futile joint to appeal to the irrational craving for "something different."

Fianna Fail confirmed and reinforced its new turn in 1966, by negotiating the Anglo-Irish Free Trade agreement, finally opening the floodgates to the economic deluge whose magnitude is quoted above. Mr. Neal Blaney and Mr. Charles Haughey (former ministers of Agriculture and Fianace whose expulsion from the Free State government

for alleged gun-running to the North drew wide attention last May) represent nothing more than the nervous-reactive twitching of a dead nationalism. Since both men were instrumental in concluding agreements which facilitated closer ties with Britain, it seems obvious they were motivated by sentimental chauvinism rather than concrete "national" economics.

Fianna Fail's attempt to enter the European Economic Community heralds the final liquidation of economic nationalism, and the bitter end of this party's flagging support of Irish small farmers. According to the Common Market's advisory Mansholt Plan, three-quarters of European farmers must be absorbed into industry in the interest of efficiency: Ireland has 50,000 unemployed already, and prospects for alleviating the high rate are deteriorating. The former party of militant republicanism is at length prepared to sacrifice the last ragged vestiges of formal decision-making in the economic sphere.

As British and American imperialism envelop the South, workers in Northern Ireland must endure the lowest wage levels and the highest prices in the United Kingdom. Trade unions are weak or nonexistent, and organizing efforts are scattered and easily suppressed. The North Ireland Labour Party is a faltering reformist voice, a weak shadow of its mammoth British counterpart. Unemployment in the six counties now stands at 8%, well over twice the level in any other part of the British Isles. In certain locales the jobless rate is astronomical, surpassing 18% in Derry (the second largest city in the six counties), 24% in Kilkeel, and 25% in Strabane — estimated to suffer the worst unemployment rate in Europe. Catholic areas invariably suffer most.

Stormont's Minister of Commerce admitted last December that the number of unemployed had risen by 2,000 during the last ten years in Northern Ireland, an area with a population smaller than that of the city of Manchester. 1,500 more jobs evaporated in the first months of 1970. 31% of employed men receive less than the fifteen pounds (thirty-six dollars) per week allotted to an unemployed man with a wife and eight children. North Irish farmers continue to flee the land and its extreme poverty. During the past decade, 35,000 persons who were employed in agriculture in the six counties left rural areas, causing a 40% decrease in the number of small farmers.

Housing conditions in the North are likewise the worst in the British Isles. The Belfast Housing Trust estimates that 90% of the housing in the

Shankill Road (Protestant) and Falls Road (Catholic) inner city ghettos is substandard: common necessities such as indoor sanitary facilities and hot water are the exception rather than the rule. There are one hundred thousand housing units in all which are considered unfit for human habitation. In Derry, where housing in the Bogside ghetto is among the worst in the six counties, twenty houses have been constructed in the last two years. In any case, for most unemployed a new house is out of the question. As Eamon Melaugh of the Derry Unemployed Action Committee writes: "Paradoxically, the prospect of a new house for those of us living below the poverty line can only add to our misery. How do we pay 3 pounds per week rent from what we get on the dole?" In housing, at least, there exists a grim equality between religious communities. Although discrimination in housing allocation is prevalent, any qualitative distinction between the shelter of Catholics and Protestants is negligible.

In the twenty-six counties, a recent de facto addition to Britain's economic family, conditions are generally inferior even to those in the six counties. Unemployment is 75% as high as in the North (6%), and unemployment pay is considerably lower. 38% of the labor force earns less than eleven pounds per week, and three-quarters of women workers earn less than nine pounds per week. While prices rose 7½% last year due to inflation, Fianna Fail's Price and Incomes policy seeks to restrict wage increases to 7%. The Free State has the highest strike rate in the world.

The housing situation is critical South as well as North of Ireland. In Dublin, asserts the Dublin Housing Action Committee, 10,000 families remain without shelter. Despite the shortage, asserts the *Young Socialist* journal, "There are many idle houses and flats, nearly all in good condition and could be used to shelter most of the 10,000 homeless families while new houses are being built," (July 1969).

Especially revealing of the current role of Irish "bourgeois nationalism" is Fianna Fail's recently proposed legislation to curb the rights of trade unionists — including freedom to picket and democratic trade union elections — a capitalist ploy homologous with the British version. Apparently "Irish nationalists" and "British imperialists" have not only found their way to concordant trade

arrangements, but "coincidentally" evolved identical methods of assaulting workers' living standards! In a similar maneuver, emergency legislation has been forwarded to repress housing squatters after the arrest of several militants in a Dublin housing estate on July 28th. The political concomitants of the new face of Fianna Fail have taken form in the Criminal Justice Bill, a law-and-order provision designed to curb the spread of street protests.

The pivotal question is not a mythical "self-determination of the Irish people," but the circumstances under which Ireland is to be industrialized. Either there will be an Irish workers' republic in the context of a world-socialist economic community or imperialist capital will determine Irish development. No form of national government can be termed "anti-imperialist" if it presides over the latter course. At this historical juncture the only anti-imperialist movement is one which can unite the Protestant and Catholic segments of the Irish working class to create a government in their own interest.

Catholic workers in the six counties suffer underemployment and substandard living conditions because British capitalism is underproductive. Northern Irish workers are jobless at a rate exceeding 30% in Catholic ghetto areas because Britain finds Ireland a convenient pit for resident industrial reserve army. The backward state of trade-union organization and fragmentation of the working class makes Ireland particularly useful. As Britain absorbed Ireland into her "division of labor," the six counties suffered an emigration rate lower than the notorious rate of departure from the Free State only because Northern workers are entitled to the higher British unemployment pay.

Because Catholics are a minority historically opposed to Protestants (especially since the start of Orange agitation against Home Rule in 1886) it is simple for British Capital to exploit the divisions within the Irish working class and force the brunt of the problem on Catholics. Protestants are led to identify wholeheartedly with certain bourgeois institutions, particularly the Orange Order with its wide patronage system, which appear to provide for them.

The Bankruptcy of Unionism

British policy has shifted, along with its economic basis, from systematic brutalization of

the Catholic minority to the cautious middle course of moderate Unionism. Protection of the large sum of British investment in the South involves avoiding extreme provocation of Irish Catholics. Last August, Catholics in the Free State responded to the threat of pogroms against Northern Catholics by demonstrating against and attacking British property. At this point, British troops intervened and prevented the slaughter of Northern Catholics in order to forestall violence to British investments.

Since then, moderate Unionist party strategy has largely consisted of confused improvisation with the general objective of maintaining the status quo. Major Chichester-Clark delivers tactical blows to either side in the vain hope of numbing both Catholic and Protestant militants into docility. Unfortunately for the professed "forces of reason," every concession to the civil rights movement or to the Orange Order — without which Unionist government could only preside over chaos — automatically becomes a provocation against the other side, and exacerbates the general tension. On July 25, for example, the Royal Ulster Constabulary arrested Bernadette Devlin en route to a Derry support rally following her conviction on rioting charges. These charges stemmed from her participation in the defense of the Bogside ghetto of Derry during the police riots of last August. Miss Devlin, the youngest member of the Westminster parliament, has for the past two years symbolized the civil rights movement. Her arrest at a police roadblock, effected despite a previous arrangement to surrender herself at a Derry police station, represented a clear political concession to the wrath of the Orange Order. Most of Miss Devlin's constituents regarded her six-month sentence as an obvious political attack, since she was only one among hundreds of defenders. The incident sparked the first serious confrontation with British troops since their arrival last August in the wake of religious violence. Their presence at that time probably saved Catholic ghettos from pogroms, and residents greeted the soldiers with tea and sandwiches in the streets. Now the troops are a despised army of occupation, hated in Catholic communities, and tolerated only out of spite by Protestants because Catholics are more harassed than they.

One week after the arrest comprehensive arms raids by British troops on the Falls Road district in Belfast were met with armed resistance by local militants and members of the Republican movement. The worst rioting in a year ensued. A

fair amount of obsolete small arms were recovered; the take was cited immediately by Orange leaders as incontrovertible proof of a Catholic nationalist plot to seize power by violence. Armed defense against the raids demonstrated by itself that no searches could effectively disarm determined militants. More violence was undoubtedly occasioned by the searches than was prevented by the seizures.

In order to set the balance right, the British Army also conducted searches, albeit less provocative ones (one hundred twenty complaints were received by authorities from Falls Road residents concerning harassment and brutality during searches), against the Shankill Road Protestant ghetto. As a further concession to Catholics, various Orange marches originally scheduled to proceed through Catholic districts were vetoed by the Unionist government as a certain source of trouble. These countermeasures were the minimum required to postpone the outbreak of civil war this July. How Unionism will attempt to deal with Orange marches planned for August is anyone's guess. As such, Chichester-Clark's fumbling toward a "moderate" posture has led consistently to moderate disaster.

In the last analysis, in order to prevent social upheaval, Catholics and Protestants must be convinced that Unionism can improve their material condition at least gradually. This apparent commonplace has been more carefully observed by the capitalist bureaucracy than by some erstwhile socialists. A Unionist White Paper states: "Shortage of jobs and shortage of houses exacerbate community tensions." The August 19th declaration, issued jointly by Stormont and the British government, acknowledges that an increase in the rate of economic development was prerequisite for social stability. The rate of deterioration in Northern Ireland's politics is, therefore, fixed ultimately by international economic conditions. A cursory examination of the economic circumstances under which the drama must unfold removes any doubt as to the fate of Unionism.

Britain's economy, of which the economy of the six counties must be regarded as an extension, could be best described as gangrenous. Britain's rate of economic growth plummeted this year to a paralytic 1.5%. Last year's favorable balance of trade figures will be decimated from 350 million surplus in 1969 to only 40 million surplus this year. This discrepancy is largely the product of losses due to the tightening American recession.

Britain's leading financial journal, *The Economist*, gauges the situation with characteristic sobriety: "The most worrying economic problem is the huge push that has been given to labour costs (original emphasis) in the last nine months. It has come at a time when the economy has been standing still and manufacturing investment actually declining," (June 26).

Certain political repercussions of Britain's economic deterioration would be amusing were they less forboding. These include proposals for anti-strike legislation in 1969 by Harold Wilson's Labour government. These coming to grief among the Labour trade-union base, were probably the best argument for workers to abstain from last June's elections and a primary cause of Labour's defeat. Under the American recession, ruling-class political economy is reduced to scrounging for every stray scrap of workers' income, according to the maxim that the first significant slippage will precipitate a monetary avalanche. Britain, under the wavering helm of a timid Tory government which is committed to an escalated austerity program, cannot be far from diving for pennies. To complement the identical Labour-Tory ironfisted trade-union policy, management and labour bureaucrats alike are giving the hard sell to a round of "productivity deals." These provide for speedups in return for insignificant wage increases, facilitate attrition of the labour force, and restrict rank-and-file influence on working conditions. British unemployment in June reached the highest level in thirty years that month. The July dock strike portends stiff obstacles to Tory strike-breaking.

In short, one may assume that Britain will presently be incapable of any economic rehabilitation of the six counties whatsoever, despite their relatively small population.

On the Ulster front, even the official view of things to come is crushingly pessimistic. Stormont's commissioned Matthew Report of this year admits that "substantial efforts will be needed merely to maintain until 1975 the existing level of manufacturing employment." The government's consultants offer as their sole concrete economic measure increasingly extravagant stipends to new industry to the extent of 60% grants for buildings and plant machinery. There are two outstanding flaws in this strategy. Present subsidies are so high, according to *The Economist*, that "those inhabitants of the United Kingdom who live in Britain are contributing an average of nearly two pounds a year each to sustain those who live in

Northern Ireland, who on average benefit to the tune of sixty pounds a year." Industry in Northern Ireland has received 252 million pounds derived from taxes on British workers, who are not only taxed to support unemployed fellow workers in the six counties, but to sustain profit levels as well. With an intensifying squeeze on British working class income, a further increase in subsidies would meet vigorous political resistance. The long-term result of government subsidies to date has been a rash of capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive industries which, in combining advanced technology (relative to Britain's neolithic factory system) with underpayment of labor, have pushed North Ireland's productivity index higher than Britain's while employment and consumption figures continue to lag; the consultants refute themselves by detailing the latter process.

In its single flirtation with *realpolitik*, the Matthew report strikes a familiar note: repression of trade unions plus productivity deals. According to Stormont's theoretical mercenaries, "the whole community and in particular the Trade Union movement will have to ensure that the promises made to the firms are kept." In any case, the trade union bureaucracy has, in the past, stampeded toward unconditional capitulation enthusiastically enough to cause the Unionist White Paper on the economy to applaud "the growing acceptance by the Trade Union movement itself of corporate responsibility for the disciplined exercise of the power of organised labour." Labor bureaucrats have already received a 25,000 pound grant to train industrial policemen to ease the acceptance of productivity deals. The essential material resources of any sedative concession fund to forestall further radicalization are unavailable.

There are only two choices. The first is extreme polarization between Catholic nationalists and Paisleyites, culminating in a civil war with, as a veteran of 1921 suggested to me, not two but a half dozen sides. The second alternative is a socialist movement which can proffer a real economic solution, unite the working class around an entirely different social policy, and overthrow Green and Orange Tories alike. Chichester-Clark's middle road is already bankrupt.

In this case it is folly to speculate on whether or not Irish unity will include socialism or not. Unity itself is possible only through a socialist victory.

Criticism of Sectarian Ideology

All workers in capitalist society rely on bourgeois institutions and class-in-itself labor organizations for their daily existence. In return

for subservience to the trade union bureaucracy (or in the case of Protestant workers, the Orange Order) which conducts no more than what is considered gentlemanly horse-trading with the boss, a worker is accorded certain "privileges."

In periods when capitalism is expanding, it is possible to distribute benefits to workers on a "liberal" basis, as in 1945 when the Labour government extended the welfare state to the six counties. Now, the inadequacy of British capitalism limits granting of such "privileges" as employment and decent housing to Protestants, who nevertheless get even less than British workers. The Unionist regime as the local representative of British imperialism finds it necessary to attempt to keep Catholics unorganized (i.e., without institutions to provide for them) and worse off than Protestants.

The key division within the working-class of any advanced capitalist society is that between organized and unorganized, employed and unemployed workers. When more than one national group has been absorbed into the industrial labor force, this conflict is reified into a national or religious question. Economic parochialism, the petty-interest group demands of one segment of the working class fought at the expense of another segment (a "bigger share of the pie"), is interpreted in terms of distinct national interest. The national question as such reflects bourgeois consciousness which the class movement must dispel.

Protestant and Catholic workers in the six counties both mystify their real economic needs into a parochial religious question. Both therefore seek to be a social majority, Catholics flying the tricolor at Easter, Protestants waving the Union Jack on July 12. Protestant and Catholic "nationalism" both express a class-in-itself outlook, a desire for a larger "share of the poverty." (The extent to which Protestants actually identify with the British throne, despite myriad Orange oaths, is extremely limited. I heard an audience of Orangemen on July 12 applaud a speaker affirming his allegiance to "The English — I mean the British — parliament"). The fact that British imperialism (and its Orange branch agents) have victimized Catholics somewhat more than Protestants in the six counties does not justify a "distinction between the nationalism of the oppressed and the nationalism of the oppressor" from socialists. Protestant workers are by no means the oppressor, any more than the Catholic workers, in desiring to be a social majority, are to be

construed as potential "oppressors" of Protestants. To support either Irish-Catholic or British-Protestant nationalism is to support the parochial strivings of one group of workers for advancement at the expense of other workers, a process inimical to the building of a socialist movement. Since in the present ideology of both Catholic and Protestant workers the category "minority" is equated with this narrow outlook, no amount of pandering to their present level of consciousness can further the class movement.

The Demand for Reunification

It is with these considerations that the demand for reunification of Ireland must be judged. Prior to 1886, when Britain deliberately destroyed the industrial potential of Ireland, looted its native peasantry, the call for a unified, independent Ireland was indubitably in the historic interest of the Irish oppressed classes. Protestants in fact, played a significant role in the northern Fenian (Irish unification) movement during the eighteen-sixties. The present Republican movement in the six counties is entirely devoid of Protestants. A demand for unification and national independence in the face of one form of British imperialism must not be mistaken for the same demand under fundamentally altered circumstances. A century ago, a united free Ireland meant liberation from plundering by British landowners. Today, unity means to both sections of the Northern working class Catholic supremacy in place of Protestant supremacy.

Any agitational demand is a call to action, a call based on specific social forces in motion. A "united workers' republic" as an agitational demand is meaningless when the political hegemony of the southern bourgeoisie is unchallenged. For workers, the call for unification means union with the political representatives of whatever social class holds power, i.e., Fianna Fail. Since the demand for a "workers' republic" represents no social movement in Ireland, its practical meaning inevitably is unity under the present bourgeois regime. As such, agitation for unity is an appeal to backward sentiments for Catholic unity among Catholic workers, and appears to Protestants to threaten their livelihood. Conditions in the thirty-two counties are also so unattractive as to further alienate Protestant workers.

At such a time as there is a powerful socialist movement in all of Ireland which represents ever-increasing numbers of both Protestant and Catholic workers, a Northern socialist can say, "We

call for unity with the Dublin workers." As a transitional demand, the call for unity only has relevance when Northern workers can identify with a Southern **working class movement** which seriously challenges the bourgeoisie for political hegemony. A socialist solution of the Irish question will certainly take the ultimate form of a united Irish workers' state, but in spite of the nationalist movement rather than because of it, and as a product rather than a precondition of the class movement.

In conference at the end of last year, Sinn Fein, the political stronghold of militant Republicanism whose military arm is the Irish Republican Army, split into an "Official" Republican movement and a "Provisional Council of the SRA." The confusion surrounding this division precludes any clear or final analysis of the fate of Republicanism at this stage. Various socialist organizations have attacked the Provisionals as a rightist tendency, charging them with cooperating with Messrs. Blaney and Haughey in order to obtain arms. The Provisionals have been accused as well of responsibility for the deaths of six Protestants during the recent Belfast riots. The flurry of polemics emanating from the Belfast incident has so obfuscated the issue as to make it impossible, in my opinion, to clarify what occurred. However, the most salient difference between Officials and Provisionals is the latter's conspicuous reliance on militarism. It is entirely conceivable that they would accept arms from Blaney.

Toward a Socialist Perspective

I spoke with Republicans from both camps who deemed their politics "socialist." The Provisionals, despairing over the inevitable failure of traditional Republicanism, are ready to abandon politics for guns. The disease of military-substitutism which plagues the Irish movement originates from intensification of class-in-itself strivings which can find no successful expression in politics, driving would-be socialists to the point of political insanity. One such "socialist" in Derry, long engaged in working-class politics, gestured from his window overlooking a British barracks and explained, "All we need in Derry is three 3-inch mortars!" This degeneration is a lawful product of the frustration of those who primarily define their political existence in terms of the struggle for a united Ireland. The official wing of Sinn Fein, although its politics remain terribly muddled, issued an exemplary non-sectarian statement before the Twelfth; most of their members are potential material for a socialist movement.

The first step for socialists in Northern Ireland is the formulation of concrete socialist policy on such key material questions as employment, housing, etc., and hard, persistent agitation around programs which present a workers' alternative to capitalist government. The organizational-conservatism which ties Protestants to bourgeois-sectarian institutions can be superseded only when workers are convinced that these old institutions are bankrupt and that only socialist formations can win benefits for them. This is possible only through attacking the material failures of sectarian ideology, which is founded on workers' conviction that sectarian institutions and policy can meet their needs. During a period of concentrated political attack on all sections of the working class, clearly no fragmented effort on the part of small groups of workers can win even the most minimal concessions. An objective basis thus exists for class-wide (i.e., socialist) politics to compete with sectarianism among workers. However, sectarianism can only be fought successfully at the level where workers' consciousness registers its failure — i.e., materially — and not by the demand for national unity, which the ideological apparatus of the majority of Northern workers must instantaneously register as a threat. Granted that such an approach will have no immediate success in empirically appreciable terms, if Irish workers are not to starve to death willingly, the breakthrough must come.

It is true that at first Catholics will respond more readily than Protestants to socialist organizing. This is plainly not because Catholics have "suffered more." Marxism demolished the mechanistic notion that levels of misery and politicization correlated a priori. Catholics, however, are less susceptible to ideological conservatism with regard to class-in-itself forms. For most Catholic workers and related layers, trade unions are either useless or nonexistent, and there is no Orange patronage machine to obtain employment for them. Thus Catholics will be quicker to realize the need for class-wide alliances. Such a situation allows two lines of strategy. First, socialist organizations must compete for hegemony with left-Republicanism among Catholic workers. A united front with socialist elements in Sinn Fein is indispensable not only to demonstrate the superiority of clear socialist politics before Catholic workers, but to co-opt the Republican working-class base and large numbers of the rank-and-file.

Second and most immediately important is the creation of a socialist organization capable of

coordinating agitation in both the six and the twenty-six counties. Protestant workers must be convinced in practice, not merely in rhetoric, that socialist demands are aimed at Green Tories as well as Orange. Specific programs will obviously be different in the heavily trade-unionized South and the divided and relatively unorganized North. The crucial point is to begin parallel organizing around material issues in the six counties and the Free State as the first step toward workers' unity. This movement would displace both British-imposed (i.e., pre-1921) unity and Irish "national" unity in favor of socialist government. At a certain stage, the call for unity will represent two powerful workers' movements in Ireland whose fusion is essential for defeating British imperialism and nationalist collaboration in either the six or the twenty-six counties. Then the demand for a 32-county Ireland will become an advanced point of revolutionary transitional program, corresponding to a period approaching the creation of dual power.

The validity of this approach is established, in my opinion, by the results of Eamonn McCann's election campaign last June in Derry. McCann, a Labour candidate denounced by the party bureaucracy, garnered 7500 votes. At least 1,000 of these were Protestant. His program consisted in straight-forward class-wide material demands with inherent socialist political content. In a period of mass motion in precisely the wrong direction, McCann's total — won against both a Unionist and a Catholic unity candidate — represents the only victory for socialism in Northern Ireland in recent years.

The continuance of a revolutionary workers' government following a seizure of power for more than a very few years is, of course, dependent upon support from Britain and the rest of Europe. Events in Ireland will resolve themselves either into apocalypse or socialist revolution within a relatively brief period. The present amount of radicalization is negligibly short of critical mass. A revolution in Ireland will precede any revolutionary attempt in England, Wales or Scotland, since the English, Welsh and Scottish labor movement is only starting to shake loose from the confinement of social-democratic trade unionism. The question of British support to an Irish workers' state will undoubtedly be catalytic. Revolution in Ireland would advance the consciousness of all British workers — especially those millions of Irish immigrants — immeasurably, increasing the possibility of socialist revolution throughout Britain.

Prospects for War and Revolution in the Middle East

By U. PARPART

The present situation in the Middle East contains two contradictory tendencies: toward "limited war" and toward "revolution." To understand the situation as a whole, it is necessary to understand the contradictions inherent in each tendency and to give a detailed analysis of the social forces in the area as well as of the "external" forces attempting to influence them.

"Limited War"

In view of the equilibrium in the balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war had to be limited if a direct confrontation (and mutual annihilation) of the two major powers was to be avoided. Consequently, two resolutions delineating the boundaries of the conflict were worked out in the U.N. Security Council: (1) The cease fire resolution of June 9, 1967, representing the maximum point of the conflict, a point beyond which the U.S.S.R. would not tolerate further Israeli expansion, and (2) the resolution of November 22, 1967, representing the minimum point of the conflict, a point at which the U.S. regards the "legitimate" interests of Israel's security as satisfied.

Since violation of either limit could draw the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. directly into the conflict, any projected "solution" has to respect the two boundary points, and the limited war situation has to be stabilized within the defined limits. Thus, the Arab and the Israeli positions are upheld by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. respectively and any arms escalation by either side is met by one or the other of the two big powers.

To sum up: The limited war situation must be

contained in its horizontal level (defined by the cease fire lines and the U.N. resolutions) and it must be stabilized in its vertical level (balance of military escalation), always respecting that no power in the area should escalate militarily beyond the level of conventional warfare.^{1.)}

The Position of the United States

The United States' interest in the Middle East is long-standing and was perhaps most succinctly summed by Senator Javits in a recent CBS interview on *Face the Nation*: "To wit," he said, "can you be dovish in respect to Vietnam and can you be hawkish in respect to the Middle East, and my answer is decidedly yes. And the reasons are very numerous, but I will give only two, just to save time. One reason is that the strategic situation is completely different. The United States' fundamental national interest, as defined by the President, as defined by NATO, because we're charged with coming to the rescue of the NATO countries, as defined by our economic and commercial interest with three continents at stake - Europe, Africa, and Asia the crossroads of which is the Middle East - our strategic interest is heavily and deeply involved in the Middle East. That is unlike South East Asia, where the best that Lyndon Johnson could do is to say we're trying to establish the principle of self-determination for small peoples, and will not allow them to be subject - swallowed up by aggression by a communist-backed state.

"Secondly...in the Middle East you've got the whole energy resources of Europe -- 80% of Europe's oil comes from the Middle East and 90% of that of Japan. So the economic life of the world is at stake, which the Soviet Union...could hold

hostage and succeed in a way (it) never dreamed of, in terms of holding the world for ransom. Now we and the rest of the world just can't allow that to happen."

What Senator Javits does not mention is that all major U.S. oil corporations have made large capital investments in the Middle East. The huge profits derived from these investments play a significant role for the stability of the American economy and must be protected at all costs. Just as important to the U.S. economy is the fact that all major European currencies are extremely sensitive to fluctuations in the price of crude oil. Any significant increase in the oil price could force a devaluation of these currencies, followed upon its heels by a general monetary crisis leading to a new world wide depression.

While the U.S. interest in the Middle East can thus hardly be a puzzle to anyone, her position in the area is nonetheless riddled by contradictions. The Israeli victory in the 1967 war considerably strengthened the U.S. position in the region and eliminated any immediate threat to her interests from the Arab states. However, as a result of their defeat, the Arab states, especially Egypt and Syria, became increasingly dependent upon the U.S.S.R. This factor enabled the Soviet Union to emerge with a strong position in the Arab world — a situation that the United States can hardly regard as favorable.

The dilemma then is the following: If the U.S. strongly supports the Israeli position at the cease fire lines, it solidifies its strong position vis a vis the Arab states while at the same time weakening them and hence driving them further into the arms of the U.S.S.R. If, on the other hand, the U.S. lends its support to the Arab states by pushing for implementation of the November 22, U.N. resolution (or limiting its support to Israel), this would decrease the dependency of these states upon the U.S.S.R., neutralizing at least part of the latter's influence in the region. However, in the absence of any normal relations between the U.S. and the Arab states, neutralization of the Soviet position does not by itself eliminate the threat to U.S. interests. Normalization of U.S.-Arab relations appears at present highly unlikely. It should be remembered that the 1967 war was a direct result of the antagonism between the U.S. and the "progressive" Arab regimes and resulted in the strong American support for Israel.

As the Soviet Union consolidates its new

position, U.S. influence in the Arab world is systematically eroding, leaving it with no choice other than more and more firmly standing behind Israel. Total commitment to Israel and stabilization of the limited war situation has become the only safeguard for the U.S. against its complete eviction from the area.

The Position of the Soviet Union

Russia's interest in the Middle East, her attempts to gain a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, not only antedate the 1967 war but go back until well before the revolution of 1917. In fact, her whole present posture in the area, especially her support for the regimes in Egypt and Syria rather than for the Palestine Resistance Movement, is more readily explained in terms of categories applicable to Imperial Russia than by attempting to make sense out of her official anti-imperialist rhetoric.

After the revolutionary process in Russia became arrested in the 1920's, the world outlook of the Soviet Union reverted to the outlook characteristic of the large nation state: maintenance of national independence coupled with an offensive strategy toward the attainment of world hegemony.

The economic and military significance of the Middle East to the Soviet Union in such a strategy is obvious. Quite frequently, however, it is interpreted too narrowly and only in terms of the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States. With her influence in East Asia receding and Chinese influence in East Africa gaining momentum, the Soviet Union's interests in the Third World as a whole are at stake. A strong presence in the Middle East, furthermore, assures the U.S.S.R. of a favorable position with regard to Western Europe and of a strong voice in areas where Western European and Russian interests directly overlap, e.g. Algeria and the former French colonies in Northwest and West Africa.

Russia's support for the Arab states did not actually develop until about 1955. In 1948, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. jointly voted in the U.N. for the establishment of the state of Israel. It might be conjectured, however, that the Soviet Union saw the formation of the Israeli state as an important step toward the complete split between the Arab countries and the imperialist powers in the area.

In 1955, the U.S.S.R. started a sizeable economic and military aid program and gained an initial foothold in the Arab world. In 1967, she immediately capitalized on the defeat of Egypt and Syria and rapidly moved to entrench her newly won position.

This position, however, is not without internal contradictions. When the Arab states went down to defeat in the June war, the Soviet Union rallied to their support by helping to bring the war to an end at the present cease fire lines and by attempting to reduce the impact of defeat to a quasi-recognition of Israel rather than permanent loss of territory and population (cf. U.N. Security Council resolution).

Implementation of the U.N. resolution became the political basis for the position of the U.S.S.R. in the area - hence, her continued support to the defeated Arab states. To solidify her position in the area, on the other hand, the Soviet Union must further increase the dependency of the Arab states upon her aid. This can only be accomplished if their position is kept relatively weak. Hence, the Soviet Union's support to the Arab states must remain limited: strong enough to withstand Israeli pressure, but not strong enough to defeat her. Much as in the case of the United States, the Soviet position in the Middle East crucially depends upon maintenance of the status quo and stabilization of the limited war situation.

The Position of Israel

The role of Israel in the Middle East is that of a colonial settler state, in many respects comparable to the situation of Rhodesia and South Africa, and of Algeria before she gained her political independence. Establishment of the Israeli state was achieved at the expense of displacement of the majority of the indigenous Arab people. Given the premises upon which the founding of Israel is based, she must uphold the conflict generated by this displacement until the native Palestinian Arabs give up any claim to the territory now occupied by the Israeli state. To make this more precise, the predominant political tendency among the Jewish settlers was and is defined by the Zionist movement whose goals are totally incompatible with social, political and cultural integration of Jews and Arabs. To quote from Abba Eban's *Voice of Israel*: "What we aspire to is not the relationship which exists between Lebanon and Syria...(but) to the relationship between the United States and the

Latin American continent...of economic interaction, but across a frankly confessed gulf of historic, cultural, and linguistic differences...Integration is something to be avoided...(there is the danger lest the (Oriental immigrants) force Israel to equalize its cultural level with that of the neighboring world...(We) should infuse them with an Occidental spirit, rather than allow them to draw us into an unnatural Orientalism." (3.)

The strong identification of Israeli interests with the interests and ideas of the Zionist movement (especially the idea of unlimited Jewish immigration into Israel) in the past proved to be a vital and dynamic factor in Israel's existence. At the same time, however, it made cooperation and co-development of Jews and Arabs virtually impossible. As a consequence, the mere existence of Israel generated a situation of continuous struggle from which counter forces equal, if not superior, to Israel are presently emerging.

Ironically, every Israeli military victory has thus made her general position in the area more precarious and brought her closer to eventual defeat. Larger and larger portions of her total social product have to be allocated for military expenditures, driving her economy toward near collapse. At this point a situation has been created where Israel's very existence increasingly depends upon large scale outside economic and military aid, forcing her to completely subordinate her national interests and her policies to the interests of her major ally, the United States.

Dependence on the U.S., however, entails Israeli acceptance of her policies: limitation of the Middle East conflict, possibly far short of Israeli goals, i.e. far short of a point where the Arab states have been forced into unqualified acceptance of the Israeli Zionist settler state.

Thus the Israeli position is as contradictory as that of her major ally: essentially interested in maintenance of an unlimited conflict until her demands are met, she must nevertheless submit to the dictates of the limited war situation.

The Position of the Arab States

It follows from the above analysis that to Israel the cease fire lines of 1967, represent a minimum position. Optimally, she would attempt to establish

complete hegemony in the area, enabling her to deal with the Arab nations from a position of strength and "directly negotiating" with them (i.e., imposing upon them) a permanent peace settlement.

To the defeated Arab states, on the other hand, the cease fire lines, i.e. the Israeli minimum position, are an unacceptable maximum that would result in the loss of significant amounts of territory and population. The most they can agree to without severe internal repercussions are the terms defined by the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967. In the space of three years since the passage of that resolution, the Arab states have nonetheless made no progress on their minimum objective, the "elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression." Instead they have grown increasingly dependent upon the Soviet Union just to defend their present position at the 1967 cease fire lines.

To gain an understanding of why the "progressive" Arab regimes have been unable to mobilize the huge human and natural resources under their control for the achievement of even their minimum goals, a brief analysis of the social and political development of the countries under the rule of these regimes is required.

The situation of Egypt can serve as an example. The bourgeois revolution of 1919 established a constitutional monarchy in Egypt, and by 1923, the country had achieved at least partial political independence from Great Britain. Under the leadership of Wafd, the party of the nationalist (agrarian) wing of the bourgeoisie, the period between the two world wars was characterized by significant economic growth and major reforms in the fields of education. These developments, coupled with the enlargement of the Egyptian armed forces from 10,000 to 50,000 men (agreement between Egypt and England in 1936 to counteract Mussolini), led to the rapid growth of the petty bourgeoisie, the class that would take power in 1952.

The 1952 revolution that ousted King Farouk and achieved complete national independence for Egypt was led by those same army officers who had been recruited from the petty bourgeoisie in 1936. The revolution had a strong popular base in the "United National Front," an alliance of workers, students, left elements in the Wafd, and the Communist Party.

While Nasser between 1952 and 1954 moved quickly to crush the political power of the National Front and consolidate his rule, the new ruling elite actively promoted the social transformation of the country and retained the support of a large minority of the population. In 1956, most of the land and the whole financial and industrial sector were still in the hands of the bourgeoisie or foreign owned.

After the 1956 war Nasser immediately "Egyptianized" all foreign banks and corporations and by the end of 1961 all financial institutions and all of industry had been nationalized. The new petty bourgeois ruling class was now in complete control of the country's resources and institutions and further social transformation was no longer in its interest.

Since then, revolutionary rhetoric and a militant posture toward the outside have increasingly become a substitute for domestic reforms. The development of the human and economic potential of the country that would have been necessary for a strong independent Egyptian stand against Israel was not possible under the rule of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie.

After 1961, and especially after the disastrous defeat of 1967, the Nasser regime, which until then had indeed played a relatively progressive role in Egypt, actively started to enlist foreign military and economic aid to withstand Israeli pressure, to satisfy the most urgent material needs of the Egyptian people, and to preserve its own rule.⁴ Apart from slight modifications, the historical developments in Iraq and Syria (but also in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Sudan) followed a similar pattern. Thus, the above study of the Egyptian position provides an accurate picture of the general contradictions inherent in the positions of all the defeated Arab States.

The Limited War Situation: Conclusion

The analysis of the Middle East situation provided so far is admittedly incomplete. It ignores almost entirely the emergence of the Palestine Resistance Movement as a strong and politically independent force in the area. Since it is the thesis of this study that a correct estimate of the developments in the Middle East depends upon understanding the interaction between the limited war situation and the revolutionary situation created by the Palestine guerillas, an analysis of the

growth and the political tendencies in the Palestine liberation movement will now be given. From the preceding it should be clear that while neither Israel nor the Arab states regard the status quo in the area as desirable, their dependence on the United States and the Soviet Union forces them to support the stabilization of the limited war situation.

Revolution

Displaced by the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, the large majority of Palestinians for the past twenty years lived under the most miserable conditions in refugee camps in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip, dependent for their existence upon the Arab States and international charity organizations. Though their existence was used effectively by the Arab States for purposes of anti-Israeli propaganda, the political posture of the Palestinians themselves was generally one of apathy and passivity, the hope that their rights would some day be restored by some agency outside their own activity and will.

Either the United Nations or the Arab States, they believed, would one day bring about the liberation of Palestine and enable them to return to their homes and lands. Whatever hopes of this kind existed were completely shattered by the Arab defeat of 1967 and by the manifest inability of the United Nations to find and enforce a lasting solution to the area's problems. The complete and overwhelming Israeli victory of 1967 created both the objective and the subjective conditions for the emergence of a massive, popularly based Palestine resistance movement.

Fateh, the Palestinian Movement for National Liberation, a guerrilla organization established in 1965, became the first catalyzing element for the development of the mass movement. Arming itself primarily with the weapons left behind in the Sinai desert by the defeated Egyptian army, this group, during the first few months after the June war carried out a number of desperate forays into the Israeli occupied territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The first significant event and turning point that transformed Fateh from a small band of guerrilla fighters into an organization with widespread popular support was the battle of Karameh in March 1968. The following is a quote from Hisham Sharabi's article *The Palestinian*

Revolutionary Struggle: "What happened in Karameh was the first military resistance operation that ended with heavy casualties for the Israelis who retreated after inflicting considerable damage and after taking some prisoners from among the guerrilla fighters. But for the first time in a generation of confrontation between Arabs and Israelis, the Arabs fought back successfully. And those who fought back were a handful of irregulars who had had little formal training and who had been hunted, not only by Israel — but by the various governments of the Arab countries. This fired the imagination of the Arab people throughout the Arab world and made young men — Palestinians as well as other Arabs — come in the hundreds to join the new resistance movements."(5)

Fateh's ability to move quickly after Karameh from the strictly military sphere to the level of a political organization enabled it to establish itself within a few weeks as the hegemonic guerilla group. Under the leadership of its spokesman, Yasir Arafat, it rapidly evolved into a state within the state of Jordan (with its own army, schools, hospitals, etc.) and gained control over the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) - the official representative of the Palestinian people, founded in 1964 - and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA).

When in June 1969 - a year after Karmeh and a few months before the attempt of the Lebanese army to destroy the guerilla movement in Lebanon - the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, declared: "It is really naive to assume that a few thousand, or 10,000, as they claim, guerillas, almost all of them outside the territory we control, could achieve something 400,000 Arabs could not."(6) It had already become clear that almost the exact opposite was true.

While the guerrillas then (and perhaps even now) did not pose a serious military threat to Israel, they had put together armed forces vastly superior in **potential** to the defeated Arab armies of 1967, and Fateh had become a major political force in the Middle East. At the threshold of large scale popular involvement and in the process of transformation from a guerrilla movement into a popular revolutionary movement, the Palestine resistance was threatening the very structure of the prevailing status quo in the region and appeared capable of completely altering the character of the Middle East confrontation.

Fateh's goals and strategy are explained by Yasir Arafat as follows: "Our goal is the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle which, we believe, is the only means to our goal - through action and not words... Zionist colonial aggression and the creation of the Israeli state have deprived us of our right to live as a free people."

"Our aim is to bring an end to the concept of a Jewish Zionist state, a racist expansionist state. Our aim is to destroy this state, this concept - but not its people. We want a democratic Palestinian state. We will not force anyone out who is willing to live under the banner of this state as a loyal Palestinian. It does not matter whether he is Christian, Moslem, or Jew." (7.)

Politically, Fateh stands for the formation of a broad national front and insist on the futility of ideological commitment at a stage of development "when Palestinians are still fighting to liberate their homeland: (Ideological Neutrality) is needed to guarantee for our movement the support of all sincere and devoted elements, regardless of their social or ideological orientations.

"The bloody battle with Zionist occupation is one of survival and not over a social ideology, it is a struggle of life and death, of being or not being. In such a struggle ideological differences ought to disappear and the people ought to join together in a broad revolutionary front to dismantle the political, social and economic structure of the oppressor state, and uproot Zionism from our noble soil.

"Cooperation and unity within the revolution is the concrete and living expression of our ideology. The spread of revolutionary resistance in our occupied lands is the cure of all the (social) ills of our people and the solution of all its (political) problems." (8.)

In its focus on self-determination and national liberation, its action orientation (armed struggle), and its insistence on ideological neutrality (i.e. unwillingness to address itself to the material needs of the Palestinians), Fateh, in the period of its most rapid growth between 1967 and 1969, reflected sociologically and politically undifferentiated outlook of a developing mass movement.

While it had assumed the essentially parochialist

form of a movement for national liberation nonetheless from the outset, the resistance contained the dual potential of becoming the political focus for the needs and aspirations of the masses of Arab workers and peasants, capable of thoroughly revolutionizing the whole Arab world or of being defused and side-tracked into pushing a self-limiting, ultimately futile struggle for a Palestinian nation state - a state which would coexist with Israel and would be ruled by the same type of petty-bourgeois nationalist regime as is characteristic of the surrounding Arab states.

The nationalist tendency finds its strongest expression in the positions taken by Fateh's "pragmatic" political leaders. The emergence of a strong revolutionary tendency in the resistance movement is a consequence both of the internal logic of the guerrilla position and of the mass strike developments in Lebanon and Jordan in 1969, which led to the influx of large numbers of recruits from the lower classes into the guerrilla ranks. The guerrilla position and the events of 1969 and early 1970 will now be described in greater detail.

The Position of the Palestine Guerrillas

To the guerrillas neither the Israeli minimum position, the 1967 cease fire lines, nor the maximum position of the defeated Arab states, defined by the U.N. resolution, are acceptable. Both, in differing degrees, imply the denial of an independent existence for the Palestinian people and neither addresses itself to their material needs. Consequently, it was the guerrillas' first task to establish themselves and the Palestinian people as an active, independent political entity strong enough to be reckoned with in any future peace negotiations. The most they could hope to achieve, however, in terms of a "Palestinian national liberation struggle," that is to say on the basis of their own resources and with the limited support of the Arab states, was physical control over those parts of the former British mandate of Palestine that are now overwhelmingly populated by Arabs. Such an "achievement" would fall short of their general objective, the establishment of a Free Democratic Palestine.

Pursuit of this larger objective by necessity brings the resistance movement in conflict with the Zionist settler state of Israel, occupying a significant part of Palestinian territory, and by extension, with the imperial interests of the

United States. To take on forces of such magnitude, Palestinian resources are definitely inadequate. To achieve any measure of success requires the total mobilization all the human and physical resources in the Arab world. Such mobilization, as explained above, presupposes radical social transformation in the Arab countries. To act upon its general objective, the guerrilla movement thus must self-consciously adopt the role of a vanguard for an Arab mass revolution. This in turn brings it into open conflict with the interests of the present Arab regimes and the Soviet Union.

The contradiction between the maximum position the guerillas could attain on the basis of their own strength and their maximum objective, the creation of a free, democratic Palestine, thus is a significant factor accounting for the dual nature and potential of their struggle. As a struggle for self-determination for the Palestinian people it remains limited, must be seen as a late continuation of the national liberation struggles of the Arab petty-bourgeoisie that started in 1948, and will become arrested at the same level. Because of the general political situation in the area and if it brings into focus the fundamental social and economic problems in the Middle East, it can at the same time become the catalyst for mass revolution as the next stage in the social transformation of the Arab world.

1969: Mass Strike Developments in Jordan

Fateh's "pragmatic" conception of the development of the Palestine resistance movement was challenged from the outset by the numerically much smaller Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Specifically, the P.F.L.P. criticized Fateh's almost exclusive reliance upon military operations against Israel and its opposition to ideological commitment. Fateh had rejected a programmatic approach to social and political change in the area for fear that such a program might alienate certain middle class elements whose political and financial backing it regarded as essential to the development of the movement.

The P.F.L.P.'s conception of the Palestine liberation struggle is expressed in its political program of February, 1969. There the Front is described as an organization committed to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and calls for the conversion of the guerrilla war against Israel into a people's war which would engulf all of Arab

society and, under the leadership of the revolutionary party "armed with correct thought," would bring the revolution to every corner of the Arab world. It further declares that the liberation struggle must be seen as a struggle against "world Zionism," "imperialism," and "Arab reaction," and, to be successful, must be based on the masses of peasants, urban workers and refugees rather than the middle class, the petty bourgeoisie and the intellectuals - elements strongly represented in Fateh.

Combining "a tough Maoist line" with a series of spectacular operations (plane hijackings, urban sabotage, bombings in foreign countries), the Popular Front after 1968 rapidly gained in prestige, influence and numbers of supporters and followers. At the same time, however, with its activities and tactical approach ("special" operations and the organization of small cells of revolutionary cadres) proved utterly incapable of bringing about its avowed goal, the transformation of the guerrilla war (understood as a series of commando actions) into the qualitatively different form of the "people's war."

To effect such a transformation, guerilla actions must be placed into the context of the mass strike process, as the organic expression of the needs of the mass movement at a specific stage of its development. They must be comprehended by the mass forces as a necessary step toward the achievement of their goals rather than being isolated acts of individual heroism, designed to "electrify the masses" and capture their imagination.

The Front's failure to develop a proper understanding of its relation to the mass movement is paralleled by its failure to develop a comprehensive program designed to deal with the overwhelming material problems of the Palestinian peasant, worker and refugee population. The fact that the P.F.L.P., despite its "Marxist-Leninist" posture, has not essentially advanced beyond the position of Fateh, is further evidenced by its failure to clearly repudiate Arab nationalist and anti-Jewish tendencies in its ranks.

It is specifically over this last question that a small group of P.F.L.P. members left the organization in February of 1969, and jointly with leftist elements in Fateh formed a new group, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. From the outset the P.D.F. rejected "the Palestine and Arab chauvinist solutions prevailing

before and after June, 1967 calling for 'butchering the Jews and throwing them into the sea'. . . It counterposed a joint struggle with Israel's disaffected classes, "for a popular democratic solution to both the Palestinian and Israeli problems based on a) the overthrow of the Zionist structure represented by the state institutions (army, administration and police) and all the Zionist chauvinist political and trade union institutions; b) the establishment of a popular democratic Palestinian state where Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights without discrimination and where all forms of national and class oppression shall be abolished; c) granting both Arab and Jew the right to develop their own national cultures."

Accordingly, immediately after its formation the P.D.F. moved to establish contact with various leftist Israeli organizations. Admittedly, these initial moves were primarily made in an attempt to combat the strong nationalist tendencies in the Palestinian movement. From a socialist perspective they must nonetheless be seen as of the same general significance as the Black Panthers' early repudiation of the "cultural nationalist" tendencies in the black liberation movement in the United States.

The P.D.F.'s major accomplishment in the period of 1969 and early 1970, however, was its initiation of political strike actions in a large number of Jordanian cities. It was precisely these strike actions that achieved the qualitative transformation of the guerilla movement into a movement with massive popular support in all of Jordan which the P.F.L.P. had originally called for but failed to bring about.

The P.D.F.'s strategy was relatively simple and based upon a rough comparison of the situation in Jordan with pre-1905 conditions in Russia. As in Russia at that time, strikes of any kind are illegal in Jordan and there exists no strongly developed trade union movement. Thus any strike action for simple economic gains, be that in the form of a strike for better working conditions, higher wages, etc., would immediately be met by the repressive apparatus of the Hussein regime and therefore take on a political character.

The P.D.F. exploited this situation to the fullest. Once a strike action had been initiated in an area where they had relative political and military hegemony, P.D.F. cadre would protect the strike against government intervention by force of arms.

After the successful conclusion of a number of such strike and strike support actions, the P.D.F.'s tactics were picked up, at first reluctantly and then systematically, by Fateh and the P.F.L.P., and strike waves hit Jordan throughout 1969 and early 1970.

On the basis of these mass strike developments, large numbers of workers and city employees, both Palestinians and non-Palestinians, came to realize that they had a direct stake in the success of the liberation movement and understood the need for arming themselves. They formed the people's militias which in September 1970, saved the guerillas from extinction.

By the summer of 1970, a situation of dual power had thus been created in Jordan, with the majority of the people solidly in support of the resistance movement. A desperate attempt of the Hussein regime and the Royal Jordanian Army to isolate and eliminate the P.D.F. and its supporters failed miserably and only had the effect of drawing Fateh forcefully into the direction of the left groups. Within a year since the formation of the P.D.F. the resistance movement had definitely taken on the character of a mass revolutionary movement which threatened to spill over into the surrounding Arab countries. This set the stage for the frantic international diplomatic activities in the early summer, which resulted in the Rogers peace proposals and the adoption of the Rogers plan by Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Revolutionary Situation: Conclusion

Acceptance of the Rogers plan by "all concerned" should be seen first and foremost as a response to the emergence of a revolutionary movement in Jordan which no longer confines itself to guerrilla actions against Israel and the occupied territories, but threatens to fundamentally upset the status quo in the area. The rapid growth of the Palestine resistance movement transformed the latent coincidence of the global schemes of the United States and the Soviet Union and of the interests of Zionism and Arab nationalism into open collusion. Conclusion of a cease-fire agreement between Egypt and Israel became imperative to the end that all powers in the area could thus attend to the most urgent task, of liquidating a movement which not only threatened the existence of the Israeli state and the continued

rule of Nasser and Hussein but appeared destined to grow into a movement that would expel both the United States and the Soviet Union from the region. The Arab-Israeli conflict had been transformed into a conflict between a revolutionary movement and the forces of the status quo; clearly, nobody had any trouble choosing sides.

The Events of September 1970

The events immediately preceding the outbreak of the Jordanian civil war as well as the war itself must be evaluated in the context of the real meaning of the Rogers peace plan as an attempt to defuse the revolutionary situation in Jordan and to liquidate the leftist elements in the resistance movement.

Moscow and Cairo agreed to a cease-fire with Israel precisely at a point when the Resistance had lost all value to them as a bargaining point against Israel and was in fact developing into a threat to their own position. Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers plan at the same time gave Hussein the occasion to proceed against the Resistance on a broad front — an opportunity for which he had been waiting for three years. Although, subsequent to Cairo's and Amman's acceptance of the American proposals, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait announced discontinuation of their financial and military support for the Palestinian movement, official Arab support to the Jordanian regime continued without interruption and the Jordanian army prepared vigorously for a military showdown with the guerilla forces.

Nasser, basically, sought to avoid being identified with the liquidation of the Resistance, since he foresaw a way of defusing the movement without hurting his popular image: the formation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hussein could nonetheless be confident that a unilateral move against the guerillas would not encounter any serious opposition from either Egypt or the Soviet Union, or for that matter from even Iraq and Syria who had stated their opposition to the Rogers plan.⁽¹²⁾ On September 19, the New York Times reported that: "given a showdown, Moscow is assumed to prefer to see the Jordanians emerge victorious, partly because some Palestinian leaders look so closely attuned to the Chinese, but mainly because of Jordans willingness to follow the leads of Cairo and Moscow."

With possible opposition by Moscow or the "progressive" Arab regimes effectively neutralized, knowing that he could count on both American and Israeli (!) intervention to support him should his regime be threatened with collapse, King Hussein in early September was ready to make his move. (13) The establishment of a military government in Jordan under the Bedouin Habid Majali was the final step in this preparatory phase.

Most of these developments were overshadowed by the Popular Front's spectacular hijackings of three jets from western European airports to a desert airstrip in Jordan. While it may be assumed that the P.F.L.P. carried out this operation in an attempt to sabotage the Rogers plan, it only obscured the essential tasks of the Palestinian movement and propelled Jordan into civil war a few weeks earlier than could have been anticipated. As a P.D.F. member put it: "The confrontation between Hussein and the guerilla forces and the unmasking of the true nature of the 'progressive' Arab regimes was inevitable. The Front's hijackings were another example of those acts of individual heroism that in the past our people have been so fond of. At least they (the P.F.L.P. commandos) should have separated the jet passengers into capitalists and workers rather than Jews and non-Jews or men and women." Hussein's military plan was to deal a quick and decisive blow to the resistance movement, especially in Amman, with the aim of wiping out its leadership and preventing it from developing any large scale popular political support.

The plan failed miserably. After two days of fighting, the 48 hours he had predicted would suffice to liquidate the guerrillas, he found that he was not just dealing with the regular guerilla forces but, in the form of the people's militia, with the majority of the population, willing and able to resist the onslaught of his army. While Hussein's own political base had shrunk to the size of his mercenary army, and his own chauffeur and cook turned out to be members of the Resistance,⁽¹⁴⁾ the guerrillas moved quickly and effectively to solidify their political support throughout the country. They established a liberated zone in the North of Jordan and, under the leadership of the P.D.F., initiated Soviet forms of government of democratically elected local and city-wide revolutionary "people's committees" in Irbid and other northern cities.⁽¹⁵⁾

With the situation of dual power an undeniable

reality, the Resistance now had to squarely face the question of state power. But Hussein held on to it. Being in control of little more than his own palace, he sent out frantic calls for help to the United States — the Sixth Fleet, Marines and paratroopers were standing ready to intervene — and ordered his heavy artillery to fire point blank into refugee camps. At the expense of the bloody massacre of more than 10,000 people, most of them innocent civilians, and more than 10,000 injured and 100,000 homeless, Hussein managed to reestablish “law and order,” saving his skin and that of his ruling “millionaire military elite,” but he emerged as easily the most hated figure in the Arab world.

The significance of the Jordanian Civil War for future developments in the Middle East is obvious. It clearly revealed the reactionary nature not only of the Hussein regime but of all the “progressive” Arab regimes in the area. Having boasted at a mass rally in Damascus that they would “spare no blood to help the Palestinian Revolution,” the Syrian rulers, after a few encounters of their troops with the Jordanian army, withdrew their forces, and Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan never intervened at all. Even at the height of the butchery in Amman, Egypt declared that the Palestinian organizations must be differentiated into “honest” and “dishonest” ones, in fact trying to split the resistance movement and making plausible the selective liquidation of the Marxist groups. The completely bankrupt policies of the miserable Arab “socialist” regimes reached their more-than-symbolic finale in Nasser’s death.

Latest Events: Conclusion

The tasks before the self-consciously socialist elements in the Palestine resistance movement were made utterly clear by the outcome of the civil war and subsequent developments. It appears that even at the peak of the movement’s political and military power during the civil war the petty bourgeois nationalist leadership of Fateh vacillated between seeing the need for seizure of state power and following a policy of coexistence with Hussein. The pressure for some form of coexistence arrangement between the guerilla movement, King Hussein and the Arab nationalist regimes bent on “holy war” with Israel will increase in the near future.

Arafat has already clearly indicated that he

wants the resistance movement to get back to its “essential task of dealing with Israel and the forces of Zionism” and has stated his opposition to the “wild schemes” of other forces in the movement. Such moves raise the question of the very survival of the Resistance as an independent political entity and play directly into the hands of all those who are intent on defusing the revolutionary potential of the Resistance by vociferously arguing for the formation now of a Palestinian state on the Westbank.

The socialist groups in the liberation movement must clearly understand that such a state would be established at the expense of their ultimate liquidation. They must counteract such schemes by again raising the overthrow of the reactionary Arab rulers and the seizure of state power as the central question for the movement at this time. At the same time they must move rapidly to protect and solidify the gains of the revolution in North Jordan.

As already indicated, Arafat is presently engaged in reconverting the revolutionary movement into a guerilla movement directed solely against Israel. Simultaneously, Egypt, Libya, the Sudan and, most recently, Syria, are involved in the large scale diversionary maneuver of establishing yet another United Arab Republic, attempting to redirect the attention of the Arab masses toward the empty glory of pan-Arab nationalism and away from the possibility of revolutionary change.

These schemes, if successful, pose a clear threat to the further development of a mass political movement that can address itself to the material needs of the Arab people. They must be exposed as a fraud and counterposed to a clear strategy for the only possible solution to the massive social and economic problems of the area: the expropriation all U.S. and European — owned capital and resources in the Middle East providing the basis for a socialist industrial co-development program in the region.

Clearly, only a mass movement based upon the workers and peasants in the entire area can hope to take the essential step in this development, the overthrow of the present Arab regimes which are protecting the foreign capital in their respective domains. The Palestine Resistance has the potential of becoming the catalyst and the vanguard for such a mass movement.

Finally, it is this type of mass movement alone that can ultimately solve the Arab-Israeli problem.

Only by addressing itself directly to the essential material needs of Israeli workers and collectivized farmers, pointing to the fantastic waste of human and material resources involved in Israeli military production (paralleled only by waste for similar

purposes on the part of the Arab nations), and proposing instead a program of economic co-development, can a revolutionary movement in the Middle East hope to win the masses of the Israeli people away from Zionism.

Footnotes

1. The "limited war" strategy was developed by U.S. General Maxwell TAYLOR in the late 1950's. Taylor argued that the U.S. and her allies had to build up their conventional armed forces (and counter-insurgency teams) in order to gain flexibility and "deterrent credibility." In the absence of a strong conventional capability he foresaw that the allies (NATO, SEATO, etc.) might be forced into situations where in cases of "limited aggression" they would have to choose between nuclear rehabilitation or no response at all. Since under conditions of a nuclear balance of power the nuclear threat was not sufficiently credible, Taylor feared that the allies would in fact be reduced to the second ("obviously undesirable") alternative. The Taylor doctrine found its first practical application in the Vietnam war.
2. The Soviet Union's interest in the Middle East should not be seen in terms of direct economic (e.g. oil) interests in the area. Rather a strong position in the Middle East will assure the Soviet Union of a favorable bargaining position in negotiating a world wide detente with the U.S. and Western Europe. (Note in this context the recent treaty between the U.S.S.R. and West Germany and the rapid growth in economic and trade relations between the U.S.S.R. and France.)
3. Quoted from: Larry Hochman, *Zionism and the Israeli State*, New England Free Press, Boston, Mass., p.11.
4. A detailed analysis of the development of Egyptian society since 1919 and especially during the Nasser period is contained in: Anouar Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, Vintage Books (Random House), September 1968.
5. Hisham Sharabi, The Palestinian Revolutionary Struggle; in: *The Arab World*, May 1969, p. 8; published monthly by The Arab Information Center, New York City, N.Y.
6. Quoted from: Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine Guerillas*, Supplementary Papers, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1970, p. 7. Many of the details of the development of the Palestine guerilla movement contained in this paper are based upon Sharabi's study.
7. Quoted from: Edmund Ghareeb, An Interview with Abu Amar, in: *The Arab World*, May 1969, p. 27.
8. Quoted from: H. Sharabi, *Palestine Guerillas*, pp. 49,50.
9. For a detailed study of the mass strike process, updating Rosa Luxemburg's essay on the same subject, see: L. Marcus, The Mass Strike, *The Campaigner*, Vol. 1, No. 3, May-June 1968, especially pp. 8,9.
10. Quoted from a collection of writings of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, published in November 1969.
11. Ibid.
12. The apparent discrepancies in the positions of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes (refusal of Rogers' peace proposals, strong vocal support for guerrillas vs. at best token support for guerrillas during the Jordanian Civil War) are a direct consequence of a) their need to cover up their own internal problem and to pacify strong popular support for the Palestine guerrillas on one hand and b) their dependence on the Soviet Union and western oil interests (especially in the case of Iraq) on the other. A very brief analysis of the Iraqi position is given in "Nasserism and the 'Peaceful Strategy,'" in: *Palestine Resistance Bulletin*, No. 2, September 1970, pp. 8,9. The Bulletin is published "In Solidarity with the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" in Somerville, Mass.
13. The possibility of U.S. and Israeli intervention was reported in the N.Y. Times on September 20: "Mr. Nixon reportedly indicated [to Golda Meir] that he would seriously consider active United States intervention if either Iraqi or Syrian forces entered fighting on the side of the guerrillas. Mrs. Meir reportedly told the President that Israel was vitally concerned about the outcome of the events in Jordan and would consider a Palestinian takeover in Amman a serious threat to his security." (Quoted from: *Palestine Resistance Bulletin*, No. 3, October 1970, p. 7).
14. Reuter dispatch, September 1925: Eric Ranleau, correspondent of *Le Monde*, quoted the King as having said: "I was indignant recently when I learned that my own chauffeur, to whom I entrusted my children, was a terrorist. He was arrested while he was firing a mortar at my palace. . . I also just discovered that my cook had important functions in one of the Palestinian organizations." (Quoted from: P.R.B., No. 3, Oct. 1970, p.9).
15. A brief report on the Soviets of Irbid was given by Loren Jenkins of *Newsweek* Magazine. The following are excerpts from Jenkins' report, quoted in P.R.B., Nov. 3, Oct. 1970, p. 3. ". . .Despite the surface tranquility of life in Irbid, genuine revolutionary activity was going on behind the scenes. To replace the city administration, the commandos set up on every street 'people's committees,' which in turn elected members to larger district committees. These groups. . . held meetings to discuss such matters as the future organization of the city and preparation for its defense. Although they are similar in structure to the local Soviets that the Bolsheviks formed in the early days of the Russian Revolution, the committees seemed to be a relatively spontaneous response to local events with no overt influence from Moscow or Peking. . . Clearly. . . the Marxist leaders were. . . certain about where they were headed. 'This week you are seeing the birth of the first Arab liberated area' commented a commando chief. 'You could call it — and I prefer to call it — the Arab soviet.' Before I left Irbid, a 'people's congress' met in the center of the city and resolved to bar all pro-government officials from the city and to resist any attack by the Jordanian army. . ."

(Sept. 28, 1970).

Comment on British I.S. Perspectives

The following document was submitted by International Socialists (Britain) to an international conference held in London in September, 1970. Following the document is a letter from L. Marcus of the NCLC to Tony Cliff, head of British IS.

The Metropolitan Countries: Perspectives

(1) The present situation is marked by the slow breakup of the conditions of postwar expansion which have marked the last 2 years. The failure of the postwar revolutionary wave was due to Stalinism and the absence of a revolutionary alternative. The subsequent unprecedented capitalist expansion was primarily due neither to state intervention nor to technological innovation but rather to the role of arms expenditure in offsetting the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

(2) The effectiveness of arms spending as a stabiliser has declined however due to its internal contradictions.

(a) The massive capital growth which the arms economy itself helped to produce, increases the absolute amount of arms spending needed to produce the same result.

(b) But the international instability created by the rapid growth of economies in Western Europe and Japan relatively less burdened with arms commitments makes it harder for the United States to make such increases without prejudicing its international competitiveness. (This shift in the international balance of forces is also associated with the roots of the international liquidity crisis.) The pressures for such an increase are reinforced by the emergence of the ABM stage of international military competition and the consequent mammoth increase in the weight of the necessary investments. If these investments are embarked on, the consequent inflation will worsen the international exchange crisis; if not, the degree to which arms are able to offset the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, will decline still further and longterm unemployment will grow.

(c) Precisely because the organic composition of capital is higher in the arms sector than elsewhere, the employment effect of arms expenditure tends to decline, as does the relevance to the rest of the economy of arms-derived technology. This makes possible the combination of rising inflation, rising unemployment, and relatively constant production, and the growing social crisis which follows.

(3) The crisis which these developments produce takes the form not of a sudden slump but of slow and uneven decline and intermittent growth. However the social and political impact of these economic trends is periodically magnified to the point of crisis by:

(a) The international financial crisis

(b) The secular rise in the unemployment floor combined with creeping inflation.

(c) The contradiction between the planning efforts of the

nation state and the growth of the international firm. Each of these two contradictory trends is reinforced by the growing intensity of international competition.

(d) The consequently growing insecurity and irrationality of the ruling class response.

Each of these factors are subordinate to the underlying trends but intensify their social and political impact.

(4) This situation of intermittent crises and intensified international competition necessitates an increase in the rate of exploitation and a negation of the previous period in which reforms could be won without politics; localised fragmented organisations are now under generalised ruling class attack.

(5) The growing interpenetration of wages conditions, plant organisation and politics means: (a) The rank and file workplace organisations thrown up in the boom period need to extend their organisation beyond the limits of the fragment and generalise their concepts to the level of a total revolutionary alternative if they are not to be destroyed.

Equally this process is not spontaneously produced by the fact of a unified and political state offensive; it requires the conscious intervention of a political organisation and a political programme.

(b) The traditional Trade Union organisations whose growing incorporation into the state machine was the other side of the boom period coin to the growth of fragmented self-activity, are also affected by this. Trade Union consciousness undergoes a rebirth as seen in the Italian events and the left TU leaders in Britain.

(c) This tendency operates at the same time as the tendency to growing incorporation of the bureaucracy within the state and can lead to contradictions and splits within the bureaucracy. Again the impact of these trends on the nature of the workers response depends on the existence of a revolutionary political alternative implanted in the class.

(6) This partial return of generalised politics does not wipe out the past twenty years of class fragmentation in a simple return to the 1930's or the politics of the 1930's. It is superimposed on the old fragmentation. The decline of the old organisations continues and as the boundaries between the fragments are eroded rapid transformations of consciousness and forms of struggle are possible in a brief period. Similarly confronted with this uncertainty the reaction of authority is more irrational.

(7) Other contradictions also products of the past period and assuming new forms in the transition period are superimposed on the basic contradiction between labour and capital.

(a) Young workers, unlike old, known only the postwar stability are more susceptible to its crisis which affects them more in every way from the ideological and moral crisis to youth unemployment. More open to generalisation, with almost no trade union consciousness, they can provide

much of the enthusiasm needed for revolutionary organisation, but must be united in workplace organisations with workers of all ages if generalised alienation is to be raised to the level of political class consciousness.

(b) Students similarly can develop to generalised protest the instability of the University situation and the volatile politics this produces makes integration into class politics through the revolutionary organisations even more important.

(c) Regional unevenness and backwardness produced by the accelerated development of the productive forces and consequent concentration produces national strains at the periphery.

Here and also with immigrant groups, woman, and the impact of the colonial revolution, contradictions other than the pure capital-labour contradiction can produce conflicts which may play 'detonating' roles. The revolutionary organisation, while keeping its centre of gravity in the struggle to build an industrial cadre, must also intervene in these other sectors to relate their struggles to the program of proletarian power.

(8) The task of developing the transitional programme in a period such as this cannot be simple. The unity of the offensive and the fragmented plurality of the targets means that no single programme of demands will suffice. The analysis and perspective must be the same as must the objectives of the various programmes; to bring out the challenge of the ruling class and its state, and to develop the activity initiative organisation and consciousness of the workers.

Comment by L. Marcus

Comrade:

Yesterday our National Committee heard reports of the I.S.-sponsored London conference. We look forward to the published selected proceedings of the conference, to which we will respond with our formal written communications on what we then regard as better than moot points of discussion. Meanwhile, I have been privately urged to write to you on the premise that this would help to establish regular channels of communication.

Meanwhile, I find myself strongly provoked by a 2½-page, mimeographed item entitled: "The Metropolitan Countries: Perspectives, Submitted by IS(B)." This demands the sort of sharp discussion suited to illuminate dusky corners of the day. The admirable quality of the mimeographed item is that my points of sharp difference and agreements with the authors immediately identify or imply the leading issues respecting every socialist organization in the world today, and also the issue of whether or not any leading tendency has grasped the main theoretical conceptions of Karl Marx. This is precisely the sort of discussion item which demands debate of the utmost relevance to the socialist movement as a whole.

For purposes of criticism I shall divide the item into three main sections. Firstly, sections numbered 1 through 3. Secondly, sections numbered 5 through 7. Lastly, section numbered 8. Section numbered 4 I treat as merely transitional from 1-3 to 5-7, containing elements of both.

1-3 is distinguished from the usual run of

conjunctural estimations by an amiable intention to assimilate Luxemburg's contributions on the point of "military economy," an aspect of the mimeographed item which requires separate discussion before getting down to specific issues of the item as a whole. Once those prefatory remarks are completed, it is of urgent practical relevance to socialist perspectives today to show why all of the analytical arguments reflect a failure to comprehend Marx's actual Law of Value or Luxemburg's defense of that Law (Accumulation of Capital) from the Hilferdings, et al.

Sections 5-7 are considerably more fortunate, since they represent an effort to counterpose a class-for-itself to a class-in-itself practice. The main flaw in this is not accidentally also reflected in the significance of the editing out of certain features of Trotsky's *What Next?* bearing on the programmatic basis for class-for-itself program in transitional program which subsumes the interpenetration of production and consumption, program which supercedes the class-in-itself adaptations inherent in a narrower focus on relations merely at the point of production. (Trotsky German pamphlets).

Section 8 reflects the disastrous consequences of attempting to reconcile the non-Marxist perspectives set forth in 1-3 with the revolutionary intentions outlined in 5-7. Having made a good case for class-for-itself program, in 5-7, the item abandons the effort to develop such program in 8.

Luxemburg As An Economist

The bankruptcy of the socialist movement on economic questions during the past thirty-odd years is systematically connected to the hagiolatric myth that Luxemburg was wrong vis-a-vis Lenin on the principled economic-theoretical questions. It is not accidental that Luxemburg's analysis of imperialism has been "vindicated with a vengeance" (Deutscher) by the past fifty years of capitalist history while Lenin's borrowed analysis from Hilferding et al. has been even more forcefully repudiated by the same course of developments. While there is more than some justice in the effort to identify Lenin's accomplishments as a dialectician, Lenin was vastly inferior to Luxemburg on all matters of theory and method and his limited actual comprehension of Marxian dialectics never extended to the domain of Marx's economic theories. Thus, the effort to apply a "Leninist" version of economic theory to analysis of the current situation over the past fifty years has led to nothing but repeated failures, encouraging "Leninists" of all principal varieties to save themselves embarrassment by avoiding conjunctural analyses and other economic investigations of more fundamental questions.

However, economics will not be ignored so easily, and so we have again sophomoric notions of Marx's Capital treated in the fashion agreeable to the "left" academics at the LSE, where Marx, Ricardo and Keynes are so often regarded as converging economic-theoretical schools of thought.

I suspect that no progress in Marxist theory can be made until we understand more generally the nonsensical character of Lenin's self-serving allegations against Luxemburg in his "eagle..chicken" remarks. Lenin was actually wrong vis-a-vis Luxemburg on the Pilsukski question

before 1905, wrong in his "theory of stages" conception vis-a-vis the law of combined and uneven development first formally developed by her in her doctoral dissertation, wrong in opposing her on the German question in the pre-1914 period, wrong in opposing her strong position on the Comintern in 1918, and absolutely wrong on every count he opposed her economic analyses. Nonetheless, for us, Lenin was not only an "eagle" but a superbly accomplished organizer with a highly-developed dialectical sense of concreteness.

Lenin's economic blunders, whose nature is identified by Luxemburg in her *Accumulation*, represent his misconception of Marx's notion of historical specificity. Lenin followed the mechanistic idiocies of the leading Social-Democratic economists in falsely assuming that the historical specificity of capitalist economic categories was located in capitalism as a "closed system." It was this absurd notion of the "closed system" which so long concurred with and rationalized the Menshevik-Adlerian "theory of stages" of national economic development.

Actually, the dialectic of capitalist economy is located entirely in the fact that it is not a closed system. I deal with this problem at more suitable length in my imminently published *Dialectical Economics*, but I can summarize the point as follows.

The form of capitalist property-titles, capitalists' capital, was more or less fully developed under pre-capitalist mercantile capitalism (bills of exchange, joint-stock companies, etc.). In that period capitalists' capital was determined by a simple price-earnings ratio, as the monetary valuation of capital is also immediately determined even today. There was no Law of Value applicable to capitalists' capital. However, as merchant's capital was directed to emerging forms of capitalist production, the market valuation of capitals became subject to the countervailing effects of social reproductive relations in this basic, emerging means of production.

Thus, the connection between two successive states in the real social reproductive process was mediated by capitalists' capital relationships, and the connection between two successive states of capitalists' capitals was mediated by real reproductive relationships. It is that dialectical relationship of capitalists' capitals to social reproductive relations in terms of emerging manufacturing and industrial production which represents the basis for the historical specificity of the Law of Value as applied to capitalists' capitals and market relations.

To recapitulate. The historical, dialectical approach to analysis of capitalism demands at least as broad an overview of the social reproductive process as the transition from feudalism to socialism through capitalism. In such an analysis, we can abstract a division of social productive labor as a whole in the form of $S/(C+V)$, where these categories are measured as proportions of all productive labor for the entire society. Development is first expressed by rising values for this ratio on an extended scale, and actual development necessarily measured by an accelerating tendency for such rise. However, actual development does not actually occur by conscious or even unconscious human

collective response to the dictates of such a "formula." Actual development occurs because of decisions mediated in the social superstructure, i.e. capitalist market relations.

Thus, historical materialism compels us to abstract a general law of development of the form $S/(C+V)$ as abstraction from the process of development from feudalism into socialism (i.e. use-value relations). Such abstraction is possible only because feudalism, capitalism and imminent socialist economy are actual historical, historically-specific states. However, the actual development of each society can not be predetermined from such use-value abstractions; actual development, and the social valuations which regulate development, is mediated through the social superstructure of (e.g.) capitalism. Thus, distinct from use-value in the historical-materialist sense, we have capitalist society's Value.

Pseudo-Marxist economics, like that offered variously by Sweezy, Mandel et al., attempts on the one hand to represent the Law of Value as a matter of a closed economic system, of the form implicitly subject to a "mathematical model." Mandel, especially, advances an explicitly mechanistic view of this sort by affirming as Marx's the Ricardian notion of Value, as determined by the specific, concrete particular labor-times embodied in particular productions. Marx's categories are thus represented explicitly or at least implicitly as mere empirical constructs from the statistical time-series of nineteenth-century British "competitive capitalism" as a closed mathematical system.

Then, so long as these muddleheads attempt to preserve a certain kind of affiliation to socialism, they are compelled to attempt to show that there are devastating contradictions within an homeostatic social process. Thus, we have Sweezy's line of adaptations to Keynes and Mandel's metaphysical allusions to the mysterious operations of the "principle" of competition.

The actual contradictions of capitalist economy arise from the fact that it is not a closed system. That the capitalist determination of variable capital may agreeably destroy large portions of the proletariat as potential modern labor-power by primitive accumulation at the expense of potential labor-power. Similarly, capitalism simultaneously overvalues what it recognizes as constant capital (by including dead capital in the accounting) and also fails to recognize use-value costs of constant capital associated with depletion of natural and made-improved means of future production. Finally, just because capitalism does not recognize use-value relations as such, it can not distinguish between fictitious and real capital, and the market thus does not immediately countervail the "errors" of diverting capital from expanded reproduction into war production and other forms of fictitious capital accumulation. It is these contradictions of capitalism which recurrently act upon the apparently "closed" capitalist market to produce periodic liquidity crises (depressions) and general breakdown crises of the sort which ravaged Europe during the 1919-46 period. Precisely as Marx analyzes Ricardo's pseudo-problem (the "tendency for the rate of profit to fall") in Volume III, as simply one aspect of a deeper process located in the contradictions between

capitalists' capitals and real social reproductive relations, contradictions whose characteristic empirical expression is not statistical time-series of capitalists' accounting profits, but periodic liquidity crises and the "rising organic composition" problem as a result rather than a cause of the onset of developments leading toward a new crisis.

Luxemburg is the only celebrated Marxist economist to recognize the incompleteness of the concluding (fragmentary) chapter of Volume II, showing that no accounting model of capitalist expanded reproduction was possible, because of qualitative changes in value resulting from the necessary increases in productivity with every extension in scale. As a corollary achievement, she adduced from Marx's treatment of the "falling rate" what Marx actually concluded rather than (as most flunking scholars have done) limiting her attention to those aspects of Marx's discussion which pertained only to the Ricardian form of the problem.

"Military Economy"

It is nonsensical to attempt to interpret the problem of "military economy" from the standpoint of a "closed capitalist market." It is not accidental that the SWP, in publishing *Luxemburg Speaks*, scrupulously omits those sections of her *What is Economics?* which expose the fallacy of national economy in general and which deal with this problem in terms of the controversy respecting the German 1914-18 military economy. As in the 1914-18 instance (German military economy based on the looting of variable and constant capital — primitive accumulation — from occupied territories) or in the Nazi model of the same process of primitive accumulation, military economy can not be understood from the vantage-point of a national-state as an autarky. It involves important "structural" interconnections between Departments I and II and also primitive accumulation both domestically (labor and existing constant capital resources) and in respect to subject populations.

The attempt to abort the expansion of Department I results in abortion of the extended division of labor in production generally — depression. Yet, the expansion of Department I leads to "overproduction" because of the cheapening of production and means of production through expanded reproduction rates. Diverting large portions of new Department I capacity to war production permits capitalism to enlarge the division of labor in capital goods production without immediately suffering the consequences of expanded Department I capacities.

The immediate "mechanics" of war production are these. The state collects surplus values from all capitalists and accumulates primitively additional surplus value from wage-earners. Taxing capitalists to pay for war production would mean simply taking in laundry within the class; it is the margin of profit provided by taxing wage-earnings which makes war production profitable.

The case of Nazi Germany's economy shows that this, by itself, is the short road to new breakdown crisis, unless enlarged primitive accumulation is provided. Thus we have the Nazi expansion drive, the slave-labor and death-camp systems, simple looting of conquered capitalist plant and

labor forces.

In the U.S. instance, the possibility of extended war economy has been based on the post-war reduction of Western Europe, Japan, and former colonial and semi-colonial clients of these countries to mere satrapies of the U.S. economy itself. In this connection it is simply gibbering to suggest that cheaper labor in Europe, etc., represents a manifestation of "interimperialist rivalry." The fact is that cheap European production means primitive accumulation by U.S. capital (and its European and Japanese cousins) at the expense of the non-U.S. sector. Competition between Europe and the U.S. is of no more significance that competition between the Buick and Pontiac divisions of General Motors. For example, the stagnation of British development, the "brain drain," etc., which reflect the transfer of capital from Britain to U.S. capital, etc.

Case in point: shoes and textiles imports into the U.S. Granted, trade associations and related lobbies have been pushing for import restrictions. Who has been doing the importing of foreign footwear but the very largest footwear manufacturers in the U.S.? Similarly, textiles. The "facts" supporting the argument of "interimperialist rivalries" are populist delusions suited to the edification of the credulous.

Or, the case of imports from Eastern Europe into the U.S. By comparing the cost of production with export prices from the East European sectors, it is clear that the result is a transfer of capital from the Eastern European economies (especially Yugoslavia) to U.S. capital through Italian and other "front" corporations and buying agencies.

The so-called competition between national sectors is mainly a part of the effort of international capital to rationalize the world division of labor in world trade, which is anarchistically accomplished in the same general way that General Motors creates "competing" divisions as a matter of playing one section of its bureaucracy and labor force against the other for the purpose of hammering down production costs.

Present "Liquidity Crisis"

The bankruptcy of the Penn Central railroad and the near-bankruptcy of Chrysler illustrate the urgent points to be made.

During the past decade or more, adherents of the Berle-Means thesis (e.g. Baran-Sweezy) have argued that finance-capital has been superseded by The Giant Corporation, to the effect that these large corporations finance themselves by internal sources of funds, making themselves thus independent of finance-capital markets. What gibberish. The main sources of "internal funding" of Giant Corporations have been first, U.S. government military spending and subsidies of world trade activities of those corporations. Secondly, the Corporations have been financing themselves not so much by sales of stock, and not by "internal sources," but by peddling ever-larger issues on the bond market and more recently supplementing bond issue with private corporate bills in the form of short-term notes. Examining the reports of any large stock-analysis

agency, as well as governmental figures, we observe an astonishing growth in debt-ratios, and also note that the rate of growth of GNP has been tied directly to increased debt — to the extent that current debt-service obligations have been growing more rapidly than corporate profits. In the most recent period, rising interest rates and shorter maturities of gross debt have accelerated debt-service ratios toward the breaking-point. The main cause of this accelerated decline in liquidity, that is, the accelerated manifest decline in the rate of profit, has been public indebtedness and corporate financing directly connected to continued military production.

Thus, the argument in (1) of the item, “the role of arms expenditure in offsetting the tendency of the rate of profit to fall” is nonsense.

Similarly, all of point (2).

The third section is apparently premised on a naive view of the “ratchet-like” series of declines since 1964-65. Nonetheless, it is obviously based on the nonsensical points of the preceding two sections and represents ignorance of, or repudiation of, the entirety of Volume III of *Capital*.

A Collateral Absurdity Implied in 1-3

The notion of the role of war production in a closed capitalist economy, as employed in sections 1-3, is premised on a commonplace misinterpretation of Marx’s observation (e.g. *Theories of Surplus Value*) that military production has market value for the capitalist. To mean that war material has use-value, i.e. Value actually, implies a bourgeois ideological conception of use-value. Unfortunately, precisely such bourgeois ideology prevails in commonplace reifications of Marx’s discussions of use-value.

The bourgeois notion of use-value or “utility” is derived from notions of the same order or species as Hobbes’ or Smith’s “economic man,” that is, economic individual man. In the various constructions premised on this bourgeois notion, it is argued that the use-value or utility of an object is located either in a metaphysical quality of the thing-in-itself, or a Kantian notion of the reality-existence connections in the relationship of the object to its individual consumer or purchaser. This coheres with the idiocies of ordinary accounting practice in which it is assumed that the unrealized commodity or pseudo-commodity has an implicit intrinsic value.

On the contrary, the use-value of a commodity is not subject to individual determination but is socially determined. The use-value of a commodity or other object of realization is determined as the effect of its substitution in the whole bill of social consumption on the resulting social-reproductive rates (S/C+V). The use-value of the consumer commodity is expressed mediately in the production of labor-power through its consumption (realization), and ultimately determined by the use-value of that labor-power itself for the social-reproductive process as a whole. The use-value of the means of production

produced is also determined by its effects (through realization) on the development of the productive forces of the society as a whole.

Military production has no use-value, but, like many other non-use-values, assumes the commodity form under capitalism. E.g., fictitious capital. This reacts on the capitalist system to the extent that fictitious capitals are capitalized; since employment of fictitious capitals results in no increase in the scale of useful production, thus causing the rate of apparent capitalist accumulation (capitalists’ capitals) to increase more rapidly than the scale of production of actual surplus value, leading toward a liquidity or realization crisis.

The historical actuality of military economy is that it represents a way of perpetuating the balanced relations of Departments I and II in the most-advanced sector in order to realize forms of primitive accumulation. It is the historically specific form of primitive accumulation possible following the general breakdown crisis of 1914-19.

Kidron and Sedgwick as Clinical Cases

It seems clear that the misconception of the economic processes represented in 1-3 depends mainly on the line of argument otherwise offered by Kidron. Thus, Kidron’s blunders in criticism of Mandel are significant clinical evidence of the flaws in not only his entire conception, but the conception endorsed by the sponsors of the subject resolution. It is useful to also take into account a grotesque blunder in Sedgwick’s review on fascism; Sedgwick’s astonishing ignorance (or hysteria) in arguing the non-economic basis for Nazi death-camps would not be tolerated as publishable views in an organization which had mastered the rudiments of “military economy.”

Mandel, reflecting his mechanistic total misconception of *Capital*, not only rejects Marx’s Law of Value in favor of Ricardo’s specific, concrete, particular labor time, but extrapolates from that absurd notion to argue that the “tendency for the rate of profit to fall” is a matter of statistical time-series of capitalist accounting figures. Kidron, in attacking Mandel’s specious defense of such “Marxism,” himself resorts to the same gibberish as Mandel, resorting to meaningless statistical time-series.

Sedgwick’s argument that Auschwitz can not be understood economically is notably ironical, since Auschwitz was especially an organic part of Krupp’s slave-labor system. Following the conquest of France, and intensifying after the historic defeat of the Nazi thrust in the Soviet Union in December, 1941 — January, 1942, the SS death-camp procedure was essentially as follows. Masses of raw slave labor were collected and processed in much the same fashion that certain jobbers collect and grade used-tire carcasses for recapping. Able-bodied potential slave-labor was put to one side, and women, children, old men, weaklings, to another side. As a matter of simple capitalist cost-reduction, the “culls” were “processed” toward early extinction. The slave labor was shipped to fill requisitions of the Goering, Himmler, Krupp and other industries. When this labor was depleted of its crude labor-power by super-intensification and Krupp “soup” diets, Krupp et al. returned the exhausted individuals to the SS for “replacement parts.” As the pressures of cost-reduction

increased with Nazi defeats and the precipitous erosion of the Nazi economy, inhibitions against immediate scrapping of "unproductive" mouths evaporated. The role of Nazi ideology respecting Jews, gypsies and slaves must not be regarded as an independent "factor," but an agreeable expression of the basic slave-labor policy. Nor is it admissible to ignore that the growth in the productive capacity of the Nazi industrial economy from 1939 to 1945 was the result of the transference of capital from depleted bodies of millions of slaves as well as the looted machinery, etc. from plants in the conquered territories. In fact, the "take-off" of post-1949 West Germany and the ability of the German Federal Republic to assimilate masses of contract labor (to really strengthen the Deutschemark through such primitive accumulation) are "benefits" to the present German economy built into the organization of German production under Hitler's slave-labor system. The notion that the death-camps were merely an eccentricity of the Nazi SS, etc., is pure capitalist rationalization.

Admittedly, one must not exaggerate one's queasy view of Sedgwick's nonsense. The Nazi ideology respecting the Jewish question can not be discounted as "merely a product of the general economic factor." Nazi anti-semitism must be distinguished from the pro-Zionist anti-semitism of Roumanian and Hungarian native fascists, and the alliance of certain Eastern European fascist regimes with the Jewish capitalist strata in those countries prior to the takeover of those sectors by the Nazis and indigenous Nazi factions. That is a concrete question of realization through the mediation of concrete superstructural processes. The essence of the Jewish question is the question of capitalism, which may assume in particular cases, appropriate variations. It is capitalism which butchered the Jews and which threatens to accomplish the destruction of the Israeli jewry — as Marx understood so well in his remarks on the Judenfrage.

"Generalization" or Class-For-Itself

In this connection I refer principally to my "Centrism As A Social Phenomenon" (Campaigner, Jan. 1970).

Otherwise, the "generalization" of the class struggle occurs by transcending the division of the worker into worker and consumer — by programs which rise above the workplace in respect to forms of organization and programmatic basis, connecting the employment of labor-power with the production of means of existence, and by defining the production of material and cultural means of existence (cultural existence having a necessary material cost) of all sectors of the potential class of itself in terms of programs of socialist expanded reproduction.

To pose the crisis only at the point of production is to limit one's struggle to demands from the capitalists, and thus to propose to perpetuate the capitalist rule of production and distribution. To "generalize" the struggle it is indispensable to pose the struggle in terms which lead to replacement of the capitalist by the political working class, that is, through programs which are addressed to the dialectical interpenetration of production and consumption.

The susceptibility of organized rank-and-file working class forces to such programs (excepting the case of

extraordinary worker-intellectuals) depends upon superceding forms of organization oriented to the workplace by bringing localized groups of workers into common struggle organizations with unemployed, radicalized youth, oppressed minorities, etc. on a common programmatic basis. It is the radical transformation of practical social relationships within the political class which provide the indispensable material basis for transforming the consciousness of the class.

The error is that of attempting to generalize from the local form of organization, rather than "generalizing" by fusing fragmented sections of the political (rather than merely economic) class into common-struggle formations.

This grievous shortcoming of 5-7 is reflected in the abandonment of positive programmatic approaches in 8.

Comments on Healy & Company

Apparently in response to the widespread section of an earlier issue of *Epanastasi*, which penetrated the Greek section of the IC, Healy has lately formally endorsed the notion of a United Socialist States of Europe and a number of Healyites (e.g., Kemp on France) have recited lip-service to the class for itself conception. I am able to assure you that these represent recent innovations in Healyite rhetoric from the fact that Healyites violently opposed exactly those conceptions in their 1965-66 disputes with me and up to the 1968-69 period.

The formal difficulty with Healy's politics on these and similar points is that, like his energetic conjunctural optimism, such phrases represent mere posturing without real practical-theoretical content. If one is serious about a "United Socialist States of Europe," one gives up all pretensions to the canonical perfection of the IC as the "unique" repository of international revolutionary vanguard leadership and enters seriously into united-front work with all revolutionaries. Instead of such revolutionary approaches, Healy degrades these fine-sounding phrases into a mere metaphysic, a literary case for the unique perfection of the IC.

A revolutionary must start from the fact that the potential class for itself forces are immediately 99 and 44/100ths per cent corrupted by various manifestations of bourgeois ideology and view the building of a revolutionary vanguard as a process.

As Marx, in the 1860's, defined the strategic importance of the Irish question for the British working class, so the ability today to get beyond the organized working-class struggles in any one national sector to potential political working class forces in one's own country and abroad are the only strategical basis for building an international vanguard capable to establishing the actual dictatorship of the proletariat in this period. Conferences such as that recently held in London, whatever their other limitations, must be encouraged and participated in, as an indispensable part of the international discussions and united-front work in this strategic perspective.

Fraternally,
"L. Marcus"

Statement of Founding Principles of the National Caucus of Labor Committees

The following "statement" of the founding principles of the National Caucus of Labor Committees was adopted by the National Conference of January 1-3, 1971. This statement provides a concise but systematic explanation of what we are and what we stand for, defining the principled basis for membership in the organization. We recognize that in practice that coming-into-agreement with the founding principles is a process: individuals initially generally become members of the organization on the basis of their agreement with and support of the practical activities and propagandistic expression of the following founding principles.

1. The National Caucus of Labor Committees is an organization of professional revolutionary-socialist cadres, an organization based on certain unalterable founding principles and dedicated to the establishment of the political (working) class for itself as the sole world economic and political government of man's actual and potential productive forces.
2. These unalterable founding principles are adduced from Karl Marx's completion of the total revolution in human knowledge begun by G.W.F. Hegel in the latter's *The Phenomenology of Mind*, viewing the connection between Marx and Hegel as mediated by Ludwig Feuerbach's *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, and viewing this latter publication as the material to which Marx's "Theses On Feuerbach" and the first section of *The German Ideology* ("Feuerbach") are immediately and explicitly addressed.
3. What is common to Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx is the conception of human Mind and Self, as absolutely distinct from that of hominids as simply a biological species. That human Mind is negatively reflected in, but not located within what is ordinarily regarded as conscious, formal, logical thought, formal logical reasoning included. That all the conceptions of human conscious thought, formal logical reasoning included, are produced by a noetic, concept-creating process which determines the "axioms" (or, "postulates") of formal reasoning, but which axioms formal reasoning is
4. inherently incapable of proving or explaining. That the real foundations of human knowledge in this noetic process of Mind can be uncovered only by a dialectical examination of the process by which hole systems of formal logic are exposed as fallacious, and totally new world-conceptions produced. That the human Self is not an epiphenomenon of the discrete human individual or his biological equipment, but that his evolved biological equipment is rather appropriate for the process by which practical social relations transform the "soulless" new-born infant into a conscious human being with a human social identity.
5. The practical implications of these (originally) Hegelian discoveries are located in the writings of Marx and Engels in their systematical opposition to the world-views reflected in the inhuman rantings of Parson Thomas Malthus. What actually distinguishes man from other animals is the process by which he has evolved as a species of human society from the condition of the Strandlooper, pelting to death and eating protein-bearing jetsam along the beaches, or similar modes of baboon-like existence, to societies whose qualitatively-new modes of existence make possible a larger human population with existing natural resources for the species' material existence. This process of social-evolutionary expanded reproduction to higher qualitative forms of existence supersedes the process of biological differentiation of species in lower animals, and is connected to the noetic process of human (social) Mind by which whole new arrays of world-conceptions (*Gestalts*) are created to provide the mental basis for revolutionized social reproductive practice.
5. What distinguishes human knowledge as knowledge is the fact that the practical comprehension of the "laws of nature" can exist only for a special kind of species, a species which more or less deliberately alters its modes of species-existence, making deliberate in that way what in lower animal species occurs only by biological differentiation. Whether a new mode of social reproduction of the human species is successful or not depends upon the appropriateness of new species-behavior to

what we regard as the laws governing the "order of nature." The ability to deliberately alter the mode of species-existence in a positive way is thus the sole basis for a species' knowledge of the laws of that "order of nature."

6. Thus, Marx (*The German Ideology*) specifies that the *sole* premise for human knowledge is human existence, which is the process of deliberate alterations in the modes by which successive societies produce the material basis for continued positive existence of the human species.
7. Since every successful mode of human production of the material and related conditions of human existence tends to exhaust natural and man-improved natural conditions for such existence, the more successfully a society reproduces itself in any one historic mode, the more rapidly it thereby exhausts the always-relatively-finite natural and man-improved resources on which that mode of human existence depends. Therefore, human knowledge cannot be practically located in the experience of a distinct form of society as such, but is located solely in the positive, historic comprehension of the process by which man makes his species-existence possible through successive, positive revolutions in technology and social forms of realization of technologies. There can be no real comprehension of the "laws of nature" except by social formations which are constituted on the fundamental premises in knowledge and practice of constantly, radically transforming the form of society to this end.
8. The empirical manifestation of successful revolutions in technology and social forms is represented by rising rates of social surplus, such that increasing proportions of all human productive effort are allocated to qualitatively expanding and otherwise positively altering the form of human existence, as distinct from merely perpetuating an existing form of society on a limited scale. Thus, every form of society can be understood and evaluated only by two, interrelated criteria: (a) By comprehending the historically-specific way in which it produces the *self-expanding 'use value'* whose consumption (as means of human existence and means of production) results in expanding and qualitatively-transformed modes of production and social existence, and determining social surplus or "free energy" rates on this basis; (b) the development within that society of social forms and practices leading toward the emergence of a successor, higher form of species-existence.
9. Human knowledge, as individual, or determinate human conscious knowledge, is determined by the practical relationship of man-to-man in society. No individual is capable of existing for himself, but depends for his material existence on the active interventions of the rest of his society. The individual's existence thus depends upon his practical internalization of his society's practical consciousness of his right to existence of a certain form. As Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx, successfully and successively show, the way in which man creates conceptions and explicit forms of formal consciousness is determined by the specific way in which individual existences are mediated through specific forms of social relations. To change society, it is necessary to change the way in which man thinks; to change the way man thinks, it is essential to qualitatively alter the forms of institutions through which individual man "relates" to other members of his *class-species*.
10. Under capitalist society, there exists a working class, the class form which that society obtains productive labor. Productive labor is defined as that labor which produces the tangible, material 'use values' whose *social* consumption results in the production of increased productive labor of higher productivities and in the qualitative expansion and improvement of the material conditions of production of such *self-expanding 'use values.'* (Marx's realization of the Feuerbach "self-subsisting positive") Only the working class and those otherwise politically integrated with that class are presently capable of achieving actual humanity, since only the working class as a political whole, constituted as an organic political unity, is capable of being a class for human existence as a whole. Only the *political* form of the working class represents a class whose self-conscious struggle to reproduce itself results in the necessary forms of productive activity historically essential to the whole human species at this juncture.
11. The central problem of humanity today is therefore the fact that the working class (as an economic class) is not capable of *spontaneously* becoming a political class for itself. Rather, under all but the most exceptional circumstances of capitalist existence, the working class as an economic

class tends to perpetuate its own social and intellectual-moral fragmentation into contending, parochialist fragments along lines of nationality, race, trade-union organization, and so forth. Under these conditions of backward, alienated self-organization, the relationship of one section of the working class to other sections depends upon the socializing, mediating role played by the ruling, capitalist political class. Thus, as long as workers are organized primarily along national, racial, trade-union, etc., lines their class struggles, however "militant," lead — like the "labors of Sisyphus"—only back to capitalist political forms.

12. Therefore, the *political* existence of the working class depends upon the intervention of an "outside agency," whose function it is to bring the political (working) class for itself into being. This "outside agency" can only be a social formation which has already attained an advanced approximation of the working-class consciousness which the working class itself lacks. Only a handful of the capitalist intelligentsia is capable of fulfilling this decisive role, by combining an anti-capitalist political and social orientation with the mastery of history, sociology and economics from the standpoint of the dialectical method. The intellectual who proceeds from commitment to the class he or she devotes his efforts to bringing into existence, the political (working class for itself, and who abstractly connects all the main (world-wide) productive existence activities of the working class into an integrated comprehension, such an intellectual has created in advance (of the coming-into-being of the class for itself) the form of consciousness natural and appropriate to an actual class for itself emerging at that historic juncture.
13. The revolutionary intelligentsia is thus the embryonic representation of a new human species, a Promethean species which seeks to reproduce its own kind from the ranks of the working class. This includes, in part, the development of individuals as such, but more general and essential is the work of calling the new species of humanity into being through every possible approximation of political class for itself forms. It is those forms of struggle-organization *around approximations of socialist program* which transform the consciousness of individual working people and thus transform a majority of the working class (ultimately) into revolutionary socialists with

the same world-view and principled commitments as the founding group of revolutionary intelligentsia.

14. It is upon such dialectical principles thus summarily represented above that the National Caucus of Labor Committees and its successor organizations are founded, and upon which individual membership in those organizations is predicated.
15. Individuals are members of the NCLC who actively support the organization, its principles and policies, and its practices, and who manifest such commitment by exhibiting a corresponding method of systematic thinking during their participation in discussions through which the organization develops and differentiates its policies for particular, concrete practice.
16. The organization of the body is based upon the dialectical notion of realization, and, explicitly, certain leading features of the process leading toward a socialist, mass-based party in the U.S.A. (in particular). Organization is nothing but the organization of practice, which practice is nothing but the material realization of theoretical conceptions. The organization of a revolutionary intelligentsia therefore also means a determined response to the currently-changing relationship of the organization to other pro-socialist organizations and to the broad organizations of working people and their potential social-political allies.
17. While the cadre organization must submit to the class interests of the potential political (working) class for itself, that means and demands insulating the vanguard organization from corrupting intrusions of reactionary (bourgeois) ideology dominant among working people generally, oppressed minorities, and radical students, etc., in a capitalist society. Realization of socialist conceptions means that alien political ideas have ipso facto no voting rights over the formulation of policy *within* the vanguard organization. It means that the less-developed consciousness of socialist principles must be subordinated to the most-advanced consciousness within the organization.
18. This set of principles might *seem* to prescribe the dictatorship of a handful of leaders within the organization, if certain objective social criteria were ignored. First, all manifestations of alien ideology within the socialist movement

have an objective social content by which they may be objectively identified. In every instance, alien ideological currents propose to subordinate the process of creating the political class for itself to the service of some bourgeois social form, such as placing "militant trade unionism" above "united front" or "cross-union caucus" formations, or proposing intervention in a political formation including capitalist political factions as an alternative to formations totally independent of capitalist political factions (e.g., "Popular Fronts" sell-outs). Otherwise, alien political outlooks are represented in socialist organizations either by a general anti-intellectualism ("proletkult" simplicism) or by a tendency to ridicule the dialectical method by contrast with "sturdy common sense" or empiricism, or formal logic. The rule of thumb thus implied is that any person who advocates membership *within* "Popular Fronts", insists that trade-union membership is the condition for vote in working class formations, etc., or who opposes the dialectical method, is not qualified to represent the organization publicly on political questions, and that no political faction characterized by such bourgeois-ideological aberrations can be permitted to exert a controlling influence on any institutions of the national or local organizations of the NCLC.

19. Furthermore, since the task of socialist organizations is to establish political class for itself institutions, and approximations of such on the broadest feasible scale, the role of the vanguard organization must be that of mediating positive connections among various fragments of the potential class for itself on the broadest social and geographical scale. Thus, the vanguard organization must be politically and organizationally centralized so that it can actually perform its primary political function. The advocacy of a collection of semi-autonomous local groupings is itself a repudiation of the fundamental principles of socialism, of the political class for itself.
20. At each juncture of the historic process, interrelated "subjective" and "objective" circumstances determine that a definite proportion of each social class and sub-class stratum is inclined to become revolutionary socialist in potential, a point which applies to declines as well as surges within the "radical movement." Such individuals tend to attach themselves to whatever "handy" organization seems to them to represent a suitable political "home" for persons of their views. Thus, the policies of the NCLC toward other U.S.

pro-socialist organizations are based on a "united front" orientation, despite the ludicrous-to-criminal policies and practices of those organizations from a standpoint of socialist morality. The strategy for socialism must depend upon winning hegemony for the appropriate program and forms of socialist organization among the broadest strata of pro-socialists, a stratum which represents the top-most distillation of the potential political class for itself as a whole.

21. Mass work is based on seeking to determine what specific forms of short-term organization around "issues" represents the best feasible approximation of the organization of political class for itself forms around socialist program, and in the direction of self-consciously political class for itself institutions. It is from these approximations that broader numbers of workers are brought towards the socialist world-outlook, and through which the vanguard organizations penetrate ever-more-deeply into the existing organizations of the masses of working people, thereby establishing connections of a practical form as well as securing increasing comprehension for a socialist program of economic and social reconstruction.
22. For the service of these principles, the National Caucus of Labor Committees is organized as a semi-annual national conference. This conference is not defined as a static aggregation of members and factions, but as a *deliberative process*. Individual votes per se would be worthless and of no binding significance. It is the engagement of the national conference in the process of systematical deliberations, based on the dialectical method, which is the national organization.
23. While local Labor Committees are necessarily delegated implicit powers and duties for the control of membership, an individual is a member of the national conference and is merely assigned to his local Labor Committee.
24. The principal delegated body of the National Conference between seatings of the conference is the National Committee, which is the executive arm of the conference and its policy-developing body between elections of National Committee members.
25. Local Labor Committees are also delegated bodies of the National Conference, delegated bodies inferior in executive and policy-making duties and powers to the National Committee.

LABOR COMMITTEE PUBLICATIONS

Available from Campaigner

The Third American Revolution <i>Draft Program of the National Caucus of Labor Committees, adopted April 1969</i>25
Emergency Reconstruction Program <i>(Draft) July, 1970</i>10
The Mass Strike <i>by L. Marcus</i>20
Economism or Socialism, Part II <i>by Steve Fraser and Tony Papert</i>25
The Rape of the Long Island Railroad25
30¢ for What: the New York City Transit Crisis25